Python
security: tighten permission handling
Rohit P9cc27619981a
diff --git a/coworker/agent.py b/coworker/agent.pyindex d0f82a0e..456a0158 100644--- a/coworker/agent.py+++ b/coworker/agent.py@@ -269,7 +269,10 @@ def build_engine(permissions = PermissionEngine(workspace_root=ws or (root_list[0].path if root_list else Path.cwd()),mode=mode,- allowed_commands=allowed_commands or config.allowed_commands,+ # `[]` is an explicit deny-by-default override, not a request to fall back to config.+ allowed_commands=(+ allowed_commands if allowed_commands is not None else config.allowed_commands+ ),auto_allow_tools=set(config.auto_allow),roots=root_list or None,risk_overrides=risk_overrides,diff --git a/coworker/config.py b/coworker/config.pyindex abfe57a6..386337ca 100644--- a/coworker/config.py+++ b/coworker/config.py@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@Global: <state-dir>/config.toml (see `secrets.state_dir`; platform-native)Workspace: <workspace>/.coworker/config.toml (overrides global)++Permission grants are deliberately global-only. A checked-out repository is untrusted+input and must not be able to grant its own shell commands or consequential tools."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -13,28 +16,12 @@ from typing import Any, Optionalfrom .secrets import state_dir-# Commands auto-run WITHOUT an approval prompt. Deliberately limited to read-only-# inspection: language interpreters and package managers (python/node/npm/npx) are NOT-# here — allowlisting an interpreter allowlists arbitrary code (`python3 -c "..."`), which-# defeats the point of approval gating. Users can still add them via config if they accept-# that trade-off. Matching is exact-argv-prefix and rejects shell operators — see-# PermissionEngine._command_allowed.-DEFAULT_ALLOWED_COMMANDS = [- "ls",- "cat",- "pwd",- "echo",- "head",- "tail",- "grep",- "find",- "wc",- "git status",- "git diff",- "git log",- "git show",- "pytest",-]+# Commands auto-run WITHOUT an approval prompt. There is no generally safe executable:+# nominally read-only programs can read secrets outside the workspace, expand environment+# variables, load project-controlled config/plugins, or execute helpers (for example+# `find -exec` and pytest collection). Keep the built-in list empty. A user may explicitly+# opt into command prefixes in their user-owned global config, accepting that authority.+DEFAULT_ALLOWED_COMMANDS: list[str] = []@dataclass@@ -87,6 +74,11 @@ _FIELDS = {"cloud_relay_ws_url",}+# These fields change what consequential actions can run without a prompt. Only the+# user-owned global config may set them; a repository's `.coworker/config.toml` may not.+_GLOBAL_ONLY_FIELDS = {"allowed_commands", "auto_allow"}+_WORKSPACE_FIELDS = _FIELDS - _GLOBAL_ONLY_FIELDS+def global_config_path() -> Path:return state_dir() / "config.toml"@@ -104,17 +96,16 @@ def load_config(workspace: Optional[str | Path] = None, *, global_path: Optional[Path] = None) -> Config:cfg = Config()- data: dict[str, Any] = {}g = Path(global_path) if global_path is not None else global_config_path()if g.is_file():- data.update(_read(g))+ for key, value in _read(g).items():+ if key in _FIELDS:+ setattr(cfg, key, value)if workspace:w = Path(workspace).expanduser() / ".coworker" / "config.toml"if w.is_file():- data.update(_read(w))-- for key, value in data.items():- if key in _FIELDS:- setattr(cfg, key, value)+ for key, value in _read(w).items():+ if key in _WORKSPACE_FIELDS:+ setattr(cfg, key, value)return cfgdiff --git a/tests/test_config.py b/tests/test_config.pyindex 27648037..9070f690 100644--- a/tests/test_config.py+++ b/tests/test_config.py@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ def test_defaults_when_no_files(tmp_path):assert cfg.model == "gpt-5.6-sol"assert cfg.mode == "interactive"assert cfg.max_iterations == 150- assert "pytest" in cfg.allowed_commands+ assert cfg.allowed_commands == []def test_global_and_workspace_override(tmp_path):@@ -31,6 +31,48 @@ def test_global_and_workspace_override(tmp_path):assert cfg.mode == "plan" # from workspace+def test_workspace_cannot_grant_its_own_permissions(tmp_path):+ g = tmp_path / "global.toml"+ g.write_text(+ 'allowed_commands = ["git status"]\nauto_allow = ["write_file"]\n'+ )+ ws = tmp_path / "ws"+ (ws / ".coworker").mkdir(parents=True)+ (ws / ".coworker" / "config.toml").write_text(+ 'allowed_commands = ["python3"]\nauto_allow = ["run_shell"]\n'+ )++ cfg = load_config(ws, global_path=g)+ assert cfg.allowed_commands == ["git status"]+ assert cfg.auto_allow == ["write_file"]+++def test_build_engine_honors_explicit_empty_command_allowlist(tmp_path):+ from coworker.agent import build_code_engine+ from coworker.config import global_config_path++ global_config_path().parent.mkdir(parents=True)+ global_config_path().write_text('allowed_commands = ["pytest"]\n')++ class _Stub:+ def complete(self, **k): # pragma: no cover+ raise NotImplementedError++ def capabilities(self, m): # pragma: no cover+ raise NotImplementedError++ engine = build_code_engine(+ workspace=tmp_path, provider=_Stub(), allowed_commands=[]+ )+ try:+ decision = engine.permissions.evaluate(+ "run_shell", {"command": "pytest -q"}, None+ )+ assert not decision.allowed and decision.needs_user+ finally:+ engine.executor.close()++def test_build_engine_respects_max_iterations(tmp_path):(tmp_path / ".coworker").mkdir()(tmp_path / ".coworker" / "config.toml").write_text("max_iterations = 3\n")diff --git a/tests/test_permissions_risk.py b/tests/test_permissions_risk.pyindex 98450eb0..c41e1141 100644--- a/tests/test_permissions_risk.py+++ b/tests/test_permissions_risk.py@@ -131,13 +131,21 @@ def test_allowlist_prefix_is_argv_boundary(tmp_path):assert eng.evaluate("run_shell", {"command": "lsof"}, None).needs_user-def test_interpreters_not_auto_allowed_by_default(tmp_path):- # The default allowlist must not auto-run interpreters (arbitrary code execution).+def test_shell_commands_not_auto_allowed_by_default(tmp_path):+ # There is no generally safe executable: these examples cover code execution,+ # environment disclosure, reads outside the workspace, and helper execution.from coworker.config import DEFAULT_ALLOWED_COMMANDSeng = PermissionEngine(workspace_root=tmp_path, allowed_commands=list(DEFAULT_ALLOWED_COMMANDS))- for cmd in ("python3 -c 'import os'", "node -e 1", "npm run x", "npx foo"):+ for cmd in (+ "python3 -c 'import os'",+ "pytest /tmp/attacker_test.py",+ "find . -exec sh -c 'echo arbitrary' {} +",+ "cat ~/.config/coworker/secrets.json",+ "echo $OPENAI_API_KEY",+ "git status",+ ):d = eng.evaluate("run_shell", {"command": cmd}, None)assert not d.allowed and d.needs_user, cmd