Multiplayer agent harness for work.
fix: harden tiered app serving per adversarial review
Josh France457f7e2777ae
diff --git a/cli/src/backends/aws.ts b/cli/src/backends/aws.tsindex 2f1e9f717..89bc69e60 100644--- a/cli/src/backends/aws.ts+++ b/cli/src/backends/aws.ts@@ -2592,8 +2592,9 @@ function awsCoreHostnames(config: QmConfig): string[] {const apiHost = normalize(hostname, "apiUrl");if (apiHost !== new URL(config.publicUrl).hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "")) hosts.push(apiHost);}- const apps = config.env.core?.AWS_DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN?.trim();- if (apps) hosts.push(`*.${normalize(apps, "env.core.AWS_DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN")}`);+ const apps = config.env.core?.DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN?.trim() || config.env.core?.AWS_DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN?.trim();+ if (apps)+ hosts.push(`*.${normalize(apps, "the apps domain (env.core.DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN or AWS_DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN)")}`);return [...new Set(hosts)];}diff --git a/cli/test/aws.test.ts b/cli/test/aws.test.tsindex c9086f2cd..8fb0dde59 100644--- a/cli/test/aws.test.ts+++ b/cli/test/aws.test.ts@@ -997,7 +997,7 @@ test("AWS portal ALB adopts pinned target groups and requires exactly the env-deawait run(hostSplitConfig({ appsDomain: "*.apps.agent.acme.example" }),undefined,- /env\.core\.AWS_DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN .* does not derive a valid ALB host-header hostname/,+ /env\.core\.DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN or AWS_DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN.* does not derive a valid ALB host-header hostname/,);await run(hostSplitConfig(bothHosts),diff --git a/docs/porter.md b/docs/porter.mdindex 2073d7303..fb95bec40 100644--- a/docs/porter.md+++ b/docs/porter.md@@ -106,8 +106,11 @@ domain you control (e.g. `apps.example.com`, with `*.apps.example.com` pointed ainstance) upgrades every app to its own origin — `https://<app>.apps.example.com/` — withportal single sign-on, the request-access flow, and live editing; the portal derives itscookie and returnTo settings from it, and boot probes the wildcard record and prints the-exact DNS record to add when it is missing. The per-provider variables below remain as-explicit overrides.+exact DNS record to add when it is missing. Point the wildcard at the ingress that fronts+core, never at Porter's sandbox ingress — the gate runs in core, so DNS that skips core+skips the gate. `PORTER_DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN` is the separate, ungated mechanism: it+registers each app's domain on Porter's own sandbox ingress and is deliberately NOT+defaulted from `DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN`.Published apps get their address from the cluster, not from qm. Declare the sandbox loadbalancer with a root domain at cluster creation and **Porter names every published app@@ -227,6 +230,10 @@ This is worth stating plainly because the failure it replaces was so confusing:whose sandbox load balancer was attached _after_ creation, or whose root domain was neverdelegated, has no usable zone for the DNS-01 challenge, so the certificate never issues andthe ingress serves nginx's self-signed _Kubernetes Ingress Controller Fake Certificate_.