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[WEB-8060] fix(security): enforce authz on is_active member (de)activation (#9367)
Manish Guptadc9d80b2d2a4
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/app/views/project/member.py b/apps/api/plane/app/views/project/member.pyindex e747f573e7..973462182a 100644--- a/apps/api/plane/app/views/project/member.py+++ b/apps/api/plane/app/views/project/member.py@@ -261,6 +261,25 @@ class ProjectMemberViewSet(BaseViewSet):status=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,)+ # Guard privileged `is_active` mutations (member (de)activation). These are NOT+ # covered by the role block above, so without this check a GUEST could PATCH+ # {"is_active": false} while omitting "role" to deactivate any member β including+ # admins β and take over the project. Mirror the role block and destroy(): only a+ # project admin (or workspace admin) may (de)activate a member, and never one whose+ # role is equal to or higher than the requester's own.+ if "is_active" in request.data:+ if requested_project_member.role < ROLE.ADMIN.value and not is_workspace_admin:+ return Response(+ {"error": "You do not have permission to update member status"},+ status=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,+ )++ if project_member.role >= requested_project_member.role and not is_workspace_admin:+ return Response(+ {"error": "You cannot update the status of a member with a role equal to or higher than your own"},+ status=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,+ )+serializer = ProjectMemberSerializer(project_member, data=request.data, partial=True)if serializer.is_valid():diff --git a/apps/api/plane/tests/contract/app/test_project_member_is_active_authz.py b/apps/api/plane/tests/contract/app/test_project_member_is_active_authz.pynew file mode 100644index 0000000000..d59cad0591--- /dev/null+++ b/apps/api/plane/tests/contract/app/test_project_member_is_active_authz.py@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@+# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors+# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only+# See the LICENSE file for details.++"""+Regression tests for GHSA-hpgm-9r34-c4x5 / GHSA-25gg-cxm8-g7h9.++A project GUEST (or MEMBER) must not be able to (de)activate other project+members by PATCHing ``{"is_active": false}`` while omitting the ``role`` field.+Before the fix, every authorization guard in ``ProjectMemberViewSet.partial_update``+lived inside ``if "role" in request.data:`` and ``is_active`` was writable through+``ProjectMemberSerializer(fields="__all__")`` β so a guest could deactivate any+member, including admins, and take over the project.+"""++import uuid++import pytest+from rest_framework import status+from rest_framework.test import APIClient++from plane.db.models import (+ Project,+ ProjectMember,+ User,+ WorkspaceMember,+)+++def _member_detail_url(slug: str, project_id: uuid.UUID, pk: uuid.UUID) -> str:+ return f"/api/workspaces/{slug}/projects/{project_id}/members/{pk}/"+++def _make_user(email: str) -> User:+ local_part = email.split("@")[0]+ user = User.objects.create(email=email, username=local_part, first_name=local_part)+ user.set_password("test-password")+ user.save()+ return user+++def _add_member(workspace, project, user, *, ws_role: int, project_role: int) -> ProjectMember:+ WorkspaceMember.objects.create(workspace=workspace, member=user, role=ws_role, is_active=True)+ return ProjectMember.objects.create(+ workspace=workspace, project=project, member=user, role=project_role, is_active=True+ )+++def project(db, workspace, create_user):+ """A project owned by ``create_user`` (workspace owner / admin)."""+ project = Project.objects.create(+ name="Secure Project",+ identifier="SEC",+ workspace=workspace,+ created_by=create_user,+ )+ # create_user is the workspace owner (role=20 via the workspace fixture);+ # make them a project ADMIN too β this is the takeover victim.+ ProjectMember.objects.create(+ workspace=workspace, project=project, member=create_user, role=20, is_active=True+ )+ return project+++class TestProjectMemberIsActiveAuthz:+ def test_guest_cannot_deactivate_admin(self, workspace, project, create_user):+ """A project GUEST must not deactivate a project ADMIN via is_active."""+ attacker = _make_user("[email protected]")+ # non-workspace-admin (role 15) so is_workspace_admin bypass does not apply,+ # project GUEST (role 5)+ _add_member(workspace, project, attacker, ws_role=15, project_role=5)+ victim = ProjectMember.objects.get(project=project, member=create_user)++ client = APIClient()+ client.force_authenticate(user=attacker)+ response = client.patch(+ _member_detail_url(workspace.slug, project.id, victim.id),+ {"is_active": False},+ format="json",+ )++ assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN+ victim.refresh_from_db()+ assert victim.is_active is True++ def test_member_cannot_deactivate_admin(self, workspace, project, create_user):+ """A project MEMBER must not deactivate a project ADMIN via is_active."""+ attacker = _make_user("[email protected]")+ _add_member(workspace, project, attacker, ws_role=15, project_role=15)+ victim = ProjectMember.objects.get(project=project, member=create_user)++ client = APIClient()+ client.force_authenticate(user=attacker)+ response = client.patch(+ _member_detail_url(workspace.slug, project.id, victim.id),+ {"is_active": False},+ format="json",+ )++ assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN+ victim.refresh_from_db()+ assert victim.is_active is True++ def test_guest_cannot_deactivate_peer_guest(self, workspace, project):+ """A GUEST cannot deactivate another GUEST either (role check applies to all)."""+ attacker = _make_user("[email protected]")+ peer = _make_user("[email protected]")+ _add_member(workspace, project, attacker, ws_role=15, project_role=5)+ peer_member = _add_member(workspace, project, peer, ws_role=15, project_role=5)++ client = APIClient()+ client.force_authenticate(user=attacker)+ response = client.patch(+ _member_detail_url(workspace.slug, project.id, peer_member.id),+ {"is_active": False},+ format="json",+ )++ assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN+ peer_member.refresh_from_db()+ assert peer_member.is_active is True++ def test_project_admin_can_deactivate_member(self, workspace, project):+ """Positive control: a project ADMIN (non-workspace-admin) may deactivate a MEMBER."""+ admin = _make_user("[email protected]")+ target = _make_user("[email protected]")+ # admin is a workspace MEMBER (15) but project ADMIN (20) β exercises the+ # role-comparison guard rather than the workspace-admin bypass.+ _add_member(workspace, project, admin, ws_role=15, project_role=20)+ target_member = _add_member(workspace, project, target, ws_role=15, project_role=15)++ client = APIClient()+ client.force_authenticate(user=admin)+ response = client.patch(+ _member_detail_url(workspace.slug, project.id, target_member.id),+ {"is_active": False},+ format="json",+ )++ assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK+ target_member.refresh_from_db()+ assert target_member.is_active is False++ def test_workspace_admin_with_low_project_role_can_deactivate(self, workspace, project, create_user):+ """+ Positive control: the intended workspace-admin bypass is preserved.++ A workspace ADMIN (role 20) may deactivate any project member β even a+ project ADMIN β despite holding only a project GUEST role, because+ is_workspace_admin short-circuits the role-comparison guard. Locks in the+ bypass so future changes don't silently remove it.+ """+ ws_admin = _make_user("[email protected]")+ # workspace ADMIN (20) but only a project GUEST (5)+ _add_member(workspace, project, ws_admin, ws_role=20, project_role=5)+ # victim is the project ADMIN (create_user) set up by the `project` fixture+ victim = ProjectMember.objects.get(project=project, member=create_user)++ client = APIClient()+ client.force_authenticate(user=ws_admin)+ response = client.patch(+ _member_detail_url(workspace.slug, project.id, victim.id),+ {"is_active": False},+ format="json",+ )++ assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK+ victim.refresh_from_db()+ assert victim.is_active is False