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fix(app): verify the deep-link peer on the connected socket

M3gA-Mind7aa06fda8f19
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-app/Cargo.toml b/crates/openhuman-app/Cargo.toml
index c90b419fcf..6f314bd5c8 100644
--- a/crates/openhuman-app/Cargo.toml
+++ b/crates/openhuman-app/Cargo.toml
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ async-trait = "0.1"
# rather than reaching for a heavier image stack.
[target.'cfg(unix)'.dependencies]
-nix = { version = "0.29", default-features = false, features = ["hostname", "signal", "user"] }
+nix = { version = "0.29", default-features = false, features = ["hostname", "signal", "socket", "user"] }
[target.'cfg(target_os = "macos")'.dependencies]
objc2 = "0.6"
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-app/src/deep_link_ipc.rs b/crates/openhuman-app/src/deep_link_ipc.rs
index 3d904d0422..7419fbf5ec 100644
--- a/crates/openhuman-app/src/deep_link_ipc.rs
+++ b/crates/openhuman-app/src/deep_link_ipc.rs
@@ -110,24 +110,24 @@ fn try_forward_urls(urls: &[String], path: &Path) -> ForwardResult {
try_forward_urls_as(urls, path, nix::unistd::getuid().as_raw())
}
-/// Whether the socket file at `path` belongs to `uid`. The /tmp fallback path
-/// is in a shared directory, so another local user can pre-create it to
-/// receive forwarded `openhuman://auth?token=…` links; only our own socket is
-/// trusted.
-fn socket_owned_by(path: &Path, uid: u32) -> bool {
+/// The owner uid of the socket file at `path`, or `None` when it does not
+/// exist. The /tmp fallback path is in a shared directory, so another local
+/// user can pre-create it.
+fn socket_owner(path: &Path) -> Option<u32> {
use std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt;
- std::fs::symlink_metadata(path).is_ok_and(|meta| meta.uid() == uid)
+ std::fs::symlink_metadata(path).ok().map(|meta| meta.uid())
+}
+
+/// The uid of the process on the other end of a connected socket
+/// (`SO_PEERCRED`). Checked on the stream itself, so a socket swapped in at the
+/// path between any file check and `connect` cannot receive the URLs.
+fn peer_uid(stream: &UnixStream) -> Option<u32> {
+ nix::sys::socket::getsockopt(stream, nix::sys::socket::sockopt::PeerCredentials)
+ .ok()
+ .map(|credentials| credentials.uid())
}
fn try_forward_urls_as(urls: &[String], path: &Path, uid: u32) -> ForwardResult {
- if path.exists() && !socket_owned_by(path, uid) {
- log::warn!(
- "[deep-link-ipc] secondary: socket at {} is owned by another user; \
- not forwarding deep links to it",
- path.display()
- );
- return ForwardResult::NoPrimary;
- }
log::info!(
"[deep-link-ipc] secondary: found {} deep-link URL(s), trying socket at {}",
urls.len(),
@@ -136,6 +136,15 @@ fn try_forward_urls_as(urls: &[String], path: &Path, uid: u32) -> ForwardResult
match UnixStream::connect(path) {
Ok(mut stream) => {
+ // Only our own primary may receive `openhuman://auth?token=…`.
+ if peer_uid(&stream) != Some(uid) {
+ log::warn!(
+ "[deep-link-ipc] secondary: socket at {} is held by another user; \
+ not forwarding deep links to it",
+ path.display()
+ );
+ return ForwardResult::NoPrimary;
+ }
stream.set_write_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(2))).ok();
let result = forward_connected_stream(&mut stream, urls);
if matches!(result, ForwardResult::Forwarded) {
@@ -231,7 +240,9 @@ pub(crate) fn bind_and_listen() -> Option<DeepLinkSocketGuard> {
Ok(l) => l,
Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AddrInUse => {
// Another user's socket is neither our primary nor ours to unlink.
- if !socket_owned_by(&path, nix::unistd::getuid().as_raw()) {
+ // One that vanished since `bind` (an old instance exiting) falls
+ // through to the rebind below.
+ if socket_owner(&path).is_some_and(|owner| owner != nix::unistd::getuid().as_raw()) {
log::warn!(
"[deep-link-ipc] socket {} is owned by another user; \
deep-link forwarding disabled for this session",
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-app/src/deep_link_ipc_tests.rs b/crates/openhuman-app/src/deep_link_ipc_tests.rs
index 6904752731..9b4844ea53 100644
--- a/crates/openhuman-app/src/deep_link_ipc_tests.rs
+++ b/crates/openhuman-app/src/deep_link_ipc_tests.rs
@@ -148,21 +148,23 @@ fn round_trip_bind_connect_forward() {
}
#[test]
-fn a_socket_owned_by_another_user_receives_nothing() {
+fn a_socket_held_by_another_user_receives_nothing() {
+ use std::io::Read;
let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
let sock_path = tmp.path().join("squatted-deeplink.sock");
let listener = UnixListener::bind(&sock_path).unwrap();
- listener.set_nonblocking(true).unwrap();
let me = nix::unistd::getuid().as_raw();
- assert!(socket_owned_by(&sock_path, me));
+ assert_eq!(socket_owner(&sock_path), Some(me));
+ assert_eq!(socket_owner(&tmp.path().join("missing.sock")), None);
- // Forwarding as a different user: our socket is "foreign" to them.
+ // Forwarding as a different user: our listener is "foreign" to them.
let urls = vec!["openhuman://auth?token=secret".to_string()];
let result = try_forward_urls_as(&urls, &sock_path, me.wrapping_add(1));
assert!(matches!(result, ForwardResult::NoPrimary));
- assert!(
- listener.accept().is_err(),
- "nothing may connect to a socket owned by someone else"
- );
+ // The peer check ran on the connected stream, so nothing was written.
+ let (mut accepted, _) = listener.accept().unwrap();
+ let mut received = String::new();
+ accepted.read_to_string(&mut received).unwrap();
+ assert!(received.is_empty(), "token leaked: {received:?}");
}