Python
fix(auto-approve): the safe-write tier covers only documents and images (OPE-233)
Devika Verma7af498a0b401
diff --git a/coworker/workspace_safety.py b/coworker/workspace_safety.pyindex 0fed5c73..f34a2e0b 100644--- a/coworker/workspace_safety.py+++ b/coworker/workspace_safety.py@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@"""What code can establish about a workspace write without asking a model (OPE-233).Auto-Approve lets a write skip the reviewer when undoing it is easy and nothing about it-can execute later: an inert file type, a name and content that don't look secret, and a+can execute later: a plain document or raster image that no build, installer, test runner+or other AI tool reads as instructions, a name and content that don't look secret, and atarget that is new, git-tracked with no uncommitted changes, or written by the agent-earlier in this session. Every check fails toward "ask the reviewer": an unknown file type,+earlier in this session. JSON and YAML are never eligible: tools read them to decide what+to run, and no list of their names can be complete, so the reviewer sees that content. Every check fails toward "ask the reviewer": an unknown file type,an unreadable git state or a doubtful name keeps today's behaviour."""@@ -16,33 +18,44 @@ import subprocessfrom pathlib import Pathfrom typing import Any, Callable, Optional-# Plain documents, data and raster images: nothing here is loaded and run by a build,-# test runner, package manager, shell or browser. Formats that can carry script are NOT-# here, however document-like: .html/.htm and .svg run JavaScript when opened, .xml can-# pull in a stylesheet that does, and .pdf supports JavaScript in many readers. A live-# run showed why (2026-10-26): refused an upload, the agent wrote an .html page whose-# script did the upload, then tried to open it.+# Plain documents and raster images: nothing here is loaded and run by a build, test+# runner, package manager, shell or browser. Formats that can carry script are NOT here,+# however document-like: .html/.htm and .svg run JavaScript when opened, .xml can pull in+# a stylesheet that does, and .pdf supports JavaScript in many readers. A live run showed+# why (2026-10-26): refused an upload, the agent wrote an .html page whose script did the+# upload, then tried to open it. JSON and YAML are not here either (Devika, 28 Oct 2026):+# package managers, task runners, CI and deploy tools read them to decide what to run._DOCUMENT_SUFFIXES = frozenset({".md", ".markdown", ".txt", ".rst", ".csv", ".tsv", ".log",".png", ".jpg", ".jpeg", ".gif", ".webp",})-# Structured data is inert unless a tool reads it to decide what to run. Those files are-# dotfiles (`.eslintrc.json`, `.gitpod.yml`) or have well-known names, listed below.-_DATA_SUFFIXES = frozenset({".json", ".jsonl", ".yaml", ".yml"})-_TOOL_CONFIG_NAMES = frozenset({- # package managers and task runners: scripts, tasks, hooks- "package.json", "package-lock.json", "composer.json", "deno.json", "deno.jsonc",- "turbo.json", "nx.json", "lerna.json", "taskfile.yml", "taskfile.yaml",- # build and transpile configs that load plugins- "babel.config.json", "tsconfig.json", "jsconfig.json", "angular.json", "project.json",- # containers and deploy targets- "docker-compose.yml", "docker-compose.yaml", "compose.yml", "compose.yaml",- "vercel.json", "now.json", "firebase.json", "app.json", "app.yaml", "serverless.yml",- "serverless.yaml", "cloudbuild.yaml", "cloudbuild.yml", "fly.toml",- # CI systems not covered by the protected list- "azure-pipelines.yml", "bitbucket-pipelines.yml", "appveyor.yml", "codemagic.yaml",- "mkdocs.yml", "renovate.json",+# Text files that decide what gets built, installed or tested: CMake runs CMakeLists.txt,+# pip installs what requirements and constraints files list (`requirements-dev.txt`,+# `dev-requirements.txt`, `requirements/base.txt`), and pytest runs `test*.txt` as doctests+# by default.