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refactor(security): extract command analysis into its own module

Steven Enamakel4e348699ba10
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_analysis.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_analysis.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a6c6169d65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_analysis.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+use crate::security::policy::CommandClass;
+
+/// Host-owned interpretation of TinyBox's structural shell facts.
+///
+/// TinyBox reports live command segments and redirection only. OpenHuman adds
+/// the policy fields below locally so command permission and autonomy remain
+/// host decisions instead of bus-contract vocabulary.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
+pub(crate) struct CommandAnalysis {
+ pub segments: Vec<CommandSegment>,
+ pub hidden_execution: bool,
+ pub redirection: bool,
+ pub expansion: bool,
+ pub tee: bool,
+ pub background: bool,
+ pub literal_words: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
+pub(crate) struct CommandSegment {
+ pub source: String,
+ pub command: String,
+ pub basename: String,
+ pub normalized_name: String,
+ pub arguments: Vec<String>,
+ pub class: CommandClass,
+ pub leading_env_assignment: bool,
+ pub dangerous_env_prefix: bool,
+ pub executor: bool,
+}
+
+impl CommandAnalysis {
+ pub(crate) fn from_shell_analysis(facts: tinybox_bus::ShellAnalysis) -> Self {
+ let mut analysis = Self {
+ segments: Vec::new(),
+ hidden_execution: false,
+ redirection: facts.redirection,
+ expansion: false,
+ tee: false,
+ background: false,
+ literal_words: Vec::new(),
+ };
+
+ for source in facts.segments {
+ let words = source.split_whitespace().collect::<Vec<_>>();
+ let Some(raw_command) = words.first().copied() else {
+ continue;
+ };
+ let command = raw_command.trim_matches(|c: char| matches!(c, '\'' | '"'));
+ let basename = command.rsplit(['/', '\\']).next().unwrap_or(command);
+ let normalized_name = basename.to_ascii_lowercase();
+ let arguments = words
+ .iter()
+ .skip(1)
+ .map(|word| {
+ word.trim_matches(|c: char| matches!(c, '\'' | '"'))
+ .to_owned()
+ })
+ .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+ let lower = source.to_ascii_lowercase();
+ let leading_env_assignment = command.contains('=')
+ && command.split_once('=').is_some_and(|(name, _)| {
+ !name.is_empty() && name.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '_')
+ });
+ let dangerous_env_prefix =
+ words
+ .iter()
+ .take_while(|word| word.contains('='))
+ .any(|word| {
+ let name = word
+ .split('=')
+ .next()
+ .unwrap_or_default()
+ .to_ascii_uppercase();
+ matches!(
+ name.as_str(),
+ "LD_PRELOAD"
+ | "LD_LIBRARY_PATH"
+ | "DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES"
+ | "DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH"
+ | "PATH"
+ )
+ });
+ let executor = matches!(
+ normalized_name.as_str(),
+ "sh" | "bash"
+ | "zsh"
+ | "fish"
+ | "python"
+ | "python2"
+ | "python3"
+ | "node"
+ | "ruby"
+ | "perl"
+ | "php"
+ | "lua"
+ | "awk"
+ | "xargs"
+ );
+ let class = classify_host_command(&normalized_name, &arguments, &lower);
+ analysis.hidden_execution |= lower.contains("$(")
+ || lower.contains("<(")
+ || lower.contains(">(")
+ || source.contains('`')
+ || has_background_operator(&source);
+ analysis.expansion |= source.contains('$') || source.contains('`');
+ analysis.background |= has_background_operator(&source);
+ analysis.tee |= words
