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Python

security: tighten permission handling

Rohit P9cc27619981a
diff --git a/coworker/agent.py b/coworker/agent.py
index d0f82a0e..456a0158 100644
--- a/coworker/agent.py
+++ b/coworker/agent.py
@@ -269,7 +269,10 @@ def build_engine(
permissions = PermissionEngine(
workspace_root=ws or (root_list[0].path if root_list else Path.cwd()),
mode=mode,
- allowed_commands=allowed_commands or config.allowed_commands,
+ # `[]` is an explicit deny-by-default override, not a request to fall back to config.
+ allowed_commands=(
+ allowed_commands if allowed_commands is not None else config.allowed_commands
+ ),
auto_allow_tools=set(config.auto_allow),
roots=root_list or None,
risk_overrides=risk_overrides,
diff --git a/coworker/config.py b/coworker/config.py
index abfe57a6..386337ca 100644
--- a/coworker/config.py
+++ b/coworker/config.py
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
Global: <state-dir>/config.toml (see `secrets.state_dir`; platform-native)
Workspace: <workspace>/.coworker/config.toml (overrides global)
+
+Permission grants are deliberately global-only. A checked-out repository is untrusted
+input and must not be able to grant its own shell commands or consequential tools.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -13,28 +16,12 @@ from typing import Any, Optional
from .secrets import state_dir
-# Commands auto-run WITHOUT an approval prompt. Deliberately limited to read-only
-# inspection: language interpreters and package managers (python/node/npm/npx) are NOT
-# here — allowlisting an interpreter allowlists arbitrary code (`python3 -c "..."`), which
-# defeats the point of approval gating. Users can still add them via config if they accept
-# that trade-off. Matching is exact-argv-prefix and rejects shell operators — see
-# PermissionEngine._command_allowed.
-DEFAULT_ALLOWED_COMMANDS = [
- "ls",
- "cat",
- "pwd",
- "echo",
- "head",
- "tail",
- "grep",
- "find",
- "wc",
- "git status",
- "git diff",
- "git log",
- "git show",
- "pytest",
-]
+# Commands auto-run WITHOUT an approval prompt. There is no generally safe executable:
+# nominally read-only programs can read secrets outside the workspace, expand environment
+# variables, load project-controlled config/plugins, or execute helpers (for example
+# `find -exec` and pytest collection). Keep the built-in list empty. A user may explicitly
+# opt into command prefixes in their user-owned global config, accepting that authority.
+DEFAULT_ALLOWED_COMMANDS: list[str] = []
@dataclass
@@ -87,6 +74,11 @@ _FIELDS = {
"cloud_relay_ws_url",
}
+# These fields change what consequential actions can run without a prompt. Only the
+# user-owned global config may set them; a repository's `.coworker/config.toml` may not.
+_GLOBAL_ONLY_FIELDS = {"allowed_commands", "auto_allow"}
+_WORKSPACE_FIELDS = _FIELDS - _GLOBAL_ONLY_FIELDS
+
def global_config_path() -> Path:
return state_dir() / "config.toml"
@@ -104,17 +96,16 @@ def load_config(
workspace: Optional[str | Path] = None, *, global_path: Optional[Path] = None
) -> Config:
cfg = Config()
- data: dict[str, Any] = {}
g = Path(global_path) if global_path is not None else global_config_path()
if g.is_file():
- data.update(_read(g))
+ for key, value in _read(g).items():
+ if key in _FIELDS:
+ setattr(cfg, key, value)
if workspace:
w = Path(workspace).expanduser() / ".coworker" / "config.toml"
if w.is_file():
- data.update(_read(w))
-
- for key, value in data.items():
- if key in _FIELDS:
- setattr(cfg, key, value)
+ for key, value in _read(w).items():
+ if key in _WORKSPACE_FIELDS:
+ setattr(cfg, key, value)
return cfg
diff --git a/tests/test_config.py b/tests/test_config.py
index 27648037..9070f690 100644
--- a/tests/test_config.py
+++ b/tests/test_config.py
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ def test_defaults_when_no_files(tmp_path):
assert cfg.model == "gpt-5.6-sol"
assert cfg.mode == "interactive"
assert cfg.max_iterations == 150
- assert "pytest" in cfg.allowed_commands
+ assert cfg.allowed_commands == []
def test_global_and_workspace_override(tmp_path):
@@ -31,6 +31,48 @@ def test_global_and_workspace_override(tmp_path):
assert cfg.mode == "plan" # from workspace
+def test_workspace_cannot_grant_its_own_permissions(tmp_path):
+ g = tmp_path / "global.toml"
+ g.write_text(
+ 'allowed_commands = ["git status"]\nauto_allow = ["write_file"]\n'
+ )
+ ws = tmp_path / "ws"
+ (ws / ".coworker").mkdir(parents=True)
+ (ws / ".coworker" / "config.toml").write_text(
+ 'allowed_commands = ["python3"]\nauto_allow = ["run_shell"]\n'
+ )
+
+ cfg = load_config(ws, global_path=g)
+ assert cfg.allowed_commands == ["git status"]
+ assert cfg.auto_allow == ["write_file"]
+
+
+def test_build_engine_honors_explicit_empty_command_allowlist(tmp_path):
+ from coworker.agent import build_code_engine
+ from coworker.config import global_config_path
+
+ global_config_path().parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+ global_config_path().write_text('allowed_commands = ["pytest"]\n')
+
+ class _Stub:
+ def complete(self, **k): # pragma: no cover
+ raise NotImplementedError
+
+ def capabilities(self, m): # pragma: no cover
+ raise NotImplementedError
+
+ engine = build_code_engine(
+ workspace=tmp_path, provider=_Stub(), allowed_commands=[]
+ )
+ try:
+ decision = engine.permissions.evaluate(
+ "run_shell", {"command": "pytest -q"}, None
+ )
+ assert not decision.allowed and decision.needs_user
+ finally:
+ engine.executor.close()
+
+
def test_build_engine_respects_max_iterations(tmp_path):
(tmp_path / ".coworker").mkdir()
(tmp_path / ".coworker" / "config.toml").write_text("max_iterations = 3\n")
diff --git a/tests/test_permissions_risk.py b/tests/test_permissions_risk.py
index 98450eb0..c41e1141 100644
--- a/tests/test_permissions_risk.py
+++ b/tests/test_permissions_risk.py
@@ -131,13 +131,21 @@ def test_allowlist_prefix_is_argv_boundary(tmp_path):
assert eng.evaluate("run_shell", {"command": "lsof"}, None).needs_user
-def test_interpreters_not_auto_allowed_by_default(tmp_path):
- # The default allowlist must not auto-run interpreters (arbitrary code execution).
+def test_shell_commands_not_auto_allowed_by_default(tmp_path):
+ # There is no generally safe executable: these examples cover code execution,
+ # environment disclosure, reads outside the workspace, and helper execution.
from coworker.config import DEFAULT_ALLOWED_COMMANDS
eng = PermissionEngine(
workspace_root=tmp_path, allowed_commands=list(DEFAULT_ALLOWED_COMMANDS)
)
- for cmd in ("python3 -c 'import os'", "node -e 1", "npm run x", "npx foo"):
+ for cmd in (
+ "python3 -c 'import os'",
+ "pytest /tmp/attacker_test.py",
+ "find . -exec sh -c 'echo arbitrary' {} +",
+ "cat ~/.config/coworker/secrets.json",
+ "echo $OPENAI_API_KEY",
+ "git status",
+ ):
d = eng.evaluate("run_shell", {"command": cmd}, None)
assert not d.allowed and d.needs_user, cmd