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fix(mcp): tighten mcp store tool policy and cli install paths (#122542)

Richard Solomou17f4577b1c13
diff --git a/products/desktop/packages/core/src/mcp-gateway/gatewayServers.test.ts b/products/desktop/packages/core/src/mcp-gateway/gatewayServers.test.ts
index 5ba461b3bead..05ec8455f4b2 100644
--- a/products/desktop/packages/core/src/mcp-gateway/gatewayServers.test.ts
+++ b/products/desktop/packages/core/src/mcp-gateway/gatewayServers.test.ts
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import type {
} from "@posthog/api-client/posthog-client";
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import {
+ canEditGatewayPolicyScope,
countGatewayServersByCategory,
countPoliciesByState,
defaultAgentGrantPolicy,
@@ -412,6 +413,58 @@ describe("getGatewayServerRemovalAction", () => {
});
});
+describe("canEditGatewayPolicyScope", () => {
+ const share = (userId: number) => ({
+ service_account_id: "sa-1",
+ user: {
+ id: userId,
+ uuid: `user-${userId}`,
+ email: `user-${userId}@example.com`,
+ hedgehog_config: null,
+ },
+ scope: "personal" as const,
+ name: "Deploy bot",
+ handle: "deploy-bot",
+ status: "active" as const,
+ last_active_at: null,
+ granted_by: null,
+ });
+ const agentScope = {
+ scopeType: "agent" as const,
+ scopeServiceAccountId: "sa-1",
+ };
+
+ it.each([
+ ["an admin without a share", server({}), true, true],
+ [
+ "a member with their own share",
+ server({ agents: [share(1)], your_connection: connection() }),
+ false,
+ true,
+ ],
+ [
+ "a member whose connection behind their share is deleted",
+ server({ agents: [share(1)] }),
+ false,
+ false,
+ ],
+ [
+ "a member with only a teammate's share",
+ server({ agents: [share(2)] }),
+ false,
+ false,
+ ],
+ ] as const)("agent scope for %s", (_label, srv, isAdmin, expected) => {
+ expect(
+ canEditGatewayPolicyScope(srv, agentScope, {
+ isAdmin,
+ canManageAgentAccess: true,
+ currentUserId: 1,
+ }),
+ ).toBe(expected);
+ });
+});
+
describe("countPoliciesByState", () => {
it("counts each state, defaulting to zero", () => {
const policy = (state: McpResolvedToolPolicy["policy_state"]) =>
diff --git a/products/desktop/packages/core/src/mcp-gateway/gatewayServers.ts b/products/desktop/packages/core/src/mcp-gateway/gatewayServers.ts
index 6f1d95662402..433c6f9f5d8a 100644
--- a/products/desktop/packages/core/src/mcp-gateway/gatewayServers.ts
+++ b/products/desktop/packages/core/src/mcp-gateway/gatewayServers.ts
@@ -191,6 +191,32 @@ export function getGatewayServerRemovalAction(
return personallyAddedCustomServer ? "delete_for_you" : "disconnect";
}
+/**
+ * Whether the caller may change tool policy for a scope. An agent's policy
+ * covers every member's share of the server, so a member may change it only
+ * while holding a share of their own and the connection behind it.
+ */
+export function canEditGatewayPolicyScope(
+ server: McpGatewayServer,
+ scope: { scopeType: McpGatewayScopeType; scopeServiceAccountId?: string },
+ caller: {
+ isAdmin: boolean;
+ canManageAgentAccess: boolean;
+ currentUserId: number | null;
+ },
+): boolean {
+ if (caller.isAdmin || scope.scopeType === "member") return true;
+ if (scope.scopeType !== "agent" || !caller.canManageAgentAccess) return false;
+ return (
+ server.your_connection !== null &&
+ server.agents.some(
+ (agent) =>
+ agent.service_account_id === scope.scopeServiceAccountId &&
+ agent.user.id === caller.currentUserId,
+ )
+ );
+}
+
export type GatewayPolicyCounts = Record<McpApprovalState, number>;
export const AGENT_POLICY_STATES = [
diff --git a/products/desktop/packages/ui/src/features/mcp-gateway/components/parts/GatewayServerDetail.test.tsx b/products/desktop/packages/ui/src/features/mcp-gateway/components/parts/GatewayServerDetail.test.tsx
index a4d8c24c0786..76ca7dad6826 100644
--- a/products/desktop/packages/ui/src/features/mcp-gateway/components/parts/GatewayServerDetail.test.tsx
+++ b/products/desktop/packages/ui/src/features/mcp-gateway/components/parts/GatewayServerDetail.test.tsx
@@ -230,52 +230,68 @@ describe("GatewayServerDetail", () => {
});
});
- it("shows a single scope-aware bulk trio when a member views an agent scope", () => {
- const serverWithAgent = {
- ...server,
- agents: [
- {
- service_account_id: "sa-1",
- user: {
- id: 7,
- uuid: "user-7",
- first_name: "Ada",
- last_name: "Lovelace",
- email: "[email protected]",
- hedgehog_config: null,
- },
- scope: "personal",
- name: "Deploy bot",
- handle: "deploy-bot",
- status: "active",
- last_active_at: null,
- granted_by: null,
+ it.each([
+ ["their own share", 7, true],
+ ["only a teammate's share", 8, false],
+ ])(
+ "offers the agent-scope bulk trio to a member viewing %s",
+ (_label, currentUserId, editable) => {
+ mocks.currentUser = { id: currentUserId };
+ const serverWithAgent = {
+ ...server,
+ your_connection: {
+ installation_id: "installation-1",
+ is_enabled: true,
+ pending_oauth: false,
+ needs_reauth: false,
+ last_used_at: null,
},
- ],
- } as McpGatewayServer;
- mocks.gateway.servers = [serverWithAgent];
-
- render(
- <Theme>
- <GatewayServerDetail
- serverId={server.id}
- initialScope={{
- scopeType: "agent",
- scopeServiceAccountId: "sa-1",
- label: "Deploy bot",
- }}
- isAdmin={false}
- canManageAgentAccess
- onNavigate={vi.fn()}
- />
- </Theme>,
- );
-
- // The scope switcher carries the only bulk trio; the top-level one
- // (label "Set all") must not render alongside it.