+ .iter()
+ .any(|word| word == &"tee" || word.ends_with("/tee"));
+ analysis.literal_words.extend(
+ words
+ .iter()
+ .map(|word| {
+ word.trim_matches(|c: char| matches!(c, '\'' | '"' | '<' | '>' | '&' | '|'))
+ .to_owned()
+ })
+ .filter(|word| !word.is_empty()),
+ );
+ analysis.segments.push(CommandSegment {
+ source: source.clone(),
+ command: source.clone(),
+ basename: basename.to_owned(),
+ normalized_name,
+ arguments,
+ class,
+ leading_env_assignment,
+ dangerous_env_prefix,
+ executor,
+ });
+ }
+ analysis
+ }
+}
+
+fn has_background_operator(source: &str) -> bool {
+ let bytes = source.as_bytes();
+ bytes.iter().enumerate().any(|(index, byte)| {
+ *byte == b'&'
+ && bytes.get(index + 1) != Some(&b'&')
+ && (index == 0 || bytes[index - 1] != b'&')
+ && (index == 0 || bytes[index - 1] != b'>')
+ })
+}
+
+pub(super) fn classify_host_command(base: &str, args: &[String], source: &str) -> CommandClass {
+ if matches!(
+ base,
+ "sudo"
+ | "su"
+ | "mkfs"
+ | "dd"
+ | "shutdown"
+ | "reboot"
+ | "halt"
+ | "poweroff"
+ | "useradd"
+ | "userdel"
+ | "usermod"
+ | "passwd"
+ ) || source.contains("rm -rf /")
+ || source.contains("rm -fr /")
+ || source.contains(":(){:|:&};:")
+ {
+ return CommandClass::Destructive;
+ }
+ if matches!(
+ base,
+ "curl" | "wget" | "ssh" | "scp" | "sftp" | "ftp" | "telnet" | "nc" | "ncat" | "netcat"
+ ) {
+ return CommandClass::Network;
+ }
+ let first = args.first().map(String::as_str).unwrap_or_default();
+ if matches!(base, "npm" | "pnpm" | "yarn" | "pip" | "pip3")
+ && matches!(first, "install" | "add" | "remove" | "uninstall" | "update")
+ || base == "cargo" && matches!(first, "add" | "remove" | "install" | "update")
+ {
+ return CommandClass::Install;
+ }
+ if matches!(
+ base,
+ "ls" | "pwd"
+ | "cat"
+ | "head"
+ | "tail"
+ | "grep"
+ | "rg"
+ | "find"
+ | "stat"
+ | "wc"
+ | "sort"
+ | "echo"
+ | "printf"
+ | "whoami"
+ | "date"
+ ) || base == "git" && matches!(first, "status" | "diff" | "log" | "show" | "branch")
+ || base == "cargo" && matches!(first, "check" | "test" | "tree" | "metadata")
+ {
+ return CommandClass::Read;
+ }
+ CommandClass::Write
+}
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_checks.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_checks.rs
index 40ffb8291e..47ae089a74 100644
--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_checks.rs
+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/command_checks.rs
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use super::CommandAnalysis;
+use super::command_analysis::classify_host_command;
+
#[cfg(test)]
use super::types::CommandRiskLevel;
use super::types::{AutonomyLevel, GateDecision, SecurityPolicy};
@@ -23,8 +26,7 @@ fn command_basename(command: &str) -> &str {
#[cfg(test)]
fn normalized_command_name(command: &str) -> String {
- command_basename(command.trim_matches(|c: char| matches!(c, '\'' | '"')))
- .to_ascii_lowercase()
+ command_basename(command.trim_matches(|c: char| matches!(c, '\'' | '"'))).to_ascii_lowercase()
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -52,19 +54,28 @@ fn has_leading_env_assignment(command: &str) -> bool {
#[cfg(test)]
fn has_dangerous_env_prefix(command: &str) -> bool {
- command.split_whitespace().take_while(|word| word.contains('=')).any(|word| {
- matches!(
- word.split('=').next().unwrap_or_default().to_ascii_uppercase().as_str(),
- "LD_PRELOAD" | "LD_LIBRARY_PATH" | "DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES" | "DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH" | "PATH"
