Uninstall Mac apps with every file they leave behind, and see why each belongs. Free up space, fine-tune macOS, and set up Terminal.
Swift cache-cleanercleanerclideveloper-toolsdisk-cleanupdisk-spaceduplicate-finderhomebrewliquid-glassmac-cleanermacosmacos-appmacos-golden-gatemacos-tahoemacos-tweaksswiftswiftuiterminal-themesuninstalluninstaller
Put what Peel reads, runs, and writes in SECURITY.md's scope
Țugui Dragoșccd7febf32ea
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.mdindex 74dfa04e..2fc60afa 100644--- a/SECURITY.md+++ b/SECURITY.md@@ -136,6 +136,20 @@ have, and anything that destroys data that cannot be recovered.- Leaking the list of a user's installed apps, file paths, or scan results off the Mac, beyond what[PRIVACY.md](PRIVACY.md) describes.+**What Peel reads, runs, and writes.**++- Files from apps and disks Peel doesn't trust, which it reads to decide what is what: other apps'+ property lists, the headers of their programs (Mach-O), and the directory of a ZIP archive, read+ without extracting it. One that causes memory corruption, an exploitable crash, or a wrong answer+ about what may be removed is in scope.+- The programs Peel runs with what a scan found: `defaults`, `launchctl`, and `tccutil`, given an+ app's identifier or a launch job's label, and `brew`, including one chosen in Settings. Getting+ one to run with arguments an attacker chose, or getting Peel to run another program, is in scope.+- What Peel writes besides moving files: the Tweaks, which also restart the Dock, Finder, Control+ Center, or Window Manager with `killall`, and the settings the Terminal page writes for Terminal,+ the shell, ssh, and Git. Getting either to write anything but the setting the user chose, or to+ write it anywhere else, such as through a link, is in scope.+### Out of scopeNot because they do not matter, but because they are not bugs in Peel.