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fix(api): enforce workspace membership on GenericAssetEndpoint (#9212)

sriram veeraghanta9a30a07cf5e4
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 61351715a1..42ef657d4b 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -115,5 +115,5 @@ scripts/
# i18n auto-generated types (regenerated on every build)
packages/i18n/src/types/keys.generated.ts
-# Local security advisory notes (not for version control)
-/advisories.md
+# Local security notes (not for version control)
+/security/
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/api/views/asset.py b/apps/api/plane/api/views/asset.py
index 72ce60e681..7af1d13d24 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/api/views/asset.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/api/views/asset.py
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ from plane.bgtasks.storage_metadata_task import get_asset_object_metadata
from plane.settings.storage import S3Storage
from plane.utils.path_validator import sanitize_filename
from plane.db.models import FileAsset, User, Workspace
+from plane.app.permissions import WorkspaceUserPermission
from plane.api.views.base import BaseAPIView
from plane.api.serializers import (
UserAssetUploadSerializer,
@@ -404,6 +405,12 @@ class UserServerAssetEndpoint(BaseAPIView):
class GenericAssetEndpoint(BaseAPIView):
"""This endpoint is used to upload generic assets that can be later bound to entities."""
+ # The workspace is taken straight from the URL slug, so every method must
+ # verify the caller is an active member of that workspace. Without this the
+ # endpoint is a cross-workspace IDOR (the public-API sibling of the
+ # CVE-2026-46558 dashboard fix).
+ permission_classes = [WorkspaceUserPermission]
+
use_read_replica = True
@asset_docs(
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/tests/contract/api/test_generic_asset.py b/apps/api/plane/tests/contract/api/test_generic_asset.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9efcc688f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/api/plane/tests/contract/api/test_generic_asset.py
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+# See the LICENSE file for details.
+
+"""Contract tests for the public REST API ``GenericAssetEndpoint``.
+
+Regression coverage for the cross-workspace asset IDOR (the unfixed
+external-API sibling of CVE-2026-46558 / GHSA-qw87-v5w3-6vxx). The endpoint
+must reject any caller that is not an active member of the workspace named in
+the URL slug, regardless of the workspace their Personal Access Token came
+from.
+"""
+
+from unittest import mock
+from uuid import uuid4
+
+import pytest
+from rest_framework import status
+
+from plane.db.models import FileAsset, User, Workspace, WorkspaceMember
+
+
+def victim_user(db):
+ """A user that owns a separate workspace the attacker is not part of."""
+ unique_id = uuid4().hex[:8]
+ user = User.objects.create(
+ email=f"victim-{unique_id}@plane.so",
+ username=f"victim_{unique_id}",
+ first_name="Victim",
+ last_name="User",
+ )
+ user.set_password("test-password")
+ user.save()
+ return user
+
+
+def victim_workspace(db, victim_user):
+ """A workspace whose only active member is ``victim_user``.
+
+ The attacker (``create_user``, who authenticates ``api_key_client``) is
+ deliberately NOT a member here.
+ """
+ workspace = Workspace.objects.create(
+ name="Victim Workspace",
+ owner=victim_user,
+ slug="victim-workspace",
+ )
+ WorkspaceMember.objects.create(workspace=workspace, member=victim_user, role=20)
+ return workspace
+
+
+def victim_asset(db, victim_workspace, victim_user):
+ """An uploaded attachment that lives inside the victim workspace.
+
+ ``storage_metadata`` is pre-populated so the PATCH handler does not enqueue
+ the metadata Celery task during the test.
+ """
+ return FileAsset.objects.create(
+ attributes={"name": "secret.pdf", "type": "application/pdf", "size": 1024},
+ asset=f"{victim_workspace.id}/secret.pdf",
+ size=1024,
+ workspace=victim_workspace,
+ created_by=victim_user,
+ entity_type=FileAsset.EntityTypeContext.ISSUE_ATTACHMENT,
+ is_uploaded=True,
+ storage_metadata={"size": 1024},
+ )
+
+
+class TestGenericAssetCrossWorkspaceIDOR:
+ """A PAT holder must not reach assets in a workspace they don't belong to."""
+
+ def detail_url(self, slug, asset_id):
+ return f"/api/v1/workspaces/{slug}/assets/{asset_id}/"
+
+ def list_url(self, slug):
+ return f"/api/v1/workspaces/{slug}/assets/"
+
+ @pytest.mark.django_db
+ def test_get_cross_workspace_asset_returns_403(self, api_key_client, victim_workspace, victim_asset):
+ """GET on another workspace's asset must be forbidden, not return a
+ presigned download URL."""
+ url = self.detail_url(victim_workspace.slug, victim_asset.id)
+
+ with mock.patch("plane.api.views.asset.S3Storage") as mock_storage:
+ mock_storage.return_value.generate_presigned_url.return_value = "https://signed.example/download"
+ response = api_key_client.get(url)
+
+ assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, f"Got {response.status_code}: {response.data!r}"
+ # The S3 download URL must never be minted for a non-member.
+ mock_storage.return_value.generate_presigned_url.assert_not_called()
+
+ @pytest.mark.django_db
+ def test_post_cross_workspace_asset_returns_403(self, api_key_client, victim_workspace):
+ """POST (upload) into another workspace must be forbidden and must not
+ plant an asset row in the victim workspace."""
+ url = self.list_url(victim_workspace.slug)
+ payload = {"name": "evil.pdf", "type": "application/pdf", "size": 1024}
+
+ with mock.patch("plane.api.views.asset.S3Storage") as mock_storage:
+ mock_storage.return_value.generate_presigned_post.return_value = {"url": "x", "fields": {}}
+ response = api_key_client.post(url, payload, format="json")
+
+ assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, f"Got {response.status_code}: {response.data!r}"
+ assert FileAsset.objects.filter(workspace=victim_workspace).count() == 0
+
+ @pytest.mark.django_db
+ def test_patch_cross_workspace_asset_returns_403(self, api_key_client, victim_workspace, victim_asset):
+ """PATCH on another workspace's asset must be forbidden and must leave
+ the asset untouched."""
+ url = self.detail_url(victim_workspace.slug, victim_asset.id)
+
+ response = api_key_client.patch(url, {"is_uploaded": False}, format="json")
+
+ assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, f"Got {response.status_code}: {response.data!r}"
+ victim_asset.refresh_from_db()
+ assert victim_asset.is_uploaded is True
+
+ @pytest.mark.django_db
+ def test_member_can_patch_own_workspace_asset(self, api_key_client, workspace, create_user):
+ """Positive control: an active member of the workspace can still update
+ their own asset, so the fix does not over-block legitimate callers."""
+ asset = FileAsset.objects.create(
+ attributes={"name": "mine.pdf", "type": "application/pdf", "size": 10},
+ asset=f"{workspace.id}/mine.pdf",
+ size=10,
+ workspace=workspace,
+ created_by=create_user,
+ entity_type=FileAsset.EntityTypeContext.ISSUE_ATTACHMENT,
+ is_uploaded=False,
+ storage_metadata={"size": 10},
+ )
+ url = self.detail_url(workspace.slug, asset.id)
+
+ response = api_key_client.patch(url, {"is_uploaded": True}, format="json")
+
+ assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT, f"Got {response.status_code}: {response.data!r}"
+ asset.refresh_from_db()
+ assert asset.is_uploaded is True