Python
fix(security): refuse write/exec flags on read-only allowlisted commands
Shakti Prasad Mohapatra3bd54ef08b3d
diff --git a/coworker/readonly.py b/coworker/readonly.pyindex 2da3e7e3..bf5cd64c 100644--- a/coworker/readonly.py+++ b/coworker/readonly.py@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@ from __future__ import annotationsimport reimport shlex-# Commands that only read local state, with no writing flags to police.+# Commands that only read local state, with no writing flags to police. Several entries+# are not unconditionally read-only — see _FLAG_BAD below, which polices the flags that+# turn a listed command into a writer or an executor._SIMPLE_SAFE = {"ls", "cat", "head", "tail", "wc", "nl", "sort", "uniq", "cut", "tr","grep", "egrep", "fgrep", "rg", "ugrep", "file", "stat", "du", "df",@@ -49,11 +51,37 @@ _GIT_BRANCH_FLAG_OK = {_FIND_BAD = ("-delete", "-exec", "-execdir", "-ok", "-okdir", "-fprint", "-fls", "-fprintf")+# Several _SIMPLE_SAFE entries are not unconditionally read-only: one flag turns the+# command into a writer or an executor. The find family taught this lesson first+# (_FIND_BAD); the same policing now applies to every other command that grows+# write/exec behavior through a flag. Values are denied flags; a token matches when it+# equals the flag, carries an attached value (`-oout.txt`, `--output=out`), or — for+# short flags — hides inside a cluster (`sort -ro out`).+_FLAG_BAD: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {+ "sort": ("-o", "--output", "--compress-program", "--files0-from"),+ "xxd": ("-r",), # reverse mode writes the decoded bytes to the `outfile` argument+ "date": ("-s", "--set"), # sets the system clock+ "file": ("-C", "--compile"), # compiles the magic database to magic.mgc+ "rg": ("--pre", "--pre-glob", "--hostname-bin", "--pager"),+ "ugrep": ("--pager",),+ "du": ("--files0-from",),+}+_ENV_ASSIGN = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=[^;&|<>`]*$")-# A sed script token that invokes the `w`/`W` (write-file) command: at the start, after a-# separator, or after an address. Conservative — a false hit just means one manual approval.-_SED_WRITE = re.compile(r"(^|[;{])\s*[0-9,$/ ]*[wW]\s")+# A sed script token that invokes the `w`/`W` (write-file) command. Two spellings:+# * at the start of a script command, optionally after an address —+# `w file`, `1,5w file`, `1wout.txt`, and after `;`/`{` in a multi-command script;+# * as a substitution flag, after the third delimiter — `s/a/b/w file`,+# `s/a/b/wout.txt`. Backreference-based so only a completed `s<d>pat<d>repl<d>` shape+# is considered, which keeps a pattern or replacement merely *starting* with `w`+# (`s/wide/X/`) out of the denials. Conservative either way: a false hit costs one+# manual approval.+_SED_WRITE = re.compile(r"(^|[;{])[0-9,$/ ]*[wW]|s(.).*?\2.*?\2.*?[wW]")++# awk programs can execute commands through pipe-redirection (`print x | "sh"`,+# `"cmd" | getline`) without containing `>` or `system(`.+_AWK_PIPE = re.compile(r"\|\s*getline|\|\s*[\"']")def _has_unquoted_shell_variable(command: str) -> bool:@@ -116,6 +144,8 @@ def _git_ok(args: list[str]) -> bool:sub, rest = args[i], args[i + 1 :]if any(t.startswith("--output") for t in rest):return False # git log/diff --output=<file> writes+ if sub == "grep" and any(_flag_denied(t, ("-O", "--open-files-in-pager")) for t in rest):+ return False # git grep -O<pager> executes the given programif sub in _GIT_SAFE:return Trueif sub == "branch":@@ -135,6 +165,34 @@ def _git_ok(args: list[str]) -> bool:return False+def _flag_denied(token: str, denied: tuple[str, ...]) -> bool:+ """True when `token` is one of `denied`, attaches a value, or hides in a cluster.++ `sort --output=out`, `sort -oout` and `sort -ro out` are all the same flag as `sort+ -o out`; a plain token comparison would wave the first two through, and a prefix+ check alone misses the cluster form. Long forms match `flag=` exactly (so a literal+ such as `--output-delimiter` is not mistaken for `--output`); short forms match any+ attached suffix, including inside a short-flag cluster.+ """+ if not token.startswith("-") or token == "-" or token == "--":+ return False+ for flag in denied:+ if token == flag:+ return True+ if flag.startswith("--"):+ if token.startswith(flag + "="):+ return True+ elif len(flag) == 2 and not token.startswith("--"):+ # `-o` matches `-oout.txt` and any cluster containing `o` (`-ro`). False+ # positives on unrelated letters are acceptable — they cost one approval.