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Voice-to-text dictation app with local (Nvidia Parakeet/Whisper) and cloud models (BYOK). Privacy-first and available cross-platform.

chore(security): add OSS Scanner build image and threat model (#2806)

Chad Piha2bb0241b287d
diff --git a/.oss-scanner/Dockerfile b/.oss-scanner/Dockerfile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2015c4898
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.oss-scanner/Dockerfile
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# Build image for Anthropic's OSS Scanner (https://github.com/anthropics/oss-scanner).
+# The scanner builds this with the repository as the build context and network access, then audits the
+# result offline, so everything the tests need is installed here. It mirrors the Linux jobs in
+# .github/workflows/build-and-notarize.yml (desktop) and .github/workflows/mobile-ci.yml (mobile).
+FROM node:24-bookworm
+
+# ELECTRON_OVERRIDE_DIST_PATH keeps require("electron") from throwing without the Electron download (tests
+# stub Electron), as in CI.
+ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \
+ CI=1 \
+ ELECTRON_OVERRIDE_DIST_PATH=/tmp
+
+# Headers for the Linux native helpers in resources/ (key listener, paste, text monitor, PipeWire audio), and
+# CMake for the meeting echo-cancellation helper in native/.
+RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+ ca-certificates build-essential cmake pkg-config git python3 \
+ libx11-dev libxtst-dev libatspi2.0-dev libglib2.0-dev libpipewire-0.3-dev \
+ && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# Scanner contract: the checkout lives inside the image, at /src.
+COPY . /src
+WORKDIR /src
+
+# Desktop app (Electron main process, preload, React renderer).
+# --ignore-scripts skips the Electron download and the rebuild of native modules for Electron's ABI;
+# better-sqlite3 is then built for this Node so the database-backed tests run instead of skipping. It also
+# skips ffmpeg-static's binary download, so that runs on its own: audio import decodes through it.
+RUN npm ci --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund \
+ && npm rebuild better-sqlite3 \
+ && node node_modules/ffmpeg-static/install.js
+
+# Native Linux helpers, compiled from source as a release build does. The meeting echo-cancellation helper
+# fetches its pinned WebRTC and Abseil sources here, while the network is still up.
+RUN npm run compile:linuxkeys \
+ && npm run compile:linux-paste \
+ && npm run compile:text-monitor \
+ && npm run compile:linux-system-audio \
+ && node scripts/build-meeting-aec-helper.js
+
+# Mobile app (Expo / React Native). Its iOS native code can't be built on Linux, so only the TypeScript side
+# is installed and tested here; the Swift sources are in the checkout for review.
+RUN cd openwhispr-mobile \
+ && npm ci --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund \
+ && node_modules/.bin/patch-package --error-on-fail \
+ && npm rebuild better-sqlite3
+
+# Run the suites once so a broken image shows up in the build log, but never fail the build on a test.
+# Bounded so a hung test can't eat the scanner's build budget.
+RUN timeout 900 npm test > /tmp/desktop-tests.log 2>&1 \
+ || echo "WARNING: desktop tests failed or timed out (see /tmp/desktop-tests.log)"; \
+ tail -n 15 /tmp/desktop-tests.log
+RUN cd openwhispr-mobile \
+ && (timeout 900 node_modules/.bin/jest --ci --runInBand > /tmp/mobile-tests.log 2>&1 \
+ || echo "WARNING: mobile tests failed or timed out (see /tmp/mobile-tests.log)"); \
+ tail -n 15 /tmp/mobile-tests.log
diff --git a/.oss-scanner/threat_model.md b/.oss-scanner/threat_model.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5903a6c9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.oss-scanner/threat_model.md
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+# OpenWhispr threat model
+
+This file is read by Anthropic's OSS Scanner before it audits the repository. `SECURITY.md` is the public
+reporting policy; this file adds the detail a reviewer needs.
+
+## What this project does
+
+OpenWhispr is a dictation and meeting-notes app. This repository holds two clients:
+
+- **Desktop** (repository root): an Electron app for macOS, Windows and Linux. It records the microphone (and
+ system audio for meetings), transcribes locally (whisper.cpp, sherpa-onnx) or through cloud providers, pastes
+ the text into the focused app, keeps notes and history in SQLite, and runs an AI assistant with tools and
+ connectors that act on the user's accounts (Gmail send, Slack, Linear, GitHub, calendars).
+- **Mobile** (`openwhispr-mobile/`): an Expo / React Native iOS app with a keyboard extension, a Live Activity,
+ background uploads and on-device models. Only its TypeScript builds and tests on Linux; the Swift sources
+ under `modules/` and `plugins/` are in scope for review.
+
+The server side (the OpenWhispr API and the openwhispr.com website, including its OAuth relay routes) lives in
+other repositories and is out of scope, except where a client sends it something it shouldn't.