- expect(screen.getByText("Set all for Deploy bot")).toBeInTheDocument();
- expect(screen.queryByText("Set all")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
- });
+ agents: [
+ {
+ service_account_id: "sa-1",
+ user: {
+ id: 7,
+ uuid: "user-7",
+ first_name: "Ada",
+ last_name: "Lovelace",
+ email: "[email protected]",
+ hedgehog_config: null,
+ },
+ scope: "personal",
+ name: "Deploy bot",
+ handle: "deploy-bot",
+ status: "active",
+ last_active_at: null,
+ granted_by: null,
+ },
+ ],
+ } as McpGatewayServer;
+ mocks.gateway.servers = [serverWithAgent];
+
+ render(
+ <Theme>
+ <GatewayServerDetail
+ serverId={server.id}
+ initialScope={{
+ scopeType: "agent",
+ scopeServiceAccountId: "sa-1",
+ label: "Deploy bot",
+ }}
+ isAdmin={false}
+ canManageAgentAccess
+ onNavigate={vi.fn()}
+ />
+ </Theme>,
+ );
+
+ // The scope switcher carries the only bulk trio; the top-level one
+ // (label "Set all") must not render alongside it.
+ expect(screen.queryByText("Set all for Deploy bot") !== null).toBe(
+ editable,
+ );
+ expect(screen.queryByText("Set all")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
+ },
+ );
it("offers the grant scope toggle only on the caller's own agent share", async () => {
mocks.currentUser = { id: 7 };
diff --git a/products/desktop/packages/ui/src/features/mcp-gateway/components/parts/GatewayServerDetail.tsx b/products/desktop/packages/ui/src/features/mcp-gateway/components/parts/GatewayServerDetail.tsx
index 4bcf0b07b92b..80e5e49f8de7 100644
--- a/products/desktop/packages/ui/src/features/mcp-gateway/components/parts/GatewayServerDetail.tsx
+++ b/products/desktop/packages/ui/src/features/mcp-gateway/components/parts/GatewayServerDetail.tsx
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import {
} from "@posthog/core/mcp-gateway/gatewayConnect";
import {
agentShareMessage,
+ canEditGatewayPolicyScope,
countPoliciesByState,
formatAgo,
getGatewayServerRemovalAction,
@@ -219,10 +220,11 @@ export function GatewayServerDetail({
const bulkEditableCount = hasToolSearch
? filteredEditablePolicies.length
: editableCount;
- const scopeEditable =
- isAdmin ||
- scope.scopeType === "member" ||
- (scope.scopeType === "agent" && canManageAgentAccess);
+ const scopeEditable = canEditGatewayPolicyScope(server, scope, {
+ isAdmin,
+ canManageAgentAccess,
+ currentUserId: currentUser?.id ?? null,
+ });
// Any connected member can re-list — it runs against their own credential,
// and it is the manual retry when auto-discovery failed.
const refreshInstallationId = liveInstallationId;
@@ -535,13 +537,15 @@ export function GatewayServerDetail({
);
})}
<div className="ml-auto flex items-center gap-1">
- <BulkTrio
- label={`Set all for ${scope.label}`}
- filtered={hasToolSearch}
- disabled={tools.setAllPending || bulkEditableCount === 0}
- allowNeedsApproval={!agentScope}
- onSet={setBulkPolicy}
- />
+ {scopeEditable && (
+ <BulkTrio
+ label={`Set all for ${scope.label}`}
+ filtered={hasToolSearch}
+ disabled={tools.setAllPending || bulkEditableCount === 0}
+ allowNeedsApproval={!agentScope}
+ onSet={setBulkPolicy}
+ />
+ )}
{refreshInstallationId && (
<RefreshToolsButton
pending={tools.refreshPending}
diff --git a/products/mcp_store/backend/facade/api.py b/products/mcp_store/backend/facade/api.py
index a817c0f75171..e2867138e717 100644
--- a/products/mcp_store/backend/facade/api.py
+++ b/products/mcp_store/backend/facade/api.py
@@ -41,7 +41,12 @@ from products.mcp_store.backend.models import (
MCPServiceAccount,
MCPServiceAccountServerAccess,
)
-from products.mcp_store.backend.policy import GatewayCaller, PolicyContext, is_read_only_connector_tool
+from products.mcp_store.backend.policy import (
+ GatewayCaller,
+ PolicyContext,
+ is_read_only_connector_tool,
+ legacy_state_for_caller,
+)
from products.mcp_store.backend.proxy import record_tool_call_audit, resolve_call_decision, validate_installation_auth
from products.mcp_store.backend.tools import (
ToolCallError,
@@ -79,19 +84,30 @@ def resolve_member_tool_states(
With `block_locked_approvals`, a `needs_approval` state that an org rule
locks surfaces as `"do_not_use"`. Use it for callers that approve calls
on the member's behalf, because the member cannot approve a locked state."""
- rows = MCPServerInstallationTool.objects.filter(installation_id=installation_id).values(
- "tool_name", "annotations", "approval_state", "removed_at"
+ rows = list(
+ MCPServerInstallationTool.objects.filter(installation_id=installation_id).values(
+ "tool_name", "annotations", "approval_state", "removed_at", "installation__user_id"
+ )
)
- legacy = {row["tool_name"]: ("do_not_use" if row["removed_at"] else row["approval_state"]) for row in rows}
+ owner_id = rows[0]["installation__user_id"] if rows else None
if gateway_server_id is None or user_id is None:
- return legacy
+ caller_owns_installation = user_id is not None and owner_id == user_id
+ return {
+ row["tool_name"]: (
+ "do_not_use"
+ if row["removed_at"]
+ else legacy_state_for_caller(row["approval_state"], caller_owns_installation=caller_owns_installation)
+ )
+ for row in rows
+ }
context = PolicyContext(
team_id=team_id,
caller=GatewayCaller(kind="member", user_id=user_id),
gateway_server_id=gateway_server_id,
legacy_rows={row["tool_name"]: row["approval_state"] for row in rows if row["removed_at"] is None},
+ installation_owner_id=owner_id,
)
resolved: dict[str, str] = {}
for row in rows:
@@ -698,7 +714,9 @@ def call_member_server_tool(
if gateway_server is not None
else None
)
- decision, block_reason = resolve_call_decision(tool, policy_context)
+ decision, block_reason = resolve_call_decision(
+ tool, policy_context, caller_owns_installation=installation.user_id == user_id
+ )
pending_approval_token = None
if block_reason == "needs_approval":
if policy_context is not None and policy_context.resolve(tool.tool_name, tool.annotations).locked:
diff --git a/products/mcp_store/backend/policy.py b/products/mcp_store/backend/policy.py
index bfa451c8a3b3..fb9376776a11 100644
--- a/products/mcp_store/backend/policy.py
+++ b/products/mcp_store/backend/policy.py
@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ can never make a tool more permissive than the team allows.
1. Org rules — enabled team guardrails; a match locks the state.
2. The stricter of the caller's own choice and the team ceiling. The caller's
choice comes from its scope row, or for members from the legacy
- per-installation state. The ceiling comes from the explicit team row, then
- the audience preset.
+ per-installation state, which only its owner can approve through. The
+ ceiling comes from the explicit team row, then the audience preset.
3. `needs_approval` — freshly discovered tools are opt-in when neither side
has made a choice.
