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// HS256 JWT verification, following the recording-api scheme (PostHog/posthog#67476).
//
// The deployment is WHICH KEY VERIFIES the token, never a claim, so there is nothing in the
// token an attacker could edit to become a different deployment. The `keys` claim is the
// whole request scope, so a token lifted from a log unlocks one call's fields.
import { jwtVerify } from 'jose'
import type { CallerIdentity } from '../types'
import type { SigningKeyLoader } from './registry'
import { AUDIENCE, AuthError, type AuthFailureReason } from './types'
/**
* Map a jose failure to a rejection reason, or null when it only means "not this key". Only
* the key that verifies the signature reaches the claim checks, so at most one is non-null.
*/
function rejectionReason(err: unknown): AuthFailureReason | null {
const code = (err as { code?: string }).code
switch (code) {
case 'ERR_JWS_INVALID':
case 'ERR_JWT_INVALID':
return 'malformed'
case 'ERR_JWT_EXPIRED':
return 'expired'
case 'ERR_JWT_CLAIM_VALIDATION_FAILED':
return (err as { claim?: string }).claim === 'exp' ? 'no_expiry' : 'bad_audience'
default:
return null
}
}
function stringArray(value: unknown): string[] {
if (!Array.isArray(value) || !value.every((item) => typeof item === 'string')) {
return []
}
return value as string[]
}
export class JwtVerifier {
constructor(private readonly keys: SigningKeyLoader) {}
async verify(token: string): Promise<CallerIdentity> {
let payload: Record<string, unknown> | undefined
let deployment = ''
let reason: AuthFailureReason = 'bad_signature'
outer: for (const [candidate, candidateKeys] of this.keys.entries()) {
for (const key of candidateKeys) {
try {
const result = await jwtVerify(token, new TextEncoder().encode(key), {
algorithms: ['HS256'],
audience: AUDIENCE,
// jose only checks `exp` when the claim is present, so without this
// a token minted without one verifies and never expires.
requiredClaims: ['exp'],
})
payload = result.payload as Record<string, unknown>
deployment = candidate
break outer
} catch (err) {
reason = rejectionReason(err) ?? reason
}
}
}
if (!payload) {
throw new AuthError(reason, 'token was not accepted')
}
const requested = stringArray(payload['keys'])
if (requested.length === 0) {
throw new AuthError('no_keys_claim', 'token carries no keys claim — the request scope is the token')
}
return {
deployment,
caller: typeof payload['caller'] === 'string' ? payload['caller'] : '',
// A repeat would otherwise be resolved, counted and logged once per occurrence.
requestedKeys: [...new Set(requested)],
}
}
}
/** Pull the bearer token out of an Authorization header. */
export function bearerToken(header: string | undefined): string {
if (!header?.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
throw new AuthError('missing_token', 'no bearer token')
}
const token = header.slice('Bearer '.length).trim()
if (!token) {
throw new AuthError('missing_token', 'empty bearer token')
}
return token
}