- )
- })
+ command
+ .split_whitespace()
+ .take_while(|word| word.contains('='))
+ .any(|word| {
+ matches!(
+ word.split('=')
+ .next()
+ .unwrap_or_default()
+ .to_ascii_uppercase()
+ .as_str(),
+ "LD_PRELOAD"
+ | "LD_LIBRARY_PATH"
+ | "DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES"
+ | "DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH"
+ | "PATH"
+ )
+ })
}
#[cfg(test)]
fn contains_unquoted_single_ampersand(command: &str) -> bool {
- contains_unquoted_char(command, '&')
- && !command.contains("&&")
- && !command.contains(">&")
+ contains_unquoted_char(command, '&') && !command.contains("&&") && !command.contains(">&")
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -80,8 +91,19 @@ fn has_hidden_execution(command: &str) -> bool {
fn is_command_executor(command: &str) -> bool {
matches!(
command,
- "sh" | "bash" | "zsh" | "fish" | "python" | "python2" | "python3" | "node"
- | "ruby" | "perl" | "php" | "lua" | "awk" | "xargs"
+ "sh" | "bash"
+ | "zsh"
+ | "fish"
+ | "python"
+ | "python2"
+ | "python3"
+ | "node"
+ | "ruby"
+ | "perl"
+ | "php"
+ | "lua"
+ | "awk"
+ | "xargs"
)
}
@@ -90,207 +112,6 @@ fn classify_segment(base: &str, args: &[String], joined: &str) -> CommandClass {
classify_host_command(base, args, joined)
}
-/// Host-owned interpretation of TinyBox's structural shell facts.
-///
-/// TinyBox reports live command segments and redirection only. OpenHuman adds
-/// the policy fields below locally so command permission and autonomy remain
-/// host decisions instead of bus-contract vocabulary.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
-pub(crate) struct CommandAnalysis {
- pub segments: Vec<CommandSegment>,
- pub hidden_execution: bool,
- pub redirection: bool,
- pub expansion: bool,
- pub tee: bool,
- pub background: bool,
- pub literal_words: Vec<String>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
-pub(crate) struct CommandSegment {
- pub source: String,
- pub command: String,
- pub basename: String,
- pub normalized_name: String,
- pub arguments: Vec<String>,
- pub class: CommandClass,
- pub leading_env_assignment: bool,
- pub dangerous_env_prefix: bool,
- pub executor: bool,
-}
-
-impl CommandAnalysis {
- pub(crate) fn from_shell_analysis(facts: tinybox_bus::ShellAnalysis) -> Self {
- let mut analysis = Self {
- segments: Vec::new(),
- hidden_execution: false,
- redirection: facts.redirection,
- expansion: false,
- tee: false,
- background: false,
- literal_words: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- for source in facts.segments {
- let words = source.split_whitespace().collect::<Vec<_>>();
- let Some(raw_command) = words.first().copied() else {
- continue;
- };
- let command = raw_command.trim_matches(|c: char| matches!(c, '\'' | '"'));
- let basename = command.rsplit(['/', '\\']).next().unwrap_or(command);
- let normalized_name = basename.to_ascii_lowercase();
- let arguments = words
- .iter()
- .skip(1)
- .map(|word| {
- word.trim_matches(|c: char| matches!(c, '\'' | '"'))
- .to_owned()
- })
- .collect::<Vec<_>>();
- let lower = source.to_ascii_lowercase();
- let leading_env_assignment = command.contains('=')
- && command.split_once('=').is_some_and(|(name, _)| {
- !name.is_empty() && name.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '_')
- });
- let dangerous_env_prefix =
- words
- .iter()
- .take_while(|word| word.contains('='))
- .any(|word| {
- let name = word
- .split('=')
- .next()
- .unwrap_or_default()
- .to_ascii_uppercase();
- matches!(
- name.as_str(),
