Local-first 🧠memory for Hermes Agent that lives in your Obsidian vault and remembers project context. Nightly 😴 dream passes turn repeat corrections into confirmed preferences with measurable confidence. Adapters ship for Claude Code, Codex, and OpenClaw, with an MCP server for anything else.
Variants - delivery-trust
Audit trail for the phase-0 brainstorm. These variants are generated in-session for this run; the same text lives at cli-output/consultant.md. In host execution mode the consultant is an in-session subagent of the design orchestrator, not the external claude CLI used by earlier cycles; the prompt at cli-output/prompt.md and the verbatim output at cli-output/consultant.md are preserved either way. Each variant is a shape for the whole wave - how the four cards compose into one coherent design - not a per-card design (the per-card approaches come from the four recon reports and are identical across variants).
Variant 1: Central egress gate at the server boundary
- Approach: Grow the one place response bytes are already reach-shaped - the MCP server's result builder and its error redaction, both of which already branch on transport reach - into a full delivery gate: every structured tool result and resource payload passes a shaper that probes each row's provenance and fences below-operator-authorship text before the response leaves, the receipt-verify verb and the attestation verification are exposed as read-side services beside it, and the opencode plugin consumes the same gate by spawning the shared hook shims.
- Trade-offs:
- Pros: one rule in one place, so no surface can forget shaping; new read surfaces inherit the fence automatically; the gate already exists as the redaction precedent, so the branch point is proven; the wave gets one obvious story - everything a remote reader receives passes one door.
- Cons: the boundary sees opaque JSON - per-row provenance is not in the payload, so the gate must re-read vault files by reconstructing paths from result shapes, fighting the per-tool output contracts and the two existing view families; structured rows and text/markdown resources need different mechanics through one function; results parked in the artifact store before the caller fetches them would bypass the gate on replay unless the gate re-shapes there too, which it cannot without per-request reach; the per-surface census rows lose their written reasons because the decision no longer lives at the surfaces.
- Complexity: large
- Risk: high
Variant 2: Family-seam shaping over shared pure kernels
- Approach: Build two pure leaf modules - a closed treatment vocabulary with the fail-closed derivation from the existing stamps (origin_channel, content_class, untrusted_source) and a cached frontmatter provenance probe - then wire them per surface family at the seams those families already own: search rows at the snippet-windowing site, report-shaped reads through one binding beside the existing reach-events reference view, whole-document resources at their readers. The verify verb is a pure kernel over the receipts family with two thin faces (an operation on the existing MCP receipts tool, a CLI subcommand); the opencode lane registers an execute.before gate and a prompt-observe hook that spawn the existing shims and drain a per-turn queue through the existing context hook; the attestation kernel binds per-shard heads and state-surface stamps under an operator Ed25519 key, sharing only the digest and seal primitives.
- Trade-offs:
- Pros: no second architecture - every wire point is a seam that already decides what a reader may see, so the frozen conventions (fail closed, identical to absent) and the local-reach byte-identity pins hold untouched; the fence lives in the delivered bytes so output schemas stay unchanged; the four lanes own disjoint families and share only pure modules and append-only registries; census registries keep their per-surface meaning.
- Cons: shaping lives at several call sites, so a future read surface can forget it - mitigated by teaching the visibility-surface census the shaper's name and pinning each family with a remote-quoted/local-identical test; more total wiring code than one central gate; the treatment vocabulary must be registered in the verdict-vocabulary census like any other closed set.
- Complexity: medium
- Risk: low
Variant 3: Delivery pipeline framework
- Approach: Introduce a typed delivery-pipeline object - stages for reach gating, provenance fencing, preview-budget parking and receipt emission - that every read handler constructs its response through; policy changes become stage registrations, the opencode lane implements the same pipeline interface over its hook events, and attestation attaches as a pipeline observer signing the state the pipeline read from.
- Trade-offs:
- Pros: future delivery policy becomes configuration rather than surface edits; one type documents the whole delivery contract; receipts and fencing cannot disagree because one object produces both; the pipeline is the natural home for the queue-then-context drain on the opencode lane.
- Cons: migrating roughly forty read surfaces onto a new abstraction is a wave of its own riding a wave that is supposed to ship four cards; the pipeline type duplicates rules the two existing view families and the search result filters already encode and pin by test, so every existing reach test rewrites or fights it; the artifact-store parking order and the preview budget are load-bearing today and re-deriving them inside pipeline stages risks subtle regressions in the oversized-result path.
- Complexity: large
- Risk: high
Recommended: Variant 2
Rationale: The repo already encodes delivery rules as per-family views with frozen conventions and per-tool output contracts, both pinned by tests; Variant 1's central gate cannot see per-row provenance in opaque results and would have to re-read files at the boundary, while Variant 3 rebuilds machinery that exists and would rewrite the reach test corpus for no new capability. Variant 2 adds exactly what is missing - one pure treatment kernel, one cached provenance probe - and wires it where each family already decides what a remote reader may see, which keeps the four lanes disjoint, the local-reach contracts byte-identical, and the census registries meaningful.
