Fully autonomous AI Agents system capable of performing complex penetration testing tasks
RFC: Cryptographic Evidence Chain for PentAGI Operations
Issue #235 proposes signed evidence receipts for PentAGI pentest operations. This RFC captures a possible design direction without committing the project to an implementation.
Goals
- Make reports verifiable against the tool actions, artifacts, and agent decisions that produced them.
- Detect deleted, modified, reordered, or fabricated evidence after a flow completes.
- Preserve the existing flow, task, subtask, and toolcall model instead of adding a separate audit workflow.
- Keep verification possible outside a running PentAGI instance.
Non-Goals
- This RFC does not add legal non-repudiation by itself.
- This RFC does not prove that a command was authorized, safe, or in scope.
- This RFC does not require every intermediate LLM token to be signed.
- This RFC does not define a final storage schema or migration.
Proposed Receipt Chain
Each meaningful operation can emit a signed receipt. Receipts form a hash-linked chain or DAG:
flow_start -> task_created -> subtask_started -> toolcall_finished -> artifact_recorded -> report_created
A receipt should include:
receipt_id: stable identifier for the signed receipt.parent_receipt_ids: prior receipts this event depends on.flow_id,task_id,subtask_id, andtoolcall_idwhen available.event_type: for exampletoolcall_started,toolcall_finished,artifact_recorded, orreport_created.actor_type: agent, user, system, or external tool.tool_nameand normalized command metadata when the event is a tool call.input_hashandoutput_hashfor data that should not be embedded directly.artifact_hashesfor files, screenshots, logs, exports, or final reports.created_atusing a server-side timestamp.previous_hashor a sorted parent hash list.signatureandpublic_key_id.
Example shape:
{
"receipt_id": "receipt_01h...",
"parent_receipt_ids": ["receipt_01g..."],
"flow_id": 42,
"task_id": 314,
"subtask_id": 2718,
"toolcall_id": 1618,
"event_type": "toolcall_finished",
"actor_type": "agent",
"tool_name": "terminal",
"input_hash": "sha256:...",
"output_hash": "sha256:...",
"artifact_hashes": ["sha256:..."],
"created_at": "2026-04-22T00:00:00Z",
"parent_hash": "sha256:...",
"signature": "ed25519:...",
"public_key_id": "pentagi-instance-2026-04"
}
Signing Model
Ed25519 is a good default for compact signatures and simple verification. The signed payload should be canonicalized before signing so independent verifiers can reproduce the same digest.
Recommended rules:
- Sign canonical JSON or another deterministic encoding.
- Hash large inputs, outputs, and artifacts instead of embedding them in every receipt.
- Include enough metadata to identify the exact flow/task/subtask/toolcall source rows.
- Keep public keys exportable with the evidence package.
- Rotate signing keys by introducing a new
public_key_id, not by rewriting old receipts.
Pipeline Integration Points
The first implementation can be incremental:
- Create a flow-level root receipt when a flow starts or when evidence signing is enabled.
- Emit toolcall receipts after terminal, browser, search, memory, agent delegation, and result-storage tools finish.
- Hash artifacts as they are saved to
/work, object storage, or report export locations. - Emit a final report receipt that references the report file hash and the latest receipt parents.
- Export receipts, public keys, and artifact hashes with the final report bundle.
Tool execution is the highest-value starting point because it binds observed findings to concrete actions without requiring changes to every prompt template.
Verification Workflow
An external verifier should be able to:
- Load the receipt bundle and public key material.
- Recompute each receipt hash from its canonical payload.
- Verify each Ed25519 signature.
- Check parent links for missing or reordered receipts.
- Recompute artifact hashes from exported files.
- Confirm the final report receipt references the report hash and expected terminal receipts.
The verifier should fail closed when a receipt is missing, a parent link cannot be resolved, a signature is invalid, or an artifact hash does not match.
Open Questions
- Should receipt signing be always on, opt-in per deployment, or opt-in per flow?
- Where should private keys live: local filesystem, KMS, HSM, Vault, or a user-provided signer?
- Should user approvals and scope changes be signed in the same chain as tool calls?
- How should streaming tool output be chunked and hashed for long-running commands?
- Should receipt bundles use an existing format such as the signed receipt draft referenced in issue #235?
- How much command input should be stored directly versus hashed or redacted?
- Should failed, canceled, and blocked tool calls be signed with the same detail as successful calls?
Suggested First Milestone
Start with a non-invasive export-only prototype:
- Sign completed toolcall summaries and final report hashes.
- Store receipt payloads as sidecar JSON files in the report export bundle.
- Provide a small verifier command that validates signatures, parent links, and artifact hashes.
- Leave database schema changes and real-time UI visualization for a later milestone after the receipt shape is validated.