Open-source gym & body-weight tracker, now in the App Store (iPhone + Apple Watch) and as an Android APK. Plan routines, log workouts, see which muscles are trained, import from Strong/Hevy/FitNotes. Self-host it or use it on the phone alone.
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Audit log: a flood of junk sign-ins or pairing codes can't wipe it
Duarte Santos25ba5a4bf579
diff --git a/api/openapi.yaml b/api/openapi.yamlindex d37bd13fd..87191718e 100644--- a/api/openapi.yaml+++ b/api/openapi.yaml@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ info:starts, so checks sent at once get no more tries than checks sent one by one. Apaused caller gets `429 {"error": …, "code": "locked", "retryAfter": <s>}` with a`Retry-After` header. Passkey sign-up and sign-in and the pairing routes are not- throttled. The two routes that redeem a one-time device link (tag `passkeys`) share+ throttled (their failures reach the audit log at most ten a minute per address).+ The two routes that redeem a one-time device link (tag `passkeys`) sharethe per-address budget, and wrong codes pause the address for link redemption only,after 20, the way wrong reset codes do. Adding or removing a passkey in Settings(`POST /api/account/passkeys/options`, `DELETE /api/account/passkeys`) and making adiff --git a/api/server.js b/api/server.jsindex e67f93d9b..98e33786a 100644--- a/api/server.js+++ b/api/server.js@@ -803,8 +803,10 @@ if (AUDIT_ON) {// since none of them exists otherwise — and so are the two that redeem a device link (#95).// Passkey sign-in, passkey registration and phone pairing stay out of it, as they always were:// nothing there is worth guessing (an assertion is a signature, an invite code 64 random bits, a-// pairing code lives five minutes), and behind a proxy that hands the API one address for every-// visitor a per-address count on them would let one stranger pause everybody's way in. A+// pairing code 40 bits that live five minutes, one per profile), and behind a proxy that hands the+// API one address for every visitor a per-address count on them would let one stranger pause+// everybody's way in. Their failures are still written to the audit log, but only a few per+// address a minute (auditFail below), so a flood of junk cannot push everything else out of it. A// device-link code is 60 bits that live ten minutes, no more worth guessing than a pairing code,// but it is counted the way a reset code is: every wrong one is a guess at a way into somebody's// profile, and the pause it can start only ever stops link redemption, never a sign-in.@@ -899,6 +901,20 @@ function strikeAddress(req, kind) {if (lock) audit(req, 'auth.throttled', { ok: false, msg: kind });}+// A failure on a route anyone can call without a session (passkey sign-in and sign-up, pairing)+// is audited like any other, but only the first few per address and event a minute, and only so+// many from everybody together. The log keeps the newest AUDIT_MAX rows, so without this a few+// thousand junk requests (no Origin needed: these routes are CSRF-exempt) pushed every sign-in,+// admin action and deletion out of it in seconds. Nobody is refused anything here: what is+// dropped is a row that says the same thing as the ten before it.+const FAIL_AUDIT = createWindow({ max: 10, windowMs: 60000 });+const FAIL_AUDIT_ALL = createWindow({ max: 120, windowMs: 60000 });+setInterval(() => { FAIL_AUDIT.sweep(); FAIL_AUDIT_ALL.sweep(); }, 60000).unref();+function auditFail(req, ev, f) {+ if (FAIL_AUDIT.take(ev + '|' + limitAddress(req)) || FAIL_AUDIT_ALL.take(ev)) return;+ audit(req, ev, f);+}+/* ---------- password sign-in (#118) ---------- */// Optional, per instance (PASSWORD_LOGIN) and per profile: nobody has a password until they set// one. Passkeys stay the default and the recommended way in. What a password needs that a@@ -1833,7 +1849,7 @@ const routes = {const body = await readBody(req);const c = takeChallenge(body.cid);if (!c || c.kind !== 'register' || !c.uid) {- audit(req, 'auth.register.fail', { ok: false, msg: 'challenge-expired' });+ auditFail(req, 'auth.register.fail', { ok: false, msg: 'challenge-expired' });return json(res, 400, { error: 'challenge expired, try again', code: 'challenge-expired' });}let verification;@@ -1847,11 +1863,11 @@ const routes = {});} catch (e) {// e.message can echo attacker-supplied response fields, so only the reason code is kept.- audit(req, 'auth.register.fail', { ok: false, name: c.name, msg: 'verify-error' });+ auditFail(req, 'auth.register.fail', { ok: false, name: c.name, msg: 'verify-error' });return json(res, 400, { error: verifyError(e, { rpId: RP_ID, origin: ORIGIN }) });}if (!verification.verified) {- audit(req, 'auth.register.fail', { ok: false, name: c.name, msg: 'not-verified' });+ auditFail(req, 'auth.register.fail', { ok: false, name: c.name, msg: 'not-verified' });return json(res, 400, { error: 'not verified' });}const { credential } = verification.registrationInfo;@@ -1897,7 +1913,7 @@ const routes = {const body = await readBody(req);const c = takeChallenge(body.cid);if (c?.kind !== 'login') {- audit(req, 'auth.login.fail', { ok: false, msg: 'challenge-expired' });+ auditFail(req, 'auth.login.fail', { ok: false, msg: 'challenge-expired' });return json(res, 400, { error: 'challenge expired, try again', code: 'challenge-expired' });}const cred = db.creds.find(x => x.id === body.credential?.id);@@ -1905,7 +1921,7 @@ const routes = {// No credential id goes in the log: it is a stable handle for one passkey, and recording it// would let an admin correlate an unknown device across attempts. Nothing here identifies// the caller beyond the timestamp (and the network, if AUDIT_IP is on).