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Stop leaking host process.env into the remote OpenCode SSH probe (#5274)

Devin Foley028c5aa00a3e
diff --git a/packages/adapters/opencode-local/src/server/runtime-config.ts b/packages/adapters/opencode-local/src/server/runtime-config.ts
index bc903e8340..6f9a338b32 100644
--- a/packages/adapters/opencode-local/src/server/runtime-config.ts
+++ b/packages/adapters/opencode-local/src/server/runtime-config.ts
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ async function readJsonObject(filepath: string): Promise<Record<string, unknown>
export async function prepareOpenCodeRuntimeConfig(input: {
env: Record<string, string>;
config: Record<string, unknown>;
+ targetIsRemote?: boolean;
}): Promise<PreparedOpenCodeRuntimeConfig> {
const skipPermissions = asBoolean(input.config.dangerouslySkipPermissions, true);
if (!skipPermissions) {
@@ -44,6 +45,19 @@ export async function prepareOpenCodeRuntimeConfig(input: {
};
}
+ // For remote execution targets the host XDG_CONFIG_HOME path is meaningless
+ // (and actively harmful — it leaks a macOS-only path into the remote Linux
+ // env). Callers that need to ship a runtime opencode config to the remote
+ // box do that via prepareAdapterExecutionTargetRuntime in execute.ts; this
+ // host-fs helper is local-only.
+ if (input.targetIsRemote) {
+ return {
+ env: input.env,
+ notes: [],
+ cleanup: async () => {},
+ };
+ }
+
const sourceConfigDir = path.join(resolveXdgConfigHome(input.env), "opencode");
const runtimeConfigHome = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "paperclip-opencode-config-"));
const runtimeConfigDir = path.join(runtimeConfigHome, "opencode");
diff --git a/packages/adapters/opencode-local/src/server/test.ts b/packages/adapters/opencode-local/src/server/test.ts
index f72054dd83..d9d4245683 100644
--- a/packages/adapters/opencode-local/src/server/test.ts
+++ b/packages/adapters/opencode-local/src/server/test.ts
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ export async function testEnvironment(
// Prevent OpenCode from writing an opencode.json into the working directory.
env.OPENCODE_DISABLE_PROJECT_CONFIG = "true";
- const preparedRuntimeConfig = await prepareOpenCodeRuntimeConfig({ env, config });
+ const preparedRuntimeConfig = await prepareOpenCodeRuntimeConfig({ env, config, targetIsRemote });
if (asBoolean(config.dangerouslySkipPermissions, true)) {
checks.push({
code: "opencode_headless_permissions_enabled",
@@ -279,6 +279,13 @@ export async function testEnvironment(
if (variant) args.push("--variant", variant);
if (extraArgs.length > 0) args.push(...extraArgs);
+ // For remote targets, do NOT spread the host process.env into the
+ // probe env: it leaks macOS-only paths (HOME=/Users/..., host
+ // XDG_CONFIG_HOME, TMPDIR, etc.) into the remote shell, which causes
+ // opencode on the remote box to try to mkdir host paths like /Users.
+ // Match the pattern used by claude_local / codex_local / gemini_local
+ // probes: send only the user-configured adapter env across SSH.
+ const probeEnv = targetIsRemote ? preparedRuntimeConfig.env : runtimeEnv;
try {
const probe = await runAdapterExecutionTargetProcess(
runId,
@@ -287,7 +294,7 @@ export async function testEnvironment(
args,
{
cwd,
- env: runtimeEnv,
+ env: probeEnv,
timeoutSec: 60,
graceSec: 5,
stdin: "Respond with hello.",