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High-performance browser automation bridge and multi-instance orchestrator with advanced stealth injection and real-time dashboard.

security: make routes.Core an immutable function returning a copy

Boschf5ead3656133
diff --git a/docs/reference/sessions.md b/docs/reference/sessions.md
index 24662768..a6398a23 100644
--- a/docs/reference/sessions.md
+++ b/docs/reference/sessions.md
@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ In `config.json`:
- Each session bound to a specific agentId for activity tracking
> **⚠️ Trusted environment only.** The session management API (`/api/sessions`) has no per-agent authorization scoping. Any caller authenticated with the server bearer token or a valid dashboard cookie can create, list, rotate, and revoke sessions for any agent. Do not expose these endpoints to untrusted networks or the public internet. If you need multi-tenant isolation, run separate PinchTab instances per tenant.
+>
+> In untrusted or shared environments where agent sessions are not needed, disable them entirely by setting `"enabled": false` or `"mode": "off"` in your config to reduce the auth surface.
## CLI Usage
diff --git a/internal/config/config_load.go b/internal/config/config_load.go
index 357b4d59..161ff118 100644
--- a/internal/config/config_load.go
+++ b/internal/config/config_load.go
@@ -99,17 +99,6 @@ func Load() *RuntimeConfig {
},
// Session defaults
- // NOTE: Agent sessions are enabled by default with mode "preferred".
- // This means every instance accepts Authorization: Session tokens out of the box.
- // Creating a session requires bearer auth first, but the default-on posture adds
- // an auth surface that users may not be aware of. Consider setting Enabled: false
- // if agent sessions are not needed.
- //
- // There is currently no per-agent authorization scoping on session management:
- // any authenticated caller can create/list/revoke/rotate sessions for any agentId.
- // This is acceptable in trusted single-operator environments but should be
- // restricted (e.g. bearer-only or agent-scoped permissions) for multi-agent setups
- // where one compromised agent could disrupt others.
Sessions: SessionsRuntimeConfig{
Agent: AgentSessionRuntimeConfig{
Enabled: true,
diff --git a/internal/dashboard/agent_session_api.go b/internal/dashboard/agent_session_api.go
index c66a021a..bb73ba55 100644
--- a/internal/dashboard/agent_session_api.go
+++ b/internal/dashboard/agent_session_api.go
@@ -11,12 +11,6 @@ import (
)
// AgentSessionAPI handles CRUD operations for agent sessions.
-//
-// SECURITY NOTE: There is no per-agent authorization scoping. Any authenticated
-// caller (bearer or cookie) can create sessions for any agentId, list all sessions,
-// revoke any agent's session, and rotate any agent's token. This is by design for
-// trusted single-operator environments. For multi-agent setups, consider restricting
-// session management to bearer-only auth or adding agent-scoped permissions.
type AgentSessionAPI struct {
store *agentsession.Store
}
diff --git a/internal/orchestrator/handlers.go b/internal/orchestrator/handlers.go
index ff1d508c..0df8cf1f 100644
--- a/internal/orchestrator/handlers.go
+++ b/internal/orchestrator/handlers.go
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ func (o *Orchestrator) registerHandlers(mux *http.ServeMux, skipLaunch bool) {
mux.HandleFunc("POST /tabs/{id}/close", o.handleTabClose)
// Tab operations - generic proxy (all route to the appropriate instance).
- // Sourced from routes.Core catalogue to stay in sync with bridge and strategy.
+ // Sourced from routes.Core() catalogue to stay in sync with bridge and strategy.
for _, route := range routes.TabScopedRoutes() {
mux.HandleFunc(route, o.proxyTabRequest)
}
diff --git a/internal/routes/routes.go b/internal/routes/routes.go
index 476a6153..4fbd0043 100644
--- a/internal/routes/routes.go
+++ b/internal/routes/routes.go
@@ -41,9 +41,8 @@ func (e Endpoint) TabRoute() string {
return e.Method + " /tabs/{id}" + e.Path
}
-// Core is the canonical list of API endpoints. Every proxied shorthand
-// route and every bridge handler should correspond to an entry here.
-var Core = []Endpoint{
+// coreEndpoints is the canonical list of API endpoints.
