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[WEB-4943]fix: next path url redirection (#7817)
Vamsi Krishna877c117c371f
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.pyindex b25e2d015c..afba06ddcc 100644--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/email.py@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ from plane.authentication.adapter.error import ()from plane.utils.path_validator import get_safe_redirect_url, validate_next_path, get_allowed_hosts+class SignInAuthSpaceEndpoint(View):def post(self, request):next_path = request.POST.get("next_path")@@ -99,13 +100,13 @@ class SignInAuthSpaceEndpoint(View):user = provider.authenticate()# Login the user and record his device infouser_login(request=request, user=user, is_space=True)- # redirect to next path- url = get_safe_redirect_url(- base_url=base_host(request=request, is_space=True),- next_path=next_path,- params={}- )- return HttpResponseRedirect(url)+ # redirect to referer path+ next_path = validate_next_path(next_path=next_path)+ url = f"{base_host(request=request, is_space=True).rstrip('/')}{next_path}"+ if url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(url, allowed_hosts=get_allowed_hosts()):+ return HttpResponseRedirect(url)+ else:+ return HttpResponseRedirect(base_host(request=request, is_space=True))except AuthenticationException as e:params = e.get_error_dict()url = get_safe_redirect_url(diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/github.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/github.pyindex acc956cf3b..1a7d51d663 100644--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/github.py+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/github.py@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ class GitHubCallbackSpaceEndpoint(View):# Process workspace and project invitations# redirect to referer pathnext_path = validate_next_path(next_path=next_path)+url = f"{base_host(request=request, is_space=True).rstrip('/')}{next_path}"if url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(url, allowed_hosts=get_allowed_hosts()):return HttpResponseRedirect(url)diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/gitlab.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/gitlab.pyindex 493cd823e2..26ed17f326 100644--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/gitlab.py+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/gitlab.py@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ from plane.authentication.adapter.error import (AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES,AuthenticationException,)-from plane.utils.path_validator import get_safe_redirect_url, get_allowed_hosts, validate_next_path+from plane.utils.path_validator import get_safe_redirect_url, validate_next_path, get_allowed_hosts+class GitLabOauthInitiateSpaceEndpoint(View):@@ -96,6 +97,7 @@ class GitLabCallbackSpaceEndpoint(View):# Process workspace and project invitations# redirect to referer pathnext_path = validate_next_path(next_path=next_path)+url = f"{base_host(request=request, is_space=True).rstrip('/')}{next_path}"if url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(url, allowed_hosts=get_allowed_hosts()):return HttpResponseRedirect(url)diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/google.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/google.pyindex c7c8337716..617216d64d 100644--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/google.py+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/google.py@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ class GoogleCallbackSpaceEndpoint(View):user_login(request=request, user=user, is_space=True)# redirect to referer pathnext_path = validate_next_path(next_path=next_path)+url = f"{base_host(request=request, is_space=True).rstrip('/')}{next_path}"if url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(url, allowed_hosts=get_allowed_hosts()):return HttpResponseRedirect(url)diff --git a/apps/space/app/page.tsx b/apps/space/app/page.tsxindex a75275e0d5..f544bcb103 100644--- a/apps/space/app/page.tsx+++ b/apps/space/app/page.tsx@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@"use client";-+import { useEffect } from "react";import { observer } from "mobx-react";+import { useSearchParams, useRouter } from "next/navigation";+// plane imports+import { isValidNextPath } from "@plane/utils";// componentsimport { UserLoggedIn } from "@/components/account/user-logged-in";import { LogoSpinner } from "@/components/common/logo-spinner";@@ -10,6 +13,15 @@ import { useUser } from "@/hooks/store/use-user";const HomePage = observer(() => {const { data: currentUser, isAuthenticated, isInitializing } = useUser();+ const searchParams = useSearchParams();+ const router = useRouter();+ const nextPath = searchParams.get("next_path");++ useEffect(() => {+ if (currentUser && isAuthenticated && nextPath && isValidNextPath(nextPath)) {+ router.replace(nextPath);+ }+ }, [currentUser, isAuthenticated, nextPath, router]);if (isInitializing)return (@@ -18,7 +30,16 @@ const HomePage = observer(() => {</div>);- if (currentUser && isAuthenticated) return <UserLoggedIn />;+ if (currentUser && isAuthenticated) {+ if (nextPath && isValidNextPath(nextPath)) {+ return (+ <div className="flex h-screen min-h-[500px] w-full justify-center items-center">+ <LogoSpinner />+ </div>+ );+ }+ return <UserLoggedIn />;+ }return <AuthView />;});diff --git a/packages/utils/src/url.ts b/packages/utils/src/url.tsindex 638839bb06..738d935d5c 100644--- a/packages/utils/src/url.ts+++ b/packages/utils/src/url.ts@@ -114,22 +114,6 @@ export function extractHostname(url: string): string {* - Removes hash fragments (everything after '#')* - Removes port numbers (everything after ':')* 3. Validates the TLD against a list of known TLDs- *- * @example- * // Valid cases (returns the TLD)- * extractTLD('example.com') // returns 'com'- * extractTLD('sub.example.com') // returns 'com'- * extractTLD('example.com/path') // returns 'com'- * extractTLD('example.com:8080') // returns 'com'- * extractTLD('example.com?query=1') // returns 'com'- * extractTLD('example.com#hash') // returns 'com'- *- * // Invalid cases (returns empty string)- * extractTLD('') // returns ''- * extractTLD('.example.com') // returns ''- * extractTLD('example.com.') // returns ''- * extractTLD('example.invalid') // returns ''- * extractTLD('localhost') // returns ''*/export function extractTLD(urlString: string): string {@@ -257,3 +241,66 @@ export function extractURLComponents(url: URL | string): IURLComponents | undefireturn undefined;}}++/**+ * Validates that a next_path parameter is safe for redirection.+ * Only allows relative paths starting with "/" to prevent open redirect vulnerabilities.+ *+ * @param url - The next_path URL to validate+ * @returns True if the URL is a safe relative path, false otherwise+ *+ * @example+ * isValidNextPath("/dashboard") // true+ * isValidNextPath("/workspace/123") // true+ * isValidNextPath("https://malicious.com") // false+ * isValidNextPath("//malicious.com") // false (protocol-relative)+ * isValidNextPath("javascript:alert(1)") // false+ * isValidNextPath("") // false+ * isValidNextPath("dashboard") // false (must start with /)+ * isValidNextPath("\\malicious") // false (backslash)+ * isValidNextPath(" /dashboard ") // true (trimmed)+ */+export function isValidNextPath(url: string): boolean {+ if (!url || typeof url !== "string") return false;++ // Trim leading/trailing whitespace+ const trimmedUrl = url.trim();++ if (!trimmedUrl) return false;++ // Only allow relative paths starting with /+ if (!trimmedUrl.startsWith("/")) return false;++ // Block protocol-relative URLs (//example.com) - open redirect vulnerability+ if (trimmedUrl.startsWith("//")) return false;++ // Block backslashes which can be used for path traversal or Windows-style paths+ if (trimmedUrl.includes("\\")) return false;++ try {+ // Use URL constructor with a dummy base to normalize and validate the path+ const normalizedUrl = new URL(trimmedUrl, "http://localhost");++ // Ensure the path is still relative (no host change from our dummy base)+ if (normalizedUrl.hostname !== "localhost" || normalizedUrl.protocol !== "http:") {+ return false;+ }++ // Use the normalized pathname for additional security checks+ const pathname = normalizedUrl.pathname;++ // Additional security checks for malicious patterns in the normalized path+ const maliciousPatterns = [+ /javascript:/i,+ /data:/i,+ /vbscript:/i,+ /<script/i,+ /on\w+=/i, // Event handlers like onclick=, onload=+ ];++ return !maliciousPatterns.some((pattern) => pattern.test(pathname));+ } catch (error) {+ // If URL constructor fails, it's an invalid path+ return false;+ }+}