@@ -232,6 +232,17 @@ class _PolicyInputs:
_STRICTNESS = {"do_not_use": 2, "needs_approval": 1, "approved": 0}
+def legacy_state_for_caller(state: str, *, caller_owns_installation: bool) -> str:
+ """Read an installation's legacy per-tool state for one caller.
+
+ Only the owner writes that column, so on a shared installation a teammate
+ keeps the owner's restrictions but not the owner's approvals.
+ """
+ if state == "approved" and not caller_owns_installation:
+ return "needs_approval"
+ return state
+
+
def is_policy_state_allowed(state: str, ceiling: str | None) -> bool:
"""Whether ``state`` is at least as restrictive as ``ceiling``."""
if ceiling is None:
@@ -252,6 +263,7 @@ class PolicyContext:
gateway_server_id: UUID | None = None,
installation: MCPServerInstallation | None = None,
legacy_rows: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+ installation_owner_id: int | None = None,
_preloaded: _PolicyInputs | None = None,
) -> None:
if gateway_server is not None:
@@ -324,8 +336,14 @@ class PolicyContext:
if legacy_rows is None and installation is not None and caller.kind == "member":
for row in installation.tools.filter(removed_at__isnull=True).values("tool_name", "approval_state"):
raw_legacy[row["tool_name"]] = row["approval_state"]
+ owner_id = installation.user_id if installation is not None else installation_owner_id
+ caller_owns_installation = caller.user_id is not None and owner_id == caller.user_id
+ caller_legacy = {
+ tool_name: legacy_state_for_caller(state, caller_owns_installation=caller_owns_installation)
+ for tool_name, state in raw_legacy.items()
+ }
self._legacy_rows = {
- tool_name: state for tool_name, state in raw_legacy.items() if state != SYNC_DEFAULT_APPROVAL_STATE
+ tool_name: state for tool_name, state in caller_legacy.items() if state != SYNC_DEFAULT_APPROVAL_STATE
}
@classmethod
diff --git a/products/mcp_store/backend/presentation/gateway_views.py b/products/mcp_store/backend/presentation/gateway_views.py
index 2b4bcdf6c0c8..eaff9e4ddb79 100644
--- a/products/mcp_store/backend/presentation/gateway_views.py
+++ b/products/mcp_store/backend/presentation/gateway_views.py
@@ -1063,19 +1063,48 @@ class MCPGatewayServerViewSet(
return "agent", None, account
return "team", None, None
- def _require_scope_permission(self, scope_type: str, scope_user: User | None, write: bool = False) -> None:
+ def _require_scope_permission(
+ self,
+ server: MCPGatewayServer,
+ scope_type: str,
+ scope_user: User | None,
+ scope_account: MCPServiceAccount | None,
+ write: bool = False,
+ ) -> None:
"""Members may view team defaults and manage their own member scope;
- agent scopes follow the team's agent-access setting."""
+ agent scopes follow the team's agent-access setting. Agent policy covers
+ every member's share of the server, so a member may change it only
+ while holding a live share of their own."""
if self._is_project_admin():
return
if scope_type == "member" and scope_user is not None and scope_user.id == self.request.user.id:
return
if scope_type == "agent" and self._can_manage_agent_access():
- return
+ if not write or self._holds_live_agent_share(server, scope_account):
+ return
+ raise PermissionDenied(
+ "Share your connection to this server with the agent before changing its tool access."
+ )
if scope_type == "team" and not write:
return
raise PermissionDenied("Only project admins can manage this scope.")
+ def _holds_live_agent_share(self, server: MCPGatewayServer, account: MCPServiceAccount | None) -> bool:
+ """The share must still carry the member's own credential. Revoked members
+ never get here, because `safely_get_queryset` hides the server from them."""
+ user_id = cast(User, self.request.user).id
+ return (
+ MCPServiceAccountServerAccess.objects.for_team(self.team_id)
+ .filter(
+ service_account=account,
+ gateway_server=server,
+ user_id=user_id,
+ installation__isnull=False,
+ installation__user_id=user_id,
+ )
+ .exists()
+ )
+
def _member_installation(self, server: MCPGatewayServer, scope_user: User) -> MCPServerInstallation | None:
"""The credential this member calls the server through.
@@ -1203,7 +1232,7 @@ class MCPGatewayServerViewSet(
"""Tool catalog with the resolved policy for a scope."""
server = self.get_object()
scope_type, scope_user, scope_account = self._resolve_scope(request.validated_query_data)
- self._require_scope_permission(scope_type, scope_user)
+ self._require_scope_permission(server, scope_type, scope_user, scope_account)
rows = self._resolve_policies_for_scope(server, scope_type, scope_user, scope_account)
return Response({"count": len(rows), "next": None, "previous": None, "results": rows})
@@ -1217,7 +1246,7 @@ class MCPGatewayServerViewSet(
server = self.get_object()
data = request.validated_data
scope_type, scope_user, scope_account = self._resolve_scope(data)
- self._require_scope_permission(scope_type, scope_user, write=True)
+ self._require_scope_permission(server, scope_type, scope_user, scope_account, write=True)
if scope_type != "team":
if scope_type == "agent" and scope_account is not None:
diff --git a/products/mcp_store/backend/presentation/views.py b/products/mcp_store/backend/presentation/views.py
index 344d69f84c52..ee0fccbddc9d 100644
--- a/products/mcp_store/backend/presentation/views.py
+++ b/products/mcp_store/backend/presentation/views.py
@@ -1334,7 +1334,9 @@ class MCPServerInstallationViewSet(TeamAndOrgViewSetMixin, viewsets.ModelViewSet
if gateway_server is not None
else None
)
- decision, block_reason = resolve_call_decision(tool, policy_context)
+ decision, block_reason = resolve_call_decision(
+ tool, policy_context, caller_owns_installation=installation.user_id == request.user.id
+ )
if gateway_server is not None:
record_tool_call_audit(
diff --git a/products/mcp_store/backend/proxy.py b/products/mcp_store/backend/proxy.py
index d3db7a825a17..3833bbcb8e09 100644
--- a/products/mcp_store/backend/proxy.py
+++ b/products/mcp_store/backend/proxy.py
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ from ee.hogai.utils.asgi import SyncIterableToAsync
from .models import MCPAuditEvent, MCPGatewayServer, MCPServerInstallation, MCPServerInstallationTool
from .oauth import TokenRefreshError, TokenRefreshRejectedError, is_token_expiring, refresh_installation_token
from .oauth_credentials import oauth_credentials_source_is_allowed
-from .policy import GatewayCaller, PolicyContext
+from .policy import GatewayCaller, PolicyContext, legacy_state_for_caller
from .url_policy import resolve_mcp_url_policy, trust_environment_proxy
logger = structlog.get_logger(__name__)
@@ -254,6 +254,8 @@ def _gateway_decision(policy_context: PolicyContext, tool: MCPServerInstallation
def resolve_call_decision(
tool: MCPServerInstallationTool,
policy_context: PolicyContext | None,
+ *,
+ caller_owns_installation: bool,
) -> tuple[str, str | None]:
"""Decide one tool call outside the JSON-RPC proxy path.