- "LD_PRELOAD"
- | "LD_LIBRARY_PATH"
- | "DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES"
- | "DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH"
- | "PATH"
- )
- });
- let executor = matches!(
- normalized_name.as_str(),
- "sh" | "bash"
- | "zsh"
- | "fish"
- | "python"
- | "python2"
- | "python3"
- | "node"
- | "ruby"
- | "perl"
- | "php"
- | "lua"
- | "awk"
- | "xargs"
- );
- let class = classify_host_command(&normalized_name, &arguments, &lower);
- analysis.hidden_execution |= lower.contains("$(")
- || lower.contains("<(")
- || lower.contains(">(")
- || source.contains('`')
- || has_background_operator(&source);
- analysis.expansion |= source.contains('$') || source.contains('`');
- analysis.background |= has_background_operator(&source);
- analysis.tee |= words
- .iter()
- .any(|word| word == &"tee" || word.ends_with("/tee"));
- analysis.literal_words.extend(
- words
- .iter()
- .map(|word| {
- word.trim_matches(|c: char| matches!(c, '\'' | '"' | '<' | '>' | '&' | '|'))
- .to_owned()
- })
- .filter(|word| !word.is_empty()),
- );
- analysis.segments.push(CommandSegment {
- source: source.clone(),
- command: source.clone(),
- basename: basename.to_owned(),
- normalized_name,
- arguments,
- class,
- leading_env_assignment,
- dangerous_env_prefix,
- executor,
- });
- }
- analysis
- }
-}
-
-fn has_background_operator(source: &str) -> bool {
- let bytes = source.as_bytes();
- bytes.iter().enumerate().any(|(index, byte)| {
- *byte == b'&'
- && bytes.get(index + 1) != Some(&b'&')
- && (index == 0 || bytes[index - 1] != b'&')
- && (index == 0 || bytes[index - 1] != b'>')
- })
-}
-
-fn classify_host_command(base: &str, args: &[String], source: &str) -> CommandClass {
- if matches!(
- base,
- "sudo"
- | "su"
- | "mkfs"
- | "dd"
- | "shutdown"
- | "reboot"
- | "halt"
- | "poweroff"
- | "useradd"
- | "userdel"
- | "usermod"
- | "passwd"
- ) || source.contains("rm -rf /")
- || source.contains("rm -fr /")
- || source.contains(":(){:|:&};:")
- {
- return CommandClass::Destructive;
- }
- if matches!(
- base,
- "curl" | "wget" | "ssh" | "scp" | "sftp" | "ftp" | "telnet" | "nc" | "ncat" | "netcat"
- ) {
- return CommandClass::Network;
- }
- let first = args.first().map(String::as_str).unwrap_or_default();
- if matches!(base, "npm" | "pnpm" | "yarn" | "pip" | "pip3")
- && matches!(first, "install" | "add" | "remove" | "uninstall" | "update")
- || base == "cargo" && matches!(first, "add" | "remove" | "install" | "update")
- {
- return CommandClass::Install;
- }
- if matches!(
- base,
- "ls" | "pwd"
- | "cat"
- | "head"
- | "tail"
- | "grep"
- | "rg"
- | "find"
- | "stat"
- | "wc"
- | "sort"
- | "echo"
- | "printf"
- | "whoami"
- | "date"
- ) || base == "git" && matches!(first, "status" | "diff" | "log" | "show" | "branch")
- || base == "cargo" && matches!(first, "check" | "test" | "tree" | "metadata")
- {
- return CommandClass::Read;
- }
- CommandClass::Write
-}
-
impl SecurityPolicy {
/// Apply the supervised allowlist to parser facts returned by TinyBox.
/// The module owns shell structure; this host owns the permission policy.
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/mod.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/mod.rs
index c17558fe69..aefad182d4 100644
--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/mod.rs
+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/mod.rs
@@ -2,15 +2,16 @@
//! for the invariants this module enforces (workspace-internal path
//! protection, fail-closed command classification, always-forbidden paths).
