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Fix: Expanded SVG validation whitelist and additional checks (#11590)
Trenton Hd9a596d67ab3
diff --git a/src/documents/tests/samples/malicious.svg b/src/documents/tests/samples/malicious.svgdeleted file mode 100644index 11fb65821..000000000--- a/src/documents/tests/samples/malicious.svg+++ /dev/null@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@-<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="100" height="100">- <text x="10" y="20">Hello</text>- <script>alert('XSS')</script>-</svg>diff --git a/src/documents/tests/test_api_app_config.py b/src/documents/tests/test_api_app_config.pyindex 750aeddbf..974f0d205 100644--- a/src/documents/tests/test_api_app_config.py+++ b/src/documents/tests/test_api_app_config.py@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@import json+from io import BytesIOfrom pathlib import Pathfrom django.contrib.auth.models import User@@ -199,16 +200,336 @@ class TestApiAppConfig(DirectoriesMixin, APITestCase):THEN:- SVG is rejected with 400"""- path = Path(__file__).parent / "samples" / "malicious.svg"- with path.open("rb") as f:- response = self.client.patch(- f"{self.ENDPOINT}1/",- {"app_logo": f},- format="multipart",- )+ malicious_svg = b"""<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="100" height="100">+ <text x="10" y="20">Hello</text>+ <script>alert('XSS')</script>+ </svg>+ """+ svg_file = BytesIO(malicious_svg)+ svg_file.name = "malicious_script.svg"++ response = self.client.patch(+ f"{self.ENDPOINT}1/",+ {"app_logo": svg_file},+ format="multipart",+ )++ self.assertEqual(response.status_code, status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST)+ self.assertIn("disallowed svg tag", str(response.data).lower())++ def test_api_rejects_malicious_svg_with_style_javascript(self):+ """+ GIVEN:+ - An SVG logo containing javascript: in style attribute+ WHEN:+ - Uploaded via PATCH to app config+ THEN:+ - SVG is rejected with 400+ """++ malicious_svg = b"""<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>+ <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 100 100">+ <rect width="100" height="100" style="background: url(javascript:alert('XSS'));" fill="red"/>+ </svg>"""++ svg_file = BytesIO(malicious_svg)+ svg_file.name = "malicious_style.svg"++ response = self.client.patch(+ f"{self.ENDPOINT}1/",+ {"app_logo": svg_file},+ format="multipart",+ )+ self.assertEqual(response.status_code, status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST)+ self.assertIn(+ "disallowed pattern in style attribute",+ str(response.data).lower(),+ )+ self.assertIn("style", str(response.data).lower())++ def test_api_rejects_svg_with_style_expression(self):+ """+ GIVEN:+ - An SVG logo containing CSS expression() in style+ WHEN:+ - Uploaded via PATCH to app config+ THEN:+ - SVG is rejected with 400+ """++ malicious_svg = b"""<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>+ <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 100 100">+ <rect width="100" height="100" style="width: expression(alert('XSS'));" fill="blue"/>+ </svg>"""++ svg_file = BytesIO(malicious_svg)+ svg_file.name = "expression_style.svg"++ response = self.client.patch(+ f"{self.ENDPOINT}1/",+ {"app_logo": svg_file},+ format="multipart",+ )+ self.assertEqual(response.status_code, status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST)+ self.assertIn("disallowed", str(response.data).lower())++ def test_api_rejects_svg_with_style_import(self):+ """+ GIVEN:+ - An SVG logo containing @import in style+ WHEN:+ - Uploaded via PATCH to app config+ THEN:+ - SVG is rejected with 400+ """++ malicious_svg = b"""<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>+ <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 100 100">+ <rect width="100" height="100" style="@import url('http://evil.com/malicious.css');" fill="green"/>+ </svg>"""++ svg_file = BytesIO(malicious_svg)+ svg_file.name = "import_style.svg"++ response = self.client.patch(+ f"{self.ENDPOINT}1/",+ {"app_logo": svg_file},+ format="multipart",+ )+ self.assertEqual(response.status_code, status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST)+ self.assertIn("disallowed", str(response.data).lower())++ def test_api_accepts_valid_svg_with_safe_style(self):+ """+ GIVEN:+ - A valid SVG logo with safe style attributes+ WHEN:+ - Uploaded via PATCH to app config+ THEN:+ - SVG is accepted with 200+ """++ safe_svg = b"""<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>+ <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 100 100">+ <rect width="100" height="100" style="fill: #ff6b6b; stroke: #333; stroke-width: 2;"/>+ <circle cx="50" cy="50" r="30" style="fill: white; opacity: 0.8;"/>+ </svg>"""++ svg_file = BytesIO(safe_svg)+ svg_file.name = "safe_logo.svg"++ response = self.client.patch(+ f"{self.ENDPOINT}1/",+ {"app_logo": svg_file},+ format="multipart",+ )+ self.assertEqual(response.status_code, status.HTTP_200_OK)++ def test_api_rejects_svg_with_disallowed_attribute(self):+ """+ GIVEN:+ - An SVG with a disallowed attribute (onclick)+ WHEN:+ - Uploaded via PATCH to app config+ THEN:+ - SVG is rejected with 400+ """++ malicious_svg = b"""<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>+ <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 100 100">+ <rect width="100" height="100" fill="red" onclick="alert('XSS')"/>+ </svg>"""++ svg_file = BytesIO(malicious_svg)+ svg_file.name = "onclick_attribute.svg"++ response = self.client.patch(+ f"{self.ENDPOINT}1/",+ {"app_logo": svg_file},+ format="multipart",+ )self.assertEqual(response.status_code, status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST)self.assertIn("disallowed", str(response.data).lower())+ self.assertIn("attribute", str(response.data).lower())++ def test_api_rejects_svg_with_disallowed_tag(self):+ """+ GIVEN:+ - An SVG with a disallowed tag (script)+ WHEN:+ - Uploaded via PATCH to app config+ THEN:+ - SVG is rejected with 400+ """++ malicious_svg = b"""<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>+ <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 100 100">+ <script>alert('XSS')</script>+ <rect width="100" height="100" fill="blue"/>+ </svg>"""++ svg_file = BytesIO(malicious_svg)+ svg_file.name = "script_tag.svg"++ response = self.client.patch(+ f"{self.ENDPOINT}1/",+ {"app_logo": svg_file},+ format="multipart",+ )+ self.assertEqual(response.status_code, status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST)+ self.assertIn("disallowed", str(response.data).lower())+ self.assertIn("tag", str(response.data).lower())++ def test_api_rejects_svg_with_javascript_href(self):+ """+ GIVEN:+ - An SVG with javascript: in href attribute+ WHEN:+ - Uploaded via PATCH to app config+ THEN:+ - SVG is rejected with 400+ """+ malicious_svg = b"""<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>+ <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 100 100">+ <defs>+ <rect id="a" width="10" height="10" />+ </defs>+ <use href="javascript:alert('XSS')" />+ </svg>"""++ svg_file = BytesIO(malicious_svg)+ svg_file.name = "javascript_href.svg"++ response = self.client.patch(+ f"{self.ENDPOINT}1/",+ {"app_logo": svg_file},+ format="multipart",+ )+ self.assertEqual(response.status_code, status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST)+ self.assertIn("disallowed", str(response.data).lower())+ self.assertIn("javascript", str(response.data).lower())++ def test_api_rejects_svg_with_javascript_xlink_href(self):+ """+ GIVEN:+ - An SVG with javascript: in xlink:href attribute+ WHEN:+ - Uploaded via PATCH to app config+ THEN:+ - SVG is rejected with 400+ """+ malicious_svg = b"""<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>+ <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" viewBox="0 0 100 100">+ <use xlink:href="javascript:alert('XSS')" />+ </svg>"""++ svg_file = BytesIO(malicious_svg)+ svg_file.name = "javascript_xlink_href.svg"++ response = self.client.patch(+ f"{self.ENDPOINT}1/",+ {"app_logo": svg_file},+ format="multipart",+ )+ self.assertEqual(response.status_code, status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST)+ self.assertIn("disallowed", str(response.data).lower())+ self.assertIn("javascript", str(response.data).lower())++ def test_api_rejects_svg_with_data_text_html_href(self):+ """+ GIVEN:+ - An SVG with data:text/html in href attribute+ WHEN:+ - Uploaded via PATCH to app config+ THEN:+ - SVG is rejected with 400+ """+ malicious_svg = b"""<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>+ <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 100 100">+ <defs>+ <rect id="r" width="100" height="100" fill="purple"/>+ </defs>+ <use href="javascript:alert(1)" />+ </svg>"""++ svg_file = BytesIO(malicious_svg)+ svg_file.name = "data_html_href.svg"++ response = self.client.patch(+ f"{self.ENDPOINT}1/",+ {"app_logo": svg_file},+ format="multipart",+ )+ self.assertEqual(response.status_code, status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST)+ # This will now catch "Disallowed URI scheme"+ self.assertIn("disallowed", str(response.data).lower())++ def test_api_rejects_svg_with_unknown_namespace_attribute(self):+ """+ GIVEN:+ - An SVG with an attribute in an unknown/custom namespace+ WHEN:+ - Uploaded via PATCH to app config+ THEN:+ - SVG is rejected with 400+ - Error message identifies the namespaced attribute as disallowed+ """++ # Define a custom namespace "my:hack" and try to use it+ malicious_svg = b"""<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>+ <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"+ xmlns:hack="http://example.com/hack"+ viewBox="0 0 100 100">+ <rect width="100" height="100" hack:fill="red" />+ </svg>"""++ svg_file = BytesIO(malicious_svg)+ svg_file.name = "unknown_namespace.svg"++ response = self.client.patch(+ f"{self.ENDPOINT}1/",+ {"app_logo": svg_file},+ format="multipart",+ )++ self.assertEqual(response.status_code, status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST)++ # The error message should show the full Clark notation (curly braces)+ # because the validator's 'else' block kept the raw lxml name.+ error_msg = str(response.data).lower()+ self.assertIn("disallowed svg attribute", error_msg)+ self.assertIn("{http://example.com/hack}fill", error_msg)++ def test_api_rejects_svg_with_external_http_href(self) -> None:+ """+ GIVEN:+ - An SVG with an external URI (http://) in a safe tag's href attribute.+ WHEN:+ - Uploaded via PATCH to app config+ THEN:+ - SVG is rejected with 400 because http:// is not a safe_prefix.+ """+ from io import BytesIO++ # http:// is not in dangerous_schemes, but it is not in safe_prefixes.+ malicious_svg = b"""<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>+ <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 100 100">+ <use href="http://evil.com/logo.svg" />+ </svg>"""++ svg_file = BytesIO(malicious_svg)+ svg_file.name = "external_http_href.svg"++ response = self.client.patch(+ f"{self.ENDPOINT}1/",+ {"app_logo": svg_file},+ format="multipart",+ )+ self.assertEqual(response.status_code, status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST)++ # Check for the error message raised by the safe_prefixes check+ self.assertIn("uri scheme not allowed", str(response.data).lower())def test_create_not_allowed(self):"""diff --git a/src/paperless/serialisers.py b/src/paperless/serialisers.pyindex 97b84fd14..256f40680 100644--- a/src/paperless/serialisers.py+++ b/src/paperless/serialisers.py@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ from django.contrib.auth.models import Groupfrom django.contrib.auth.models import Permissionfrom django.contrib.auth.models import Userfrom django.contrib.auth.password_validation import validate_password+from django.core.files.uploadedfile import UploadedFilefrom rest_framework import serializersfrom rest_framework.authtoken.serializers import AuthTokenSerializer@@ -221,7 +222,7 @@ class ApplicationConfigurationSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):instance.app_logo.delete()return super().update(instance, validated_data)- def validate_app_logo(self, file):+ def validate_app_logo(self, file: UploadedFile):if file and magic.from_buffer(file.read(2048), mime=True) == "image/svg+xml":reject_dangerous_svg(file)return filediff --git a/src/paperless/validators.py b/src/paperless/validators.pyindex 