+The remediation (confirmed with Porter support) is manual: create the dedicated hosted zone+for the root domain yourself, add its `NS` delegation to the parent zone, move the wildcard+record into it, then reconcile the cluster (the dashboard's infra **Update**, or re-POST the+contract) so Porter actually creates the certificate issuer against the new zone.Every client then fails certificate verification against an app that is otherwise servingcorrectly — including the agent's own probe of the app it just published, which is why itreports a gateway error it cannot explain. `kubectl get certificate -n porter-sandbox` tellsdiff --git a/plugins/portal/src/index.ts b/plugins/portal/src/index.tsindex e7f9e19f7..9d02ae5d7 100644--- a/plugins/portal/src/index.ts+++ b/plugins/portal/src/index.ts@@ -303,13 +303,37 @@ function hostOf(raw: string): string {}}+function isMultiPartPublicSuffix(domain: string): boolean {+ return [+ "co.uk",+ "org.uk",+ "gov.uk",+ "ac.uk",+ "com.au",+ "net.au",+ "org.au",+ "co.nz",+ "co.jp",+ "or.jp",+ "ne.jp",+ "com.br",+ "com.mx",+ "co.in",+ "co.za",+ "com.sg",+ "com.hk",+ "com.tw",+ ].includes(domain);+}+export function commonParentDomain(a: string, b: string): string | undefined {const as = a.toLowerCase().split(".").filter(Boolean);const bs = b.toLowerCase().split(".").filter(Boolean);let n = 0;while (n < as.length && n < bs.length && as[as.length - 1 - n] === bs[bs.length - 1 - n]) n++;if (n < 2) return undefined;- return as.slice(as.length - n).join(".");+ const parent = as.slice(as.length - n).join(".");+ return isMultiPartPublicSuffix(parent) ? undefined : parent;}export function hostIsWithinDomain(host: string, domain: string): boolean {diff --git a/plugins/portal/src/proxy.ts b/plugins/portal/src/proxy.tsindex 89a9793c3..c7f73dc0a 100644--- a/plugins/portal/src/proxy.ts+++ b/plugins/portal/src/proxy.ts@@ -4,7 +4,14 @@ import { mintPortalIdentity, PORTAL_IDENTITY_HEADER } from "../../chassis/src/poconst IDENTITY_TTL_MS = 60_000;-const FORWARD_REQUEST_HEADERS = ["content-type", "accept", "accept-language", "user-agent", "accept-encoding"];+const FORWARD_REQUEST_HEADERS = [+ "content-type",+ "accept",+ "accept-language",+ "user-agent",+ "accept-encoding",+ "sec-fetch-dest",+];const DROP_RESPONSE_HEADERS = new Set(["connection",diff --git a/plugins/portal/test/apps-domain-defaults.test.ts b/plugins/portal/test/apps-domain-defaults.test.tsindex 6bdaace83..ee7983608 100644--- a/plugins/portal/test/apps-domain-defaults.test.ts+++ b/plugins/portal/test/apps-domain-defaults.test.ts@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ test("commonParentDomain finds the deepest shared dot-suffix, never a bare TLD",assert.equal(commonParentDomain("a.example.com", "b.other.net"), undefined);assert.equal(commonParentDomain("a.example.com", "b.acme.com"), undefined, "a bare TLD is not a cookie domain");assert.equal(commonParentDomain("", "apps.example.com"), undefined);+ assert.equal(+ commonParentDomain("portal.foo.co.uk", "apps.bar.co.uk"),+ undefined,+ "a shared public suffix like co.uk is not a cookie domain browsers accept",+ );});test("DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN alone yields a working portal apps setup — cookie domain derived, boot clean", () => {diff --git a/src/api/routes/deployments.ts b/src/api/routes/deployments.tsindex 50446884f..837584637 100644--- a/src/api/routes/deployments.ts+++ b/src/api/routes/deployments.ts@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ async function proxyDeployment(ctx: BaseCtx): Promise<void> {}}const reach = await app.reachDeployment(id, principal);- return proxyReach(ctx, reach, subPath, { sandboxHtml: true });+ return proxyReach(ctx, reach, subPath, { sandbox: true });}function adminDeploymentProxyParts(pathname: string): { id: string; subPath: string } | null {@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ async function proxyAdminDeployment(ctx: BaseCtx): Promise<void> {scopeLabel: deployment.ownerScopeId,});const reach = await app.reachDeployment(parts.id, "", { bypassAcl: true });- return proxyReach(ctx, reach, parts.subPath, { sandboxHtml: true });+ return proxyReach(ctx, reach, parts.subPath, { sandbox: true });}const GATEWAY_AUTH_HEADERS = [@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ const APP_SANDBOX_CSP = "sandbox allow-scripts allow-forms