+ body = token[1:]+ if flag[1] in body:+ return True+ elif token.startswith(flag):+ return True+ return False++def _stage_ok(argv: list[str]) -> bool:# Leading VAR=value assignments (LC_ALL=C grep …) are inert — skip them.i = 0@@ -148,6 +206,14 @@ def _stage_ok(argv: list[str]) -> bool:return False # path-invoked binaries can be anything; bare names onlyargs = argv[1:]if head in _SIMPLE_SAFE:+ denied = _FLAG_BAD.get(head)+ if denied and any(_flag_denied(t, denied) for t in args):+ return False+ if head == "xxd":+ # Without -r, `xxd infile outfile` still writes the dump to outfile. Only+ # reject when a second non-flag operand is present (`xxd a.txt b.txt`).+ operands = [t for t in args if not t.startswith("-")]+ return len(operands) < 2return Trueif head == "env":return not args # bare `env` prints; `env CMD` executes@@ -156,13 +222,35 @@ def _stage_ok(argv: list[str]) -> bool:if head == "git":return _git_ok(args)if head == "sed":- if any(t.startswith(("-i", "--in-place", "-f", "--file")) for t in args):+ if any(_flag_denied(t, ("-i", "--in-place", "-f", "--file")) for t in args):return False- return not any(_SED_WRITE.search(t) for t in args if not t.startswith("-"))+ # The script is the value of -e/--expression (separate or attached); when none is+ # given, the first positional is the script and the rest are file operands.+ scripts: list[str] = []+ skip_next = False+ for tok in args:+ if skip_next:+ scripts.append(tok)+ skip_next = False+ continue+ if tok in {"-e", "--expression"}:+ skip_next = True+ elif tok.startswith("-e"):+ scripts.append(tok[2:])+ elif tok.startswith("--expression="):+ scripts.append(tok.split("=", 1)[1])+ if not scripts:+ for tok in args:+ if not tok.startswith("-"):+ scripts.append(tok)+ break+ return not any(_SED_WRITE.search(t) for t in scripts)if head in {"awk", "gawk", "mawk", "nawk"}:- return not any(">" in t or "system" in t for t in args)+ if any(_flag_denied(t, ("-f", "--file")) for t in args):+ return False+ return not any(">" in t or "system" in t or _AWK_PIPE.search(t) for t in args)if head == "find":- return not any(t.startswith(_FIND_BAD) for t in args)+ return not any(_flag_denied(t, _FIND_BAD) for t in args)return Falsediff --git a/tests/test_readonly_grant.py b/tests/test_readonly_grant.pyindex c51875e8..5f02fc92 100644--- a/tests/test_readonly_grant.py+++ b/tests/test_readonly_grant.py@@ -28,12 +28,26 @@ ACCEPT = ["git remote -v","jq '.results | length' /tmp/report.json","find . -name '*.py'",+ "find . -newer build.log","LC_ALL=C grep -c uses .github/workflows/ci.yml","command -v semgrep","wc -l file.txt | sort","printf 'a: '","awk '{print $1}' data.txt",+ "awk -F'|' '{print $1}' data.txt","head -20 x | tail -5 | uniq -c",+ # -- the write/exec flags stay denied without taking the plain reads away ---------+ "sort data.txt",+ "xxd dump.bin",+ "xxd -p dump.bin",+ "file magic",+ "date -u +%Y",+ "du -sh .",+ "sed --expression='s/a/b/' data.txt",+ "sed -ne 's/a/b/' data.txt",+ "sed 's/wide/X/' wide.txt",+ "git grep -c needle",+ "git grep --cached needle",]REJECT = [@@ -69,6 +83,9 @@ REJECT = ["git config user.name evil", # writes"git -c core.pager='touch x' log", # exec hook via -c"git log --output=/tmp/f", # write via flag+ "git grep -O./pwn.sh needle", # exec via pager+ "git grep --open-files-in-pager=sh needle",+ "git grep --open-files-in-pager needle", # pager defaults to less, still exec-shaped"/tmp/evil/cat file", # path-invoked binary"env FOO=1 rm x","tee /tmp/x",@@ -76,6 +93,34 @@ REJECT = ["ls | tee /tmp/x", # every pipeline stage must classify"ls |", # dangling pipe"sudo cat /etc/shadow",+ # -- flags that turn a listed reader into a writer or an executor ---------------+ "sort -o /tmp/f data.txt", # writes the sorted output+ "sort -o/tmp/f data.txt", # attached value+ "sort --output=/tmp/f data.txt",+ "sort --output /tmp/f data.txt",+ "sort -ro /tmp/f data.txt", # cluster+ "sort --compress-program=./p data.txt", # executes the compressor+ "xxd -r dump.hex out.bin", # reverse mode writes the outfile+ "xxd payload.txt direct.bin", # the outfile needs no flag at all+ "rg --pre ./pwn.sh pattern file.txt", # executes the preprocessor+ "rg --pre=./pwn.sh pattern file.txt",+ "rg --hostname-bin=./pwn.sh pattern file.txt",+ "rg --pager ./pwn.sh pattern file.txt",+ "file -C -m magic", # compiles magic.mgc+ "file --compile -m magic",+ "date -s 2020-01-01", # sets the system clock+ "date --set=2020-01-01",+ "du --files0-from=/etc/list", # reads filenames the scoper cannot see+ "sed -e'w /tmp/f' data.txt", # attached -e script carries the write+ "sed --expression='w /tmp/f' data.txt",+ "sed -n '1wout.txt' data.txt", # attached filename after an address+ "sed 's/a/b/w out.txt' data.txt", # substitution flag+ "sed 's/a/b/wout.txt' data.txt",+ "sed '1w w1.txt' data.txt",+ "awk 'BEGIN{print \"x\" | \"sh\"}'", # pipe to a command executes+ "awk 'BEGIN{\"id\" | getline x}'",+ "awk -f prog.awk data.txt", # program file can carry system()/pipes+ "awk --file=prog.awk data.txt",]