+
+## Who the attacker is
+
+In scope:
+
+- A remote party who controls content the app takes in: audio or video files, a transcript, a calendar invite
+ (title, description, attendees, meeting link), a shared or synced note, an email address, a Slack, Linear or
+ GitHub search result, a web search result, a provider's HTTP response, a downloaded model, a deep link.
+- A web page in the user's browser that reaches the app's loopback servers (DNS rebinding, CSRF, a guessed
+ OAuth `state`) or opens an `openwhispr://` link.
+- Another user account on the same machine, or another app on the same phone.
+- Prompt injection: text from any of the sources above that steers the assistant.
+
+Out of scope: malware already running as the same desktop user (it can read the user's files and keychain
+anyway), physical access to an unlocked device, and attacks that need the user to paste a command into a shell.
+
+## Where untrusted input enters (desktop)
+
+- **IPC** (`preload.js`, `src/helpers/ipcHandlers.js`): the renderer runs with context isolation. Assume the
+ renderer can be compromised (it renders notes, Markdown, transcripts and model output) and check that a
+ handler doesn't give it more than it needs: arbitrary file reads or writes, `shell.openExternal` with a
+ non-http(s) URL, process spawning, or secrets it shouldn't see.
+- **Rendering**: notes are Markdown via Tiptap (`src/components/ui/RichTextEditor*.ts*`, `html: false`), chat
+ and assistant output, release notes, calendar text. XSS in the renderer, and Markdown images or links that leak
+ data to a third party, matter.
+- **Loopback HTTP servers**: the CLI bridge (`src/helpers/cliBridge.js`, 127.0.0.1:8200–8219, bearer token in
+ `~/.openwhispr/cli-bridge.json`; `POST /v1/transcribe` takes a file path checked by `approveAudioPath`) and
+ the OAuth PKCE loopback flow (`src/helpers/oauthLoopbackFlow.js`, used by the Google and Microsoft calendars,
+ Gmail, Slack and Linear). Slack and Linear redirect through an openwhispr.com relay that forwards to the
+ loopback port carried in `state` (`v1.<port>.<nonce>`), so check what a forged or replayed callback can do.
+- **Deep links**: `openwhispr://` (`main.js` `open-url`, `second-instance`, `linuxUrlSchemeHandler.js`):
+ sign-in and OAuth callbacks, note links, workspace invitations, upgrade links. Any web page can open one.
+- **Agent tools and connectors** (`src/helpers/connectors/`, `src/services/`, `src/components/chat/`): any
+ action other people see (sending an email, posting to Slack, creating a Linear or GitHub issue or comment)
+ must go through `prepare` → an approval card the user confirms → `commit`. The model must never reach
+ `commit`, and a card must send exactly what the user saw and edited. Query results are marked untrusted and
+ capped (`queryResult.js`). A way around any of this is high or critical.
+- **Credentials**: BYOK API keys and enterprise cloud credentials (`src/helpers/environment.js`,
+ `userData/secure-keys/`, Electron `safeStorage`); connector logins (`connectorCredentials.js`,
+ `boundLogin.js`, one encrypted file per account under `userData/connectors/`); OpenWhispr session tokens.
+ Check for leaks into logs (`debugLogger.js`), renderer, URLs, crash output, other accounts on the same device,
+ or the wrong OAuth client.
+- **Native helpers and child processes**: `resources/*.c`, `resources/*.swift`, `native/`, and the code that
+ spawns them (paste helpers, key and mic listeners, text monitor, system-audio capture, whisper.cpp,
+ sherpa-onnx, llama-server, Qdrant, FFmpeg, yt-dlp). Command or argument injection, path traversal, and memory
+ safety bugs in the C and C++ sources on input they parse (stdin protocol, audio buffers, window titles).
+ `native/meeting-aec-helper/` runs WebRTC echo cancellation over meeting audio, which includes the remote
+ party's audio.
+- **Files and downloads**: audio import and transcription of user-chosen or URL-sourced media, model downloads
+ (`scripts/lib/download-utils.js`, `src/helpers/modelManagerBridge.js`, `whisper.js`, `parakeet.js`), temp
+ files, auto-update.
+- **Meeting and calendar data**: Google, Microsoft and Apple calendar sync, attendee lists fed to the assistant
+ (`<meeting_attendees>` fence; check that note or invite text can't fake it).
+
+## Where untrusted input enters (mobile)
+
+- Deep links (`openwhispr://`) and universal links, the auth flow (`src/lib/authClient.ts`), note share tokens
+ (`src/lib/notes/noteShareTokens.ts`).
+- The keyboard extension (`plugins/keyboard-extension/`) and the App Group storage it shares with the app
+ (`modules/app-group-storage/`): what a host app can read or trigger, and what the extension stores.
+- Background uploads (`modules/background-uploader/`), the App Transport Security exception that lets the app
+ reach AI providers on the local network (`plugins/provider-networking/`), StoreKit and paywall handling,
+ secrets in the keychain versus plain storage.