Orchestrator decision
Chosen: Variant 2 (the recommended variant; no override).
Premise verification
Spot-checked against the live worktree at 285cb9a8 (branch feat/delivery-trust) on 2026-11-01. No premise was refuted; no slice is dropped. Line drifts are recorded as corrections for the plan; the validator's refreshed anchors all held exactly.
| Card | Premise | Key anchors checked live | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| t_1af24938 | confirmed | provenance.ts:41/:44/:69 (stated>deduced>inferred, PROVENANCE_LEVELS, provenanceTrustRank); origin-channel.ts:86 (mcp-tool/cli/import), :109 unset, :123 field; trust/untrusted-provenance.ts:31/:50/:77/:90; untrusted-source.ts:33/:176/:188/:219 (wrapUntrustedSource)/:238 (fenceUntrustedContent); safety/context-guard.ts:3; context-pack.ts:799-807 guard site with delimitUntrusted at :804; policy/blocks/guardrails.ts:86 (untrusted_source_delimiting: false); trust/retrieval-gate.ts:66 (untrusted_source_provenance); tool-error-codes.ts:136 (quote_unverified); transport-reach.ts:40/:79/:97; tool-contract.ts:168/:305; reach-refusal.ts:44/:89; error-redaction.ts:54/:61; server.ts:802; search-tools.ts:745 (windowContent); reach-view.ts:40; artifact-ref-view.ts:20-29 (the two conventions verbatim); stdio.ts:42; http.ts:601; no per-page verified flag exists |
Exact, except VISIBILITY_SURFACE_REGISTRY is at visibility-surface-registry.ts:86 (recon said :81; DIRECT_VAULT_READ_REGISTRY :1459 exact) and CONTENT_CLASS is at content-class.ts:89 (recon said :69; field constant :96 exact). Corrections recorded for the plan. |
| t_4300e5fd | confirmed | ContextReceiptFilter.receiptId at context-receipts.ts:101; text_hash / session_id / final_text_hash at :155-163; sourceRefs hash duplication at :178-187; emitContextReceipt:137; listContextReceipts:203; summarizeContextReceiptSession:374; getContextReceipt:474; structural ids :829; CONTEXT_RECEIPT_TRIGGERS:846; emit sites context-pack.ts:1790 and budget :1887, pre-compress-pack.ts:297, hooks/active-inject.ts:592/:599 (session_inject, no text); digest.ts:54/:64/:82/:106/:118; content-hash.ts:32/:71; docs rows docs/cli-reference.md:473/:534, docs/mcp.md:407 |
Exact, except pre-compress-pack.ts emit is at :297 (recon :295) and recordInjectionSize at active-inject.ts:592 with the trigger at :599 (recon :596). Corrections recorded for the plan. |
| t_eaf760a6 | confirmed | Plugin plugins/opencode/open-second-brain.ts (549 lines): capture branch :393-395, experimental.chat.system.transform :404, tool.execute.after :415, default export :460, ctx.session.hook("context") :479, ctx.tool.hook("execute.after") :488, ctx.event.subscribe :506, CAPTURE_EVENTS:49, V2_CAPTURE_EVENTS:50, MUTATING_TOOLS:64, HOOK_TIMEOUT_MS:68, renderActiveContext:281, hookCommand:338; NO tool.execute.before / tool.hook("execute.before") and no prompt hook anywhere in the file; hooks/hooks.json UserPromptSubmit :80 (rows session-capture :86, recall-inject :92, nav-inject :98, counterparty-brief :104, reground-deliver :110), PreToolUse :117 (pretool-orient :123, pretool-host-backup :134); codex mirror runs pretool-orient at plugins/codex/hooks/hooks.json:137; INSTALL_TARGET_ID.opencode at host-facts.ts:70 |
Exact at the validator-refreshed anchors; the card's own :62/:93 and :297-338 are the stale spellings the validator already corrected. The parity gap is real: no denial hook and no prompt-submit row on the opencode lane. |
| t_3bdb82b0 | confirmed | grep -rn "ed25519|createSign|createVerify|generateKeyPair" src/ plugins/ returns zero hits; verifyLogChain at log-chain.ts:156; lastChainHash at log.ts:568 is module-private (no exported head reader exists); LOG_CHAIN_FIELDS:523, logChainHash:546, renderJsonlLine:496, acquireLogLock:289, appendLogEvent:320; trust.ts receipt head fields (actor, pid, before-hash, summary) in the docblock at :18; STATE_SURFACES at state/surfaces.ts:378; DOCTOR_CHECKS at doctor.ts:181; loadOrCreateKey at secrets/crypto.ts:93; restrictToOwner at secrets/owner-acl.ts:116; checkpoint-store.ts:42/:72/:83/:113; docs docs/cli-reference.md:437 (log verify) and :442-444 (snapshot family) |
Exact. Two load-bearing facts beyond the card: the log head scanner is private (the wave must add an exported, lock-taking head collector in log.ts), and there is no whole-store digest function anywhere. |