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armgit / peel

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Uninstall Mac apps with every file they leave behind, and see why each belongs. Free up space, fine-tune macOS, and set up Terminal.

Put what Peel reads, runs, and writes in SECURITY.md's scope

Țugui Dragoșccd7febf32ea
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
index 74dfa04e..2fc60afa 100644
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -136,6 +136,20 @@ have, and anything that destroys data that cannot be recovered.
- Leaking the list of a user's installed apps, file paths, or scan results off the Mac, beyond what
[PRIVACY.md](PRIVACY.md) describes.
+**What Peel reads, runs, and writes.**
+
+- Files from apps and disks Peel doesn't trust, which it reads to decide what is what: other apps'
+ property lists, the headers of their programs (Mach-O), and the directory of a ZIP archive, read
+ without extracting it. One that causes memory corruption, an exploitable crash, or a wrong answer
+ about what may be removed is in scope.
+- The programs Peel runs with what a scan found: `defaults`, `launchctl`, and `tccutil`, given an
+ app's identifier or a launch job's label, and `brew`, including one chosen in Settings. Getting
+ one to run with arguments an attacker chose, or getting Peel to run another program, is in scope.
+- What Peel writes besides moving files: the Tweaks, which also restart the Dock, Finder, Control
+ Center, or Window Manager with `killall`, and the settings the Terminal page writes for Terminal,
+ the shell, ssh, and Git. Getting either to write anything but the setting the user chose, or to
+ write it anywhere else, such as through a link, is in scope.
+
### Out of scope
Not because they do not matter, but because they are not bugs in Peel.