+mod command_analysis;
mod command_checks;
mod enforcement;
mod path_checks;
mod types;
-pub(crate) use command_checks::CommandAnalysis;
+pub(crate) use command_analysis::CommandAnalysis;
#[cfg(test)]
-pub(crate) use command_checks::CommandSegment;
+pub(crate) use command_analysis::CommandSegment;
pub use enforcement::validate_path_within_root;
pub use enforcement::{ensure_openhuman_scratch_dir, openhuman_scratch_dir};
@@ -21,8 +22,8 @@ pub(crate) use path_checks::{
ALWAYS_FORBIDDEN_PREFIXES, SENSITIVE_COMPONENTS, SENSITIVE_FILES, SENSITIVE_PAIRS,
};
pub use types::{
- tool_result_artifacts_dir, ActionTracker, AutonomyLevel, CommandClass, CommandRiskLevel,
- GateDecision, SecurityPolicy, ToolOperation, TrustedAccess, TrustedRoot,
+ ActionTracker, AutonomyLevel, CommandClass, CommandRiskLevel, GateDecision, SecurityPolicy,
+ ToolOperation, TrustedAccess, TrustedRoot, tool_result_artifacts_dir,
};
#[cfg(test)]
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/path_checks.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/path_checks.rs
index 6b48350b97..a8bc9e7d9f 100644
--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/path_checks.rs
+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/path_checks.rs
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
-use super::types::{SecurityPolicy, TrustedAccess};
use super::types::{
- ACCOUNT_CONFIG_FILE, ARTIFACTS_DIR, ARTIFACT_TOOL_RESULTS_DIR, WORKSPACE_INTERNAL_DIRS,
+ ACCOUNT_CONFIG_FILE, ARTIFACT_TOOL_RESULTS_DIR, ARTIFACTS_DIR, WORKSPACE_INTERNAL_DIRS,
WORKSPACE_INTERNAL_FILES,
};
+use super::types::{SecurityPolicy, TrustedAccess};
use tinytools::status::POLICY_BLOCKED_MARKER;
/// Credential-store path segments, matched case-insensitively at any depth.
@@ -224,11 +224,11 @@ impl SecurityPolicy {
.unwrap_or(forbidden_expanded);
if canonical.starts_with(&forbidden_canonical) {
log::trace!(
- "[security:policy] path blocked: symlink resolves to forbidden tree (requested={}, resolved={}, forbidden={})",
- path,
- canonical.display(),
- forbidden_canonical.display()
- );
+ "[security:policy] path blocked: symlink resolves to forbidden tree (requested={}, resolved={}, forbidden={})",
+ path,
+ canonical.display(),
+ forbidden_canonical.display()
+ );
return false;
}
}
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_action_dir_tests.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_action_dir_tests.rs
index 1c8b2f2c47..7f2f528e67 100644
--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_action_dir_tests.rs
+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_action_dir_tests.rs
@@ -109,10 +109,12 @@ async fn tool_result_artifacts_are_readable_by_absolute_path_under_workspace_onl
let grant = super::tool_result_artifacts_dir(&workspace)
.to_string_lossy()
.to_string();
- assert!(policy
- .trusted_roots
- .iter()
- .any(|r| r.path == grant && r.access == TrustedAccess::Read));
+ assert!(
+ policy
+ .trusted_roots
+ .iter()
+ .any(|r| r.path == grant && r.access == TrustedAccess::Read)
+ );
let result = artifacts.join("call.txt");
policy
@@ -120,8 +122,10 @@ async fn tool_result_artifacts_are_readable_by_absolute_path_under_workspace_onl
.await
.expect("a tool-result artifact must be readable by absolute path");
// The grant is that directory only: internal artifact records stay closed.