@@ -273,9 +275,10 @@ def resolve_call_decision(
return decision, "needs_approval" if decision == "pending" else "disabled"
# Pre-gateway installations fall back to the cached per-tool approval flag.
- if tool.approval_state == "approved":
+ state = legacy_state_for_caller(tool.approval_state, caller_owns_installation=caller_owns_installation)
+ if state == "approved":
return "approved", None
- if tool.approval_state == "needs_approval":
+ if state == "needs_approval":
return "pending", "needs_approval"
return "blocked", "disabled"
@@ -295,8 +298,10 @@ def record_tool_call_audit(
def _evaluate_tool_call(
tools_by_name: dict[str, MCPServerInstallationTool],
item: dict[str, Any],
- policy_context: PolicyContext | None = None,
- audit_entries: list[tuple[str, str]] | None = None,
+ policy_context: PolicyContext | None,
+ audit_entries: list[tuple[str, str]] | None,
+ *,
+ caller_owns_installation: bool,
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Check a single JSON-RPC item against the installation's tool approval state.
@@ -349,15 +354,16 @@ def _evaluate_tool_call(
f"Tool '{tool_name}' is blocked by team policy",
)
- if tool.approval_state == "approved":
+ state = legacy_state_for_caller(tool.approval_state, caller_owns_installation=caller_owns_installation)
+ if state == "approved":
return None
- if tool.approval_state == "needs_approval":
+ if state == "needs_approval":
return _jsonrpc_error(
request_id,
TOOL_NEEDS_APPROVAL_CODE,
f"Tool '{tool_name}' requires approval before it can be called",
)
- if tool.approval_state == "do_not_use":
+ if state == "do_not_use":
return _jsonrpc_error(
request_id,
TOOL_DISABLED_CODE,
@@ -422,6 +428,8 @@ def enforce_tool_approval(
data: dict[str, Any] | list[Any],
policy_context: PolicyContext | None = None,
audit_entries: list[tuple[str, str]] | None = None,
+ *,
+ caller_user_id: int | None,
) -> HttpResponse | None:
"""Inspect a JSON-RPC body and short-circuit tools/call that isn't approved.
@@ -430,6 +438,7 @@ def enforce_tool_approval(
passed through; unknown tool names return a JSON-RPC method-not-found error
without hitting the upstream server.
"""
+ caller_owns_installation = caller_user_id is not None and caller_user_id == installation.user_id
if isinstance(data, list):
if not any(_is_tools_call(item) for item in data):
return None
@@ -439,7 +448,9 @@ def enforce_tool_approval(
any_blocked = False
any_passthrough = False
for item in data:
- blocked = _evaluate_tool_call(tools_by_name, item, policy_context, audit_entries)
+ blocked = _evaluate_tool_call(
+ tools_by_name, item, policy_context, audit_entries, caller_owns_installation=caller_owns_installation
+ )
if blocked is not None:
responses.append(blocked)
any_blocked = True
@@ -476,7 +487,9 @@ def enforce_tool_approval(
if not _is_tools_call(data):
return None
tools_by_name = _tools_by_name(installation, _requested_tool_names(data))
- blocked = _evaluate_tool_call(tools_by_name, data, policy_context, audit_entries)
+ blocked = _evaluate_tool_call(
+ tools_by_name, data, policy_context, audit_entries, caller_owns_installation=caller_owns_installation
+ )
if blocked is None:
return None
return HttpResponse(json.dumps(blocked), content_type="application/json", status=200)
@@ -561,7 +574,13 @@ def proxy_mcp_request(
installation=installation,
)
- enforcement_response = enforce_tool_approval(installation, data, policy_context, audit_entries)
+ enforcement_response = enforce_tool_approval(
+ installation,
+ data,
+ policy_context,
+ audit_entries,
+ caller_user_id=caller.user_id if caller is not None and caller.kind == "member" else None,
+ )
if gateway_server is not None and caller is not None and audit_entries:
_write_audit_events(
installation,
diff --git a/products/mcp_store/backend/test/test_api.py b/products/mcp_store/backend/test/test_api.py
index 41cf97d027dc..999935accd74 100644
--- a/products/mcp_store/backend/test/test_api.py
+++ b/products/mcp_store/backend/test/test_api.py
@@ -1598,6 +1598,73 @@ class TestMCPServiceAccountAPI(APIBaseTest):
is expected_access
)
+ @parameterized.expand(
+ [
+ ("member_with_only_a_teammate_share", "member", "teammate", status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN),
+ ("member_whose_access_is_revoked", "member", "revoked", status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND),
+ ("member_whose_connection_is_deleted", "member", "deleted_connection", status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN),
+ ("admin_without_a_share", "admin", "teammate", status.HTTP_200_OK),
+ ]
+ )
+ def test_agent_tool_policy_write_needs_a_live_share_of_your_own(
+ self, _name: str, role: str, share: str, expected_status: int
+ ) -> None:
+ if role == "admin":
+ self._make_admin()
+ else:
+ self._make_member()
+ account = sync_built_in_agents(self.team)[0]
+ server = MCPGatewayServer.objects.for_team(self.team.id).create(
+ team=self.team,
+ name="Agent share",
+ url="https://mcp.agent-share.example.com/mcp",
+ )
+ sharer = User.objects.create_and_join(self.organization, "[email protected]", None)
+ installation = MCPServerInstallation.objects.create(
+ team=self.team,
+ user=sharer if share == "teammate" else self.user,
+ display_name=server.name,
+ url=server.url,
+ auth_type="api_key",
+ sensitive_configuration={"api_key": "secret"},
+ scope="personal",
+ gateway_server=server,
+ )
+ MCPServerInstallationTool.objects.create(
+ installation=installation,
+ tool_name="create_issue",
+ last_seen_at=timezone.now(),
+ )
+ share_owner = sharer if share == "teammate" else self.user
+ MCPServiceAccountServerAccess.objects.for_team(self.team.id).create(
+ team=self.team,
+ user=share_owner,
+ service_account=account,
+ gateway_server=server,
+ installation=None if share == "deleted_connection" else installation,
+ granted_by=share_owner,
+ scope="team",
+ )
+ if share == "revoked":
+ MCPMemberServerRevocation.objects.for_team(self.team.id).create(
+ team=self.team, gateway_server=server, user=self.user, revoked_by=sharer
+ )
+
+ response = self.client.post(
+ f"/api/projects/{self.team.id}/mcp_gateway/servers/{server.id}/policies/",
+ data={
+ "scope_type": "agent",
+ "scope_service_account_id": str(account.id),
+ "policies": [{"tool_name": "create_issue", "policy_state": "approved"}],
+ },
+ format="json",
+ )
+
+ assert response.status_code == expected_status
+ assert MCPToolPolicy.objects.for_team(self.team.id).filter(scope_type="agent").exists() is (
+ expected_status == status.HTTP_200_OK
+ )
+
def test_restricted_member_cannot_change_existing_agent_access_but_admin_can(self) -> None:
self._make_member()
account = sync_built_in_agents(self.team)[0]
diff --git a/products/mcp_store/backend/test/test_facade.py b/products/mcp_store/backend/test/test_facade.py
index b43c1d50c484..e022a5810c67 100644
--- a/products/mcp_store/backend/test/test_facade.py
+++ b/products/mcp_store/backend/test/test_facade.py
@@ -985,7 +985,10 @@ class TestCallMemberServerTool(BaseTest):
self._installation(user=other_user, url="https://mcp.example.com.evil.test/mcp")
self._tool(shared)
- assert self._call().status == "ok"
+ # The owner's approval does not carry over, so the teammate approves the call first.
