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[WEB-4943]fix: next path url redirection (#7817)

Vamsi Krishna877c117c371f
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py
index b25e2d015c..afba06ddcc 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ from plane.authentication.adapter.error import (
)
from plane.utils.path_validator import get_safe_redirect_url, validate_next_path, get_allowed_hosts
+
class SignInAuthSpaceEndpoint(View):
def post(self, request):
next_path = request.POST.get("next_path")
@@ -99,13 +100,13 @@ class SignInAuthSpaceEndpoint(View):
user = provider.authenticate()
# Login the user and record his device info
user_login(request=request, user=user, is_space=True)
- # redirect to next path
- url = get_safe_redirect_url(
- base_url=base_host(request=request, is_space=True),
- next_path=next_path,
- params={}
- )
- return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+ # redirect to referer path
+ next_path = validate_next_path(next_path=next_path)
+ url = f"{base_host(request=request, is_space=True).rstrip('/')}{next_path}"
+ if url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(url, allowed_hosts=get_allowed_hosts()):
+ return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+ else:
+ return HttpResponseRedirect(base_host(request=request, is_space=True))
except AuthenticationException as e:
params = e.get_error_dict()
url = get_safe_redirect_url(
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/github.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/github.py
index acc956cf3b..1a7d51d663 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/github.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/github.py
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ class GitHubCallbackSpaceEndpoint(View):
# Process workspace and project invitations
# redirect to referer path
next_path = validate_next_path(next_path=next_path)
+
url = f"{base_host(request=request, is_space=True).rstrip('/')}{next_path}"
if url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(url, allowed_hosts=get_allowed_hosts()):
return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/gitlab.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/gitlab.py
index 493cd823e2..26ed17f326 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/gitlab.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/gitlab.py
@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ from plane.authentication.adapter.error import (
AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES,
AuthenticationException,
)
-from plane.utils.path_validator import get_safe_redirect_url, get_allowed_hosts, validate_next_path
+from plane.utils.path_validator import get_safe_redirect_url, validate_next_path, get_allowed_hosts
+
class GitLabOauthInitiateSpaceEndpoint(View):
@@ -96,6 +97,7 @@ class GitLabCallbackSpaceEndpoint(View):
# Process workspace and project invitations
# redirect to referer path
next_path = validate_next_path(next_path=next_path)
+
url = f"{base_host(request=request, is_space=True).rstrip('/')}{next_path}"
if url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(url, allowed_hosts=get_allowed_hosts()):
return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/google.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/google.py
index c7c8337716..617216d64d 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/google.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/google.py
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ class GoogleCallbackSpaceEndpoint(View):
user_login(request=request, user=user, is_space=True)
# redirect to referer path
next_path = validate_next_path(next_path=next_path)
+
url = f"{base_host(request=request, is_space=True).rstrip('/')}{next_path}"
if url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(url, allowed_hosts=get_allowed_hosts()):
return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
diff --git a/apps/space/app/page.tsx b/apps/space/app/page.tsx
index a75275e0d5..f544bcb103 100644
--- a/apps/space/app/page.tsx
+++ b/apps/space/app/page.tsx
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
"use client";
-
+import { useEffect } from "react";
import { observer } from "mobx-react";
+import { useSearchParams, useRouter } from "next/navigation";
+// plane imports
+import { isValidNextPath } from "@plane/utils";
// components
import { UserLoggedIn } from "@/components/account/user-logged-in";
