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//! `SecurityPolicy` as the filesystem tools' [`FsGate`].
//!
//! A mechanical mapping: every method is one call the tools used to make on
//! the policy directly, with the same argument and the same answer. No policy
//! is decided here; the adapter only names the questions.
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use tinyagents_harness_tools::fs::filesystem::FsGate;
use crate::security::policy::CommandClass;
use crate::security::policy::{TrustedAccess, TrustedRoot};
use crate::security::{AutonomyLevel, GateDecision, SecurityPolicy};
/// Clone `security` and scope it to `root`, a run's workspace descriptor root.
///
/// The root becomes both the relative-path resolution root (`action_dir`)
/// **and** a `ReadWrite` trusted root. The grant is the load-bearing half:
/// `action_dir` only decides where a relative path lands, while the allow/deny
/// decision reads `workspace_dir` + `trusted_roots`
/// (`SecurityPolicy::is_resolved_path_allowed_for`). Without the grant a
/// descriptor rooted outside `workspace_dir` moved the cwd but refused every
/// read and write in it.
///
/// The grant is *additive and per-call*: it is pushed onto a clone, so nothing
/// process-global is mutated and concurrent turns cannot race each other. It
/// also cannot widen the hard invariants: `is_always_forbidden` (credential
/// stores, core OS dirs) and `is_workspace_internal_path` (core-managed state
/// under `workspace_dir`) are both evaluated *before* any trusted-root
/// shortcut, so a granted root can never expose them.
///
/// The root always originates from trusted in-process code (the session
/// builder, the sub-agent runner, or the `cwd` RPC parameter), never from
/// model-supplied text.
pub(in crate::tools::implementations) fn security_scoped_to_root(
security: &SecurityPolicy,
root: &Path,
) -> SecurityPolicy {
let mut scoped = security.clone();
scoped.action_dir = root.to_path_buf();
scoped.trusted_roots.push(TrustedRoot {
path: root.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
access: TrustedAccess::ReadWrite,
});
scoped
}
#[async_trait]
impl FsGate for SecurityPolicy {
fn can_act(&self) -> bool {
SecurityPolicy::can_act(self)
}
fn is_read_only(&self) -> bool {
// Deliberately the raw tier, not `can_act()`: `git_operations` asks
// this in addition to `can_act()` and always has.
self.autonomy == AutonomyLevel::ReadOnly
}
fn is_rate_limited(&self) -> bool {
SecurityPolicy::is_rate_limited(self)
}
fn record_action(&self) -> bool {
SecurityPolicy::record_action(self)
}
fn write_needs_approval(&self) -> bool {
self.gate_decision(CommandClass::Write) == GateDecision::Prompt
}
fn action_dir(&self) -> &Path {
&self.action_dir
}
fn is_path_string_allowed(&self, path: &str) -> bool {
SecurityPolicy::is_path_string_allowed(self, path)
}
async fn validate_path(&self, path: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
SecurityPolicy::validate_path(self, path).await
}
async fn validate_parent_path(&self, path: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
SecurityPolicy::validate_parent_path(self, path).await
}
fn scoped_to_workspace(&self, root: &Path) -> Arc<dyn FsGate> {
Arc::new(security_scoped_to_root(self, root))
}
}