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Python ab-testingai-analyticsanalyticscdpdata-warehouseexperimentsfeature-flagsjavascriptproduct-analyticspythonreactsession-replaysurveystypescriptweb-analytics
from posthog.test.base import BaseTest
from unittest.mock import patch
from parameterized import parameterized
from prometheus_client import REGISTRY
from posthog.models import User
from products.security.backend.facade.api import (
access_refused,
decide,
gateway_credentials_revoked,
is_email_code_exempt,
is_enforced,
is_signup_risk_exempt,
)
from products.security.backend.facade.contracts import SubjectInput
from products.security.backend.facade.enums import Outcome, Surface
from products.security.backend.tests.helpers import block_rule, enforcing, exempt_rule, seed_rules
def _would_block(call_site: str) -> float:
return (
REGISTRY.get_sample_value(
"posthog_security_access_would_block_total",
{"surface": "app", "call_site": call_site, "target_type": "user_uuid"},
)
or 0.0
)
def _decisions(surface: str, call_site: str, outcome: str) -> float:
return (
REGISTRY.get_sample_value(
"posthog_security_access_decisions_total",
{"surface": surface, "call_site": call_site, "outcome": outcome},
)
or 0.0
)
def _refusals(call_site: str) -> float:
return (
REGISTRY.get_sample_value(
"posthog_security_access_refusals_total",
{"surface": "app", "call_site": call_site, "target_type": "user_uuid"},
)
or 0.0
)
class TestFacade(BaseTest):
def test_a_uuid_only_subject_is_resolved_before_the_posthog_check(self) -> None:
staff = User.objects.create_and_join(self.organization, "[email protected]", "password1234")
seed_rules(block_rule(targetType="user_uuid", targetValue=str(staff.uuid)))
assert decide(SubjectInput(user_uuid=str(staff.uuid)), Surface.APP).outcome == Outcome.ALLOW
def test_decide_reports_the_rule(self) -> None:
rule = block_rule(targetType="ip", targetValue="93.184.216.0/24")
seed_rules(rule)
decision = decide(SubjectInput(ip="93.184.216.7"), Surface.SIGNUP)
assert (decision.outcome, decision.rule_id, decision.target_type) == (Outcome.BLOCK, rule["id"], "ip")
assert decide(SubjectInput(ip="garbage"), Surface.SIGNUP).outcome == Outcome.ALLOW
def test_email_code_exemption(self) -> None:
seed_rules(exempt_rule(targetValue="[email protected]"))
assert is_email_code_exempt("[email protected]") is True
assert is_email_code_exempt("[email protected]") is False
def test_signup_risk_exemption(self) -> None:
seed_rules(exempt_rule(targetValue="[email protected]", scope="signup_risk"))
assert is_signup_risk_exempt("[email protected]") is True
assert is_email_code_exempt("[email protected]") is False
assert is_signup_risk_exempt("[email protected]") is False
def test_signup_risk_exemption_fails_closed(self) -> None:
with patch("products.security.backend.facade.api.current_snapshot", side_effect=RuntimeError("boom")):
assert is_signup_risk_exempt("[email protected]") is False
def test_email_code_exemption_fails_closed(self) -> None:
with patch("products.security.backend.facade.api.current_snapshot", side_effect=RuntimeError("boom")):
assert is_email_code_exempt("[email protected]") is False
def test_access_refused_counts_every_decision_and_never_raises(self) -> None:
user = User.objects.create_and_join(self.organization, "[email protected]", "password1234")
seed_rules(block_rule(targetType="user_uuid", targetValue=str(user.uuid)))
before = _would_block("test_site")
blocked_before = _decisions("app", "test_site", "block")
access_refused(SubjectInput(email=user.email, user_uuid=str(user.uuid)), Surface.APP, call_site="test_site")
assert _would_block("test_site") == before + 1
assert _decisions("app", "test_site", "block") == blocked_before + 1
# An allow must be counted too. When no block rule matches, every decision is an
# allow, so a counter that moved only on a block would have no series exactly when
# there is nothing to block, which is the case it exists to distinguish.
allowed_before = _decisions("app", "test_site", "allow")
access_refused(SubjectInput(email="[email protected]"), Surface.APP, call_site="test_site")