+ pending = self._call()
+ assert pending.status == "needs_approval"
+ assert self._call(approval_token=pending.approval_token).status == "ok"
assert mock_call.call_args.args[0].id == shared.id
@patch("products.mcp_store.backend.facade.api.call_upstream_tool")
diff --git a/products/mcp_store/backend/test/test_gateway_tools.py b/products/mcp_store/backend/test/test_gateway_tools.py
index 7f61a0bb65f7..38d96a15c623 100644
--- a/products/mcp_store/backend/test/test_gateway_tools.py
+++ b/products/mcp_store/backend/test/test_gateway_tools.py
@@ -2,15 +2,19 @@ from posthog.test.base import APIBaseTest
from django.utils import timezone
+from parameterized import parameterized
from rest_framework import status
+from posthog.models import User
+
+from products.mcp_store.backend.facade.api import resolve_member_tool_states
from products.mcp_store.backend.models import (
MCPGatewayServer,
MCPServerInstallation,
MCPServerInstallationTool,
MCPToolPolicy,
)
-from products.mcp_store.backend.policy import SYNC_DEFAULT_APPROVAL_STATE
+from products.mcp_store.backend.policy import SYNC_DEFAULT_APPROVAL_STATE, GatewayCaller, PolicyContext
class TestMCPGatewayToolPoliciesAPI(APIBaseTest):
@@ -150,3 +154,43 @@ class TestMCPGatewayToolPoliciesAPI(APIBaseTest):
row = self._member_row(server)
assert row["policy_state"] == "approved"
assert row["decided_by"] == "scope"
+
+ @parameterized.expand(
+ [
+ (f"{entry_point}_{caller}_{legacy_state}", entry_point, caller == "owner", legacy_state, expected)
+ for entry_point in ("policy_context", "facade", "facade_unlinked")
+ for caller, legacy_state, expected in (
+ ("owner", "approved", "approved"),
+ ("teammate", "approved", "needs_approval"),
+ ("teammate", "do_not_use", "do_not_use"),
+ )
+ ]
+ )
+ def test_shared_installation_teammates_keep_owner_restrictions_but_not_approvals(
+ self, _name: str, entry_point: str, caller_is_owner: bool, legacy_state: str, expected: str
+ ) -> None:
+ server, installation = self._server_with_tool("shared", legacy_state=legacy_state)
+ installation.scope = "shared"
+ installation.save(update_fields=["scope"])
+ caller = (
+ self.user if caller_is_owner else User.objects.create_and_join(self.organization, "[email protected]", None)
+ )
+
+ if entry_point == "policy_context":
+ state = (
+ PolicyContext(
+ team_id=self.team.id,
+ caller=GatewayCaller(kind="member", user_id=caller.id),
+ gateway_server=server,
+ installation=installation,
+ )
+ .resolve("search_items")
+ .state
+ )
+ else:
+ gateway_server_id = server.id if entry_point == "facade" else None
+ state = resolve_member_tool_states(str(installation.id), self.team.id, gateway_server_id, caller.id)[
+ "search_items"
+ ]
+
+ assert state == expected
diff --git a/products/mcp_store/backend/test/test_proxy.py b/products/mcp_store/backend/test/test_proxy.py
index dd66265badbb..c7756a13229d 100644
--- a/products/mcp_store/backend/test/test_proxy.py
+++ b/products/mcp_store/backend/test/test_proxy.py
@@ -698,6 +698,29 @@ class TestMCPProxyToolApproval(ClickhouseTestMixin, APIBaseTest, QueryMatchingTe
assert response.status_code == 200
mock_client.send.assert_called_once()
+ @patch("products.mcp_store.backend.proxy.pinned_client")
+ def test_owner_approval_on_shared_installation_still_prompts_a_teammate(self, mock_client_cls):
+ owner = User.objects.create_and_join(self.organization, "[email protected]", None)
+ installation = MCPServerInstallation.objects.create(
+ team=self.team,
+ user=owner,
+ display_name="Shared tools",
+ url="https://mcp.example.com/mcp",
+ auth_type="api_key",
+ sensitive_configuration={"api_key": "sk"},
+ scope="shared",
+ )
+ self._tool(installation, "search", "approved")
+
+ response = self.client.post(
+ self._proxy_url(installation.id),
+ data={"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 7, "method": "tools/call", "params": {"name": "search"}},
+ format="json",
+ )
+
+ assert response.json()["error"]["code"] == -32001
+ mock_client_cls.assert_not_called()
+
@patch("products.mcp_store.backend.proxy.pinned_client")
def test_needs_approval_tool_call_blocked_with_jsonrpc_error(self, mock_client_cls):
installation = self._installation()
diff --git a/products/mcp_store/frontend/gateway/GatewayServerScene.tsx b/products/mcp_store/frontend/gateway/GatewayServerScene.tsx
index 20b7e249ce00..383dced7d94c 100644
--- a/products/mcp_store/frontend/gateway/GatewayServerScene.tsx
+++ b/products/mcp_store/frontend/gateway/GatewayServerScene.tsx
@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ export function GatewayServerScene({
function ToolPoliciesSection(): JSX.Element {
const {
availableScopes,
+ canEditScope,
displayedToolPolicies,
filteredToolPolicies,
isAdmin,
@@ -296,8 +297,6 @@ function ToolPoliciesSection(): JSX.Element {
} = useValues(gatewayServerLogic)
const { setScope, setAllTools, setToolSearch, toggleToolsExpanded } = useActions(gatewayServerLogic)
const { refreshServerTools } = useActions(mcpGatewayLogic)
- const canEditScope =
- isAdmin || scope.scopeType === 'member' || (scope.scopeType === 'agent' && canManageAgentAccess)
const agentScope = scope.scopeType === 'agent'
const bulkOptions = agentScope
? POLICY_OPTIONS.filter((option) => option.value !== 'needs_approval')
@@ -435,15 +434,13 @@ function ToolPoliciesSection(): JSX.Element {
}
function ToolPolicyRow({ policy }: { policy: ResolvedToolPolicyApi }): JSX.Element {