- assert!(policy
- .validate_path(&record.join("meta.json").to_string_lossy())
- .await
- .is_err());
+ assert!(
+ policy
+ .validate_path(&record.join("meta.json").to_string_lossy())
+ .await
+ .is_err()
+ );
}
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_allowlist_tests.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_allowlist_tests.rs
index 84cd1c3b5c..399307c611 100644
--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_allowlist_tests.rs
+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_allowlist_tests.rs
@@ -36,9 +36,10 @@ fn can_act_full_true() {
#[test]
fn enforce_tool_operation_read_allowed_in_readonly_mode() {
let p = readonly_policy();
- assert!(p
- .enforce_tool_operation(ToolOperation::Read, "memory_recall")
- .is_ok());
+ assert!(
+ p.enforce_tool_operation(ToolOperation::Read, "memory_recall")
+ .is_ok()
+ );
}
#[test]
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_media_artifact_tests.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_media_artifact_tests.rs
index 9fc01a02c7..51fb563adf 100644
--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_media_artifact_tests.rs
+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_media_artifact_tests.rs
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
use super::*;
-use crate::artifacts::{create_artifact, finalize_artifact, ArtifactKind, FileRoots};
+use crate::artifacts::{ArtifactKind, FileRoots, create_artifact, finalize_artifact};
use std::sync::Arc;
use tempfile::TempDir;
@@ -64,18 +64,24 @@ async fn ready_media_artifacts_are_readable_but_other_files_are_not() {
..SecurityPolicy::default()
};
- assert!(policy
- .validate_path(&image_path.to_string_lossy())
- .await
- .is_ok());
- assert!(policy
- .validate_path(&document_path.to_string_lossy())
- .await
- .is_err());
- assert!(policy
- .validate_path(&pending_path.to_string_lossy())
- .await
- .is_err());
+ assert!(
+ policy
+ .validate_path(&image_path.to_string_lossy())
+ .await
+ .is_ok()
+ );
+ assert!(
+ policy
+ .validate_path(&document_path.to_string_lossy())
+ .await
+ .is_err()
+ );
+ assert!(
+ policy
+ .validate_path(&pending_path.to_string_lossy())
+ .await
+ .is_err()
+ );
crate::artifacts::store::delete_artifact(&workspace, FileRoots::new(files), &image.id)
.await
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_paths_and_risk_tests.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_paths_and_risk_tests.rs
index e7a790a2c8..04eef3b529 100644
--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_paths_and_risk_tests.rs
+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_paths_and_risk_tests.rs
@@ -370,14 +370,16 @@ fn relative_personalities_path_resolves_under_action_dir() {
};
assert!(policy.is_path_string_allowed("personalities/alice.md"));
- assert!(!policy.is_path_string_allowed(
- workspace
- .join("personalities")
- .join("alice")
- .join("SOUL.md")
- .to_string_lossy()
- .as_ref()
- ));
+ assert!(
+ !policy.is_path_string_allowed(
+ workspace
+ .join("personalities")
+ .join("alice")
+ .join("SOUL.md")
+ .to_string_lossy()
+ .as_ref()
+ )
+ );
}
#[test]
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_trusted_roots_tests.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_trusted_roots_tests.rs
index c0df8164bf..b16dfd415d 100644
--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_trusted_roots_tests.rs
+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_trusted_roots_tests.rs
@@ -177,10 +177,12 @@ async fn validate_parent_path_blocks_symlinked_parent_dir() {
forbidden_paths: vec![],
..SecurityPolicy::default()
};
- assert!(policy
- .validate_parent_path("subdir/newfile.txt")
- .await
- .is_err());
+ assert!(
+ policy
+ .validate_parent_path("subdir/newfile.txt")
+ .await
+ .is_err()
+ );
}
#[cfg(unix)]
@@ -224,10 +226,12 @@ async fn validate_parent_path_blocks_forbidden_path() {
..SecurityPolicy::default()
};
// Writing a new file directly into the forbidden dir must be blocked.