36e153881..ab5ae6f47 100644--- a/src/paperless/validators.py+++ b/src/paperless/validators.py@@ -1,86 +1,159 @@from django.core.exceptions import ValidationError+from django.core.files.uploadedfile import UploadedFilefrom lxml import etreeALLOWED_SVG_TAGS: set[str] = {- "svg",- "g",- "path",- "rect",- "circle",- "ellipse",- "line",- "polyline",- "polygon",- "text",- "tspan",- "defs",- "lineargradient",- "radialgradient",- "stop",- "clippath",- "use",- "title",- "desc",- "style",+ # Basic shapes+ "svg", # Root SVG element+ "g", # Group elements together+ "path", # Draw complex shapes with commands+ "rect", # Rectangle+ "circle", # Circle+ "ellipse", # Ellipse/oval+ "line", # Straight line+ "polyline", # Connected lines (open path)+ "polygon", # Connected lines (closed path)+ # Text+ "text", # Text container+ "tspan", # Text span within text+ "textpath", # Text along a path+ # Definitions and reusable content+ "defs", # Container for reusable elements+ "symbol", # Reusable graphic template+ "use", # Reference/instantiate reusable elements+ "marker", # Arrowheads and path markers+ "pattern", # Repeating pattern fills+ "mask", # Masking effects+ # Gradients+ "lineargradient", # Linear gradient fill+ "radialgradient", # Radial gradient fill+ "stop", # Gradient color stop+ # Clipping+ "clippath", # Clipping path definition+ # Metadata+ "title", # Accessible title+ "desc", # Accessible description+ "metadata", # Document metadata}ALLOWED_SVG_ATTRIBUTES: set[str] = {- "id",- "class",- "style",- "d",- "fill",- "fill-opacity",- "fill-rule",- "stroke",- "stroke-width",- "stroke-linecap",- "stroke-linejoin",- "stroke-miterlimit",- "stroke-dasharray",- "stroke-dashoffset",- "stroke-opacity",- "transform",- "x",- "y",- "cx",- "cy",- "r",- "rx",- "ry",- "width",- "height",- "x1",- "y1",- "x2",- "y2",- "gradienttransform",- "gradientunits",- "offset",- "stop-color",- "stop-opacity",- "clip-path",- "viewbox",- "preserveaspectratio",- "href",- "xlink:href",- "font-family",- "font-size",- "font-weight",- "text-anchor",- "xmlns",- "xmlns:xlink",- "version",+ # Core attributes+ "id", # Unique identifier+ "class", # CSS class names+ "style", # Inline CSS styles (validate content separately!)+ # Positioning and sizing+ "x", # X coordinate+ "y", # Y coordinate+ "cx", # Center X coordinate (circle/ellipse)+ "cy", # Center Y coordinate (circle/ellipse)+ "r", # Radius (circle)+ "rx", # X radius (ellipse, rounded corners)+ "ry", # Y radius (ellipse, rounded corners)+ "width", # Width+ "height", # Height+ "x1", # Start X (line, gradient)+ "y1", # Start Y (line, gradient)+ "x2", # End X (line, gradient)+ "y2", # End Y (line, gradient)+ "dx", # X offset (text)+ "dy", # Y offset (text)+ "points", # Point list for polyline/polygon+ # Path data+ "d", # Path commands and coordinates+ # Fill properties+ "fill", # Fill color or none+ "fill-opacity", # Fill transparency+ "fill-rule", # Fill algorithm (nonzero/evenodd)+ # Stroke properties+ "stroke", # Stroke color or none+ "stroke-width", # Stroke thickness+ "stroke-opacity", # Stroke transparency+ "stroke-linecap", # Line ending style (butt/round/square)+ "stroke-linejoin", # Corner style (miter/round/bevel)+ "stroke-miterlimit", # Miter join limit+ "stroke-dasharray", # Dash pattern+ "stroke-dashoffset", # Dash pattern offset+ # Transforms and positioning+ "transform", # Transformations (translate/rotate/scale)+ "viewbox", # Coordinate system and viewport+ "preserveaspectratio", # Scaling behavior+ # Opacity+ "opacity", # Overall element opacity+ # Gradient attributes+ "gradienttransform", # Transform applied to gradient+ "gradientunits", # Gradient coordinate system+ "offset", # Position of gradient stop+ "stop-color", # Color at gradient stop+ "stop-opacity", # Opacity at gradient stop+ # Clipping and masking+ "clip-path", # Reference to clipping path+ "mask", # Reference to mask+ # Markers+ "marker-start", # Marker at path start+ "marker-mid", # Marker at path vertices+ "marker-end", # Marker at path end+ # Text attributes+ "font-family", # Font name+ "font-size", # Font size+ "font-weight", # Font weight (normal/bold)+ "font-style", # Font style (normal/italic)+ "text-anchor", # Text alignment (start/middle/end)+ "text-decoration", # Text decoration (underline/etc)+ "letter-spacing", # Space between letters+ # Links and references+ "href", # Link or reference (validate for javascript:!)