Self-hosted email delivery platform that enables applications to send emails via HTTP APIs while handling SMTP delivery, templates, storage, security, and analytics. Fully self-hostable alternative to services like SendGrid or Mailgun.
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// Copyright (c) 2026 Jonas Kaninda.
//
// This file is part of Posta.
//
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
// along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
// Package netguard keeps connections that a workspace member configures, such
// as a webhook URL or an SMTP host, from reaching the server's own network:
// loopback, private ranges, link-local addresses (cloud metadata endpoints
// among them) and the like.
//
// The check runs on the address actually dialled, after DNS resolution, so a
// hostname that resolves to a private address, a DNS answer that changes
// between saving and sending, and a redirect to an internal URL are all
// caught the same way.
package netguard
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"os"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
)
// ErrBlocked is returned for a destination that is not on the public internet.
var ErrBlocked = errors.New("destination is a private or reserved address")
// Policy decides which addresses outbound connections may reach.
type Policy struct {
// AllowPrivate turns the guard off: any address may be reached.
AllowPrivate bool
// Allowed are networks reachable even though they are not public, such
// as the subnet of an internal automation service.
Allowed []netip.Prefix
}
// nonPublic are the ranges a connection must not reach unless allowed. The
// unspecified address and the other special-purpose ranges are blocked too:
// 0.0.0.0 reaches the local host on most systems.
var nonPublic = mustPrefixes(
"0.0.0.0/8", // "this network"; 0.0.0.0 is the local host
"10.0.0.0/8", // private
"100.64.0.0/10", // carrier-grade NAT
"127.0.0.0/8", // loopback
"169.254.0.0/16", // link-local, cloud metadata
"172.16.0.0/12", // private
"192.0.0.0/24", // IETF protocol assignments
"192.0.2.0/24", // documentation
"192.168.0.0/16", // private
"198.18.0.0/15", // benchmarking
"198.51.100.0/24", // documentation
"203.0.113.0/24", // documentation
"224.0.0.0/4", // multicast
"240.0.0.0/4", // reserved, broadcast
"::/128", // unspecified
"::1/128", // loopback
"64:ff9b:1::/48", // local-use NAT64
"100::/64", // discard
"2001:db8::/32", // documentation
"fc00::/7", // unique local
"fe80::/10", // link-local
"ff00::/8", // multicast
)
func mustPrefixes(cidrs ...string) []netip.Prefix {
out := make([]netip.Prefix, len(cidrs))
for i, c := range cidrs {
out[i] = netip.MustParsePrefix(c)
}
return out
}
// Check reports whether ip may be reached.
func (p Policy) Check(ip netip.Addr) error {
if p.AllowPrivate {
return nil
}
// An IPv4 address written as IPv6 (::ffff:10.0.0.1) is judged as IPv4.
ip = ip.Unmap()
for _, allowed := range p.Allowed {
if allowed.Contains(ip) {
return nil
}
}
for _, blocked := range nonPublic {
if blocked.Contains(ip) {
return ErrBlocked
}
}
return nil
}
// control is a net.Dialer Control function: it runs once the address has been
// resolved, just before connecting, for every address the dialer tries.
func (p Policy) control(_, address string, _ syscall.RawConn) error {
ap, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(address)
if err != nil {
return ErrBlocked
}
return p.Check(ap.Addr())
}
// Dialer returns a dialer that refuses addresses the policy blocks.
func (p Policy) Dialer(timeout time.Duration) *net.Dialer {
return &net.Dialer{Timeout: timeout, KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second, Control: p.control}
}
// DialContext is the policy's dialer as an http.Transport DialContext.
func (p Policy) DialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
return p.Dialer(30*time.Second).DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
}
// CheckURL checks a URL before it is saved: http or https, a host, and a host
// that does not resolve to a blocked address. It gives a clear error early;
// the dialer still decides at send time, when DNS may answer differently.
func (p Policy) CheckURL(ctx context.Context, raw string) error {
u, err := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(raw))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid URL")
}
if u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https" {
return fmt.Errorf("the URL must start with http:// or https://")
}
host := u.Hostname()
if host == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("the URL has no host")
}
if u.User != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("the URL must not contain credentials")
}
return p.CheckHost(ctx, host)
}
// CheckHost resolves host and refuses it when any of its addresses is
// blocked. A host that does not resolve is accepted: it may exist later, and
// the dialer checks again then.
func (p Policy) CheckHost(ctx context.Context, host string) error {
if p.AllowPrivate {
return nil
}
if ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(strings.Trim(host, "[]")); err == nil {
if p.Check(ip) != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%q is a private or reserved address", host)
}
return nil
}
addrs, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupNetIP(ctx, "ip", host)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
for _, ip := range addrs {
if p.Check(ip) != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%q resolves to a private or reserved address", host)
}
}
return nil
}
// FromEnv reads a policy from <prefix>_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORKS (a boolean) and
// <prefix>_ALLOWED_NETWORKS (comma-separated CIDRs or single addresses).
// Entries that do not parse are returned as an error alongside the rest.
func FromEnv(prefix string, defaultAllowPrivate bool) (Policy, error) {
p := Policy{AllowPrivate: defaultAllowPrivate}
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(prefix + "_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORKS"))) {
case "1", "true", "yes", "on":
p.AllowPrivate = true
case "0", "false", "no", "off":
p.AllowPrivate = false
}
var bad []string
for _, entry := range strings.Split(os.Getenv(prefix+"_ALLOWED_NETWORKS"), ",") {
entry = strings.TrimSpace(entry)
if entry == "" {
continue
}
if prefixVal, err := netip.ParsePrefix(entry); err == nil {
p.Allowed = append(p.Allowed, prefixVal.Masked())
continue
}
if ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(entry); err == nil {
p.Allowed = append(p.Allowed, netip.PrefixFrom(ip.Unmap(), ip.Unmap().BitLen()))
continue
}
bad = append(bad, entry)
}
if len(bad) > 0 {
return p, fmt.Errorf("%s_ALLOWED_NETWORKS: not a network or address: %s", prefix, strings.Join(bad, ", "))
}
return p, nil
}
// Describe turns a connection error into a short reason fit to show a
// workspace member: what went wrong, without the addresses and ports a raw
// network error carries, which would map the server's network.
func Describe(err error) string {
if err == nil {
return ""
}
var dnsErr *net.DNSError
var netErr net.Error
msg := strings.ToLower(err.Error())
switch {
case errors.Is(err, ErrBlocked):
return "blocked: the destination is a private or reserved address"
case errors.As(err, &dnsErr):
return "the host name could not be resolved"
case errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded), errors.As(err, &netErr) && netErr.Timeout():
return "the connection timed out"
case errors.Is(err, syscall.ECONNREFUSED), strings.Contains(msg, "connection refused"):
return "the connection was refused"
case errors.Is(err, syscall.ECONNRESET), strings.Contains(msg, "connection reset"), errors.Is(err, net.ErrClosed), strings.Contains(msg, "eof"):
return "the connection was closed unexpectedly"
case strings.Contains(msg, "certificate"), strings.Contains(msg, "tls"), strings.Contains(msg, "x509"):
return "the TLS handshake failed"
case strings.Contains(msg, "no route"), strings.Contains(msg, "unreachable"):
return "the destination is unreachable"
}
return "the connection failed"
}