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Fully autonomous AI Agents system capable of performing complex penetration testing tasks

fix(sandbox): harden sandbox containers against privilege escalation

manusjsa50ba4c7a4de
diff --git a/.env.example b/.env.example
index 4b95dc8f..a91c5f9d 100644
--- a/.env.example
+++ b/.env.example
@@ -213,7 +213,14 @@ DOCKER_TLS_VERIFY=
DOCKER_CERT_PATH=
## Docker settings inside primary terminal container
-DOCKER_INSIDE=true # enable to use docker socket
+# SECURITY NOTE: DOCKER_INSIDE=true mounts the host Docker socket into every
+# sandbox container so agents can launch sub-containers (Docker-in-Docker).
+# This grants any process inside the sandbox unrestricted access to the Docker
+# API, which can be exploited via prompt injection to escape the sandbox and
+# reach the host (issue #337). Only enable this when DinD is required and you
+# understand the risk. Consider using a least-privilege socket proxy such as
+# https://github.com/Tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy instead of the raw socket.
+DOCKER_INSIDE=false # enable to use docker socket (see security note above; default false)
DOCKER_NET_ADMIN=true # enable to use net_admin capability
DOCKER_SOCKET=/var/run/docker.sock # path on host machine
DOCKER_NETWORK=
diff --git a/backend/pkg/docker/client.go b/backend/pkg/docker/client.go
index 58c1b9bf..a4b007db 100644
--- a/backend/pkg/docker/client.go
+++ b/backend/pkg/docker/client.go
@@ -111,6 +111,13 @@ func NewDockerClient(ctx context.Context, db database.Querier, cfg *config.Confi
socket = getHostDockerSocket(ctx, cli)
}
inside := cfg.DockerInside
+ if inside {
+ logrus.Warn("DOCKER_INSIDE=true: the host Docker socket will be bind-mounted into " +
+ "every sandbox container. Any process inside the sandbox can use the socket " +
+ "to ask the host daemon to launch a privileged container, achieving a full " +
+ "host escape (issue #337). Set DOCKER_INSIDE=false unless DinD is required, " +
+ "or front the socket with a least-privilege proxy (e.g. Tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy).")
+ }
netName := cfg.DockerNetwork
publicIP := cfg.DockerPublicIP
defImage := strings.ToLower(cfg.DockerDefaultImage)
@@ -283,6 +290,27 @@ func (dc *dockerClient) RunContainer(
hostConfig.Binds = append(hostConfig.Binds, fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", dc.socket, defaultDockerSocketPath))
}
+ // Defense-in-depth: block setuid/setgid and file-capability escalation
+ // *within* the container (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS / no-new-privileges).
+ // NOTE: this does NOT mitigate the docker.sock host-escape in issue #337 —
+ // an attacker with socket access can ask the host daemon to spawn a privileged
+ // container regardless of this flag. The real mitigation for #337 is to avoid
+ // mounting the raw socket (DOCKER_INSIDE=false) or to front it with a
+ // least-privilege proxy such as https://github.com/Tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy.
+ // NOTE: no-new-privileges causes the kernel to ignore setuid-root bits on
+ // execve, so sudo/su from a non-root uid will not work inside the sandbox.
+ if !slices.Contains(hostConfig.SecurityOpt, "no-new-privileges:true") {
+ hostConfig.SecurityOpt = append(hostConfig.SecurityOpt, "no-new-privileges:true")
+ }
+
+ // Cap fork-bomb / resource-exhaustion risk at a bounded limit.
+ // 2048 pids is generous for most pentest workloads (nmap, hydra, parallel scans).
+ // Callers can override by setting hostConfig.PidsLimit before calling RunContainer.
+ if hostConfig.PidsLimit == nil {
+ pidsLimit := int64(2048)
+ hostConfig.PidsLimit = &pidsLimit
+ }
+
hostConfig.LogConfig = container.LogConfig{
Type: "json-file",
Config: map[string]string{
diff --git a/backend/pkg/tools/tools.go b/backend/pkg/tools/tools.go
index 2c72884b..f190b5f0 100644
--- a/backend/pkg/tools/tools.go
+++ b/backend/pkg/tools/tools.go
@@ -479,7 +479,22 @@ func (fte *flowToolsExecutor) Prepare(ctx context.Context) error {
}
}
- capAdd := []string{"NET_RAW"}
+ // Start with capabilities pentest tooling genuinely needs.
+ // NET_RAW: raw sockets (nmap, ping, packet crafting)
+ // NET_BIND_SERVICE: bind ports <1024 (reverse shells, Responder, rogue DNS)
+ // SETUID/SETGID: needed by daemons/tools that drop privileges (setuid DOWN).
+ // NOTE: RunContainer also sets no-new-privileges:true, which causes the kernel
+ // to ignore setuid-root bits on execve — sudo/su from a non-root uid will NOT
+ // work. These caps do not re-enable setuid-root escalation.
+ // CHOWN/DAC_OVERRIDE/FOWNER: root file-permission overrides (dpkg, package builds)
+ // KILL: signal other processes inside the container
+ // SYS_CHROOT: chroot-based isolation within the sandbox
+ capAdd := []string{
+ "NET_RAW", "NET_BIND_SERVICE",
+ "SETUID", "SETGID",
+ "CHOWN", "DAC_OVERRIDE", "FOWNER",
+ "KILL", "SYS_CHROOT",
+ }
if fte.cfg.DockerNetAdmin {
capAdd = append(capAdd, "NET_ADMIN")
}
@@ -495,7 +510,8 @@ func (fte *flowToolsExecutor) Prepare(ctx context.Context) error {
Entrypoint: []string{"tail", "-f", "/dev/null"},
},
&container.HostConfig{
- CapAdd: capAdd,
+ CapDrop: []string{"ALL"},
+ CapAdd: capAdd,
},
)
if err != nil {