+_BUILD_INPUT_NAME = re.compile(+ r"^cmakelists\.txt$|^test.*\.txt$|(requirements|constraints).*\.txt$", re.IGNORECASE+)+_BUILD_INPUT_FOLDERS = frozenset({"requirements"})+# Instructions other AI coding tools read into their prompt on their next run, so a write+# here steers a later agent. AGENTS.md is not listed: the protected list (permissions.py)+# already keeps it human-only, before this tier is consulted.+_AGENT_INSTRUCTION_NAME = re.compile(+ r"^(claude|claude\.local|gemini|qwen|crush|warp|agent|agents\.override|conventions"+ r"|copilot-instructions|skill)\.md$"+ r"|\.(instructions|prompt|chatmode|agent)\.md$", # GitHub Copilot's per-topic files+ re.IGNORECASE,+)+# Every file in these folders, at any depth: Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Cline, Roo,+# Kiro, Amazon Q, Continue, Junie, Augment, Gemini, Antigravity, OpenHands, Trae, Codex+# and OpenCode keep rules, commands, prompts and skills there.+_AGENT_FOLDERS = frozenset({+ ".claude", ".cursor", ".windsurf", ".clinerules", ".roo", ".kiro", ".amazonq",+ ".continue", ".junie", ".augment", ".gemini", ".agent", ".agents", ".openhands",+ ".trae", ".codex", ".opencode",})+# Under .github/, only Copilot's folders: CONTRIBUTING.md and issue templates stay eligible.+_GITHUB_AGENT_FOLDERS = frozenset({"instructions", "prompts", "chatmodes", "agents", "skills"})_SENSITIVE_NAME = re.compile(r"^\.env(\..*)?$"@@ -73,13 +86,24 @@ UNKNOWN = "unknown"def is_inert_name(name: str) -> bool:- lowered = name.lower()- suffix = os.path.splitext(lowered)[1]- if suffix in _DOCUMENT_SUFFIXES:- return True- if suffix in _DATA_SUFFIXES:- return not lowered.startswith(".") and lowered not in _TOOL_CONFIG_NAMES- return False+ if os.path.splitext(name.lower())[1] not in _DOCUMENT_SUFFIXES:+ return False+ return not (_BUILD_INPUT_NAME.search(name) or _AGENT_INSTRUCTION_NAME.search(name))+++def is_inert_path(path: Path) -> bool:+ """`is_inert_name`, and not inside a folder that build tools or AI tools read from.+ Folder names match in any letter case and anywhere in the path: a doubtful match only+ sends the write to the reviewer."""+ if not is_inert_name(path.name):+ return False+ folders = [part.casefold() for part in path.parts[:-1]]+ if any(f in _AGENT_FOLDERS or f in _BUILD_INPUT_FOLDERS for f in folders):+ return False+ return not any(+ parent == ".github" and child in _GITHUB_AGENT_FOLDERS+ for parent, child in zip(folders, folders[1:])+ )def is_sensitive_name(name: str) -> bool:@@ -171,7 +195,7 @@ def inert_write_check(parts: list[str] = []for target in targets:name = target.name- if not is_inert_name(name) or is_sensitive_name(name):+ if not is_inert_path(target) or is_sensitive_name(name):return False, ""if not target.exists():parts.append(f"new file {name}")diff --git a/surfaces/gui/src/components/Transcript.test.tsx b/surfaces/gui/src/components/Transcript.test.tsxindex 8c73cc69..7b92c657 100644--- a/surfaces/gui/src/components/Transcript.test.tsx+++ b/surfaces/gui/src/components/Transcript.test.tsx@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ describe("origin chips — standing MCP trust names its source", () => {expect(tier.text).toBe("safe change, no card");expect(tier.title).toContain("without the reviewer");expect(tier.title).toContain("can be undone");+ expect(tier.title).toContain("a document or image"); // OPE-233: JSON/YAML left the tier});});diff --git a/surfaces/gui/src/locales/en.json