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Python

Reject path-traversal session ids in the conversation store

Saidheerajgollu03c4a16f95ad
diff --git a/coworker/conversations.py b/coworker/conversations.py
index fd2131bf..f97c8011 100644
--- a/coworker/conversations.py
+++ b/coworker/conversations.py
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
+import re
import sqlite3
import threading
from pathlib import Path
@@ -19,6 +20,19 @@ from typing import Optional
from .sessions import SessionRecord
+# A session id becomes a filename (`<id>.jsonl`) and a scratch dir name, so it must be a
+# single, benign path component. Every legitimate id is hex or a `__run__`/`__task__`-
+# prefixed hex string, so this charset is a superset of what we generate; it excludes the
+# path separators and dots (`/`, `\`, `..`) a client-supplied id would need to escape the
+# store. Session ids arrive from client-controlled surfaces (the `/ws/session/{id}` route,
+# REST paths), so without this an id like `../../evil` writes `<base>/evil.jsonl` outside
+# `conversations/`.
+_SAFE_SESSION_ID = re.compile(r"\A[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,128}\Z")
+
+
+def is_safe_session_id(sid: str) -> bool:
+ return bool(isinstance(sid, str) and _SAFE_SESSION_ID.match(sid))
+
def _load_roots(raw: Optional[str]) -> list[dict]:
if not raw:
@@ -105,7 +119,15 @@ class ConversationStore:
# -- file helpers -----------------------------------------------------------
def _file(self, sid: str) -> Path:
- return self.conv_dir / f"{sid}.jsonl"
+ # Single chokepoint for every conversation-file path. Reject ids that aren't a
+ # safe path component, then confirm the resolved path stays inside conv_dir — so
+ # a crafted id can never read or clobber a file outside the store.
+ if not is_safe_session_id(sid):
+ raise ValueError(f"unsafe session id: {sid!r}")
+ path = (self.conv_dir / f"{sid}.jsonl").resolve()
+ if path.parent != self.conv_dir.resolve():
+ raise ValueError(f"unsafe session id: {sid!r}")
+ return path
def _read_jsonl(self, sid: str) -> Optional[list[dict]]:
path = self._file(sid)
diff --git a/tests/test_conversation_store.py b/tests/test_conversation_store.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4413ac74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_conversation_store.py
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+"""ConversationStore: session id path-traversal hardening.
+
+A session id becomes a filename ("<id>.jsonl"); ids arrive from client-controlled
+surfaces (the /ws/session/{id} route, REST paths), so a crafted id must never let a
+write or read escape the conversations/ directory.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+
+from coworker.conversations import ConversationStore, is_safe_session_id
+from coworker.sessions import SessionRecord
+
+
+def test_is_safe_session_id():
+ # Every id shape the app actually generates is accepted.
+ for ok in (
+ "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", # uuid4().hex
+ "abc123def456", # uuid4().hex[:12]
+ "__run__run-abcdef1234", # automation run thread
+ "__task__task-0123456789", # automation task thread
+ ):
+ assert is_safe_session_id(ok), ok
+ # Anything that could escape a single path component is rejected.
+ for bad in (
+ "../evil",
+ "../../etc/passwd",
+ "a/b",
+ "a\\b",
+ "..",
+ ".",
+ "with space",
+ "dot.dot",
+ "",
+ "x" * 129, # over the length cap
+ ):
+ assert not is_safe_session_id(bad), bad
+
+
+def test_save_rejects_traversal_id_without_writing_outside(tmp_path):
+ """The verified vuln: saving a record with '../evil' used to create 'evil.jsonl'
+ OUTSIDE the conversations dir. It must raise and write nothing."""
+ store = ConversationStore(tmp_path / "state")
+ rec = SessionRecord(
+ session_id="../evil",
+ workspace=str(tmp_path),
+ model="m",
+ mode="interactive",
+ messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
+ )
+ with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+ store.save(rec)
+ # Nothing landed outside conversations/ (the previous behavior wrote here).
+ assert not (tmp_path / "state" / "evil.jsonl").exists()
+ assert list((tmp_path / "state" / "conversations").glob("*.jsonl")) == []
+
+
+def test_load_of_unknown_or_unsafe_id_is_none_not_crash(tmp_path):
+ store = ConversationStore(tmp_path / "state")
+ # A normal missing id: no DB row, returns None (never touches the filesystem).
+ assert store.load("deadbeef") is None
+ # An unsafe id also has no DB row, so load short-circuits to None before any file IO.
+ assert store.load("../evil") is None
+
+
+def test_round_trip_with_valid_id_still_works(tmp_path):
+ store = ConversationStore(tmp_path / "state")
+ rec = SessionRecord(
+ session_id="abc123def456",
+ workspace=str(tmp_path),
+ model="m",
+ mode="interactive",
+ messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}],
+ )
+ store.save(rec)
+ loaded = store.load("abc123def456")
+ assert loaded is not None
+ assert loaded.messages[0]["content"] == "hello"
+ assert (tmp_path / "state" / "conversations" / "abc123def456.jsonl").is_file()