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refactor(shell): move shell tool trait impl out of shell.rs
Steven Enamakel3c64303d5ea7
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/tools/impl/system/shell.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/tools/impl/system/shell.rsindex b7bbc42144..dae548534b 100644--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/tools/impl/system/shell.rs+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/tools/impl/system/shell.rs@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use async_trait::async_trait;use serde_json::{Value, json};use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};use std::sync::Arc;-use std::time::{Duration, Instant};+use std::time::Duration;use tinytools::ToolRunContext;use tinytools::{PermissionLevel, Tool, ToolCallOptions, ToolResult, ToolTimeout};use tinyagents_harness_tools::exec::{@@ -103,35 +103,6 @@ impl ShellHost {}}- /// Emit a single `CommandExecution` audit event. A write failure is logged- /// as a structured warning but not propagated — audit must never block or- /// fail a tool call, yet a silently broken audit trail must not go- /// unnoticed.- fn emit_audit(- &self,- command: &str,- approved: bool,- allowed: bool,- success: bool,- duration_ms: u64,- ) {- if let Err(error) = self.audit.log_command_event(CommandExecutionLog {- channel: "tool:shell",- command,- risk_level: "unknown",- approved,- allowed,- success,- duration_ms,- }) {- tracing::warn!(- error = %error,- channel = "tool:shell",- "[shell] failed to persist command execution audit event"- );- }- }-/// Resolve the working directory for this shell invocation.////// Returns the root from a [`WorkspaceDescriptor`] threaded into this@@ -167,82 +138,12 @@ impl ShellHost {}}-#[async_trait]-impl Tool for ShellHost {- fn name(&self) -> &str {- "shell"- }-- fn description(&self) -> &str {- shell_description(self.runtime.shell_flavor())- }-- fn parameters_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {- json!({- "type": "object",- "properties": {- "command": {- "type": "string",- "description": command_param_description(self.runtime.shell_flavor())- },- "category": {- "type": "string",- "enum": ["read", "write", "network", "install", "destructive"],- "description": "Optional self-declared risk; can only raise the approval requirement."- },- "timeout_secs": {- "type": "integer",- "minimum": 0,- "maximum": 3600,- "description": "Optional wall-clock timeout (seconds, up to 3600) for this command before it is killed. Use a larger value for long-running work (builds, test suites, solvers). Omitted or 0 runs without a deadline."- }- },- "required": ["command"]- })- }-- /// Cap shell output at ~30k chars before threading into history.- /// Verbose commands (`find /`, dependency installs, log dumps)- /// can otherwise blow past 100k chars in one call. The agent- /// rarely needs the full firehose — a head/tail/grep follow-up is- /// the right move when it does.- fn max_result_size_chars(&self) -> Option<usize> {- Some(30_000)- }-- /// Shell runs scripts that legitimately take a long time, so it runs- /// unbounded unless the caller passes an explicit `timeout_secs`. This- /// keeps the harness from hard-killing a long command at the global tool- /// timeout (issue #4023).- fn timeout_policy(&self, args: &serde_json::Value) -> ToolTimeout {- match args.get("timeout_secs").and_then(|v| v.as_u64()) {- // `0` (or absent) means "no deadline".- None | Some(0) => ToolTimeout::Unbounded,- Some(secs) => ToolTimeout::Millis(secs.saturating_mul(1000)),- }- }-- fn permission_level(&self) -> PermissionLevel {- PermissionLevel::Execute- }-- /// Whether this shell call must be approved by the human before it runs.- /// True for any command the current tier prompts on (Write / Network /- /// Destructive in ask-before-edit; Network / Destructive in Full). The- /// harness routes these through the `ApprovalGate`; the read-only `Block`- /// and the structural guard are enforced in `run_with_security`.- fn external_effect_with_args(&self, args: &serde_json::Value) -> bool {- let command = args.get("command").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");- // This synchronous declaration cannot consult TinyBox. Be- // conservative here; the host authorization gate uses the exact- // per-call TinyBox analysis and applies the configured tier.- !command.is_empty()+impl ShellHost {+ fn external_effect_with_args(&self, args: &Value) -> bool {+ args.get("command").and_then(Value::as_str).is_some_and(|command| !command.is_empty())}- async fn prepare_authorization(- &self,- args: &serde_json::Value,- ) -> anyhow::Result<Option<serde_json::Value>> {+ async fn prepare_authorization(&self, args: &Value) -> anyhow::Result<Option<Value>> {#[cfg(feature = "modules")]{let config = self@@ -266,62 +167,6 @@ impl Tool for ShellHost {Err(anyhow::anyhow!("command analysis is unavailable"))}}-- async fn execute(&self, args: serde_json::Value) -> anyhow::Result<ToolResult> {- self.execute_in_context(&dispatch_ctx_for_tool(None), args, None)- .await- }-- async fn execute_with_context(- &self,- args: serde_json::Value,- _options: ToolCallOptions,- context: Option<&dyn ToolRunContext>,- ) -> anyhow::Result<ToolResult> {- self.execute_in_context(&dispatch_ctx_for_tool(context), args, context)- .await- }-}--impl ShellHost {- async fn execute_in_context(- &self,- ctx: &DispatchCtx,- args: serde_json::Value,- context: Option<&dyn ToolRunContext>,- ) -> anyhow::Result<ToolResult> {- let command = args- .get("command")- .and_then(|v| v.as_str())- .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing 'command' parameter"))?;-- // Optional per-call wall-clock budget. `None`/`0` ⇒ run unbounded;- // a positive value is clamped downstream by- // `tool_timeout::explicit_call_timeout_*`. Shell has no default deadline- // (issue #4023) — long scripts must run to completion.- let requested_timeout = args.get("timeout_secs").and_then(|v| v.as_u64());- let start = Instant::now();- let (allowed, result) = crate::sandbox::shell_progress::with_shell_progress(- context,- crate::sandbox::shell_progress::HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL,- |meter| {- self.run_with_security_in_context(ctx, command, requested_timeout, context, meter)- },- )- .await;- let duration_ms = u64::try_from(start.elapsed().as_millis()).unwrap_or(u64::MAX);- // `allowed` = passed the in-tool security checks. `approved` = the command- // is Prompt-class (required human approval) and thus went through the- // harness ApprovalGate to reach here — distinct from `allowed`. Reads and- // Full-mode writes run without a prompt, so they audit as approved=false- // rather than over-claiming a human approval that never happened. (The- // gate's exact yes/no isn't threaded into tools; this is the accurate- // "required approval" proxy.)- let approved = self.external_effect_with_args(&args);- // emit_audit signature is (command, approved, allowed, …) — keep that order.- self.emit_audit(command, approved, allowed, !result.is_error, duration_ms);- Ok(result)- }}impl ShellHost {