b/surfaces/gui/src/locales/en.jsonindex b474a222..8b26ec4a 100644--- a/surfaces/gui/src/locales/en.json+++ b/surfaces/gui/src/locales/en.json@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@"run_grant": "allowed for this request","run_grant_title": "you chose 'Allow for this request' earlier in this answer — this call ran without a card. Its full arguments are in this transcript and the audit log; the grant expired when the answer finished","gate_tier": "safe change, no card",- "gate_tier_title": "Auto-approve let this run without the reviewer: an inert file (a document or data, not code) inside your folders that can be undone — a new file, a file unchanged in git, or one the agent wrote earlier. Its full arguments are in this transcript and the audit log"+ "gate_tier_title": "Auto-approve let this run without the reviewer: an inert file (a document or image, not code or config) inside your folders that can be undone — a new file, a file unchanged in git, or one the agent wrote earlier. Its full arguments are in this transcript and the audit log"},"step": {"raw": "raw",diff --git a/surfaces/gui/src/locales/zh.json b/surfaces/gui/src/locales/zh.jsonindex 5e2f1970..0edd2a84 100644--- a/surfaces/gui/src/locales/zh.json+++ b/surfaces/gui/src/locales/zh.json@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@"run_grant": "本次请求内已允许","run_grant_title": "您在本次回答早些时候选择了“本次请求内允许”——此调用未显示审批卡片。完整参数保存在会话记录与审计日志中;回答结束后该授权已失效","gate_tier": "安全更改,无需审批卡片",- "gate_tier_title": "自动批准未经审查模型即运行了此操作:这是您文件夹内可撤销的非执行文件(文档或数据,而非代码)——新文件、在 git 中未修改的文件,或智能体早先写入的文件。完整参数保存在会话记录与审计日志中"+ "gate_tier_title": "自动批准未经审查模型即运行了此操作:这是您文件夹内可撤销的非执行文件(文档或图片,而非代码或配置)——新文件、在 git 中未修改的文件,或智能体早先写入的文件。完整参数保存在会话记录与审计日志中"},"step": {"raw": "原始",diff --git a/tests/test_inert_writes.py b/tests/test_inert_writes.pyindex abb37e36..361a42a5 100644--- a/tests/test_inert_writes.py+++ b/tests/test_inert_writes.py@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@"""Auto-approve's inert-writes tier (OPE-233).-A write inside the session's folders runs without a reviewer call when it is an inert-file type, its name and content don't look secret, it isn't a protected file, and it can-be undone: a new file, a git-tracked file with no uncommitted changes, or a file the agent+A write inside the session's folders runs without a reviewer call when it is a plain+document or raster image (not JSON or YAML, not a build or install input, not another AI+tool's instruction file), its name and content don't look secret, it isn't a protected+file, and it can be undone: a new file, a git-tracked file with no uncommitted changes, or a file the agentitself wrote earlier in the session. Every other write reaches the reviewer exactly asbefore. Behind `inert_writes`: "off" (default) → "audit" (decision unchanged, "wouldallow" recorded) → "on"."""@@ -87,13 +88,62 @@ def test_an_unknown_flag_value_means_off(tmp_path):@pytest.mark.parametrize("path",- ["notes.md", "out/report.txt", "data/rows.csv", "data/rows.tsv", "result.json", "cfg/settings.yaml",- "chart.png", "docs/guide.rst", "run.log", "NOTES.MD"],+ ["notes.md", "out/report.txt", "data/rows.csv", "data/rows.tsv", "chart.png", "docs/guide.rst",+ "run.log", "NOTES.MD", "README.md", "CHANGELOG.md", "LICENSE.txt", "docs/design.markdown",+ # names that only look like the exclusions below+ "docs/claude-notes.md", "notes/agents-meeting.txt", "cursor-tips.md", "cmake-notes.txt"],)def test_inert_types_are_eligible(tmp_path, path):assert _ran_without_reviewer(_gate(tmp_path).evaluate("write_file", _write(path)))+ "path",+ # Devika, 28 Oct 2026: JSON and YAML left the tier. Tools read them to decide what to+ # run, and no list of tool-config names can be complete. The reviewer sees the content.