- const { server, scope, isAdmin, canManageAgentAccess, toolPoliciesLoading } = useValues(gatewayServerLogic)
+ const { server, scope, canEditScope, toolPoliciesLoading } = useValues(gatewayServerLogic)
const { setToolPolicy } = useActions(gatewayServerLogic)
const fqName = `${server?.name ?? ''}.${policy.tool_name}`
const ruleLocked = policy.decided_by === 'rule'
const setByTeamAdmin =
scope.scopeType !== 'team' && (policy.decided_by === 'team' || policy.decided_by === 'preset')
- const canEditScope =
- isAdmin || scope.scopeType === 'member' || (scope.scopeType === 'agent' && canManageAgentAccess)
const agentScope = scope.scopeType === 'agent'
const displayedState: MCPToolApprovalStateEnumApi =
agentScope && policy.policy_state === 'needs_approval' ? 'do_not_use' : policy.policy_state
diff --git a/products/mcp_store/frontend/gateway/gatewayServerLogic.test.ts b/products/mcp_store/frontend/gateway/gatewayServerLogic.test.ts
index 53a5cd76c22b..f837d919671c 100644
--- a/products/mcp_store/frontend/gateway/gatewayServerLogic.test.ts
+++ b/products/mcp_store/frontend/gateway/gatewayServerLogic.test.ts
@@ -277,6 +277,25 @@ describe('gatewayServerLogic', () => {
})
})
+ it.each([
+ ['a member with their own share', false, YOU, true, true],
+ ['a member whose connection behind their share is deleted', false, YOU, false, false],
+ ['a member with only a teammate share', false, TEAMMATE, true, false],
+ ['an admin without a share', true, TEAMMATE, true, true],
+ ])('lets %s edit an agent scope', (_label, isAdmin, sharer, connected, expected) => {
+ parentLogic.actions.loadConfigSuccess({
+ is_admin: isAdmin,
+ registered_template_ids: [],
+ allow_custom_servers: true,
+ allow_member_agent_access: true,
+ })
+ parentLogic.actions.loadServersSuccess([gatewayServer(connected ? {} : { your_connection: null })])
+ parentLogic.actions.loadServiceAccountsSuccess([serviceAccount('scout-id', [{ user: sharer, scope: 'team' }])])
+ logic.actions.setScope({ scopeType: 'agent', scopeServiceAccountId: 'scout-id', label: 'Agent scout-id' })
+
+ expect(logic.values.canEditScope).toBe(expected)
+ })
+
it('uses the policy mutation response while keeping the loader in flight', async () => {
const pendingResponse = deferred<Awaited<ReturnType<typeof mcpGatewayServersPoliciesCreate>>>()
const updatedPolicy = toolPolicy('create_issue', { policy_state: 'needs_approval' })
diff --git a/products/mcp_store/frontend/gateway/gatewayServerLogic.ts b/products/mcp_store/frontend/gateway/gatewayServerLogic.ts
index e232127ae98b..35337205ab29 100644
--- a/products/mcp_store/frontend/gateway/gatewayServerLogic.ts
+++ b/products/mcp_store/frontend/gateway/gatewayServerLogic.ts
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ export interface gatewayServerLogicValues {
availableAgentAccounts: MCPServiceAccountApi[]
availableScopes: PolicyScope[]
breadcrumbs: Breadcrumb[]
+ canEditScope: boolean
displayedToolPolicies: ResolvedToolPolicyApi[]
filteredToolPolicies: ResolvedToolPolicyApi[]
policyCounts: Record<MCPToolApprovalStateEnumApi, number>
@@ -402,6 +403,13 @@ export interface gatewayServerLogicMeta {
serviceAccounts: MCPServiceAccountApi[],
agentSharesByAccountId: Record<string, AgentServerShare>
) => MCPServiceAccountApi[]
+ canEditScope: (
+ server: MCPGatewayServerApi | null,
+ isAdmin: boolean,
+ scope: PolicyScope,
+ canManageAgentAccess: boolean,
+ agentSharesByAccountId: Record<string, AgentServerShare>
+ ) => boolean
agentShareDisabledReason: (server: MCPGatewayServerApi | null) => string | undefined
refreshInstallationId: (server: MCPGatewayServerApi | null) => string | null
filteredToolPolicies: (toolPolicies: ResolvedToolPolicyApi[], toolSearch: string) => ResolvedToolPolicyApi[]
@@ -719,6 +727,24 @@ export const gatewayServerLogic = kea<gatewayServerLogicType>([
// stays available for the viewer to share their own connection.
serviceAccounts.filter((account) => !agentSharesByAccountId[account.id]?.sharedByYou),
],
+ canEditScope: [
+ (s) => [s.server, s.isAdmin, s.scope, s.canManageAgentAccess, s.agentSharesByAccountId],
+ (
+ server: MCPGatewayServerApi | null,
+ isAdmin: boolean,
+ scope: PolicyScope,
+ canManageAgentAccess: boolean,
+ agentSharesByAccountId: Record<string, AgentServerShare>
+ ): boolean =>
+ isAdmin ||
+ scope.scopeType === 'member' ||
+ // An agent's tool policy covers every member's share, so members tune it only alongside
+ // their own share and the connection behind it.
+ (scope.scopeType === 'agent' &&
+ canManageAgentAccess &&
+ !!server?.your_connection &&
+ !!agentSharesByAccountId[scope.scopeServiceAccountId ?? '']?.sharedByYou),
+ ],
agentShareDisabledReason: [
(s) => [s.server],
(server: MCPGatewayServerApi | null): string | undefined =>
diff --git a/products/posthog_ai/scripts/build_skills/frontmatter.py b/products/posthog_ai/scripts/build_skills/frontmatter.py
index cdec2cfa2035..0cb4bef2866f 100644
--- a/products/posthog_ai/scripts/build_skills/frontmatter.py
+++ b/products/posthog_ai/scripts/build_skills/frontmatter.py
@@ -11,9 +11,12 @@ _FRONTMATTER_RE = re.compile(r"^---\s*\n(.*?)\n---\s*\n", re.DOTALL)
_MAX_SKILL_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH = 1024
+# A skill name becomes a directory under dist/skills and .agents/skills, so it must stay one path segment.
