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fix(security): the core RPC token file is always owner-only and never a symlink

M3gA-Mindb551067bb2ee
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/pairing.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/pairing.rs
index cd2ffb43cb..12d450e4d3 100644
--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/pairing.rs
+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/pairing.rs
@@ -107,12 +107,17 @@ fn write_core_token_file(path: &Path, token: &str) -> std::io::Result<()> {
#[cfg(unix)]
{
+ use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
+ // `mode` applies only when the file is created, so tighten an existing
+ // file too; refuse to follow a symlink planted at the token path.
let mut file = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
.write(true)
.create(true)
.truncate(true)
.mode(0o600)
+ .custom_flags(libc::O_NOFOLLOW)
.open(path)?;
+ file.set_permissions(std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))?;
file.write_all(token.as_bytes())?;
}
diff --git a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/pairing_tests.rs b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/pairing_tests.rs
index e544144c8b..b6ca13ad4e 100644
--- a/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/pairing_tests.rs
+++ b/crates/openhuman-core/src/security/pairing_tests.rs
@@ -69,3 +69,35 @@ async fn public_bind_uses_nonempty_env_token_without_writing_file() {
assert!(!tmp.join("core.token").exists());
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&tmp).ok();
}
+
+/// `mode(0o600)` only applies on create: a token rewritten over an existing
+/// world-readable file must still end up owner-only.
+#[cfg(unix)]
+#[test]
+async fn rewriting_the_token_tightens_an_existing_file_to_owner_only() {
+ use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
+ let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+ let path = tmp.path().join("core.token");
+ std::fs::write(&path, "old").unwrap();
+ std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o644)).unwrap();
+
+ write_core_token_file(&path, "new-token").unwrap();
+
+ let mode = std::fs::metadata(&path).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777;
+ assert_eq!(mode, 0o600, "token file left at {mode:o}");
+ assert_eq!(std::fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap(), "new-token");
+}
+
+/// A symlink planted at the token path must not redirect the bearer token.
+#[cfg(unix)]
+#[test]
+async fn the_token_is_not_written_through_a_symlink() {
+ let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+ let target = tmp.path().join("elsewhere");
+ std::fs::write(&target, "untouched").unwrap();
+ let path = tmp.path().join("core.token");
+ std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&target, &path).unwrap();
+
+ assert!(write_core_token_file(&path, "secret-token").is_err());
+ assert_eq!(std::fs::read_to_string(&target).unwrap(), "untouched");
+}