assert _decisions("app", "test_site", "allow") == allowed_before + 1
# A decision that raised is an error, not an evaluation, and must not be counted twice.
allowed_before = _decisions("app", "test_site", "allow")
with patch("products.security.backend.facade.api.current_snapshot", side_effect=RuntimeError("boom")):
access_refused(SubjectInput(email=user.email), Surface.APP, call_site="test_site")
assert _decisions("app", "test_site", "allow") == allowed_before
@parameterized.expand(
[
("email_code exempt", "email_code", "email_code", "[email protected]", "exempt"),
("email_code allow", "email_code", "email_code", "[email protected]", "allow"),
("signup_risk exempt", "signup_risk", "signup_risk", "[email protected]", "exempt"),
("signup_risk allow", "signup_risk", "signup_risk", "[email protected]", "allow"),
]
)
def test_exemption_checks_count_every_decision(
self, _name: str, scope: str, surface: str, address: str, outcome: str
) -> None:
# The exemption checks do not go through access_refused, so they need their own count
# to show that they ran.
seed_rules(exempt_rule(targetValue="[email protected]", scope=scope))
check = is_email_code_exempt if surface == "email_code" else is_signup_risk_exempt
before = _decisions(surface, surface, outcome)
check(address)
assert _decisions(surface, surface, outcome) == before + 1
@parameterized.expand(
[
("surface enforced", ["app"], True, True),
("surface enforced, but this request is exempt", ["app"], False, False),
("another surface enforced", ["signup", "ai_gateway"], True, False),
("nothing enforced", [], True, False),
]
)
def test_access_refused_only_on_an_enforced_surface(
self, _name: str, enforced: list[str], enforce: bool, expected: bool
) -> None:
user = User.objects.create_and_join(self.organization, "[email protected]", "password1234")
seed_rules(block_rule(targetType="user_uuid", targetValue=str(user.uuid)))
refused_before, would_block_before = _refusals("refuse_site"), _would_block("refuse_site")
with enforcing(*enforced):
result = access_refused(
SubjectInput(email=user.email, user_uuid=str(user.uuid)),
Surface.APP,
call_site="refuse_site",
enforce=enforce,
)
assert result is expected
assert _refusals("refuse_site") == refused_before + (1 if expected else 0)
assert _would_block("refuse_site") == would_block_before + (0 if expected else 1)
def test_access_refused_refuses_nobody_when_the_decision_fails(self) -> None:
seed_rules(block_rule(targetValue="[email protected]"))
with (
enforcing("app"),
patch("products.security.backend.facade.api.current_snapshot", side_effect=RuntimeError("boom")),
):
assert (
access_refused(SubjectInput(email="[email protected]"), Surface.APP, call_site="refuse_site") is False
)
@parameterized.expand([("gateway enforced", ["ai_gateway"], True), ("gateway in shadow", ["signup", "app"], False)])
def test_gateway_credentials_are_revoked_only_while_the_gateway_is_enforced(
self, _name: str, enforced: list[str], expected: bool
) -> None:
seed_rules(block_rule(targetValue="[email protected]", scope="ai_gateway"))
would_block_before = REGISTRY.get_sample_value(
"posthog_security_access_would_block_total",
{"surface": "ai_gateway", "call_site": "revoke_sweep", "target_type": "email"},
)
with enforcing(*enforced):
assert gateway_credentials_revoked(SubjectInput(email="[email protected]")) is expected
# The sweep re-reads every credential every few minutes, so a would-block from it would
# swamp the shadow data the flip depends on.
assert (
REGISTRY.get_sample_value(
"posthog_security_access_would_block_total",
{"surface": "ai_gateway", "call_site": "revoke_sweep", "target_type": "email"},
)
== would_block_before
)
@parameterized.expand(
[
("payload turns the surface on", {"signup": True}, True),
("payload arrives as JSON text", '{"signup": true}', True),
("payload leaves the surface off", {"signup": False, "app": True}, False),
("a truthy value that is not true", {"signup": "false"}, False),
("no payload, or no definitions yet", None, False),
("payload that is not an object", '["signup"]', False),
]
)
def test_is_enforced_reads_only_a_literal_true_from_the_flag_payload(
self, _name: str, payload: object, expected: bool
) -> None:
with patch(
"products.security.backend.logic.enforcement.posthoganalytics.get_feature_flag_payload",
return_value=payload,
):
assert is_enforced(Surface.SIGNUP) is expected
def test_is_enforced_leaves_the_surface_logging_only_when_the_flag_cannot_be_read(self) -> None:
with patch(
"products.security.backend.logic.enforcement.posthoganalytics.get_feature_flag_payload",
side_effect=RuntimeError("definitions unavailable"),
):
assert is_enforced(Surface.SIGNUP) is False