- audit(req, 'auth.login.fail', { ok: false, msg: 'unknown-credential' });+ auditFail(req, 'auth.login.fail', { ok: false, msg: 'unknown-credential' });return json(res, 404, { error: 'unknown passkey, create a profile first', code: 'unknown-credential' });}let verification;@@ -1924,11 +1940,11 @@ const routes = {}});} catch (e) {- audit(req, 'auth.login.fail', { ok: false, user: db.users.find(u => u.id === cred.userId), uid: cred.userId, msg: 'verify-error' });+ auditFail(req, 'auth.login.fail', { ok: false, user: db.users.find(u => u.id === cred.userId), uid: cred.userId, msg: 'verify-error' });return json(res, 400, { error: verifyError(e, { rpId: RP_ID, origin: ORIGIN }) });}if (!verification.verified) {- audit(req, 'auth.login.fail', { ok: false, user: db.users.find(u => u.id === cred.userId), uid: cred.userId, msg: 'not-verified' });+ auditFail(req, 'auth.login.fail', { ok: false, user: db.users.find(u => u.id === cred.userId), uid: cred.userId, msg: 'not-verified' });return json(res, 400, { error: 'not verified' });}cred.counter = verification.authenticationInfo.newCounter;@@ -1991,7 +2007,7 @@ const routes = {const p = pairings.get(code);if (p) pairings.delete(code);if (!p || p.exp < Date.now()) {- audit(req, 'auth.pair.fail', { ok: false, msg: 'code-invalid' });+ auditFail(req, 'auth.pair.fail', { ok: false, msg: 'code-invalid' });return json(res, 400, { error: 'invalid or expired code', code: 'pair-invalid' });}const user = db.users.find(u => u.id === p.uid);diff --git a/api/test/server-anon-flood.test.js b/api/test/server-anon-flood.test.jsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..3f246f8ee--- /dev/null+++ b/api/test/server-anon-flood.test.js@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@+/* The routes anyone can call without a session (pairing, passkey sign-in and sign-up) used to+ answer a flood of junk with a 400 and an audit row each, never a 429: a few thousand requests+ pushed every other row out of the AUDIT_MAX-capped log in seconds. And a signed-in session could+ mint pairing codes without limit, each one kept for five minutes. Real server.js in a child. */+import { test } from 'node:test';+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';+import crypto from 'node:crypto';+import fs from 'node:fs';+import os from 'node:os';+import path from 'node:path';+import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';+import { boundPort } from './helpers.mjs';++const API = path.join(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), '..');+const SECRET = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');++function mintSession(uid) {+ const payload = `${uid}:${Date.now() + 86400000}:0`;+ return payload + '.' + crypto.createHmac('sha256', SECRET).update(payload).digest('base64url');+}+const cookie = { Cookie: `gymsid=${mintSession('u_test_1')}` };++async function startServer(t) {+ const dataDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gym-flood-'));+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dataDir, 'secret'), SECRET, { mode: 0o600 });+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dataDir, 'db.json'), JSON.stringify({+ users: [{ id: 'u_test_1', name: 'One', created: new Date().toISOString() }], creds: [], subs: [], invites: []+ }));+ const child = spawn(process.execPath, ['server.js'], {+ cwd: API, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],+ env: { ...process.env, PORT: '0', DATA_DIR: dataDir, ORIGIN: 'http://localhost:8080', RP_ID: 'localhost', AUDIT_LOG: '1' }+ });+ const h = { api: '', dataDir, log: '' };+ child.stdout.on('data', d => h.log += d);+ child.stderr.on('data', d => h.log += d);+ t.after(() => { child.kill('SIGKILL'); fs.rmSync(dataDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); });+ h.port = await boundPort(child, () => h.log);+ h.api = `http://127.0.0.1:${h.port}`;+ h.post = (p, body, headers = {}) => fetch(`${h.api}${p}`, {+ method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...headers }, body: JSON.stringify(body || {})+ });+ h.audit = () => {+ let text = '';+ try { text = fs.readFileSync(path.join(dataDir, 'audit.log'), 'utf8'); } catch { /* none yet */ }+ return text.split('\n').filter(Boolean).map(l => JSON.parse(l));+ };+ return h;+}++test('wrong pairing codes are all answered, but only a few of them reach the audit log', async t => {+ const h = await startServer(t);+ // Not paused: behind a proxy every visitor shares an address, and a 40-bit code that lives five+ // minutes is not worth guessing (see the sign-in throttle in server.js).+ for (let i = 0; i < 30; i++) assert.equal((await h.post('/api/pair/redeem', { code: 'WRONG' + i })).status, 400);+ assert.equal(h.audit().filter(r => r.ev === 'auth.pair.fail').length, 10, 'ten a minute per address, not thirty');+});++test('junk passkey sign-ins and sign-ups are answered but not each written to the audit log', async t => {+ const h = await startServer(t);+ for (let i = 0; i < 25; i++) {+ assert.equal((await h.post('/api/login/verify', { cid: 'junk' + i, credential: { id: 'x' } })).status, 400);+ assert.equal((await h.post('/api/register/verify', { cid: 'junk' + i })).status, 400);+ }+ // A valid challenge with an unknown passkey is the other cheap miss.+ for (let i = 0; i < 15; i++) {+ const { cid } = await (await h.post('/api/login/options')).json();+ assert.equal((await h.post('/api/login/verify', { cid, credential: { id: 'nobody' + i } })).status, 404);+ }+ const rows = h.audit();+ assert.equal(rows.filter(r => r.ev === 'auth.login.fail').length, 10);+ assert.equal(rows.filter(r => r.ev === 'auth.register.fail').length, 10);+});