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fix(plugins): run process: programs through their PATH-found link (#2007)
arookieofc4ef4adf9b326
diff --git a/crates/ide-extension/src/ledger.rs b/crates/ide-extension/src/ledger.rsindex 19128165a..89a9f9f6c 100644--- a/crates/ide-extension/src/ledger.rs+++ b/crates/ide-extension/src/ledger.rs@@ -308,6 +308,13 @@ pub fn by_risk(caps: &[Capability]) -> Vec<(Risk, Vec<Capability>)> {/// Resolves a `process:` program to an absolute path once, at grant time:/// absolute names are taken as is, others are looked up in `path_var`.+/// The directory is canonicalized but the file name kept as found: `cargo`,+/// `rustc` and friends are often links to a multicall shim (rustup, asdf,+/// mise) that picks the tool by the name it was invoked under — resolving the+/// link itself would start the shim with the tool's arguments. The grant+/// still pins the target's content: a hash read through a link reads the file+/// it points to, so relinking or replacing either still fails the+/// approved-file check.pub fn resolve_program(name: &str, path_var: Option<&OsStr>) -> Result<PathBuf, String> {let candidate = Path::new(name);if candidate.is_absolute() {@@ -325,15 +332,21 @@ pub fn resolve_program(name: &str, path_var: Option<&OsStr>) -> Result<PathBuf,for ext in &exts {let p = dir.join(format!("{name}{ext}"));if is_executable(&p) {- return Ok(dunce_canonical(&p));+ return Ok(canonical_dir(&p));}}}Err(format!("{name} was not found on PATH"))}-fn dunce_canonical(p: &Path) -> PathBuf {- std::fs::canonicalize(p).unwrap_or_else(|_| p.to_path_buf())+/// `p` with its parent canonicalized but the file name as found: PATH+/// entries like `/var` → `/private/var` (macOS) or `~` links collapse to+/// their real directory, while a linked program (`cargo` → rustup) keeps+/// its link name so the shim still dispatches on argv[0].+fn canonical_dir(p: &Path) -> PathBuf {+ let Some(dir) = p.parent() else { return p.to_path_buf() };+ let Some(name) = p.file_name() else { return p.to_path_buf() };+ std::fs::canonicalize(dir).map(|d| d.join(name)).unwrap_or_else(|_| p.to_path_buf())}fn is_executable(p: &Path) -> bool {@@ -474,6 +487,42 @@ mod tests {assert!(l.check_binary(&r.subject, &cap).unwrap_err().contains("changed"));}+ /// A program found as a link stays the link: multicall shims (rustup,+ /// asdf, mise) pick the tool by the name they were invoked under, so+ /// `Command::new` must see the link. The hash still covers the target —+ /// reading through the link reads it — so replacing either still trips+ /// the approved-file check.+ #[cfg(unix)]+ #[test]+ fn linked_programs_resolve_to_the_link() {+ use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;+ let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();+ let bin_dir = tmp.path().join("bin");+ let real_dir = tmp.path().join("real");+ std::fs::create_dir(&bin_dir).unwrap();+ std::fs::create_dir(&real_dir).unwrap();+ let target = real_dir.join("shim");+ std::fs::write(&target, "#!/bin/sh\necho v1\n").unwrap();+ std::fs::set_permissions(&target, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();+ std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&target, bin_dir.join("cargo")).unwrap();++ let path_var = std::env::join_paths([bin_dir.clone()]).unwrap();+ let resolved = resolve_program("cargo", Some(&path_var)).unwrap();+ // Directory canonicalized, file name kept — still the link.+ let want = std::fs::canonicalize(&bin_dir).unwrap().join("cargo");+ assert_eq!(resolved, want);+ assert!(resolved.symlink_metadata().unwrap().file_type().is_symlink());++ let mut l = Ledger::in_memory();+ let r = req("1.0.0", "h", &["process:cargo"], &[]);+ let cap: Capability = "process:cargo".parse().unwrap();+ let bin = BinaryGrant { path: resolved.clone(), hash: file_hash(&resolved).unwrap() };+ l.confirm(&r, &[], [(cap.to_string(), bin)].into());+ assert_eq!(l.check_binary(&r.subject, &cap).unwrap(), resolved);+ std::fs::write(&target, "#!/bin/sh\necho evil\n").unwrap();+ assert!(l.check_binary(&r.subject, &cap).unwrap_err().contains("changed"));+ }+#[test]fn hashes_and_grouping() {let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();diff --git a/crates/ide-plugin/src/runtime.rs b/crates/ide-plugin/src/runtime.rsindex fc13fe8e9..b3e26c02c 100644--- a/crates/ide-plugin/src/runtime.rs+++ b/crates/ide-plugin/src/runtime.rs@@ -1650,6 +1650,7 @@ mod tests {operations: Vec::new(),open: None,data: None,+ file_action: false,};assert_eq!(code_action_to_wit(&action).edits[0].path, expected);}