Python
OPE-111: gate mislabeled catalog tools, floor catalog writes against relaxing overrides
Devika Vermaaf768b357f2a
diff --git a/coworker/connectors/tool_defs.py b/coworker/connectors/tool_defs.pyindex d8b365eb..e9ef6e02 100644--- a/coworker/connectors/tool_defs.py+++ b/coworker/connectors/tool_defs.py@@ -34,9 +34,11 @@ TOOL_DEFS: tuple[ConnectorToolDef, ...] = (),ConnectorToolDef("browser",+ # Egress, not a read: the URL is model-chosen, so the request itself can carry+ # data off-machine (same reasoning as web_fetch, OPE-111)."browser_open_url","Open URL",- "read",+ "write","Open a URL in the Playwright browser.",),ConnectorToolDef(@@ -86,9 +88,11 @@ TOOL_DEFS: tuple[ConnectorToolDef, ...] = (),ConnectorToolDef("browser",+ # Writes an image file to a resolved path (creating parents) — a local write,+ # whatever the pane shows (OPE-111)."browser_screenshot","Screenshot",- "read",+ "write","Capture a browser screenshot.",),ConnectorToolDef(@@ -142,16 +146,18 @@ TOOL_DEFS: tuple[ConnectorToolDef, ...] = (),ConnectorToolDef("github",+ # Writes a whole tree to local disk — reading GitHub, writing the machine (OPE-111)."github_clone","Clone a repo",- "read",+ "write","Clone a repository into a session folder to explore the code.",),ConnectorToolDef("github",+ # Mutates an existing working tree (OPE-111)."github_pull","Update a clone",- "read",+ "write","Fast-forward an existing clone to the latest commits.",),ConnectorToolDef(diff --git a/coworker/risk.py b/coworker/risk.pyindex 11da31db..46938976 100644--- a/coworker/risk.py+++ b/coworker/risk.py@@ -52,22 +52,36 @@ _STRICTNESS: dict[RiskClass, int] = {RiskOverrides = Callable[[str], Optional["RiskClass"]]+def _catalog_floor(tool_name: str) -> Optional[RiskClass]:+ """The floor a connector-catalog tool must not be relaxed below. Catalog writes are+ EXTERNAL by construction (`approval_for_tool` → `requires_approval=True`), and letting+ an override drop one to READ would switch off approval, the Auto-Approve reviewer, and+ read-only mode in a single step (OPE-111). Lazy import: risk.py must stay importable+ without the connectors package."""+ try:+ from .connectors.tool_defs import _KIND_BY_NAME+ except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - connectors always ship, but fail open to base+ return None+ kind = _KIND_BY_NAME.get(tool_name)+ return RiskClass.EXTERNAL if kind is not None and kind != "read" else None++def classify(tool_name: str, metadata: Any = None, overrides: Optional[RiskOverrides] = None) -> RiskClass:"""Effective risk of a tool call. A user override may *relax* a metadata/MCP tool (theintended use — quieting an over-cautious plug-in), but may only ever **tighten** a- built-in write/exec/egress tool, never loosen it. Downgrading a built-in write to a read- would switch off path scoping AND the read-only gate at once, so it is refused here.- Precedence otherwise: the by-name base table, then aisuite metadata- (`requires_approval` → external), else read."""- base = _BASE.get(tool_name)+ built-in write/exec/egress tool or a connector-catalog write, never loosen one.+ Downgrading a write to a read would switch off path scoping AND the read-only gate at+ once, so it is refused here. Precedence otherwise: the by-name base table, then aisuite+ metadata (`requires_approval` → external), else read."""+ base = _BASE.get(tool_name) or _catalog_floor(tool_name)if overrides is not None:ov = overrides(tool_name)if ov is not None:if base is None or _STRICTNESS[ov] >= _STRICTNESS[base]:return ov- # A loosening override on a built-in is ignored: fall through to the base class.+ # A loosening override on a floored tool is ignored: fall through to the base.if base is not None:return baseif bool(getattr(metadata, "requires_approval", False)):diff --git a/tests/test_connectors.py b/tests/test_connectors.pyindex cb155fa6..252e124f 100644--- a/tests/test_connectors.py+++ b/tests/test_connectors.py@@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ def test_engine_connector_tools_are_cowork_scoped(tmp_path):assert "browser_open_url" not in helper.registry.names()# §36: browser READS (registry kind) are free; interactions still gate.- assert cowork.registry.get("browser_open_url").metadata.requires_approval is False+ # OPE-111: open_url is egress (model-chosen URL), so it gates like an interaction.