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Rust agent-orchestrationai-agentsai-assistantdesktopllmlocal-firstmcppersonal-aiprivacyrustsecond-braintauri
//! Autonomy and security policy configuration.
use super::defaults;
use crate::security::{AutonomyLevel, TrustedRoot};
use schemars::JsonSchema;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
#[serde(default)]
pub struct AutonomyConfig {
/// Master switch for the autonomy policy. **Defaults to `false`.**
///
/// These agents run inside containers, platform jails and Docker sandboxes
/// that already provide the isolation this in-process policy was
/// approximating, and a shell tool that refuses ordinary shell syntax
/// (`$(…)`, backticks, a `&` inside a heredoc body) is not a usable shell.
/// So the policy is opt-in rather than opt-out.
///
/// When `false`, every field below is inert: command classification, the
/// allowlist, the approval gate, the hourly action budget, `workspace_only`,
/// `forbidden_paths` and the workspace-internal boundary are all skipped.
///
/// `SecurityPolicy::is_always_forbidden` still applies either way —
/// credential stores (`~/.ssh`, `~/.gnupg`, `~/.aws`) and system roots stay
/// unreachable. Deliberate floor, documented on
/// [`crate::security::SecurityPolicy::enabled`].
///
/// Set `[autonomy] enabled = true` to restore the full policy; `level`,
/// `workspace_only` and the rest then behave exactly as they always have.
#[serde(default)]
pub enabled: bool,
// No field-level override needed — AutonomyLevel's #[default] is Supervised,
// matching the struct Default. It only takes effect when `enabled` is true.
pub level: AutonomyLevel,
#[serde(default = "default_true")]
pub workspace_only: bool,
#[serde(default = "default_allowed_commands")]
pub allowed_commands: Vec<String>,
#[serde(default = "default_forbidden_paths")]
pub forbidden_paths: Vec<String>,
#[serde(default = "default_max_actions_per_hour")]
pub max_actions_per_hour: u32,
#[serde(default = "default_max_cost_per_day_cents")]
pub max_cost_per_day_cents: u32,
#[serde(default = "default_true")]
pub require_approval_for_medium_risk: bool,
#[serde(default = "default_true")]
pub block_high_risk_commands: bool,
/// Tool names the user has pre-approved ("Always allow"). The `ApprovalGate`
/// skips the interactive prompt for any tool listed here. Populated by the
/// "Always allow" approval decision or hand-edited, and surfaced in
/// Settings → Agent access. Read live by the gate via `SecurityPolicy`.
#[serde(default = "default_auto_approve")]
pub auto_approve: Vec<String>,
/// When true, the approval gate auto-approves ALL tool calls without
/// prompting the user — a blanket bypass of the interactive approval
/// flow, not just the per-tool `auto_approve` allowlist above. An
/// unlabelled call site is still hard-denied regardless of this flag (see `ApprovalGate::intercept_audited_inner`).
/// Hard security blocks (`is_always_forbidden`, `is_workspace_internal_path`,
/// `ToolPolicyMiddleware`) live on independent code paths inside the tool
/// implementations themselves and are unaffected by this setting.
///
/// It also bypasses **parking**, which is worth knowing before enabling it.
/// A remote-origin triage dispatch — a Composio or webhook payload reaching
/// `triage.escalate` — normally parks for a decision and writes a
/// `pending_approvals` audit row. With this flag on it is allowed
/// immediately and **no audit row is written**, so those dispatches leave no
/// approval trail. Accepted deliberately as the cost of a blanket
/// "approve everything" switch (openhuman#5634); the alternative was to make
/// this flag mean "approve everything except…", which is harder to reason
/// about.
///
/// Defaults to `false` — existing users see no behavior change.
#[serde(default)]
pub auto_approve_all: bool,
/// Directories outside the workspace the agent may access. Each entry grants
/// read (or read+write) to its subtree, taking precedence over `workspace_only`
/// and `forbidden_paths` — except credential stores (~/.ssh, ~/.gnupg, ~/.aws),
/// which stay blocked regardless.
#[serde(default)]
pub trusted_roots: Vec<TrustedRoot>,
/// Whether the agent may install OS packages via the `install_tool` tool.
/// Intended to be enabled only in Full access mode.
#[serde(default)]
pub allow_tool_install: bool,
}
fn default_true() -> bool {
defaults::default_true()
}
fn default_max_actions_per_hour() -> u32 {
// Effectively unlimited. The rate-limiter check is `count <= max`, so any
// ceiling above realistic per-hour traffic is functionally infinite;
// u32::MAX lets the field stay a plain `u32` without a sentinel option.
u32::MAX
}
fn default_max_cost_per_day_cents() -> u32 {
500
}
fn default_allowed_commands() -> Vec<String> {
vec![
// Version control
"git".into(),
// Package managers / build systems. `make` can run arbitrary recipes,
// but the shell policy still gates execution to this command allow-list
// and Supervised mode approval remains responsible for risky invocations.
"npm".into(),
"pnpm".into(),
"yarn".into(),
"cargo".into(),
"make".into(),
"cmake".into(),
// Directory / file inspection (read-only)
"ls".into(),
"cat".into(),
"grep".into(),
"find".into(),
"echo".into(),
"pwd".into(),
"wc".into(),
"head".into(),
"tail".into(),
"date".into(),
"sort".into(),
"uniq".into(),
"diff".into(),
"which".into(),
"uname".into(),
"basename".into(),
"dirname".into(),
"tr".into(),
"cut".into(),
"realpath".into(),
"readlink".into(),
"stat".into(),
"file".into(),
// Filesystem mutations (medium-risk — require approval in Supervised mode)
"mkdir".into(),
"touch".into(),
"cp".into(),
"mv".into(),
"ln".into(),
// Windows read-only equivalents for ls/cat/grep/which
"dir".into(),
"type".into(),
"where".into(),
"findstr".into(),
"more".into(),
]
}
fn default_forbidden_paths() -> Vec<String> {
vec![
"/etc".into(),
"/root".into(),
"/home".into(),
"/usr".into(),
"/bin".into(),
"/sbin".into(),
"/lib".into(),
"/opt".into(),
"/boot".into(),
"/dev".into(),
"/proc".into(),
"/sys".into(),
"/var".into(),
"/tmp".into(),
"~/.ssh".into(),
"~/.gnupg".into(),
"~/.aws".into(),
"~/.config".into(),
]
}
fn default_auto_approve() -> Vec<String> {
vec![
// Read-only tools — always safe to skip the approval prompt
"file_read".into(),
"memory_search".into(),
"memory_list".into(),
"get_time".into(),
"list_dir".into(),
// Workspace-scoped search tools — read-only, no side effects
"glob".into(),
"grep".into(),
]
}
impl Default for AutonomyConfig {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
enabled: false,
level: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
workspace_only: default_true(),
allowed_commands: default_allowed_commands(),
forbidden_paths: default_forbidden_paths(),
max_actions_per_hour: default_max_actions_per_hour(),
max_cost_per_day_cents: default_max_cost_per_day_cents(),
require_approval_for_medium_risk: default_true(),
block_high_risk_commands: default_true(),
auto_approve: default_auto_approve(),
auto_approve_all: false,
trusted_roots: Vec::new(),
allow_tool_install: false,
}
}
}