+SKILL_NAME_PATTERN = r"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$"
+
class SkillFrontmatter(BaseModel):
- name: str
+ name: str = Field(pattern=SKILL_NAME_PATTERN)
description: str = Field(max_length=_MAX_SKILL_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH)
diff --git a/products/posthog_ai/scripts/build_skills/skill_builder.py b/products/posthog_ai/scripts/build_skills/skill_builder.py
index dc82069f40a3..48bca6da0042 100644
--- a/products/posthog_ai/scripts/build_skills/skill_builder.py
+++ b/products/posthog_ai/scripts/build_skills/skill_builder.py
@@ -225,8 +225,7 @@ class SkillBuilder:
match = next((s for s in skills if s.name == skill_name), None)
if match is not None and match.source_file.suffix != ".j2":
try:
- metadata, _ = frontmatter.parse_frontmatter(match.source_file.read_text())
- fm_name = metadata.get("name", skill_name)
+ fm_name = frontmatter.validate_frontmatter(match.source_file.read_text(), str(match.source_file)).name
if fm_name != skill_name and fm_name not in names_to_try:
names_to_try.append(fm_name)
except Exception:
diff --git a/products/posthog_ai/scripts/build_skills/skill_manifest.py b/products/posthog_ai/scripts/build_skills/skill_manifest.py
index df96e0c4364f..708d16cdef4a 100644
--- a/products/posthog_ai/scripts/build_skills/skill_manifest.py
+++ b/products/posthog_ai/scripts/build_skills/skill_manifest.py
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ from pathlib import Path
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, model_validator
+from . import frontmatter
+
MANIFEST_VERSION = "1.0.0"
@@ -22,7 +24,7 @@ class SkillFile(BaseModel):
class SkillResource(BaseModel):
- name: str
+ name: str = Field(pattern=frontmatter.SKILL_NAME_PATTERN)
description: str
files: list[SkillFile]
source: str
diff --git a/products/posthog_ai/scripts/test/test_build_skills.py b/products/posthog_ai/scripts/test/test_build_skills.py
index ec45071b4930..38e49db87b05 100644
--- a/products/posthog_ai/scripts/test/test_build_skills.py
+++ b/products/posthog_ai/scripts/test/test_build_skills.py
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ from products.posthog_ai.scripts.build_skills.discovery import SkillDiscoverer
from products.posthog_ai.scripts.build_skills.frontmatter import parse_frontmatter, validate_frontmatter
from products.posthog_ai.scripts.build_skills.rendering import SkillRenderer
from products.posthog_ai.scripts.build_skills.skill_builder import SkillBuilder
-from products.posthog_ai.scripts.build_skills.skill_manifest import DiscoveredSkill
+from products.posthog_ai.scripts.build_skills.skill_manifest import DiscoveredSkill, SkillResource
from products.posthog_ai.scripts.build_skills.tool_references import _check_tool_references
@@ -389,6 +389,17 @@ def test_build_manifest_rejects_duplicate_rendered_names(tmp_path: Path) -> None
builder.build_manifest(discoverer.discover(), SkillRenderer())
[email protected]("name", ["shadow/../trusted-skill", "../escape", "nested/skill", '""'])
+def test_frontmatter_rejects_names_that_are_not_one_path_segment(name: str) -> None:
+ with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+ validate_frontmatter(f"---\nname: {name}\ndescription: desc\n---\n# Body\n")
+
+
+def test_skill_resource_rejects_names_that_are_not_one_path_segment() -> None:
+ with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+ SkillResource(name="shadow/../trusted-skill", description="desc", files=[], source="products/alpha/skills/x")
+
+
def test_end_to_end_template_with_pydantic(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
diff --git a/services/mcp/src/cli/agents-md.ts b/services/mcp/src/cli/agents-md.ts
index 4f042fb953d2..f8eeb6c31c29 100644
--- a/services/mcp/src/cli/agents-md.ts
+++ b/services/mcp/src/cli/agents-md.ts
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import * as fs from 'node:fs/promises'
import * as path from 'node:path'
import agentsMdPrompt from './agents-md-snippet.md'
-import { errorCode } from './utils'
+import { assertResolvesInside, errorCode } from './utils'
const OPEN_TAG = '<posthog>'
const CLOSE_TAG = '</posthog>'
@@ -15,7 +15,11 @@ export const AGENTS_MD_SNIPPET = `${OPEN_TAG}\n${AGENTS_MD_PROMPT}\n${CLOSE_TAG}
const MANAGED_BLOCK_PATTERN = /<posthog>[\s\S]*?<\/posthog>/
export async function installAgentsMdSnippet(opts: { cwd?: string; filePath?: string } = {}): Promise<string> {
- const targetPath = path.resolve(opts.filePath ?? path.join(opts.cwd ?? process.cwd(), 'AGENTS.md'))
+ const cwd = opts.cwd ?? process.cwd()
+ const targetPath = path.resolve(opts.filePath ?? path.join(cwd, 'AGENTS.md'))
+ if (!opts.filePath) {
+ await assertResolvesInside(cwd, targetPath, '. Pass --path to choose the file to update.')
+ }
let existing = ''
try {
existing = await fs.readFile(targetPath, 'utf-8')
diff --git a/services/mcp/src/cli/skills.ts b/services/mcp/src/cli/skills.ts
index 61a383bda748..53b6214fc992 100644
--- a/services/mcp/src/cli/skills.ts
+++ b/services/mcp/src/cli/skills.ts
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import * as path from 'node:path'
import { fetchContextMillResources, filterValidEntries, loadManifestFromArchive } from '@/resources/internals'
import type { ContextMillResource } from '@/resources/manifest-types'
-import { errorCode } from './utils'
+import { assertResolvesInside, assertSafeDestination, errorCode } from './utils'
export interface SkillListItem {
id: string
@@ -46,14 +46,6 @@ function targetSkillDirectory(targetRoot: string, skillId: string): string {
return destinationRoot
}
-function assertSafeDestination(root: string, destination: string): void {
- const normalizedRoot = path.resolve(root)
- const normalizedDestination = path.resolve(destination)
- if (normalizedDestination !== normalizedRoot && !normalizedDestination.startsWith(normalizedRoot + path.sep)) {
- throw new Error(`Refusing to write outside ${normalizedRoot}: ${normalizedDestination}`)
- }
-}
-
function assertSafeSkillId(skillId: string): void {
if (!skillId || skillId.includes('..') || /[/\\]/.test(skillId)) {
throw new Error(`Invalid skill ID "${skillId}": must not contain path separators or traversal sequences.`)
@@ -80,6 +72,7 @@ export async function installSkill(
}
const destinationRoot = targetSkillDirectory(cwd, skillId)
+ await assertResolvesInside(cwd, destinationRoot)
try {
await fs.access(destinationRoot)
if (!opts.force) {
diff --git a/services/mcp/src/cli/utils.ts b/services/mcp/src/cli/utils.ts
index 7973969defdd..c861075de2c7 100644
--- a/services/mcp/src/cli/utils.ts
+++ b/services/mcp/src/cli/utils.ts
@@ -1,5 +1,58 @@
+import * as fs from 'node:fs/promises'
+import * as path from 'node:path'
+
export function errorCode(error: unknown): unknown {
return typeof error === 'object' && error !== null && 'code' in error
? (error as { code?: unknown }).code
: undefined
}
+
+// Matches Linux's MAXSYMLINKS, so a link cycle fails instead of looping.
