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fix(secret_storage): fail closed on profile reads without secret-file
Steven Enamakel595baf38f813
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend.rsindex 90cfb66984..d33a01afc8 100644--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend.rs+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend.rs@@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ use zeroize::Zeroizing;#[path = "encrypted_file_backend/key_source.rs"]pub mod key_source;-use key_source::{env_value, master_key_from_env, read_master_key_file};-#[cfg(all(test, unix))]-use key_source::key_file_mode_is_other_writable;+use key_source::{env_value, master_key_from_env};/// Environment variable carrying the master key inline as `2 * KEY_LEN` hex/// characters (`openssl rand -hex 32`). Lets a headless `openhuman-core@@ -256,6 +254,34 @@ fn try_load_master_key() -> Result<([u8; KEY_LEN], String), MasterKeyError> {.map_err(|e| MasterKeyError::Configured(e.to_string()))}+/// Reads the file named by [`MASTER_KEY_FILE_ENV`].+///+/// On Unix a key file must not be writable by other users. Read-only group or+/// other permissions are supported for container secret mounts, where the+/// runtime may add group-read access for a non-root core.+fn read_master_key_file(path: &Path) -> Result<String, String> {+ #[cfg(unix)]+ {+ use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;+ let metadata = std::fs::metadata(path).map_err(|e| {+ format!("cannot inspect master key file permissions ({MASTER_KEY_FILE_ENV}): {e}")+ })?;+ let mode = metadata.permissions().mode() & 0o777;+ if key_file_mode_is_other_writable(mode) {+ return Err(format!(+ "master key file ({MASTER_KEY_FILE_ENV}) is writable by other users; \+ restrict it to a read-only secret mount"+ ));+ }+ }+ std::fs::read_to_string(path).map_err(|e| format!("cannot read master key file: {e}"))+}++#[cfg(unix)]+fn key_file_mode_is_other_writable(mode: u32) -> bool {+ mode & 0o002 != 0+}+/// Decodes a master key supplied as exactly `2 * KEY_LEN` hex characters./// The value never appears in the error.fn parse_master_key_hex(hex: &str) -> Result<[u8; KEY_LEN], String> {diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend/key_source.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend/key_source.rsindex 1dd9335f4b..1dc3867f7b 100644--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend/key_source.rs+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend/key_source.rs@@ -140,39 +140,12 @@ pub(super) fn workspace_master_key(}}-/// Reads the file named by [`MASTER_KEY_FILE_ENV`].-///-/// On Unix a key file must not be writable by other users. Read-only group or-/// other permissions are supported for container secret mounts, where the-/// runtime may add group-read access for a non-root core.-pub(super) fn read_master_key_file(path: &Path) -> Result<String, String> {- #[cfg(unix)]- {- use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;- let metadata = std::fs::metadata(path).map_err(|e| {- format!("cannot inspect master key file permissions ({MASTER_KEY_FILE_ENV}): {e}")- })?;- let mode = metadata.permissions().mode() & 0o777;- if key_file_mode_is_other_writable(mode) {- return Err(format!(- "master key file ({MASTER_KEY_FILE_ENV}) is writable by other users; \- restrict it to a read-only secret mount"- ));- }- }- std::fs::read_to_string(path).map_err(|e| format!("cannot read master key file: {e}"))-}--#[cfg(unix)]-pub(super) fn key_file_mode_is_other_writable(mode: u32) -> bool {- mode & 0o002 != 0-}-/// Resolves a key for a profile-scoped diagnostic read without creating or/// changing key state. Explicit operator key variables retain their normal/// precedence; otherwise only an existing key file beneath `workspace` is/// considered. Host key sources are excluded because they can prompt or mint.-/// Only the encrypted-file backend reads profiles this way.+/// Only the encrypted-file backend reads profiles; without `secret-file` the+/// placeholder backend refuses the read instead.#[cfg(feature = "secret-file")]pub(super) fn profile_master_key_read_only(workspace: &Path,@@ -184,7 +157,7 @@ pub(super) fn profile_master_key_read_only(if let Some((key, _)) = master_key_from_env(inline.as_deref(),file.as_deref(),- read_master_key_file,+ super::read_master_key_file,).map_err(SecretStorageError::Backend)?{diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend_disabled.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend_disabled.rsindex ddccdabcb3..fe5c8fa9f5 100644--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend_disabled.rs+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend_disabled.rs@@ -85,6 +85,17 @@ impl EncryptedFileBackend {}}+impl EncryptedFileBackend {+ /// A profile-scoped read-only lookup, as the enabled backend offers it.+ /// There is no encrypted file to read, so it fails closed.+ pub fn get_profile_read_only(+ &self,+ _namespaced_key: &str,+ ) -> Result<Option<String>, SecretStorageError> {+ Err(unavailable())+ }+}+impl SecretBackend for EncryptedFileBackend {fn get(&self, _: &str) -> Result<Option<String>, SecretStorageError> {Err(unavailable())diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend_disabled_tests.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend_disabled_tests.rsindex d89ce7b205..9fe1f82a8d 100644--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend_disabled_tests.rs+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/secret_storage/encrypted_file_backend_disabled_tests.rs@@ -15,3 +15,13 @@ fn selecting_encrypted_file_fails_closed_when_the_feature_is_disabled() {.to_string().contains("enable the secret-file feature"));}++#[test]+fn a_read_only_profile_lookup_fails_closed_when_the_feature_is_disabled() {+ let backend = EncryptedFileBackend::new(Path::new("unused"));+ assert!(backend+ .get_profile_read_only("user/token")+ .unwrap_err()+ .to_string()+ .contains("enable the secret-file feature"));+}diff --git a/scripts/ci/self-hosted/lanes-plan.mjs b/scripts/ci/self-hosted/lanes-plan.mjsindex d58d56d865..d3dd3ebf52 100644--- a/scripts/ci/self-hosted/lanes-plan.mjs+++ b/scripts/ci/self-hosted/lanes-plan.mjs@@ -463,6 +463,13 @@ export function buildPlan({ profile, areas, env = {}, isPullRequest = true }) {when: core,run: "cargo check -p openhuman-embed --no-default-features",},+ // Hosts such as Chottu run modules with neither legacy storage import+ // nor the encrypted secrets file; both are gated separately.+ {+ name: "embed-check-no-default-modules",+ when: core,+ run: "bash scripts/ci-cancel-aware.sh cargo check -p openhuman-embed --no-default-features --features modules",+ },// Consumers such as TinySweeper enable tracing without native modules.{name: "embed-check-no-default-langfuse",