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fix(api): enforce workspace membership on GenericAssetEndpoint (#9212)
sriram veeraghanta9a30a07cf5e4
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignoreindex 61351715a1..42ef657d4b 100644--- a/.gitignore+++ b/.gitignore@@ -115,5 +115,5 @@ scripts/# i18n auto-generated types (regenerated on every build)packages/i18n/src/types/keys.generated.ts-# Local security advisory notes (not for version control)-/advisories.md+# Local security notes (not for version control)+/security/diff --git a/apps/api/plane/api/views/asset.py b/apps/api/plane/api/views/asset.pyindex 72ce60e681..7af1d13d24 100644--- a/apps/api/plane/api/views/asset.py+++ b/apps/api/plane/api/views/asset.py@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ from plane.bgtasks.storage_metadata_task import get_asset_object_metadatafrom plane.settings.storage import S3Storagefrom plane.utils.path_validator import sanitize_filenamefrom plane.db.models import FileAsset, User, Workspace+from plane.app.permissions import WorkspaceUserPermissionfrom plane.api.views.base import BaseAPIViewfrom plane.api.serializers import (UserAssetUploadSerializer,@@ -404,6 +405,12 @@ class UserServerAssetEndpoint(BaseAPIView):class GenericAssetEndpoint(BaseAPIView):"""This endpoint is used to upload generic assets that can be later bound to entities."""+ # The workspace is taken straight from the URL slug, so every method must+ # verify the caller is an active member of that workspace. Without this the+ # endpoint is a cross-workspace IDOR (the public-API sibling of the+ # CVE-2026-46558 dashboard fix).+ permission_classes = [WorkspaceUserPermission]+use_read_replica = True@asset_docs(diff --git a/apps/api/plane/tests/contract/api/test_generic_asset.py b/apps/api/plane/tests/contract/api/test_generic_asset.pynew file mode 100644index 0000000000..9efcc688f3--- /dev/null+++ b/apps/api/plane/tests/contract/api/test_generic_asset.py@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@+# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors+# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only+# See the LICENSE file for details.++"""Contract tests for the public REST API ``GenericAssetEndpoint``.++Regression coverage for the cross-workspace asset IDOR (the unfixed+external-API sibling of CVE-2026-46558 / GHSA-qw87-v5w3-6vxx). The endpoint+must reject any caller that is not an active member of the workspace named in+the URL slug, regardless of the workspace their Personal Access Token came+from.+"""++from unittest import mock+from uuid import uuid4++import pytest+from rest_framework import status++from plane.db.models import FileAsset, User, Workspace, WorkspaceMember+++def victim_user(db):+ """A user that owns a separate workspace the attacker is not part of."""+ unique_id = uuid4().hex[:8]+ user = User.objects.create(+ email=f"victim-{unique_id}@plane.so",+ username=f"victim_{unique_id}",+ first_name="Victim",+ last_name="User",+ )+ user.set_password("test-password")+ user.save()+ return user+++def victim_workspace(db, victim_user):+ """A workspace whose only active member is ``victim_user``.++ The attacker (``create_user``, who authenticates ``api_key_client``) is+ deliberately NOT a member here.+ """+ workspace = Workspace.objects.create(+ name="Victim Workspace",+ owner=victim_user,+ slug="victim-workspace",+ )+ WorkspaceMember.objects.create(workspace=workspace, member=victim_user, role=20)+ return workspace+++def victim_asset(db, victim_workspace, victim_user):+ """An uploaded attachment that lives inside the victim workspace.++ ``storage_metadata`` is pre-populated so the PATCH handler does not enqueue+ the metadata Celery task during the test.+ """+ return FileAsset.objects.create(+ attributes={"name": "secret.pdf", "type": "application/pdf", "size": 1024},+ asset=f"{victim_workspace.id}/secret.pdf",+ size=1024,+ workspace=victim_workspace,+ created_by=victim_user,+ entity_type=FileAsset.EntityTypeContext.ISSUE_ATTACHMENT,+ is_uploaded=True,+ storage_metadata={"size": 1024},+ )+++class TestGenericAssetCrossWorkspaceIDOR:+ """A PAT holder must not reach assets in a workspace they don't belong to."""++ def detail_url(self, slug, asset_id):+ return f"/api/v1/workspaces/{slug}/assets/{asset_id}/"++ def list_url(self, slug):+ return f"/api/v1/workspaces/{slug}/assets/"++ @pytest.mark.django_db+ def test_get_cross_workspace_asset_returns_403(self, api_key_client, victim_workspace, victim_asset):+ """GET on another workspace's asset must be forbidden, not return a+ presigned download URL."""+ url = self.detail_url(victim_workspace.slug, victim_asset.id)++ with mock.patch("plane.api.views.asset.S3Storage") as mock_storage:+ mock_storage.return_value.generate_presigned_url.return_value = "https://signed.example/download"+ response = api_key_client.get(url)++ assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, f"Got {response.status_code}: {response.data!r}"+ # The S3 download URL must never be minted for a non-member.+ mock_storage.return_value.generate_presigned_url.assert_not_called()++ @pytest.mark.django_db+ def test_post_cross_workspace_asset_returns_403(self, api_key_client, victim_workspace):+ """POST (upload) into another workspace must be forbidden and must not+ plant an asset row in the victim workspace."""+ url = self.list_url(victim_workspace.slug)+ payload = {"name": "evil.pdf", "type": "application/pdf", "size": 1024}++ with mock.patch("plane.api.views.asset.S3Storage") as mock_storage:+ mock_storage.return_value.generate_presigned_post.return_value = {"url": "x", "fields": {}}+ response = api_key_client.post(url, payload, format="json")++ assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, f"Got {response.status_code}: {response.data!r}"+ assert FileAsset.objects.filter(workspace=victim_workspace).count() == 0++ @pytest.mark.django_db+ def test_patch_cross_workspace_asset_returns_403(self, api_key_client, victim_workspace, victim_asset):+ """PATCH on another workspace's asset must be forbidden and must leave+ the asset untouched."""+ url = self.detail_url(victim_workspace.slug, victim_asset.id)++ response = api_key_client.patch(url, {"is_uploaded": False}, format="json")++ assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, f"Got {response.status_code}: {response.data!r}"+ victim_asset.refresh_from_db()+ assert victim_asset.is_uploaded is True++ @pytest.mark.django_db+ def test_member_can_patch_own_workspace_asset(self, api_key_client, workspace, create_user):+ """Positive control: an active member of the workspace can still update+ their own asset, so the fix does not over-block legitimate callers."""+ asset = FileAsset.objects.create(+ attributes={"name": "mine.pdf", "type": "application/pdf", "size": 10},+ asset=f"{workspace.id}/mine.pdf",+ size=10,+ workspace=workspace,+ created_by=create_user,+ entity_type=FileAsset.EntityTypeContext.ISSUE_ATTACHMENT,+ is_uploaded=False,+ storage_metadata={"size": 10},+ )+ url = self.detail_url(workspace.slug, asset.id)++ response = api_key_client.patch(url, {"is_uploaded": True}, format="json")++ assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT, f"Got {response.status_code}: {response.data!r}"+ asset.refresh_from_db()+ assert asset.is_uploaded is True