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fix(secrets): build the key file reader without the secret-file feature
M3gA-Mind18da39e15f03
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend.rsindex d33a01afc8..2a082c636e 100644--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend.rs+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend.rs@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ use zeroize::Zeroizing;#[path = "encrypted_file_backend/key_source.rs"]pub mod key_source;-use key_source::{env_value, master_key_from_env};+use key_source::{env_value, master_key_from_env, read_master_key_file};/// Environment variable carrying the master key inline as `2 * KEY_LEN` hex/// characters (`openssl rand -hex 32`). Lets a headless `openhuman-core@@ -254,34 +254,6 @@ fn try_load_master_key() -> Result<([u8; KEY_LEN], String), MasterKeyError> {.map_err(|e| MasterKeyError::Configured(e.to_string()))}-/// Reads the file named by [`MASTER_KEY_FILE_ENV`].-///-/// On Unix a key file must not be writable by other users. Read-only group or-/// other permissions are supported for container secret mounts, where the-/// runtime may add group-read access for a non-root core.-fn read_master_key_file(path: &Path) -> Result<String, String> {- #[cfg(unix)]- {- use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;- let metadata = std::fs::metadata(path).map_err(|e| {- format!("cannot inspect master key file permissions ({MASTER_KEY_FILE_ENV}): {e}")- })?;- let mode = metadata.permissions().mode() & 0o777;- if key_file_mode_is_other_writable(mode) {- return Err(format!(- "master key file ({MASTER_KEY_FILE_ENV}) is writable by other users; \- restrict it to a read-only secret mount"- ));- }- }- std::fs::read_to_string(path).map_err(|e| format!("cannot read master key file: {e}"))-}--#[cfg(unix)]-fn key_file_mode_is_other_writable(mode: u32) -> bool {- mode & 0o002 != 0-}-/// Decodes a master key supplied as exactly `2 * KEY_LEN` hex characters./// The value never appears in the error.fn parse_master_key_hex(hex: &str) -> Result<[u8; KEY_LEN], String> {diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend/key_source.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend/key_source.rsindex 4664c84ce4..594acff087 100644--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend/key_source.rs+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend/key_source.rs@@ -95,6 +95,34 @@ pub(super) fn load_or_mint_master_key(Ok(key)}+/// Reads the file named by [`MASTER_KEY_FILE_ENV`].+///+/// On Unix a key file must not be writable by other users. Read-only group or+/// other permissions are supported for container secret mounts, where the+/// runtime may add group-read access for a non-root core.+pub(super) fn read_master_key_file(path: &Path) -> Result<String, String> {+ #[cfg(unix)]+ {+ use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;+ let metadata = std::fs::metadata(path).map_err(|e| {+ format!("cannot inspect master key file permissions ({MASTER_KEY_FILE_ENV}): {e}")+ })?;+ let mode = metadata.permissions().mode() & 0o777;+ if key_file_mode_is_other_writable(mode) {+ return Err(format!(+ "master key file ({MASTER_KEY_FILE_ENV}) is writable by other users; \+ restrict it to a read-only secret mount"+ ));+ }+ }+ std::fs::read_to_string(path).map_err(|e| format!("cannot read master key file: {e}"))+}++#[cfg(unix)]+pub(super) fn key_file_mode_is_other_writable(mode: u32) -> bool {+ mode & 0o002 != 0+}+/// Load or durably create the workspace key under the cross-process write/// lock. Never replace a malformed or unreadable existing key. The atomic/// file writer creates the key with Unix mode `0600` before publication.@@ -151,12 +179,9 @@ pub(super) fn profile_master_key_read_only(.map_err(SecretStorageError::Backend)?;let file = env_value(MASTER_KEY_FILE_ENV, std::env::var(MASTER_KEY_FILE_ENV)).map_err(SecretStorageError::Backend)?;- if let Some((key, _)) = master_key_from_env(- inline.as_deref(),- file.as_deref(),- super::read_master_key_file,- )- .map_err(SecretStorageError::Backend)?+ if let Some((key, _)) =+ master_key_from_env(inline.as_deref(), file.as_deref(), read_master_key_file)+ .map_err(SecretStorageError::Backend)?{return Ok(Some(Zeroizing::new(key)));}diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend_tests.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend_tests.rsindex b89b58d765..aaef803bcc 100644--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend_tests.rs+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend_tests.rs@@ -419,10 +419,16 @@ fn read_master_key_file_rejects_other_writable_files() {#[test]fn key_file_permissions_reject_other_writes_but_allow_read_only_access() {for mode in [0o400, 0o600, 0o644, 0o444, 0o604, 0o440, 0o640] {- assert!(!key_file_mode_is_other_writable(mode), "{mode:04o}");+ assert!(+ !key_source::key_file_mode_is_other_writable(mode),+ "{mode:04o}"+ );}for mode in [0o602, 0o666] {- assert!(key_file_mode_is_other_writable(mode), "{mode:04o}");+ assert!(+ key_source::key_file_mode_is_other_writable(mode),+ "{mode:04o}"+ );}}