+
+## Components that matter most / least
+
+Most: the connector approval flow, credential storage and OAuth flows, IPC handlers, the CLI bridge, deep link
+handling, renderer XSS, the native C and C++ helpers, the mobile keyboard extension and App Group storage.
+
+Less: UI layout, onboarding copy, i18n files, build scripts that only run on a maintainer's machine or in CI
+(still report a supply chain issue in them).
+
+Out of scope: `node_modules/`, downloaded third-party binaries under `resources/bin/` (whisper.cpp, sherpa-onnx,
+Qdrant, llama-server, yt-dlp, FFmpeg) and vulnerabilities inside third-party dependencies themselves (report how
+we call them, not the library bug), `docs/`, `examples/`, `agent-skills/` (Markdown instructions for AI
+agents), `nix/` packaging.
+
+## How to exercise it
+
+- Desktop tests: `npm test` at the root (Node test runner; Electron is stubbed). Tests sit in `test/`, mirroring
+ `src/` (`test/helpers/`, `test/stores/`, `test/components/`). Many helpers are pure modules with unit tests
+ (e.g. `test/helpers/connectors/`, `test/helpers/cliBridge*.test.js`), which are the easiest place to write a
+ reproducer.
+- Native helpers are compiled into `resources/bin/` during the image build (`linux-key-listener`,
+ `linux-fast-paste`, `linux-text-monitor`, `linux-system-audio-helper`, `meeting-aec-helper-linux-<arch>`).
+ FFmpeg is at `node_modules/ffmpeg-static/ffmpeg`, the binary the app decodes imported audio with.
+- Mobile tests: `cd openwhispr-mobile && node_modules/.bin/jest --ci --runInBand <path>`.
+- The full Electron app can't be launched in this image (no display, no Electron binary); prefer unit-level
+ reproducers against the real module.
+
+## How we rate severity
+
+- **Critical**: remote code execution from content the app takes in (audio file, transcript, note, invite,
+ deep link, web page); a connector action sent without the user confirming the card, or sending different
+ content than the card showed; a web page or another app obtaining API keys, OAuth tokens or session tokens.
+- **High**: a deep link or OAuth callback that, without the user confirming, signs the user into another
+ account, joins a workspace, or shares notes or recordings (their later notes and dictations would reach
+ someone else); renderer XSS from synced or shared content; reading or writing arbitrary files through IPC
+ or the CLI bridge; command injection into a helper process; prompt injection that exfiltrates notes,
+ transcripts or contacts to a third party (e.g. through a rendered image URL or a tool); one OpenWhispr
+ account's data or connector logins reachable from another account on the same device; memory corruption in
+ a native helper on attacker-controlled input.
+- **Medium**: secrets or note content written to logs; a deep link that changes a setting without the user's
+ intent; leaking data across the App Group to the keyboard extension beyond what it needs; denial of service
+ that needs a remote trigger and survives a restart.
+- **Low**: local denial of service, crashes on malformed local files, missing hardening with no demonstrated
+ impact.
+
+A memory safety bug without a demonstrated path from attacker-controlled input is high at most. Prompt injection
+that only makes the assistant give a wrong or rude answer is not a vulnerability.
+
+## Reports and patches
+
+Please include a reproducer we can run (a failing `node --test` or Jest test is ideal), the affected file and
+function, and a minimal patch in the style of the surrounding code. Name the platform when a finding is
+platform-specific (macOS, Windows, a Linux desktop, iOS).
+
+## Anything to leave alone
+
+- On Linux without a keyring, `safeStorage` falls back to plaintext. This matches Electron's default and is
+ documented in `SECURITY.md`.
+- Same-user local access to `userData/`, `~/.openwhispr/cli-bridge.json` or the keychain.
+- Development-only code paths (`npm run dev`, Vite dev server, `OPENWHISPR_LOG_LEVEL=debug` verbosity) unless
+ they ship in a release build.
+- Long emails copied to the clipboard by the email-draft connector when they don't fit a compose URL (intended).
+- GitHub Disconnect deleting the login locally without revoking it on github.com (intended; see `CLAUDE.md`).
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
index b74b39ea6..f93a36da6 100644
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
| Version | Supported |
| ------- | ------------------ |
-| 1.7.x | :white_check_mark: |
-| < 1.7 | :x: |
+| 1.10.x | :white_check_mark: |
+| < 1.10 | :x: |
## Reporting a Vulnerability
@@ -52,6 +52,12 @@ Out of scope:
- **Context isolation** — The Electron renderer runs with context isolation
enabled and a restricted preload bridge.
+## Automated Scanning
+
+[`.oss-scanner/`](.oss-scanner/) holds the build image and threat model for Anthropic's
+[OSS Scanner](https://github.com/anthropics/oss-scanner), which sends its model-generated
+vulnerability reports for both the desktop and mobile apps to [email protected].
+
## Disclosure Policy
We follow coordinated disclosure. Once a fix is released, we will credit