import { LogoSpinner } from "@/components/common/logo-spinner";
@@ -10,6 +13,15 @@ import { useUser } from "@/hooks/store/use-user";
const HomePage = observer(() => {
const { data: currentUser, isAuthenticated, isInitializing } = useUser();
+ const searchParams = useSearchParams();
+ const router = useRouter();
+ const nextPath = searchParams.get("next_path");
+
+ useEffect(() => {
+ if (currentUser && isAuthenticated && nextPath && isValidNextPath(nextPath)) {
+ router.replace(nextPath);
+ }
+ }, [currentUser, isAuthenticated, nextPath, router]);
if (isInitializing)
return (
@@ -18,7 +30,16 @@ const HomePage = observer(() => {
</div>
);
- if (currentUser && isAuthenticated) return <UserLoggedIn />;
+ if (currentUser && isAuthenticated) {
+ if (nextPath && isValidNextPath(nextPath)) {
+ return (
+ <div className="flex h-screen min-h-[500px] w-full justify-center items-center">
+ <LogoSpinner />
+ </div>
+ );
+ }
+ return <UserLoggedIn />;
+ }
return <AuthView />;
});
diff --git a/packages/utils/src/url.ts b/packages/utils/src/url.ts
index 638839bb06..738d935d5c 100644
--- a/packages/utils/src/url.ts
+++ b/packages/utils/src/url.ts
@@ -114,22 +114,6 @@ export function extractHostname(url: string): string {
* - Removes hash fragments (everything after '#')
* - Removes port numbers (everything after ':')
* 3. Validates the TLD against a list of known TLDs
- *
- * @example
- * // Valid cases (returns the TLD)
- * extractTLD('example.com') // returns 'com'
- * extractTLD('sub.example.com') // returns 'com'
- * extractTLD('example.com/path') // returns 'com'
- * extractTLD('example.com:8080') // returns 'com'
- * extractTLD('example.com?query=1') // returns 'com'
- * extractTLD('example.com#hash') // returns 'com'
- *
- * // Invalid cases (returns empty string)
- * extractTLD('') // returns ''
- * extractTLD('.example.com') // returns ''
- * extractTLD('example.com.') // returns ''
- * extractTLD('example.invalid') // returns ''
- * extractTLD('localhost') // returns ''
*/
export function extractTLD(urlString: string): string {
@@ -257,3 +241,66 @@ export function extractURLComponents(url: URL | string): IURLComponents | undefi
return undefined;
}
}
+
+/**
+ * Validates that a next_path parameter is safe for redirection.
+ * Only allows relative paths starting with "/" to prevent open redirect vulnerabilities.
+ *
+ * @param url - The next_path URL to validate
+ * @returns True if the URL is a safe relative path, false otherwise
+ *
+ * @example
+ * isValidNextPath("/dashboard") // true
+ * isValidNextPath("/workspace/123") // true
+ * isValidNextPath("https://malicious.com") // false
+ * isValidNextPath("//malicious.com") // false (protocol-relative)
+ * isValidNextPath("javascript:alert(1)") // false
+ * isValidNextPath("") // false
+ * isValidNextPath("dashboard") // false (must start with /)
+ * isValidNextPath("\\malicious") // false (backslash)
+ * isValidNextPath(" /dashboard ") // true (trimmed)
+ */
+export function isValidNextPath(url: string): boolean {
+ if (!url || typeof url !== "string") return false;
+
+ // Trim leading/trailing whitespace
+ const trimmedUrl = url.trim();
+
+ if (!trimmedUrl) return false;
+
+ // Only allow relative paths starting with /
+ if (!trimmedUrl.startsWith("/")) return false;
+
+ // Block protocol-relative URLs (//example.com) - open redirect vulnerability
+ if (trimmedUrl.startsWith("//")) return false;
+
+ // Block backslashes which can be used for path traversal or Windows-style paths
+ if (trimmedUrl.includes("\\")) return false;
+
+ try {
+ // Use URL constructor with a dummy base to normalize and validate the path
+ const normalizedUrl = new URL(trimmedUrl, "http://localhost");
+
+ // Ensure the path is still relative (no host change from our dummy base)
+ if (normalizedUrl.hostname !== "localhost" || normalizedUrl.protocol !== "http:") {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Use the normalized pathname for additional security checks
+ const pathname = normalizedUrl.pathname;
+
+ // Additional security checks for malicious patterns in the normalized path
+ const maliciousPatterns = [
+ /javascript:/i,
+ /data:/i,
+ /vbscript:/i,
+ /<script/i,
+ /on\w+=/i, // Event handlers like onclick=, onload=
+ ];
+
+ return !maliciousPatterns.some((pattern) => pattern.test(pathname));
+ } catch (error) {
+ // If URL constructor fails, it's an invalid path
+ return false;
+ }
+}