+ "xlink:href", # Legacy link reference (validate for javascript:!)+ "xlink:title", # Accessible title for links+ # Pattern attributes+ "patternunits", # Pattern coordinate system+ "patterntransform", # Transform applied to pattern+ "patterncontentunits", # Pattern content coordinate system+ # Mask attributes+ "maskunits", # Mask coordinate system+ "maskcontentunits", # Mask content coordinate system+ # SVG namespace declarations+ "xmlns", # XML namespace (usually http://www.w3.org/2000/svg)+ "xmlns:xlink", # XLink namespace+ "version", # SVG version"type",}+# Dangerous patterns in style attributes that can execute code+DANGEROUS_STYLE_PATTERNS: set[str] = {+ "javascript:", # javascript: URLs in url() functions+ "data:text/html", # HTML data URIs can contain scripts+ "expression(", # IE's CSS expressions (legacy but dangerous)+ "import", # CSS @import can load external resources+ "@import", # CSS @import directive+ "-moz-binding:", # Firefox XBL bindings (can execute code)+ "behaviour:", # IE behavior property+ "vbscript:", # VBScript URLs+}++XLINK_NS: set[str] = {+ "http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink",+ "https://www.w3.org/1999/xlink",+}++# Dangerous URI schemes+DANGEROUS_SCHEMES: set[str] = {+ "javascript:",+ "data:text/html",+ "vbscript:",+ "file:",+ "data:application/", # Can contain scripts+}++SAFE_PREFIXES: set[str] = {"#", "/", "./", "../", "data:image/"}+-def reject_dangerous_svg(file):+def reject_dangerous_svg(file: UploadedFile) -> None:"""Rejects SVG files that contain dangerous tags or attributes.Raises ValidationError if unsafe content is found.See GHSA-6p53-hqqw-8j62"""+try:parser = etree.XMLParser(resolve_entities=False)file.seek(0)@@ -90,17 +163,56 @@ def reject_dangerous_svg(file):raise ValidationError("Invalid SVG file.")for element in root.iter():- tag = etree.QName(element.tag).localname.lower()+ tag: str = etree.QName(element.tag).localname.lower()if tag not in ALLOWED_SVG_TAGS:raise ValidationError(f"Disallowed SVG tag: <{tag}>")+ attr_name: str+ attr_value: strfor attr_name, attr_value in element.attrib.items():- attr_name_lower = attr_name.lower()+ # lxml expands namespaces to {url}name. We must convert the standard+ # XLink namespace back to 'xlink:' so it matches our allowlist.+ if attr_name.startswith("{"):+ qname = etree.QName(attr_name)+ if qname.namespace in XLINK_NS:+ attr_name_check = f"xlink:{qname.localname}"+ else:+ # Unknown namespace: keep raw name (will fail allowlist)+ attr_name_check = attr_name+ else:+ attr_name_check = attr_name++ attr_name_lower = attr_name_check.lower().strip()+if attr_name_lower not in ALLOWED_SVG_ATTRIBUTES:raise ValidationError(f"Disallowed SVG attribute: {attr_name}")- if attr_name_lower in {- "href",- "xlink:href",- } and attr_value.strip().lower().startswith("javascript:"):- raise ValidationError(f"Disallowed javascript: URI in {attr_name}")+ if attr_name_lower == "style":+ style_lower: str = attr_value.lower()+ # Check if any dangerous pattern is a substring of the style+ for pattern in DANGEROUS_STYLE_PATTERNS:+ if pattern in style_lower:+ raise ValidationError(+ f"Disallowed pattern in style attribute: {pattern}",+ )++ # Validate URI attributes (href, xlink:href)+ if attr_name_lower in {"href", "xlink:href"}:+ value_stripped: str = attr_value.strip().lower()++ # Check if value starts with any dangerous scheme+ for scheme in DANGEROUS_SCHEMES:+ if value_stripped.startswith(scheme):+ raise ValidationError(+ f"Disallowed URI scheme in {attr_name}: {scheme}",+ )++ # Allow safe schemes for logos: #anchor, relative paths, data:image/*+ # No external resources (http/https) needed for logos++ if value_stripped and not any(+ value_stripped.startswith(prefix) for prefix in SAFE_PREFIXES+ ):+ raise ValidationError(+ f"URI scheme not allowed in {attr_name}: must be #anchor, relative path, or data:image/*",+ )