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Fully autonomous AI Agents system capable of performing complex penetration testing tasks

docs(rfc): address Copilot review feedback on MCP client RFC

mason50525af902872aaa
diff --git a/examples/proposals/mcp_client_integration.md b/examples/proposals/mcp_client_integration.md
index 80272818..70be2a27 100644
--- a/examples/proposals/mcp_client_integration.md
+++ b/examples/proposals/mcp_client_integration.md
@@ -17,10 +17,11 @@ surface for maintainers to push back on before any code lands.
The RFC is intentionally staged. MCP is powerful, and the issue's most
direct reading -- auto-discover every MCP tool from every configured
server and expose all of them to every agent -- would land near the
-pattern PR [#268](https://github.com/vxcontrol/pentagi/pull/268) was
-rejected for: implicit lifecycle state, weak operator visibility, and
-weak operator control. The proposed v1 below is narrower on purpose so a
-later implementation PR can be reviewed in small slices.
+patterns that were pushed back on during PR
+[#268](https://github.com/vxcontrol/pentagi/pull/268) review: implicit
+lifecycle state, weak operator visibility, and weak operator control.
+The proposed v1 below is narrower on purpose so a later implementation
+PR can be reviewed in small slices.
## Goals
@@ -46,10 +47,11 @@ later implementation PR can be reviewed in small slices.
allowlists them.
- This RFC does not propose hidden background execution of MCP tool
calls. Calls happen inside the same agent loop and are visible the
- same way native tool calls are. This is the explicit lesson from PR
- [#268](https://github.com/vxcontrol/pentagi/pull/268): no hidden
- in-memory queues, no implicit lifecycle state, no invisible background
- behavior.
+ same way native tool calls are. This carries forward the explicit
+ lessons from PR
+ [#268](https://github.com/vxcontrol/pentagi/pull/268) review: no
+ hidden in-memory queues, no implicit lifecycle state, no invisible
+ background behavior.
- This RFC does not propose a hidden queue, retry buffer, or implicit
per-tool state machine sitting between agents and MCP servers.
- This RFC does not grant MCP servers arbitrary host or network access
@@ -228,22 +230,30 @@ A pentester running Burp Suite Pro on their own analyst workstation,
or on a controlled internal host, enables the Burp MCP extension. The
extension exposes an MCP endpoint over HTTP on localhost. From a
PentAGI compose deployment running on the same workstation, that
-endpoint is reachable as `http://host.docker.internal:<port>` from
-the backend container, which is the existing pattern PentAGI already
-uses for other host-reachable services.
+endpoint can be reached at `http://host.docker.internal:<port>` from
+the backend container -- but this name is not universally available.
+Docker Desktop on macOS and Windows commonly resolves
+`host.docker.internal` automatically, while on Linux and other
+operator-managed compose stacks the operator typically has to add an
+explicit `extra_hosts: - "host.docker.internal:host-gateway"` mapping
+to the relevant service, or point the MCP server `url` at another
+controlled endpoint (a routed internal IP, a reverse proxy, etc.).
+Either way, host reachability for an MCP server should be explicit
+and operator-controlled, not implied by the design.
The operator adds a single named server entry (call it `burp`),
explicitly enables it, supplies any required header or token, and
allowlists a small set of read-only tools. Nothing else changes.
+Anything beyond read-only -- in particular active scan -- is not part
+of this safe initial setup and is described separately below.
### Candidate tool categories
The Burp MCP server, depending on version and configured access, can
expose a range of capabilities. From the issue's framing, useful
-categories for PentAGI agents would include:
+read-only categories for PentAGI agents would include:
- reading the current Burp sitemap or list of discovered URLs;
-- starting an active scan against a specific in-scope URL;
- retrieving structured findings (vulnerability type, severity,
request and response evidence) for incorporation into the agent's
reasoning and reports;
@@ -251,6 +261,11 @@ categories for PentAGI agents would include:
server exposes them, to detect blind classes of vulnerabilities
that PentAGI's CLI-only toolset cannot detect today.
+Active capabilities -- in particular starting an active scan against
+a specific in-scope URL -- are higher risk and intentionally **not**
+part of the safe initial example. They belong to a later, explicitly
+gated milestone and are discussed under "Scope discipline" below.
+
### Scope discipline
Active scan tools are not read-only. They send traffic, can be noisy,
@@ -262,10 +277,11 @@ and can be destructive against fragile targets. They must be:
- bounded by the same scope and approval mindset PentAGI applies to
other intrusive tools.
-PentAGI must not be inferred from this RFC to "freely scan arbitrary
-targets" once Burp MCP is wired in. The agent only ever invokes a
-Burp MCP tool that an operator has both configured and allowlisted,
-against a target that already exists inside the engagement's scope.
+It should not be inferred from this RFC that PentAGI can freely scan
+arbitrary targets once Burp MCP is wired in. The agent only ever
+invokes a Burp MCP tool that an operator has both configured and
+allowlisted, against a target that already exists inside the
+engagement's scope.
### Illustrative configuration (non-final pseudocode)
@@ -288,9 +304,12 @@ mcp:
header: X-API-Key
secret_ref: burp_mcp_token
allowlist:
+ # safe initial set: read-only tools only.
+ # active capabilities like start_active_scan are intentionally
+ # excluded here and would be added later, under explicit
+ # in-scope target checks and operator approval.
- get_sitemap
- get_findings
- - start_active_scan
```
## Security and Safety