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fix(sandbox): judge a symlinked credential store at its target

M3gA-Mind0e8ce2a3d312
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/sandbox/local_grants.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/sandbox/local_grants.rs
index 1f23229220..f246cfc0de 100644
--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/sandbox/local_grants.rs
+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/sandbox/local_grants.rs
@@ -156,6 +156,13 @@ fn admit_grants_under(
stores.extend(crate::security::policy::home_credential_stores(&resolved));
}
}
+ // A store that is itself a symlink (`~/.ssh` -> `~/dotfiles/ssh`) is also
+ // judged at its target: a grant of that target exposes the same files.
+ let targets: Vec<PathBuf> = stores
+ .iter()
+ .filter_map(|s| s.canonicalize().ok())
+ .collect();
+ stores.extend(targets);
let admit = |raw: String| -> Option<PathBuf> {
let path = PathBuf::from(raw);
let lexical = path.has_root()
@@ -184,13 +191,18 @@ fn admit_grants_under(
);
return None;
}
- if stores
- .iter()
- .any(|store| store.starts_with(&path) || store.starts_with(&resolved))
- {
+ // Containing a store exposes it; lying inside a store's target is
+ // reading it, whatever the path's own components are called.
+ let overlaps = |store: &PathBuf| {
+ store.starts_with(&path)
+ || store.starts_with(&resolved)
+ || path.starts_with(store)
+ || resolved.starts_with(store)
+ };
+ if stores.iter().any(overlaps) {
tracing::warn!(
path = %path.display(),
- "[sandbox:grants] refused module grant: it contains a credential store"
+ "[sandbox:grants] refused module grant: it overlaps a credential store"
);
return None;
}
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/sandbox/local_grants_tests.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/sandbox/local_grants_tests.rs
index b7def66c5d..eb92e6e85c 100644
--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/sandbox/local_grants_tests.rs
+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/sandbox/local_grants_tests.rs
@@ -72,6 +72,35 @@ mod with_module {
assert!(grants.read_write.is_empty(), "{:?}", grants.read_write);
}
+ #[cfg(unix)]
+ #[test]
+ fn a_credential_store_symlinked_out_of_home_is_refused_at_its_target() {
+ // `~/.ssh` -> `<tmp>/dotfiles/ssh`: the target holds the keys, and none
+ // of its own components is called `.ssh`.
+ let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
+ let home = tmp.path().join("home");
+ let dotfiles = tmp.path().join("dotfiles");
+ let target = dotfiles.join("ssh");
+ let unrelated = tmp.path().join("work");
+ for dir in [&home, &target, &unrelated] {
+ std::fs::create_dir_all(dir).expect("dir");
+ }
+ std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&target, home.join(".ssh")).expect("symlink");
+ std::fs::write(target.join("id_ed25519"), "key").expect("key file");
+ let reply = LocalGrants {
+ read_only: vec![
+ target.display().to_string(),
+ dotfiles.display().to_string(),
+ target.join("id_ed25519").display().to_string(),
+ unrelated.display().to_string(),
+ ],
+ read_write: vec![target.display().to_string()],
+ };
+ let grants = admit_grants_under(reply, false, Some(&home));
+ assert_eq!(grants.read_only, [unrelated]);
+ assert!(grants.read_write.is_empty(), "{:?}", grants.read_write);
+ }
+
#[test]
fn proc_is_admitted_only_through_allow_proc() {
let reply = || LocalGrants {