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test(security): pin every URL form ExtractHost resolves through urls.EnsureScheme, and trim its comment to the ownership line (PIN-301)
Luigi Agosti1d376fcb7eb2
diff --git a/internal/security/allowlist.go b/internal/security/allowlist.goindex 5fecd655..fb165078 100644--- a/internal/security/allowlist.go+++ b/internal/security/allowlist.go@@ -51,28 +51,7 @@ func HostMatchesPatterns(host string, patterns []string) bool {return false}-// ExtractHost is the ONE extractor that answers "which host is this security-// decision about". navguard and internal/urls each kept a private copy with its-// own hand-rolled bare-URL branch, and the three disagreed: a single-label name-// like "intranet" was a host to one and nothing to another, and every scheme-less-// "host:port" — "localhost:9222" included — was nothing to all of them, because-// url.Parse reads the leading label as a scheme. Normalizing the scheme first-// (urls.EnsureScheme) leaves this with nothing to guess at, so it is a parse and-// a lowercase and there is no branch left to diverge.-//-// This widens what the allowlist matches, deliberately. Every consumer of this-// primitive — the IDPI domain check, the response-forgery rule, download policy,-// route interception — now sees a host for two forms that used to yield "":-//-// - a single-label name ("intranet"), which the operator can only have put in-// security.allowedDomains on purpose, and which the docs say the list matches;-// - any "host:port" without a scheme, which was refused BY the allowlist for-// every host, listed or not.-//-// The forgery rule reads the same answer inverted, so a host that starts matching-// there starts being protected rather than starting to be permitted. A bare host-// defaults to https:// — the assumption the CLI and MCP already make — so the-// scheme-less form is upgraded, never downgraded.+// urls.EnsureScheme owns the normalisation that decides which forms carry a host.func ExtractHost(rawURL string) string {parsed, err := url.Parse(urls.EnsureScheme(rawURL))if err != nil {diff --git a/internal/security/allowlist_test.go b/internal/security/allowlist_test.goindex d854effb..953c040c 100644--- a/internal/security/allowlist_test.go+++ b/internal/security/allowlist_test.go@@ -64,21 +64,23 @@ func TestHostAllowed_CaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {}}-func TestExtractHost_BareHostname(t *testing.T) {- if got := ExtractHost("example.com/path"); got != "example.com" {- t.Errorf("ExtractHost('example.com/path') = %q, want 'example.com'", got)- }-}--func TestExtractHost_FullURL(t *testing.T) {- if got := ExtractHost("https://example.com:8080/path?q=1"); got != "example.com" {- t.Errorf("ExtractHost full URL = %q, want 'example.com'", got)- }-}--func TestExtractHost_NoHost(t *testing.T) {- if got := ExtractHost("about:blank"); got != "" {- t.Errorf("ExtractHost('about:blank') = %q, want ''", got)+func TestExtractHostResolvesEveryFormTheNormaliserWidened(t *testing.T) {+ for raw, want := range map[string]string{+ "example.com/path": "example.com",+ "https://example.com:8080/path?q=1": "example.com",+ "intranet": "intranet",+ "localhost:9222": "localhost",+ "//evil.com/x": "evil.com",+ "/evil.com/x": "evil.com",+ "https:evil.com/x": "evil.com",+ "https:/evil.com/x": "evil.com",+ "https:////evil.com/x": "evil.com",+ `https:\\evil.com\x`: "evil.com",+ "about:blank": "",+ } {+ if got := ExtractHost(raw); got != want {+ t.Errorf("ExtractHost(%q) = %q, want %q. This primitive is read in BOTH directions: the IDPI domain check and download policy read a match as permission, the response-forgery rule inverts it, so a form that stops yielding a host re-opens surface rather than tightening it. urls.EnsureScheme owns the normalisation that decides which forms carry a host", raw, got, want)+ }}}