Fully autonomous AI Agents system capable of performing complex penetration testing tasks
Go ai-agentsai-security-toolanthropicautonomous-agentsgolanggptgraphqlmulti-agent-systemoffensive-securityopen-sourceopenaipenetration-testingpenetration-testing-toolsreactsecurity-automationsecurity-testingsecurity-toolsself-hosted
fix(sandbox): harden sandbox containers against privilege escalation
manusjsa50ba4c7a4de
diff --git a/.env.example b/.env.exampleindex 4b95dc8f..a91c5f9d 100644--- a/.env.example+++ b/.env.example@@ -213,7 +213,14 @@ DOCKER_TLS_VERIFY=DOCKER_CERT_PATH=## Docker settings inside primary terminal container-DOCKER_INSIDE=true # enable to use docker socket+# SECURITY NOTE: DOCKER_INSIDE=true mounts the host Docker socket into every+# sandbox container so agents can launch sub-containers (Docker-in-Docker).+# This grants any process inside the sandbox unrestricted access to the Docker+# API, which can be exploited via prompt injection to escape the sandbox and+# reach the host (issue #337). Only enable this when DinD is required and you+# understand the risk. Consider using a least-privilege socket proxy such as+# https://github.com/Tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy instead of the raw socket.+DOCKER_INSIDE=false # enable to use docker socket (see security note above; default false)DOCKER_NET_ADMIN=true # enable to use net_admin capabilityDOCKER_SOCKET=/var/run/docker.sock # path on host machineDOCKER_NETWORK=diff --git a/backend/pkg/docker/client.go b/backend/pkg/docker/client.goindex 58c1b9bf..a4b007db 100644--- a/backend/pkg/docker/client.go+++ b/backend/pkg/docker/client.go@@ -111,6 +111,13 @@ func NewDockerClient(ctx context.Context, db database.Querier, cfg *config.Confisocket = getHostDockerSocket(ctx, cli)}inside := cfg.DockerInside+ if inside {+ logrus.Warn("DOCKER_INSIDE=true: the host Docker socket will be bind-mounted into " ++ "every sandbox container. Any process inside the sandbox can use the socket " ++ "to ask the host daemon to launch a privileged container, achieving a full " ++ "host escape (issue #337). Set DOCKER_INSIDE=false unless DinD is required, " ++ "or front the socket with a least-privilege proxy (e.g. Tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy).")+ }netName := cfg.DockerNetworkpublicIP := cfg.DockerPublicIPdefImage := strings.ToLower(cfg.DockerDefaultImage)@@ -283,6 +290,27 @@ func (dc *dockerClient) RunContainer(hostConfig.Binds = append(hostConfig.Binds, fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", dc.socket, defaultDockerSocketPath))}+ // Defense-in-depth: block setuid/setgid and file-capability escalation+ // *within* the container (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS / no-new-privileges).+ // NOTE: this does NOT mitigate the docker.sock host-escape in issue #337 —+ // an attacker with socket access can ask the host daemon to spawn a privileged+ // container regardless of this flag. The real mitigation for #337 is to avoid+ // mounting the raw socket (DOCKER_INSIDE=false) or to front it with a+ // least-privilege proxy such as https://github.com/Tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy.+ // NOTE: no-new-privileges causes the kernel to ignore setuid-root bits on+ // execve, so sudo/su from a non-root uid will not work inside the sandbox.+ if !slices.Contains(hostConfig.SecurityOpt, "no-new-privileges:true") {+ hostConfig.SecurityOpt = append(hostConfig.SecurityOpt, "no-new-privileges:true")+ }++ // Cap fork-bomb / resource-exhaustion risk at a bounded limit.+ // 2048 pids is generous for most pentest workloads (nmap, hydra, parallel scans).+ // Callers can override by setting hostConfig.PidsLimit before calling RunContainer.+ if hostConfig.PidsLimit == nil {+ pidsLimit := int64(2048)+ hostConfig.PidsLimit = &pidsLimit+ }+hostConfig.LogConfig = container.LogConfig{Type: "json-file",Config: map[string]string{diff --git a/backend/pkg/tools/tools.go b/backend/pkg/tools/tools.goindex 2c72884b..f190b5f0 100644--- a/backend/pkg/tools/tools.go+++ b/backend/pkg/tools/tools.go@@ -479,7 +479,22 @@ func (fte *flowToolsExecutor) Prepare(ctx context.Context) error {}}- capAdd := []string{"NET_RAW"}+ // Start with capabilities pentest tooling genuinely needs.+ // NET_RAW: raw sockets (nmap, ping, packet crafting)+ // NET_BIND_SERVICE: bind ports <1024 (reverse shells, Responder, rogue DNS)+ // SETUID/SETGID: needed by daemons/tools that drop privileges (setuid DOWN).+ // NOTE: RunContainer also sets no-new-privileges:true, which causes the kernel+ // to ignore setuid-root bits on execve — sudo/su from a non-root uid will NOT+ // work. These caps do not re-enable setuid-root escalation.+ // CHOWN/DAC_OVERRIDE/FOWNER: root file-permission overrides (dpkg, package builds)+ // KILL: signal other processes inside the container+ // SYS_CHROOT: chroot-based isolation within the sandbox+ capAdd := []string{+ "NET_RAW", "NET_BIND_SERVICE",+ "SETUID", "SETGID",+ "CHOWN", "DAC_OVERRIDE", "FOWNER",+ "KILL", "SYS_CHROOT",+ }if fte.cfg.DockerNetAdmin {capAdd = append(capAdd, "NET_ADMIN")}@@ -495,7 +510,8 @@ func (fte *flowToolsExecutor) Prepare(ctx context.Context) error {Entrypoint: []string{"tail", "-f", "/dev/null"},},&container.HostConfig{- CapAdd: capAdd,+ CapDrop: []string{"ALL"},+ CapAdd: capAdd,},)if err != nil {