Open-source status page, incident response and uptime monitoring
TypeScript alertingincident-managementmcpmcp-servermonitoringmonitoring-as-codeobservabilityon-callopen-sourcesrestatus-pagestatuspagesynthetic-monitoringterraformtinybirdtursouptimeuptime-checkeruptime-monitor
"use server";
import { resolveClientIp } from "@openstatus/services/page-access";
import { getWorkspaceByVerifiedSsoDomain } from "@openstatus/services/sso";
import { AuthError } from "next-auth";
import { cookies, headers } from "next/headers";
import { signIn } from "@/lib/auth";
import { ssoLookupRateLimit } from "@/lib/rate-limit/sso-lookup";
import { SSO_ORG_COOKIE } from "@/lib/sso-cookie";
const hasWorkOS = Boolean(
process.env.AUTH_WORKOS_ID && process.env.AUTH_WORKOS_SECRET,
);
// Same-origin paths only; the Auth.js `redirect` callback is the second line
// of defense, not the first.
function sanitizeRedirectTo(raw: FormDataEntryValue | null) {
const value = String(raw ?? "");
return value.startsWith("/") && !value.startsWith("//") ? value : undefined;
}
export type EmailFormState = { sent?: boolean; error?: string };
// One message for every refusal (bad address, disposable domain, throttled,
// send failure): the form must not tell a caller which addresses exist or
// what we filter. The screening itself runs in the Resend provider.
const EMAIL_ERROR =
"We couldn't send a sign-in link to that address. Try GitHub or Google.";
/**
* Routes by domain: a verified SSO domain goes to the identity provider,
* everything else gets a magic link. SSO is an additional way in, not a
* replacement (GitHub and Google stay available), so an SSO-domain address
* that reaches the Resend provider directly is still allowed.
*/
export async function continueWithEmail(
_prevState: EmailFormState,
formData: FormData,
): Promise<EmailFormState> {
const email = String(formData.get("email") ?? "").trim();
if (!email.includes("@")) return { error: EMAIL_ERROR };
const redirectTo = sanitizeRedirectTo(formData.get("redirectTo"));
if (hasWorkOS) {
const ip = resolveClientIp(await headers()) ?? "unknown";
// The lookup limiter guards the SSO-domain oracle, not the login: once it
// trips (shared office IP), the address takes the magic-link path instead.
const workspace = (await ssoLookupRateLimit(ip))
? await getWorkspaceByVerifiedSsoDomain(email).catch((e: unknown) => {
// A lookup outage must not take the magic link down with it.
console.warn("sso domain lookup failed, sending magic link", e);
return null;
})
: null;
if (workspace?.workosOrganizationId) {
const cookieStore = await cookies();
cookieStore.set(SSO_ORG_COOKIE, workspace.workosOrganizationId, {
httpOnly: true,
secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === "production",
sameSite: "lax",
maxAge: 60 * 10,
path: "/",
});
await signIn(
"workos",
{ redirectTo: redirectTo ?? "/overview" },
{ organization: workspace.workosOrganizationId },
);
return {};
}
}
// next-auth lifts `redirectTo` into the magic link's `callbackUrl` itself.
// In a server action Auth.js rethrows `AuthError`s; anything else comes back
// as the `?error=` URL it would have redirected to.
try {
const url = await signIn("resend", { email, redirectTo, redirect: false });
if (typeof url === "string" && new URL(url).searchParams.has("error")) {
return { error: EMAIL_ERROR };
}
} catch (e) {
if (!(e instanceof AuthError)) throw e;
console.error("magic link sign-in failed", e);
return { error: EMAIL_ERROR };
}
return { sent: true };
}