Fully autonomous AI Agents system capable of performing complex penetration testing tasks
Go ai-agentsai-security-toolanthropicautonomous-agentsgolanggptgraphqlmulti-agent-systemoffensive-securityopen-sourceopenaipenetration-testingpenetration-testing-toolsreactsecurity-automationsecurity-testingsecurity-toolsself-hosted
docs(rfc): address Copilot review feedback on MCP client RFC
mason50525af902872aaa
diff --git a/examples/proposals/mcp_client_integration.md b/examples/proposals/mcp_client_integration.mdindex 80272818..70be2a27 100644--- a/examples/proposals/mcp_client_integration.md+++ b/examples/proposals/mcp_client_integration.md@@ -17,10 +17,11 @@ surface for maintainers to push back on before any code lands.The RFC is intentionally staged. MCP is powerful, and the issue's mostdirect reading -- auto-discover every MCP tool from every configuredserver and expose all of them to every agent -- would land near the-pattern PR [#268](https://github.com/vxcontrol/pentagi/pull/268) was-rejected for: implicit lifecycle state, weak operator visibility, and-weak operator control. The proposed v1 below is narrower on purpose so a-later implementation PR can be reviewed in small slices.+patterns that were pushed back on during PR+[#268](https://github.com/vxcontrol/pentagi/pull/268) review: implicit+lifecycle state, weak operator visibility, and weak operator control.+The proposed v1 below is narrower on purpose so a later implementation+PR can be reviewed in small slices.## Goals@@ -46,10 +47,11 @@ later implementation PR can be reviewed in small slices.allowlists them.- This RFC does not propose hidden background execution of MCP toolcalls. Calls happen inside the same agent loop and are visible the- same way native tool calls are. This is the explicit lesson from PR- [#268](https://github.com/vxcontrol/pentagi/pull/268): no hidden- in-memory queues, no implicit lifecycle state, no invisible background- behavior.+ same way native tool calls are. This carries forward the explicit+ lessons from PR+ [#268](https://github.com/vxcontrol/pentagi/pull/268) review: no+ hidden in-memory queues, no implicit lifecycle state, no invisible+ background behavior.- This RFC does not propose a hidden queue, retry buffer, or implicitper-tool state machine sitting between agents and MCP servers.- This RFC does not grant MCP servers arbitrary host or network access@@ -228,22 +230,30 @@ A pentester running Burp Suite Pro on their own analyst workstation,or on a controlled internal host, enables the Burp MCP extension. Theextension exposes an MCP endpoint over HTTP on localhost. From aPentAGI compose deployment running on the same workstation, that-endpoint is reachable as `http://host.docker.internal:<port>` from-the backend container, which is the existing pattern PentAGI already-uses for other host-reachable services.+endpoint can be reached at `http://host.docker.internal:<port>` from+the backend container -- but this name is not universally available.+Docker Desktop on macOS and Windows commonly resolves+`host.docker.internal` automatically, while on Linux and other+operator-managed compose stacks the operator typically has to add an+explicit `extra_hosts: - "host.docker.internal:host-gateway"` mapping+to the relevant service, or point the MCP server `url` at another+controlled endpoint (a routed internal IP, a reverse proxy, etc.).+Either way, host reachability for an MCP server should be explicit+and operator-controlled, not implied by the design.The operator adds a single named server entry (call it `burp`),explicitly enables it, supplies any required header or token, andallowlists a small set of read-only tools. Nothing else changes.+Anything beyond read-only -- in particular active scan -- is not part+of this safe initial setup and is described separately below.### Candidate tool categoriesThe Burp MCP server, depending on version and configured access, canexpose a range of capabilities. From the issue's framing, useful-categories for PentAGI agents would include:+read-only categories for PentAGI agents would include:- reading the current Burp sitemap or list of discovered URLs;-- starting an active scan against a specific in-scope URL;- retrieving structured findings (vulnerability type, severity,request and response evidence) for incorporation into the agent'sreasoning and reports;@@ -251,6 +261,11 @@ categories for PentAGI agents would include:server exposes them, to detect blind classes of vulnerabilitiesthat PentAGI's CLI-only toolset cannot detect today.+Active capabilities -- in particular starting an active scan against+a specific in-scope URL -- are higher risk and intentionally **not**+part of the safe initial example. They belong to a later, explicitly+gated milestone and are discussed under "Scope discipline" below.+### Scope disciplineActive scan tools are not read-only. They send traffic, can be noisy,@@ -262,10 +277,11 @@ and can be destructive against fragile targets. They must be:- bounded by the same scope and approval mindset PentAGI applies toother intrusive tools.-PentAGI must not be inferred from this RFC to "freely scan arbitrary-targets" once Burp MCP is wired in. The agent only ever invokes a-Burp MCP tool that an operator has both configured and allowlisted,-against a target that already exists inside the engagement's scope.+It should not be inferred from this RFC that PentAGI can freely scan+arbitrary targets once Burp MCP is wired in. The agent only ever+invokes a Burp MCP tool that an operator has both configured and+allowlisted, against a target that already exists inside the+engagement's scope.### Illustrative configuration (non-final pseudocode)@@ -288,9 +304,12 @@ mcp:header: X-API-Keysecret_ref: burp_mcp_tokenallowlist:+ # safe initial set: read-only tools only.+ # active capabilities like start_active_scan are intentionally+ # excluded here and would be added later, under explicit+ # in-scope target checks and operator approval.- get_sitemap- get_findings- - start_active_scan```## Security and Safety