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fix(app): don't forward Linux deep links to another user's socket
M3gA-Mind04ae40ee8910
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-app/src/deep_link_ipc.rs b/crates/openhuman-app/src/deep_link_ipc.rsindex 423cd77900..3d904d0422 100644--- a/crates/openhuman-app/src/deep_link_ipc.rs+++ b/crates/openhuman-app/src/deep_link_ipc.rs@@ -107,6 +107,27 @@ pub(crate) fn try_forward_deep_links() -> ForwardResult {}fn try_forward_urls(urls: &[String], path: &Path) -> ForwardResult {+ try_forward_urls_as(urls, path, nix::unistd::getuid().as_raw())+}++/// Whether the socket file at `path` belongs to `uid`. The /tmp fallback path+/// is in a shared directory, so another local user can pre-create it to+/// receive forwarded `openhuman://auth?token=…` links; only our own socket is+/// trusted.+fn socket_owned_by(path: &Path, uid: u32) -> bool {+ use std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt;+ std::fs::symlink_metadata(path).is_ok_and(|meta| meta.uid() == uid)+}++fn try_forward_urls_as(urls: &[String], path: &Path, uid: u32) -> ForwardResult {+ if path.exists() && !socket_owned_by(path, uid) {+ log::warn!(+ "[deep-link-ipc] secondary: socket at {} is owned by another user; \+ not forwarding deep links to it",+ path.display()+ );+ return ForwardResult::NoPrimary;+ }log::info!("[deep-link-ipc] secondary: found {} deep-link URL(s), trying socket at {}",urls.len(),@@ -209,6 +230,15 @@ pub(crate) fn bind_and_listen() -> Option<DeepLinkSocketGuard> {let listener = match UnixListener::bind(&path) {Ok(l) => l,Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AddrInUse => {+ // Another user's socket is neither our primary nor ours to unlink.+ if !socket_owned_by(&path, nix::unistd::getuid().as_raw()) {+ log::warn!(+ "[deep-link-ipc] socket {} is owned by another user; \+ deep-link forwarding disabled for this session",+ path.display()+ );+ return None;+ }// A socket file already exists. Probe whether a live primary// is behind it before deciding to unlink.match UnixStream::connect(&path) {diff --git a/crates/openhuman-app/src/deep_link_ipc_tests.rs b/crates/openhuman-app/src/deep_link_ipc_tests.rsindex 33fa096fa5..6904752731 100644--- a/crates/openhuman-app/src/deep_link_ipc_tests.rs+++ b/crates/openhuman-app/src/deep_link_ipc_tests.rs@@ -146,3 +146,23 @@ fn round_trip_bind_connect_forward() {assert_eq!(got.len(), 1);assert_eq!(got[0], "openhuman://auth?token=testtoken123");}++#[test]+fn a_socket_owned_by_another_user_receives_nothing() {+ let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();+ let sock_path = tmp.path().join("squatted-deeplink.sock");+ let listener = UnixListener::bind(&sock_path).unwrap();+ listener.set_nonblocking(true).unwrap();+ let me = nix::unistd::getuid().as_raw();+ assert!(socket_owned_by(&sock_path, me));++ // Forwarding as a different user: our socket is "foreign" to them.+ let urls = vec!["openhuman://auth?token=secret".to_string()];+ let result = try_forward_urls_as(&urls, &sock_path, me.wrapping_add(1));++ assert!(matches!(result, ForwardResult::NoPrimary));+ assert!(+ listener.accept().is_err(),+ "nothing may connect to a socket owned by someone else"+ );+}