- assert!(policy
- .validate_parent_path("secrets/output.csv")
- .await
- .is_err());
+ assert!(
+ policy
+ .validate_parent_path("secrets/output.csv")
+ .await
+ .is_err()
+ );
}
// ── tilde expansion in validate_path / validate_parent_path ──────────────────
@@ -458,9 +462,10 @@ fn supervised_runs_approved_redirects_but_blocks_hidden_execution() {
.is_ok(),
"stderr-dup redirect 2>&1 must run after approval"
);
- assert!(p
- .check_gated_command("pip show yfinance 2>/dev/null")
- .is_ok());
+ assert!(
+ p.check_gated_command("pip show yfinance 2>/dev/null")
+ .is_ok()
+ );
assert!(p.check_gated_command("ls -la | grep foo").is_ok());
assert!(p.check_gated_command("echo done > out.txt").is_ok());
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_workspace_internal_tests.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_workspace_internal_tests.rs
index e767432dbe..261653d814 100644
--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_workspace_internal_tests.rs
+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/policy/policy_workspace_internal_tests.rs
@@ -20,10 +20,12 @@ fn is_workspace_internal_path_blocks_state_dirs() {
assert!(policy.is_workspace_internal_path(&ws.join("memory").join("namespaces")));
assert!(policy.is_workspace_internal_path(&ws.join("memory-alice").join("memory.db")));
assert!(policy.is_workspace_internal_path(&ws.join("memory_tree-alice").join("tree")));
- assert!(policy.is_workspace_internal_path(
- &ws.join("session_raw-alice")
- .join("1700000000_orchestrator.jsonl")
- ));
+ assert!(
+ policy.is_workspace_internal_path(
+ &ws.join("session_raw-alice")
+ .join("1700000000_orchestrator.jsonl")
+ )
+ );
assert!(policy.is_workspace_internal_path(&ws.join("sessions")));
assert!(policy.is_workspace_internal_path(&ws.join("state")));
assert!(policy.is_workspace_internal_path(&ws.join("cron")));
@@ -31,13 +33,15 @@ fn is_workspace_internal_path_blocks_state_dirs() {
assert!(
policy.is_workspace_internal_path(&ws.join("personalities").join("alice").join("SOUL.md"))
);
- assert!(policy.is_workspace_internal_path(
- &ws.join("personalities")
- .join("alice")
- .join("skills")
- .join("private-skill")
- .join("SKILL.md")
- ));
+ assert!(
+ policy.is_workspace_internal_path(
+ &ws.join("personalities")
+ .join("alice")
+ .join("skills")
+ .join("private-skill")
+ .join("SKILL.md")
+ )
+ );
assert!(policy.is_workspace_internal_path(&ws.join("approval")));
assert!(policy.is_workspace_internal_path(&ws.join("mcp_clients")));
assert!(policy.is_workspace_internal_path(&ws.join("codegraph")));
@@ -120,17 +124,21 @@ async fn artifact_metadata_is_internal_but_tool_results_are_not() {
let meta = record.join("meta.json");
assert!(!policy.is_path_string_allowed(&meta.to_string_lossy()));
assert!(policy.validate_path(&meta.to_string_lossy()).await.is_err());
- assert!(policy
- .validate_parent_path(&record.join("args.json").to_string_lossy())
- .await
- .is_err());
+ assert!(
+ policy
+ .validate_parent_path(&record.join("args.json").to_string_lossy())
+ .await
+ .is_err()
+ );
let result = results.join("call-1.txt");
assert!(policy.is_path_string_allowed(&result.to_string_lossy()));
- assert!(policy
- .validate_path(&result.to_string_lossy())
- .await
- .is_ok());
+ assert!(
+ policy
+ .validate_path(&result.to_string_lossy())
+ .await
+ .is_ok()
+ );
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -154,14 +162,16 @@ async fn trusted_root_cannot_expose_workspace_internal_state() {
assert!(!policy.is_path_string_allowed(&soul.to_string_lossy()));
assert!(policy.validate_path(&soul.to_string_lossy()).await.is_err());
- assert!(policy
- .validate_parent_path(
- &ws.join("session_raw-alice")
- .join("new.jsonl")
- .to_string_lossy()
- )
- .await
- .is_err());
+ assert!(
+ policy
+ .validate_parent_path(
+ &ws.join("session_raw-alice")
+ .join("new.jsonl")
+ .to_string_lossy()
+ )
+ .await
+ .is_err()
+ );
}
#[test]
@@ -212,13 +222,17 @@ async fn the_account_config_beside_the_workspace_is_internal() {
};
assert!(!policy.is_path_string_allowed(&config.to_string_lossy()));
- assert!(policy
- .validate_path(&config.to_string_lossy())
- .await
- .is_err());
- assert!(policy
- .validate_parent_path(&config.to_string_lossy())
- .await
- .is_err());
+ assert!(
+ policy
+ .validate_path(&config.to_string_lossy())
+ .await
+ .is_err()
+ );
+ assert!(
+ policy
+ .validate_parent_path(&config.to_string_lossy())
+ .await
+ .is_err()
+ );
assert!(policy.validate_path(&notes.to_string_lossy()).await.is_ok());
}