Python
Reject path-traversal session ids in the conversation store
Saidheerajgollu03c4a16f95ad
diff --git a/coworker/conversations.py b/coworker/conversations.pyindex fd2131bf..f97c8011 100644--- a/coworker/conversations.py+++ b/coworker/conversations.py@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ from __future__ import annotationsimport jsonimport os+import reimport sqlite3import threadingfrom pathlib import Path@@ -19,6 +20,19 @@ from typing import Optionalfrom .sessions import SessionRecord+# A session id becomes a filename (`<id>.jsonl`) and a scratch dir name, so it must be a+# single, benign path component. Every legitimate id is hex or a `__run__`/`__task__`-+# prefixed hex string, so this charset is a superset of what we generate; it excludes the+# path separators and dots (`/`, `\`, `..`) a client-supplied id would need to escape the+# store. Session ids arrive from client-controlled surfaces (the `/ws/session/{id}` route,+# REST paths), so without this an id like `../../evil` writes `<base>/evil.jsonl` outside+# `conversations/`.+_SAFE_SESSION_ID = re.compile(r"\A[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,128}\Z")+++def is_safe_session_id(sid: str) -> bool:+ return bool(isinstance(sid, str) and _SAFE_SESSION_ID.match(sid))+def _load_roots(raw: Optional[str]) -> list[dict]:if not raw:@@ -105,7 +119,15 @@ class ConversationStore:# -- file helpers -----------------------------------------------------------def _file(self, sid: str) -> Path:- return self.conv_dir / f"{sid}.jsonl"+ # Single chokepoint for every conversation-file path. Reject ids that aren't a+ # safe path component, then confirm the resolved path stays inside conv_dir — so+ # a crafted id can never read or clobber a file outside the store.+ if not is_safe_session_id(sid):+ raise ValueError(f"unsafe session id: {sid!r}")+ path = (self.conv_dir / f"{sid}.jsonl").resolve()+ if path.parent != self.conv_dir.resolve():+ raise ValueError(f"unsafe session id: {sid!r}")+ return pathdef _read_jsonl(self, sid: str) -> Optional[list[dict]]:path = self._file(sid)diff --git a/tests/test_conversation_store.py b/tests/test_conversation_store.pynew file mode 100644index 00000000..4413ac74--- /dev/null+++ b/tests/test_conversation_store.py@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@+"""ConversationStore: session id path-traversal hardening.++A session id becomes a filename ("<id>.jsonl"); ids arrive from client-controlled+surfaces (the /ws/session/{id} route, REST paths), so a crafted id must never let a+write or read escape the conversations/ directory.+"""++from __future__ import annotations++import pytest++from coworker.conversations import ConversationStore, is_safe_session_id+from coworker.sessions import SessionRecord+++def test_is_safe_session_id():+ # Every id shape the app actually generates is accepted.+ for ok in (+ "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", # uuid4().hex+ "abc123def456", # uuid4().hex[:12]+ "__run__run-abcdef1234", # automation run thread+ "__task__task-0123456789", # automation task thread+ ):+ assert is_safe_session_id(ok), ok+ # Anything that could escape a single path component is rejected.+ for bad in (+ "../evil",+ "../../etc/passwd",+ "a/b",+ "a\\b",+ "..",+ ".",+ "with space",+ "dot.dot",+ "",+ "x" * 129, # over the length cap+ ):+ assert not is_safe_session_id(bad), bad+++def test_save_rejects_traversal_id_without_writing_outside(tmp_path):+ """The verified vuln: saving a record with '../evil' used to create 'evil.jsonl'+ OUTSIDE the conversations dir. It must raise and write nothing."""+ store = ConversationStore(tmp_path / "state")+ rec = SessionRecord(+ session_id="../evil",+ workspace=str(tmp_path),+ model="m",+ mode="interactive",+ messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],+ )+ with pytest.raises(ValueError):+ store.save(rec)+ # Nothing landed outside conversations/ (the previous behavior wrote here).+ assert not (tmp_path / "state" / "evil.jsonl").exists()+ assert list((tmp_path / "state" / "conversations").glob("*.jsonl")) == []+++def test_load_of_unknown_or_unsafe_id_is_none_not_crash(tmp_path):+ store = ConversationStore(tmp_path / "state")+ # A normal missing id: no DB row, returns None (never touches the filesystem).+ assert store.load("deadbeef") is None+ # An unsafe id also has no DB row, so load short-circuits to None before any file IO.+ assert store.load("../evil") is None+++def test_round_trip_with_valid_id_still_works(tmp_path):+ store = ConversationStore(tmp_path / "state")+ rec = SessionRecord(+ session_id="abc123def456",+ workspace=str(tmp_path),+ model="m",+ mode="interactive",+ messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}],+ )+ store.save(rec)+ loaded = store.load("abc123def456")+ assert loaded is not None+ assert loaded.messages[0]["content"] == "hello"+ assert (tmp_path / "state" / "conversations" / "abc123def456.jsonl").is_file()