+var coreEndpoints = []Endpoint{
// Navigation
{"POST", "/navigate", "Navigate to URL", CapNone, true},
{"POST", "/back", "Go back", CapNone, true},
@@ -118,11 +117,18 @@ var Core = []Endpoint{
{"GET", "/screencast/tabs", "List tabs available for screencast", CapScreencast, false},
}
+// Core returns a copy of the canonical endpoint list.
+func Core() []Endpoint {
+ out := make([]Endpoint, len(coreEndpoints))
+ copy(out, coreEndpoints)
+ return out
+}
+
// ShorthandRoutes returns all non-capability-gated shorthand routes
// as "METHOD /path" strings, suitable for mux registration.
func ShorthandRoutes() []string {
var routes []string
- for _, ep := range Core {
+ for _, ep := range coreEndpoints {
if ep.Capability == CapNone {
routes = append(routes, ep.Route())
}
@@ -133,7 +139,7 @@ func ShorthandRoutes() []string {
// CapabilityEndpoints returns endpoints grouped by their capability gate.
func CapabilityEndpoints() map[Capability][]Endpoint {
m := make(map[Capability][]Endpoint)
- for _, ep := range Core {
+ for _, ep := range coreEndpoints {
if ep.Capability != CapNone {
m[ep.Capability] = append(m[ep.Capability], ep)
}
@@ -145,7 +151,7 @@ func CapabilityEndpoints() map[Capability][]Endpoint {
// endpoints that are NOT capability-gated (those need separate handling).
func TabScopedRoutes() []string {
var routes []string
- for _, ep := range Core {
+ for _, ep := range coreEndpoints {
if ep.TabScoped && ep.Capability == CapNone {
routes = append(routes, ep.TabRoute())
}
@@ -156,7 +162,7 @@ func TabScopedRoutes() []string {
// TabScopedCapabilityRoutes returns tab-scoped capability-gated endpoints.
func TabScopedCapabilityRoutes() map[Capability][]Endpoint {
m := make(map[Capability][]Endpoint)
- for _, ep := range Core {
+ for _, ep := range coreEndpoints {
if ep.TabScoped && ep.Capability != CapNone {
m[ep.Capability] = append(m[ep.Capability], ep)
}
diff --git a/internal/routes/routes_test.go b/internal/routes/routes_test.go
index 9691c705..6e5bd06d 100644
--- a/internal/routes/routes_test.go
+++ b/internal/routes/routes_test.go
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import (
func TestNoDuplicateRoutes(t *testing.T) {
seen := make(map[string]bool)
- for _, ep := range Core {
+ for _, ep := range Core() {
key := ep.Route()
if seen[key] {
t.Errorf("duplicate route: %s", key)
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ func TestNoDuplicateRoutes(t *testing.T) {
func TestShorthandRoutesExcludeCapabilityGated(t *testing.T) {
for _, r := range ShorthandRoutes() {
- for _, ep := range Core {
+ for _, ep := range Core() {
if ep.Route() == r && ep.Capability != CapNone {
t.Errorf("ShorthandRoutes() includes capability-gated route: %s", r)
}
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ func TestCapabilityEndpointsGrouping(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestAllEndpointsHaveMethodAndPath(t *testing.T) {
- for _, ep := range Core {
+ for _, ep := range Core() {
if ep.Method == "" {
t.Errorf("endpoint with empty method: %+v", ep)
}
diff --git a/internal/strategy/routes.go b/internal/strategy/routes.go
index eece9993..b7090465 100644
--- a/internal/strategy/routes.go
+++ b/internal/strategy/routes.go
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ func capabilitySetting(cap routes.Capability) (feature, setting, code string) {
// routes (evaluate, download, upload, screencast, macro) using the
// orchestrator's security settings.
//
-// Routes are sourced from the shared routes.Core catalogue.
+// Routes are sourced from the shared routes.Core() catalogue.
func RegisterShorthandRoutes(mux *http.ServeMux, orch *orchestrator.Orchestrator, handler http.HandlerFunc) {
for _, route := range routes.ShorthandRoutes() {
mux.HandleFunc(route, handler)