Python
human_only asks skip the reviewer - it could clear git-hook writes
Devika Vermab5a93fb138e2
diff --git a/coworker/engine.py b/coworker/engine.pyindex 6f503f00..ca1a7e6e 100644--- a/coworker/engine.py+++ b/coworker/engine.py@@ -806,7 +806,8 @@ class TurnEngine:decision = self.permissions.evaluate(tool_call.name, tool_call.arguments, spec.metadata)- if not decision.allowed and decision.needs_user:+ # human_only asks never reach the reviewer — same rule as `_authorize`.+ if not decision.allowed and decision.needs_user and not decision.human_only:pending.append(tool_call)if not pending:return@@ -948,10 +949,17 @@ class TurnEngine:self._audit(tool_call, stage="auto_allowed", status="allowed", reason=reason)consulted_live = False- if not allowed and decision.needs_user and self._reviewer_active():+ if (+ not allowed+ and decision.needs_user+ and not decision.human_only+ and self._reviewer_active()+ ):# The one thing the reviewer may do: turn "ask the human" into "go ahead" —# never "blocked" into "go ahead" (§1.2; hard denies never reach this branch- # because needs_user is False on them).+ # because needs_user is False on them). `human_only` asks (git hooks, CI+ # configs, unscopable writes) skip the reviewer entirely: their floor is that+ # a PERSON sees them, and a verdict here would be that floor's bypass.consulted_live = Trueverdict = await self._consult_reviewer(tool_call)self._audit(diff --git a/coworker/permissions.py b/coworker/permissions.pyindex 7791aa44..acfa9f4d 100644--- a/coworker/permissions.py+++ b/coworker/permissions.py@@ -204,6 +204,12 @@ class Decision:allowed: boolreason: str = ""needs_user: bool = False # True → surface should prompt the user for approval+ # True → this ask is reserved for a HUMAN: the Auto-Approve reviewer must not be+ # consulted and cannot clear it. Set on decisions whose entire point is that a person+ # sees them — protected in-project files that execute later (git hooks, CI configs:+ # "never WITHOUT a human — no auto-approve path may clear them") and writes whose path+ # could not be located for scoping (an allow would bypass root scoping unverified).+ human_only: bool = False# Set when a task-scoped standing rule allowed the call ("tool → target") so the# engine can audit the exact rule and the tool card can say so (§25).rule: str = ""@@ -313,6 +319,7 @@ class PermissionEngine:False,"cannot determine the write path to scope",needs_user=True,+ human_only=True, # an unscopable write must reach a person, not the reviewer)for path in paths:if not self._under_writable_root(path):@@ -335,6 +342,7 @@ class PermissionEngine:False,"this file runs automatically later — approval required",needs_user=True,+ human_only=True, # deferred-execution files: a human sees every one (§ floor))# Full access.diff --git a/tests/test_auto_approve.py b/tests/test_auto_approve.pyindex 10c9703a..15ba2af5 100644--- a/tests/test_auto_approve.py+++ b/tests/test_auto_approve.py@@ -96,6 +96,22 @@ def test_hard_floors_hold_in_auto_approve(tmp_path):assert not d.allowed and not d.needs_user # hard deny: the reviewer never sees it+def test_deferred_execution_files_are_human_only(tmp_path):+ # Git hooks / CI configs run on a LATER innocuous action — the floor is that a human+ # sees every such write ("no auto-approve path may clear them"). The decision says so.+ d = _gate(tmp_path).evaluate(+ "write_file", {"path": ".git/hooks/pre-commit", "content": "curl evil.site"}+ )+ assert not d.allowed and d.needs_user and d.human_only+ # An unscopable write (no locatable path) is human-only too: an allow would bypass+ # root scoping unverified.+ d2 = _gate(tmp_path).evaluate("apply_patch", {"patch": "garbage, no file header"})+ assert not d2.allowed and d2.needs_user and d2.human_only+ # An ordinary ask stays reviewer-eligible.+ d3 = _gate(tmp_path).evaluate("run_shell", {"command": "pytest -q"})+ assert d3.needs_user and not d3.human_only++# -- verdict parsing: no parse path results in execution (§8.5) -------------------@@ -173,6 +189,30 @@ def test_replies_are_labelled_reply_and_turn_numbering_skips_them():assert lines[2].startswith(" turn 2 update the changelog") # numbering skipped the reply+# -- human-only asks skip the reviewer entirely -------------------------------------+++def test_reviewer_cannot_clear_a_git_hook_write(tmp_path):+ # Stress case that found the gap (2026-08-17): the engine used to consult the+ # reviewer on ANY needs_user decision — including protected in-project files, whose+ # entire floor is that a PERSON sees them. An "allow" here would have been the+ # bypass. Now: card always, reviewer never asked.+ engine, rows, approvals = _engine(+ tmp_path,+ [+ _tool_turn(("write_file", {"path": ".git/hooks/pre-commit", "content": "x"})),+ AssistantTurn(text="done", finish_reason="stop"),+ ],+ )+ engine.reviewer = _FakeReviewer({"write_file": "allow"}) # eager to allow — must not matter+ events = _run(engine, "update the changelog")++ assert approvals == ["write_file"] # the human saw the card+ assert EventType.PERMISSION_REQUIRED in [ev.type for ev in events]+ assert engine.reviewer.asked == [] # the reviewer was never consulted+ assert [r for r in rows if r.get("stage") == "reviewer_verdict"] == []++# -- attachments never reach the reviewer's request (§4.4) --------------------------