+ # result.json and cfg/settings.yaml were eligible before this change.+ ["result.json", "cfg/settings.yaml", "data/rows.jsonl", "config.yml", "nodemon.json",+ "docker-compose.override.yml", "deploy/playbook.yml", "buildspec.yml",+ ".vscode/settings.json", ".vscode/launch.json", "package.json", ".eslintrc.json"],+)+def test_json_and_yaml_go_to_the_reviewer(tmp_path, path):+ assert _goes_to_reviewer(_gate(tmp_path).evaluate("write_file", _write(path)))+++ "path",+ # Text files that decide what gets built, installed or tested: CMake runs+ # CMakeLists.txt, pip installs what requirements and constraints files list, and+ # pytest runs test*.txt files as doctests by default.+ ["CMakeLists.txt", "src/lib/cmakelists.TXT", "requirements.txt", "REQUIREMENTS.txt",+ "requirements-dev.txt", "requirements_test.txt", "dev-requirements.txt",+ "requirements/base.txt", "constraints.txt", "ci/constraints-py311.txt",+ "test_examples.txt", "docs/testing.txt"],+)+def test_build_and_install_inputs_go_to_the_reviewer(tmp_path, path):+ assert _goes_to_reviewer(_gate(tmp_path).evaluate("write_file", _write(path)))+++ "path",+ # Instructions another AI coding tool reads into its prompt on its next run.+ ["CLAUDE.md", "claude.MD", "sub/dir/CLAUDE.md", "CLAUDE.local.md", "GEMINI.md", "QWEN.md",+ "CRUSH.md", "WARP.md", "AGENT.md", "AGENTS.override.md", "CONVENTIONS.md",+ ".github/copilot-instructions.md", ".github/instructions/python.instructions.md",+ "src/api.instructions.md", ".github/prompts/release.prompt.md",+ ".github/chatmodes/plan.chatmode.md", ".github/agents/reviewer.agent.md",+ ".claude/commands/deploy.md", ".claude/agents/helper.md", "tools/x/SKILL.md",+ ".cursor/rules/style.md", ".Cursor/Rules/Style.md", ".windsurf/rules/rules.md",+ ".clinerules/01-style.md", ".roo/rules/style.md", ".kiro/steering/product.md",+ ".amazonq/rules/style.md", ".continue/rules/style.md", ".junie/guidelines.md",+ ".augment/rules/style.md", ".gemini/styleguide.md", ".agent/rules/style.md",+ ".agents/rules/style.md", ".openhands/microagents/repo.md", ".trae/rules/project_rules.md",+ ".codex/notes.md", ".opencode/agent/review.md"],+)+def test_other_ai_tools_instruction_files_go_to_the_reviewer(tmp_path, path):+ assert _goes_to_reviewer(_gate(tmp_path).evaluate("write_file", _write(path)))++@pytest.mark.parametrize("path",["make_report.py", "build.sh", "run.ps1", "app.js", "main.ts", "lib.rb", "x.c", "Makefile",@@ -107,8 +157,8 @@ def test_code_scripts_and_unknown_types_go_to_the_reviewer(tmp_path, path):@pytest.mark.parametrize("path",- [".env", ".env.local", "secrets/.ENV.production", "server.pem", "api_key.txt", "API-KEY.json",- "credentials.json", "id_rsa.txt", "my_secrets.yaml", "token.txt", "password.txt"],+ [".env", ".env.local", "secrets/.ENV.production", "server.pem", "api_key.txt", "API-KEY.md",+ "credentials.txt", "id_rsa.txt", "my_secrets.md", "token.txt", "password.txt"],)def test_secret_looking_names_go_to_the_reviewer(tmp_path, path):assert _goes_to_reviewer(_gate(tmp_path).evaluate("write_file", _write(path)))@@ -199,8 +249,8 @@ def test_an_untracked_existing_file_goes_to_the_reviewer(tmp_path):def test_an_ignored_existing_file_goes_to_the_reviewer(tmp_path):_repo(tmp_path, {".gitignore": "out/\n"})(tmp_path / "out").mkdir()- (tmp_path / "out" / "result.json").write_text("{}", encoding="utf-8")- d = _gate(tmp_path).evaluate("write_file", _write("out/result.json", overwrite=True))+ (tmp_path / "out" / "result.csv").write_text("a,b", encoding="utf-8")+ d = _gate(tmp_path).evaluate("write_file", _write("out/result.csv", overwrite=True))assert _goes_to_reviewer(d)