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description: >- The trust boundary for the autonomous core: the autonomy and risk policy, sandbox selection, the audit log, the encrypted secret store, the pairing guard and the redact() helper. icon: shield-halved
Security
crates/openhuman-core/src/security/ is the trust boundary for the autonomous core. Look here first when you ask "is this agent action allowed, and if so, how is it confined?"
It owns:
- The autonomy and risk policy that decides whether a tool call is allowed.
- The sandbox selection that confines calls when the host supports it.
- The append-only audit log of every agent action.
- The encrypted secret store.
- The pairing guard that gates public binding of the RPC server.
- The
redact()helper every other domain uses to keep plaintext credentials out of logs.
It does not own the cross-domain EncryptionEngine (in security/encryption/) or per-channel credential storage (in security/credentials/).
Public surface
| Item | File | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
SecurityPolicy |
policy/types.rs (path checks in policy/path_checks.rs, command classification in policy/command_checks.rs, gating in policy/enforcement.rs) |
Assembles runtime policy from AutonomyConfig + workspace dir. |
AutonomyLevel (ReadOnly / Supervised / Full) |
policy/types.rs |
Three-step autonomy ladder. |
CommandRiskLevel, ToolOperation, ActionTracker |
policy/types.rs |
Risk classification and per-session counting. |
SecretStore |
secret_storage/encrypted_store.rs (secrets.rs re-exports it) |
OS-keychain / encrypted-file secret persistence with round-trip helpers. |
AuditLogger, AuditEventType, AuditEvent, Actor, Action, ExecutionResult, SecurityContext, CommandExecutionLog |
audit.rs |
Append-only audit trail. |
PairingGuard, constant_time_eq, is_public_bind |
pairing.rs (PairingGuard and constant_time_eq are re-exported from tinychannels_bus::security) |
Pairing-token check before binding the RPC server publicly. |
redact(value: &str) -> String |
core.rs |
Uniform 4-char-prefix redaction for logs. |
security_policy_info_for_config(&Config) -> Outcome<serde_json::Value> |
ops.rs |
RPC handler for the doctor / settings UI. |
Sandboxing
This module carries no sandbox backends. Per-session sandbox selection lives in crates/openhuman-core/src/sandbox/. It delegates local OS confinement to tinybox-jail (vendored tinybox) and keeps its own docker run executor. Command classification scans shell strings with tinybox_core::shell::scan, and the classification rules stay in this module.
Autonomy ladder
AutonomyLevel is a three-step ladder that sets how strictly the policy gates tool calls. It only takes effect while [autonomy] enabled = true.
ReadOnlyblocks every writing class outright. No approval can authorize one.Supervisedis the default. It allows reads and parks everything else for an approval round trip.Fullallows reads and writes. It still parks the network, install and destructive classes.
The wire spellings are lowercase (readonly, supervised, full). The user-facing table is in Approval gate.
CommandRiskLevel and ToolOperation classify a tool call. ActionTracker keeps the per-session counts that the policy compares against its caps. The agent harness asks SecurityPolicy for a decision before every executable tool dispatch.
All of this applies only when the autonomy policy is on. [autonomy] enabled = false is the default, and SecurityPolicy::from_config carries that flag through every enforcement entry point. With the policy off, command classification, the approval gate, the command allowlist and the hourly action budget do nothing. workspace_only, forbidden_paths and the workspace-internal boundary are not enforced either.
One check never turns off. is_always_forbidden blocks credential stores (~/.ssh, ~/.gnupg, ~/.aws) and system roots. It also rejects .. traversal and null bytes in a path. This is the floor the module keeps whatever the configuration.
Audit log
audit.rs writes an append-only stream of AuditEvents under the workspace dir. Every executable tool call lands here with its Actor (agent or user), Action, ExecutionResult and the SecurityContext (autonomy level, sandbox backend and so on) it ran under. The log tells you afterwards what the agent did and why it was allowed.
Pairing guard
PairingGuard (in pairing.rs) stands between the RPC server and any attempt to bind to a non-loopback address. is_public_bind detects that case. PairingGuard then requires a pairing token, compared in constant time with constant_time_eq, before the bind is allowed. The iOS and LAN-companion pairing flow relies on this to keep an unpaired peer from attaching to the desktop core.
Secret store
SecretStore (implemented in security/secret_storage/encrypted_store.rs, re-exported through secrets.rs) encrypts config-field secrets with ChaCha20-Poly1305 (enc2: prefix). It migrates the legacy XOR enc: format when it decrypts. Core owns the platform-independent secret-storage contracts, an in-memory default, and an optional encrypted-file backend. openhuman-rpc::keyring owns the native OS providers and installs them through those contracts before host boot. RPC product hosts explicitly select persistent storage; embed uses memory unless a provider or backend override is supplied. Backend selection and migration are described in crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/README.md.
redact()
redact(value) returns a uniform 4-character-prefix string (for example "sk-a…") for use in logs and error messages. Use it whenever a secret, credential, token, or PII string is about to be formatted into a log:: / tracing:: call. Other domains call it directly: credentials/, webhooks/, composio/, the integration adapters.
Layout
| Path | Role |
|---|---|
policy/ (mod.rs, types.rs, path_checks.rs, command_checks.rs, enforcement.rs, policy_*_tests.rs, proptest_tests.rs) |
SecurityPolicy, AutonomyLevel, risk classification, path and command checks, action tracking. |
core.rs, core_tests.rs |
redact() + small shared helpers. |
audit.rs |
Append-only audit log types. |
secrets.rs, secret_storage/ |
SecretStore (implemented in secret_storage/encrypted_store.rs) + round-trip tests. |
pairing.rs, pairing_tests.rs |
PairingGuard + constant-time helpers. |
ops.rs |
RPC handler (security_policy_info_for_config). |
schemas.rs |
Controller schemas + handler dispatch. |
mod.rs |
Re-exports of the public surface above. |
live_policy.rs, scrub.rs, tools.rs |
Live-policy lookup, the host scrubbing policy (scrub::host_policy), and the domain's own agent tools. |
approval/, credentials/, devices/, egress/, encryption/, keyring_consent/, prompt_injection/ |
Sibling kernel-security domains under the same module. Each owns its own surface. This page covers the policy core only. |
Local PII detection belongs to tinymemory_api::safety behind its local-safety feature. OpenHuman keeps privacy policy and redaction decisions.
Calls into
crates/openhuman-core/src/config/:SecurityConfig,AutonomyConfigfor policy + sandbox selection.- Workspace filesystem, for the audit log and secret store.
Called by
crates/openhuman-core/src/cron/ops.rs: wraps shell jobs inSecurityPolicy::from_config.crates/openhuman-core/src/tools/ops.rsandtools/impl/{browser,document,filesystem,network,presentation,system}/: every executable tool consultsSecurityPolicy.crates/openhuman-core/src/tools/impl/network/{gate,mcp,mcp_server_tools}.rs: risk-classify outbound calls.crates/openhuman-core/src/memory/guard.rs: wraps every memory write insecurity::scrub::host_policy().crates/openhuman-core/src/agent/subagent_host/: sub-agent execution applies the host's tool policy and autonomy gate.crates/openhuman-core/src/security/credentials/: usesSecretStoreandredact.
Tests
- Unit:
pairing_tests.rs,policy/policy_tests*.rs,policy/proptest_tests.rs,secret_storage/encrypted_store_tests*.rs. core_tests.rscoversredact().
Related
security/README.md: the in-repo overview this page mirrors.- Architecture: the wider system context.
- Agent harness: where
SecurityPolicyis consulted on every tool dispatch.