Open-source status page, incident response and uptime monitoring
TypeScript alertingincident-managementmcpmcp-servermonitoringmonitoring-as-codeobservabilityon-callopen-sourcesrestatus-pagestatuspagesynthetic-monitoringterraformtinybirdtursouptimeuptime-checkeruptime-monitor
const REDACTED = "[redacted]";
const SENSITIVE_HEADER_NAMES = new Set([
"authorization",
"cookie",
"set-cookie",
"proxy-authorization",
"x-api-key",
"x-auth-token",
]);
// Matched against whole words of a name split on `-`, `_` and camelCase, so
// `api_key`, `accessToken` and `x-auth-token` match but `monkey` does not.
const SENSITIVE_WORD =
/^(?:auth(?:orization|entication|n|z)?|cookies?|credentials?|keys?|secrets?|sessions?|tokens?|passwords?|passwd)$/;
// Common sensitive names written as a single lowercase word.
const SENSITIVE_COMPOUND_WORDS = new Set([
"apikey",
"accesskey",
"secretkey",
"privatekey",
"accesstoken",
"refreshtoken",
"idtoken",
"authtoken",
"clientsecret",
"sessionid",
]);
function isSensitiveName(name: string) {
if (SENSITIVE_HEADER_NAMES.has(name.toLowerCase())) return true;
return name
.replace(/([a-z0-9])([A-Z])/g, "$1 $2")
.toLowerCase()
.split(/[^a-z0-9]+/)
.some(
(word) => SENSITIVE_WORD.test(word) || SENSITIVE_COMPOUND_WORDS.has(word),
);
}
export function redactSensitiveHeaders(
headers: Record<string, string> | null,
): Record<string, string> {
if (!headers) return {};
return Object.fromEntries(
Object.entries(headers).map(([name, value]) => [
name,
isSensitiveName(name) ? REDACTED : value,
]),
);
}
// A bare `Bearer …` value or a JWT can sit anywhere in a non-JSON body.
const BEARER_PATTERN = /\bBearer\s+[\w.~+/=-]+/gi;
const JWT_PATTERN = /\beyJ[\w-]+\.[\w-]+\.[\w-]+/g;
// `token=…`, `"api_key": "…"`, `secret: …` in form-encoded or plain text bodies.
// The pattern only pre-filters candidate keys; `isSensitiveName` decides.
// Quoted values are consumed whole so secrets containing spaces don't leak.
const KEY_VALUE_PATTERN =
/\b([\w-]*(?:auth|cookie|credential|key|secret|session|token|passw)[\w-]*)(["']?\s*[:=]\s*)("[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\s"'&,;}]+)/gi;
function redactJsonValue(value: unknown): unknown {
if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(redactJsonValue);
if (value && typeof value === "object") {
return Object.fromEntries(
Object.entries(value).map(([key, inner]) => [
key,
isSensitiveName(key) ? REDACTED : redactJsonValue(inner),
]),
);
}
if (typeof value === "string") return redactText(value);
return value;
}
function redactText(text: string): string {
return text
.replace(BEARER_PATTERN, `Bearer ${REDACTED}`)
.replace(JWT_PATTERN, REDACTED)
.replace(
KEY_VALUE_PATTERN,
(match, key: string, sep: string, value: string) => {
if (!isSensitiveName(key)) return match;
const quote = value[0] === '"' || value[0] === "'" ? value[0] : "";
return `${key}${sep}${quote}${REDACTED}${quote}`;
},
);
}
/**
* Best-effort secret scrubbing for a checked endpoint's response body: JSON
* values under sensitive keys, plus bearer tokens, JWTs and `key=value` pairs
* in anything else. Bodies are third-party content, so callers that hand them
* to an LLM should still treat the result as untrusted data.
*/
export function redactSensitiveBody(body: string | null): string | null {
if (!body) return body;
try {
return JSON.stringify(redactJsonValue(JSON.parse(body)));
} catch {
return redactText(body);
}
}