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Python

security: reject non-https persona git_url before cloning (ext:: RCE / option injection)

coderdailyone6238cc9394e2
diff --git a/coworker/personas/loading.py b/coworker/personas/loading.py
index f7478353..dc009215 100644
--- a/coworker/personas/loading.py
+++ b/coworker/personas/loading.py
@@ -69,13 +69,35 @@ def capability_set(m: PersonaManifest) -> set[str]:
return caps
+def validate_git_url(url: str) -> str:
+ """Reject persona URLs that git would treat as a command instead of a fetch.
+
+ Install is meant to be a *light* trust event (a persona ships no executable code), but
+ ``git clone`` runs arbitrary code before that consent gate if the URL is hostile:
+ ``ext::sh -c <cmd>`` executes via the ext transport, and a URL starting with ``-`` is
+ parsed as an option (``--upload-pack=<cmd>``). Allow only ``https://`` so neither reaches
+ git. Returns the URL unchanged when valid; raises ValueError otherwise.
+ """
+ if not isinstance(url, str) or not url.startswith("https://"):
+ raise ValueError("persona git_url must be an https:// URL")
+ return url
+
+
def git_clone(
url: str, dest: Path
) -> None: # pragma: no cover - exercised via injection
"""Shallow-clone a persona repo. Injectable so tests don't touch the network."""
+ validate_git_url(url)
dest.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
subprocess.run(
- ["git", "clone", "--depth", "1", url, str(dest)],
+ # protocol.*.allow pins the transport to https (blocks ext::/file:/etc. even via a
+ # redirect); "--" ends option parsing so a "-"-leading URL can't become a git flag.
+ [
+ "git",
+ "-c", "protocol.allow=never",
+ "-c", "protocol.https.allow=always",
+ "clone", "--depth", "1", "--", url, str(dest),
+ ],
check=True,
capture_output=True,
)
@@ -95,6 +117,10 @@ def clone_persona_repo(
url: str, base: Path, *, clone: Callable[[str, Path], None] = git_clone
) -> Path:
"""Clone (or reuse) a persona repo under ``base`` and return its directory."""
+ # Validate here too, not just in git_clone: this is the chokepoint every install path
+ # reaches, so a hostile URL is rejected before cache_dir_for/clone even when the caller
+ # injects its own clone. A trusted injected clone (tests) still passes on valid https.
+ validate_git_url(url)
dest = cache_dir_for(url, base)
if not dest.is_dir():
clone(url, dest)
diff --git a/tests/test_persona_loading.py b/tests/test_persona_loading.py
index a78ac2a5..6a297e3d 100644
--- a/tests/test_persona_loading.py
+++ b/tests/test_persona_loading.py
@@ -82,6 +82,28 @@ def test_install_from_git_uses_injected_clone(tmp_path):
assert "acme-ops" in reg.ids()
+ "hostile",
+ [
+ "ext::sh -c 'touch /tmp/pwned'", # ext transport → command execution at clone time
+ "--upload-pack=touch /tmp/pwned", # leading "-" → parsed as a git option
+ "-oProxyCommand=touch /tmp/pwned",
+ "file:///etc/passwd", # non-https transport
+ "git://example.com/x",
+ ],
+)
+def test_install_from_git_rejects_hostile_urls_before_cloning(tmp_path, hostile):
+ reg = PersonaRegistry(state_path=tmp_path / "personas.json")
+ calls: list[str] = []
+
+ def spy_clone(url, dest): # must never run for a rejected URL
+ calls.append(url)
+
+ with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+ reg.install_from_git(hostile, cache_base=tmp_path / "cache", clone=spy_clone)
+ assert calls == []
+
+
def test_invalid_third_party_manifest_fails_loud(tmp_path):
bad = "---\nid: broken\ntools: [does_not_exist]\n---\nbody\n"
reg = PersonaRegistry(state_path=tmp_path / "personas.json")