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test(handlers): pin every URL spelling refused under the configs operators run (PIN-282)

Luigi Agosti259c4217ddb1
diff --git a/internal/handlers/navigation_host_forms_test.go b/internal/handlers/navigation_host_forms_test.go
index d050a029..652a1792 100644
--- a/internal/handlers/navigation_host_forms_test.go
+++ b/internal/handlers/navigation_host_forms_test.go
@@ -178,3 +178,60 @@ func TestAnEmptyAllowlistNeverGrantsThePrivateIPOverride(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
+
+// The spelling table above runs with IDPI off and no allowlist, deliberately, so it
+// measures the spelling property rather than the allowlist override that used to sit
+// in front of it. That leaves the configurations an operator actually runs
+// unmeasured, and the two fixes involved landed on separate cards: one makes every
+// spelling name the same host, the other stops an empty allowlist reading as "every
+// host explicitly allowed". Neither card's tests cover the combination, so a
+// regression in either could restore the bypass under a real config while both
+// suites stay green.
+func TestEverySpellingIsRefusedUnderTheConfigurationsOperatorsRun(t *testing.T) {
+ spellings := []string{
+ `https://10.0.0.5/x`,
+ `https:\\10.0.0.5\x`,
+ `https:/10.0.0.5/x`,
+ `https:\/10.0.0.5\x`,
+ `https:////10.0.0.5/x`,
+ `//10.0.0.5/x`,
+ `https:10.0.0.5/x`,
+ `/10.0.0.5/x`,
+ }
+
+ shipped := config.DefaultFileConfig()
+ defaults := hostFormConfig(shipped.Security.AllowedDomains)
+ defaults.IDPI = config.IDPIConfig{Enabled: shipped.Security.IDPI.Enabled, StrictMode: shipped.Security.IDPI.StrictMode}
+
+ for _, tc := range []struct {
+ name string
+ cfg *config.RuntimeConfig
+ }{
+ {"the shipped defaults", defaults},
+ {"idpi on with an empty allowlist", hostFormConfig(nil)},
+ } {
+ t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+ h := New(&policyMockBridge{}, tc.cfg, nil, nil, nil)
+ for _, raw := range spellings {
+ w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+ if _, ok := h.validateNavigateTargets(w, httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/navigate", nil), "", raw, h.Config); ok {
+ t.Errorf("navigate path ALLOWED a private address written as %q", raw)
+ }
+ if _, err := h.validateAuditTarget(raw, h.Config); err == nil {
+ t.Errorf("audit-page path ALLOWED a private address written as %q", raw)
+ }
+ }
+ })
+ }
+
+ // Without this a blanket refusal under either config would satisfy every row
+ // above, which is the failure mode the normalising half of the fix exists to
+ // avoid.
+ t.Run("a public host in an unusual spelling is still permitted", func(t *testing.T) {
+ h := New(&policyMockBridge{}, hostFormConfig(nil), nil, nil, nil)
+ w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+ if _, ok := h.validateNavigateTargets(w, httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/navigate", nil), "", `https:\\example.com\x`, h.Config); !ok {
+ t.Errorf("a public host written unusually was refused: %d %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+ }
+ })
+}