+const MAX_SYMLINK_HOPS = 40
+
+export function assertSafeDestination(root: string, destination: string, hint = ''): void {
+ const normalizedRoot = path.resolve(root)
+ const normalizedDestination = path.resolve(destination)
+ if (normalizedDestination !== normalizedRoot && !normalizedDestination.startsWith(normalizedRoot + path.sep)) {
+ throw new Error(`Refusing to write outside ${normalizedRoot}: ${normalizedDestination}${hint}`)
+ }
+}
+
+/** Throws unless `target` stays inside `root` once symlinks are resolved, so a
+ * link committed into a checkout cannot redirect a write elsewhere. */
+export async function assertResolvesInside(root: string, target: string, hint = ''): Promise<void> {
+ const realRoot = await fs.realpath(root)
+ const missing: string[] = []
+ let existing = path.resolve(target)
+ let realExisting: string
+ let hops = 0
+ for (;;) {
+ try {
+ realExisting = await fs.realpath(existing)
+ break
+ } catch (error) {
+ if (errorCode(error) !== 'ENOENT') {
+ throw error
+ }
+ }
+ // realpath fails on a dangling link too, but writing through it creates its target.
+ const isLink = await fs.lstat(existing).then(
+ (stats) => stats.isSymbolicLink(),
+ () => false
+ )
+ if (isLink) {
+ hops += 1
+ if (hops > MAX_SYMLINK_HOPS) {
+ throw new Error(`Refusing to follow too many symlinks at ${existing}${hint}`)
+ }
+ // Splice the raw target on without normalizing it, so the OS resolves any `..` after
+ // the links it passes through, with its own separators.
+ const linkTarget = await fs.readlink(existing)
+ existing = path.isAbsolute(linkTarget) ? linkTarget : `${path.dirname(existing)}${path.sep}${linkTarget}`
+ continue
+ }
+ missing.unshift(path.basename(existing))
+ existing = path.dirname(existing)
+ }
+ assertSafeDestination(realRoot, path.join(realExisting, ...missing), hint)
+}
diff --git a/services/mcp/tests/unit/cli-agents-md.test.ts b/services/mcp/tests/unit/cli-agents-md.test.ts
index b434ab173da4..fb74cd5a1594 100644
--- a/services/mcp/tests/unit/cli-agents-md.test.ts
+++ b/services/mcp/tests/unit/cli-agents-md.test.ts
@@ -40,4 +40,53 @@ describe('CLI AGENTS.md installer', () => {
expect(content.indexOf('# Project')).toBeLessThan(content.indexOf('<posthog>'))
expect(content.indexOf('</posthog>')).toBeLessThan(content.indexOf('Trailing instructions.'))
})
+
+ it.each([
+ ['an existing file', true],
+ ['a missing file', false],
+ ])('refuses to follow an AGENTS.md symlink to %s outside the working directory', async (_label, exists) => {
+ const dir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'posthog-agents-md-'))
+ const outside = path.join(await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'posthog-agents-md-outside-')), 'target.md')
+ if (exists) {
+ await fs.writeFile(outside, 'Outside content.\n')
+ }
+ await fs.symlink(outside, path.join(dir, 'AGENTS.md'))
+
+ await expect(installAgentsMdSnippet({ cwd: dir })).rejects.toThrow('Refusing to write outside')
+ const outsideAfter = await fs.readFile(outside, 'utf-8').catch(() => null)
+ expect(outsideAfter).toBe(exists ? 'Outside content.\n' : null)
+ })
+
+ it('follows a link inside the target before applying a later ..', async () => {
+ const base = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'posthog-agents-md-'))
+ const dir = path.join(base, 'checkout')
+ await fs.mkdir(path.join(base, 'outside', 'subdir'), { recursive: true })
+ await fs.mkdir(dir)
+ await fs.symlink('../outside/subdir', path.join(dir, 'redirect'))
+ await fs.symlink('redirect/../target.md', path.join(dir, 'AGENTS.md'))
+
+ await expect(installAgentsMdSnippet({ cwd: dir })).rejects.toThrow('Refusing to write outside')
+ await expect(fs.access(path.join(base, 'outside', 'target.md'))).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' })
+ })
+
+ it.runIf(path.sep === '/')('treats a backslash in a link target as part of a file name', async () => {
+ const base = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'posthog-agents-md-'))
+ const dir = path.join(base, 'checkout')
+ await fs.mkdir(path.join(base, 'outside'), { recursive: true })
+ await fs.mkdir(dir)
+ await fs.symlink('../outside', path.join(dir, 'safe\\dir'))
+ await fs.symlink('safe\\dir/target.md', path.join(dir, 'AGENTS.md'))
+
+ await expect(installAgentsMdSnippet({ cwd: dir })).rejects.toThrow('Refusing to write outside')
+ await expect(fs.access(path.join(base, 'outside', 'target.md'))).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' })
+ })
+
+ it('writes through an AGENTS.md symlink to a missing file inside the working directory', async () => {
+ const dir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'posthog-agents-md-'))
+ await fs.symlink('CLAUDE.md', path.join(dir, 'AGENTS.md'))
+
+ await installAgentsMdSnippet({ cwd: dir })
+
+ await expect(fs.readFile(path.join(dir, 'CLAUDE.md'), 'utf-8')).resolves.toContain('<posthog>')
+ })
})
diff --git a/services/mcp/tests/unit/cli-skills.test.ts b/services/mcp/tests/unit/cli-skills.test.ts
index 381484bc1b4c..82268be054ec 100644
--- a/services/mcp/tests/unit/cli-skills.test.ts
+++ b/services/mcp/tests/unit/cli-skills.test.ts
@@ -65,4 +65,14 @@ describe('CLI skill installer', () => {
await expect(installSkill('../../../outside', { cwd: dir, force: true })).rejects.toThrow('Invalid skill ID')
await expect(fs.access(path.join(dir, 'outside'))).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' })
})
+
+ it('refuses to follow a symlinked .agents directory out of the working directory', async () => {
+ const dir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'posthog-cli-skills-'))
+ const outside = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'posthog-cli-outside-'))
+ await fs.symlink(outside, path.join(dir, '.agents'))
+ mockSkillArchive([skillEntry('test-skill')])
+
+ await expect(installSkill('test-skill', { cwd: dir })).rejects.toThrow('Refusing to write outside')
+ await expect(fs.readdir(outside)).resolves.toEqual([])
+ })
})