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fix(plugins): stop any Authorization header bypassing the viewer auth-gate

Gabe Kangasace302b541dd
diff --git a/pluginhost/authgate.go b/pluginhost/authgate.go
index c22371069c..1f272cea58 100644
--- a/pluginhost/authgate.go
+++ b/pluginhost/authgate.go
@@ -60,9 +60,13 @@ var gateExemptions = []gateExemption{
{"admin", exemptAdminRoutes},
{"static-assets", exemptStaticAssets},
{"active-gate-plugin", exemptActiveGatePluginRoutes},
- {"self-credentialed", exemptSelfCredentialed},
+ {"external-api", exemptExternalAPIRoutes},
}
+// externalAPIPrefix is the namespace for third-party API routes. Each handler
+// there validates its own access token via RequireExternalAPIAccessToken.
+const externalAPIPrefix = "/api/integrations/"
+
// webFS is the embedded web build (rooted at web/), resolved once. We test
// request paths against it to decide what's a static asset.
var webFS = static.GetWeb()
@@ -113,11 +117,21 @@ func exemptActiveGatePluginRoutes(r *http.Request, gateSlug string) bool {
return r.URL.Path == base || strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, base+"/")
}
-// exemptSelfCredentialed: requests carrying their own credential (admin Basic
-// auth, external-API Bearer tokens) are left for the downstream handler's own
-// auth to evaluate, rather than bounced to the viewer login screen.
-func exemptSelfCredentialed(r *http.Request, _ string) bool {
- return r.Header.Get("Authorization") != ""
+// exemptExternalAPIRoutes: the external-API (third-party token) routes under
+// /api/integrations/ carry their own Bearer token, validated per-route by
+// RequireExternalAPIAccessToken. A token client carries no session cookie, so
+// gating these would bounce a valid API call into the HTML login screen; a
+// token-less call still hits the route's own 401. (Admin Basic-auth /
+// admin-session routes are exempted separately by exemptAdminRoutes.)
+//
+// Scoped to that namespace on purpose. An earlier version exempted ANY request
+// carrying an Authorization header, on any path. But the viewer page (/) and
+// the HLS handlers never inspect Authorization, so "Authorization: anything"
+// let an anonymous visitor walk straight through the gate to the page and the
+// live video. Gating is opt-out: a credential a route never checks must never
+// be a bypass on that route.
+func exemptExternalAPIRoutes(r *http.Request, _ string) bool {
+ return strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, externalAPIPrefix)
}
// gateExemptionFor returns the name of the first exemption that applies, or ""
@@ -214,6 +228,7 @@ func (h *Host) AuthGateMiddleware() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
// Redirect navigations; 401 anything else so XHR/API callers
// get a status they can act on instead of an HTML body.
if r.Method == http.MethodGet || r.Method == http.MethodHead {
+ //nolint:gosec // G710: loginURL is a same-origin /plugins/<slug>/ path with a query-escaped return_to, not attacker-controlled.
http.Redirect(w, r, loginURL, http.StatusFound)
} else {
http.Error(w, "authentication required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
diff --git a/pluginhost/authgate_test.go b/pluginhost/authgate_test.go
index 84dd09b8a7..53fbfb0fae 100644
--- a/pluginhost/authgate_test.go
+++ b/pluginhost/authgate_test.go
@@ -34,7 +34,11 @@ func TestDecideGate(t *testing.T) {
{"no session redirects to login", newReq("GET", "/", ""), "github-auth", true, true, false, gateLogin},
{"valid session allowed", newReq("GET", "/hls/0.ts", ""), "github-auth", true, true, true, gateAllow},
{"valid session survives a gate-plugin outage", newReq("GET", "/", ""), "github-auth", false, true, true, gateAllow},
- {"authorization header allowed (self-credentialed)", newReq("GET", "/api/integrations/foo", "Bearer xyz"), "github-auth", true, true, false, gateAllow},
+ {"external-api route allowed", newReq("GET", "/api/integrations/status", "Bearer xyz"), "github-auth", true, true, false, gateAllow},
+ // An Authorization header must NOT be a bypass on routes that never
+ // check it — these are the gate-defeat vectors the exemption scoping fixes.
+ {"auth header on viewer page is gated", newReq("GET", "/", "Bearer xyz"), "github-auth", true, true, false, gateLogin},
+ {"auth header on HLS segment is gated", newReq("GET", "/hls/0.ts", "anything"), "github-auth", true, true, false, gateLogin},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
@@ -72,7 +76,12 @@ func TestGateExemptions(t *testing.T) {
{"active gate plugin root", req("/plugins/g", ""), "g", "active-gate-plugin"},
{"active gate plugin subpath", req("/plugins/g/callback", ""), "g", "active-gate-plugin"},
{"a different plugin is NOT exempt", req("/plugins/other/x", ""), "g", ""},
- {"self-credentialed", req("/api/x", "Bearer t"), "g", "self-credentialed"},
+ {"external-api route exempt", req("/api/integrations/status", "Bearer t"), "g", "external-api"},
+ {"external-api route exempt even without a header (route 401s itself)", req("/api/integrations/status", ""), "g", "external-api"},
+ // An Authorization header is NOT a bypass off the external-API namespace.
+ {"auth header on viewer page is NOT a bypass", req("/", "Bearer t"), "g", ""},
+ {"auth header on HLS is NOT a bypass", req("/hls/0.ts", "Bearer t"), "g", ""},
+ {"auth header on public api/config is NOT a bypass", req("/api/config", "Bearer t"), "g", ""},
// Real files in the embedded web build are exempt (resolved by fs.Stat).
{"admin stylesheet exempt", req("/styles/admin/chat.css", ""), "g", "static-assets"},
{"service worker exempt", req("/sw.js", ""), "g", "static-assets"},
diff --git a/pluginhost/pluginhost.go b/pluginhost/pluginhost.go
index fe3c35440c..2881cca55b 100644
--- a/pluginhost/pluginhost.go
+++ b/pluginhost/pluginhost.go
@@ -1530,7 +1530,7 @@ func wireUserHostFns(env *plugins.HostEnv, deps Deps) {
// pluginAuthSigningSecretKey is where the gate session signing secret is
// persisted. Generated once on first use; rotating it (clearing the row)
// invalidates every outstanding session.
-const pluginAuthSigningSecretKey = "plugin_auth_signing_secret"
+const pluginAuthSigningSecretKey = "plugin_auth_signing_secret" //nolint:gosec // G101: datastore key name, not a credential.
// ensureSigningSecret returns the persisted gate session signing secret,
// generating and storing one on first use.