High-performance browser automation bridge and multi-instance orchestrator with advanced stealth injection and real-time dashboard.
security: add debug log for nil URLReader fallback and document session auth scope
Bosch5c315a4b6102
diff --git a/internal/bridge/bridge.go b/internal/bridge/bridge.goindex 0d0add0a..1ed0d35d 100644--- a/internal/bridge/bridge.go+++ b/internal/bridge/bridge.go@@ -535,6 +535,7 @@ func (b *Bridge) ExecuteAction(ctx context.Context, kind string, req ActionRequeurlReader := b.URLReaderif urlReader == nil {urlReader = defaultActionURLReader+ slog.Debug("URLReader is nil, using default fallback (guard checks may be no-ops without chromedp context)")}var beforeURL stringif checkNav {diff --git a/internal/config/config_load.go b/internal/config/config_load.goindex 161ff118..357b4d59 100644--- a/internal/config/config_load.go+++ b/internal/config/config_load.go@@ -99,6 +99,17 @@ func Load() *RuntimeConfig {},// Session defaults+ // NOTE: Agent sessions are enabled by default with mode "preferred".+ // This means every instance accepts Authorization: Session tokens out of the box.+ // Creating a session requires bearer auth first, but the default-on posture adds+ // an auth surface that users may not be aware of. Consider setting Enabled: false+ // if agent sessions are not needed.+ //+ // There is currently no per-agent authorization scoping on session management:+ // any authenticated caller can create/list/revoke/rotate sessions for any agentId.+ // This is acceptable in trusted single-operator environments but should be+ // restricted (e.g. bearer-only or agent-scoped permissions) for multi-agent setups+ // where one compromised agent could disrupt others.Sessions: SessionsRuntimeConfig{Agent: AgentSessionRuntimeConfig{Enabled: true,diff --git a/internal/dashboard/agent_session_api.go b/internal/dashboard/agent_session_api.goindex bb73ba55..c66a021a 100644--- a/internal/dashboard/agent_session_api.go+++ b/internal/dashboard/agent_session_api.go@@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ import ()// AgentSessionAPI handles CRUD operations for agent sessions.+//+// SECURITY NOTE: There is no per-agent authorization scoping. Any authenticated+// caller (bearer or cookie) can create sessions for any agentId, list all sessions,+// revoke any agent's session, and rotate any agent's token. This is by design for+// trusted single-operator environments. For multi-agent setups, consider restricting+// session management to bearer-only auth or adding agent-scoped permissions.type AgentSessionAPI struct {store *agentsession.Store}