+ assert cowork.registry.get("browser_open_url").metadata.requires_approval is Trueassert cowork.registry.get("browser_snapshot").metadata.requires_approval is Falseassert cowork.registry.get("browser_click").metadata.requires_approval is Trueassert cowork.registry.get("browser_type").metadata.requires_approval is Truediff --git a/tests/test_egress_and_overrides.py b/tests/test_egress_and_overrides.pyindex 7b46b723..1d5567c6 100644--- a/tests/test_egress_and_overrides.py+++ b/tests/test_egress_and_overrides.py@@ -119,6 +119,68 @@ def test_override_may_tighten(tmp_path):assert classify("mcp__x__run", None, ov) is RiskClass.EXEC+# -- catalog effects vs UX labels (OPE-111) -------------------------------------+# These connector tools were catalogued "read" while actually writing to disk or+# carrying model-chosen egress, which routed them around approval, the reviewer,+# root scoping, and read-only mode all at once. The names are pinned here so a+# future catalog edit can't quietly reopen the hole.+_CATALOG_WRITES_IN_DISGUISE = (+ "github_clone", # writes a repo tree to disk+ "github_pull", # mutates a working tree+ "browser_open_url", # model-chosen URL = egress, like web_fetch+ "browser_screenshot", # writes an image file, creating parent dirs+ "browser_upload_file", # sends a local file's contents off-machine+)+++def test_disguised_catalog_writes_gate():+ from coworker.connectors.tool_defs import approval_for_tool++ for name in _CATALOG_WRITES_IN_DISGUISE:+ assert approval_for_tool(name) is True, name+ assert classify(name) is RiskClass.EXTERNAL, name+++def test_catalog_floor_holds_even_with_lying_metadata():+ # The floor keys off the catalog, not the attached metadata — a mis-built+ # requires_approval=False cannot un-gate a catalog write.+ from types import SimpleNamespace++ meta = SimpleNamespace(requires_approval=False)+ assert classify("github_clone", meta) is RiskClass.EXTERNAL+++def test_override_cannot_relax_a_catalog_write(tmp_path):+ ov = _override({"github_clone": RiskClass.READ})+ assert classify("github_clone", None, ov) is RiskClass.EXTERNAL++ eng = PermissionEngine(workspace_root=tmp_path, mode=Mode.PLAN, risk_overrides=ov)+ d = eng.evaluate("github_clone", {"repo": "octo/repo"}, None)+ assert not d.allowed # read-only mode still applies; the downgrade did nothing+++def test_catalog_reads_stay_relaxed_and_unprompted(tmp_path):+ from coworker.connectors.tool_defs import approval_for_tool++ for name in ("browser_read_url", "email_search", "github_get_issue"):+ assert approval_for_tool(name) is False, name+ assert classify(name) is RiskClass.READ, name+ # And the plugin-relaxation path is untouched for genuine reads.+ ov = _override({"email_search": RiskClass.READ})+ assert classify("email_search", None, ov) is RiskClass.READ+++def test_disguised_writes_blocked_in_read_only_modes(tmp_path):+ from types import SimpleNamespace++ meta = SimpleNamespace(requires_approval=True)+ for mode in (Mode.DISCUSS, Mode.PLAN):+ eng = PermissionEngine(workspace_root=tmp_path, mode=mode)+ for name in _CATALOG_WRITES_IN_DISGUISE:+ d = eng.evaluate(name, {}, meta)+ assert not d.allowed, f"{name} ran in {mode.value} mode"++# -- write-path extraction / scoping -------------------------------------------def test_write_paths_simple_tools():assert write_paths("write_file", {"path": "a.txt"}) == (["a.txt"], True)diff --git a/tests/test_send_target_resolution.py b/tests/test_send_target_resolution.pyindex 645f27a0..6498b006 100644--- a/tests/test_send_target_resolution.py+++ b/tests/test_send_target_resolution.py@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ def test_browser_automation_reads_are_free_interactions_gate():assert (tools["browser_snapshot"].__aisuite_tool_metadata__.requires_approval is False)+ # OPE-111: opening a model-chosen URL is egress, not a read — it gates.assert (- tools["browser_open_url"].__aisuite_tool_metadata__.requires_approval is False+ tools["browser_open_url"].__aisuite_tool_metadata__.requires_approval is True)assert tools["browser_click"].__aisuite_tool_metadata__.requires_approval is Trueassert tools["browser_type"].__aisuite_tool_metadata__.requires_approval is True