allow-popups allow-mofunction gatewaySafeResponseHeaders(headers: Record<string, string | string[] | number | undefined>,- sandboxHtml = false,+ sandbox = false,): Record<string, string | string[]> {const normalized: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> = {};for (const [rawName, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {@@ -208,7 +208,8 @@ function gatewaySafeResponseHeaders(if (kept.length) out["set-cookie"] = kept;else delete out["set-cookie"];}- if (sandboxHtml && String(out["content-type"] ?? "").includes("text/html")) {+ delete out["clear-site-data"];+ if (sandbox) {const existing = out["content-security-policy"];out["content-security-policy"] = existing? [...(Array.isArray(existing) ? existing : [existing]), APP_SANDBOX_CSP]@@ -279,7 +280,7 @@ function proxyReachHttp2(subPath: string,headers: Record<string, string | string[]>,bufferedBody: Buffer | null,- sandboxHtml: boolean,+ sandbox: boolean,): void {const { req, res, deps, url, method } = ctx;const { host, port, tls } = endpoint.endpoint;@@ -384,7 +385,7 @@ function proxyReachHttp2(markUpstreamUp(`${host}:${port}`);armThrottleShield(`${host}:${port}`, Number(responseHeaders[":status"] ?? 0), up);const status = Number(responseHeaders[":status"] ?? 502);- const safeHeaders = gatewaySafeResponseHeaders(responseHeaders, sandboxHtml);+ const safeHeaders = gatewaySafeResponseHeaders(responseHeaders, sandbox);res.writeHead(status, safeHeaders);up.pipe(res, { end: false });});@@ -474,7 +475,7 @@ async function proxyReach(ctx: BaseCtx,reach: Awaited<ReturnType<App["reachDeployment"]>>,subPath: string,- opts?: { sandboxHtml?: boolean },+ opts?: { sandbox?: boolean },): Promise<void> {const { req, res, deps, url, method } = ctx;if (res.destroyed) return;@@ -520,7 +521,7 @@ async function proxyReach(}if (res.destroyed) return;if (reach.endpoint.httpVersion === "2") {- proxyReachHttp2(ctx, reach, subPath, headers, bufferedBody, opts?.sandboxHtml ?? false);+ proxyReachHttp2(ctx, reach, subPath, headers, bufferedBody, opts?.sandbox ?? false);return;}const htmlNav = wantsWarmingPage(req, method);@@ -529,7 +530,7 @@ async function proxyReach(markUpstreamUp(upstreamKey);upRes.on("error", () => res.destroy());armThrottleShield(upstreamKey, upRes.statusCode ?? 0, upRes);- const headers = gatewaySafeResponseHeaders(upRes.headers, opts?.sandboxHtml ?? false);+ const headers = gatewaySafeResponseHeaders(upRes.headers, opts?.sandbox ?? false);res.writeHead(upRes.statusCode ?? 502, headers);upRes.pipe(res);});diff --git a/src/config.ts b/src/config.tsindex 0b0d58704..2ee517c82 100644--- a/src/config.ts+++ b/src/config.ts@@ -456,14 +456,16 @@ function deployAppsEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,defaultLoginUrl: string | undefined,): { deployAppsSessionSecret?: string; deployAppsLoginUrl?: string } {- const secret = env.DEPLOY_APPS_SESSION_SECRET;- const loginUrl = env.DEPLOY_APPS_LOGIN_URL ?? (secret ? defaultLoginUrl : undefined);- if (loginUrl && !secret) {+ const explicit = env.DEPLOY_APPS_SESSION_SECRET;+ const shared = env.PORTAL_SESSION_SECRET;+ const loginUrl = env.DEPLOY_APPS_LOGIN_URL ?? (explicit || shared ? defaultLoginUrl : undefined);+ if (loginUrl && !explicit && !shared) {throw new Error("DEPLOY_APPS_LOGIN_URL requires DEPLOY_APPS_SESSION_SECRET");}- if (secret && !loginUrl) {+ if (explicit && !loginUrl) {throw new Error("DEPLOY_APPS_SESSION_SECRET needs a sign-in address — set DEPLOY_APPS_LOGIN_URL or PUBLIC_WEB_URL");}+ const secret = explicit ?? (loginUrl ? shared : undefined);if (!secret || !loginUrl) return {};return { deployAppsSessionSecret: secret, deployAppsLoginUrl: loginUrl.replace(/\/$/, "") };}@@ -493,9 +495,18 @@ function sharedPlatformSuffixOf(domain: string): string | undefined {return SHARED_PLATFORM_SUFFIXES.find((suffix) => host === suffix || host.endsWith(`.${suffix}`));}+const HOSTNAME_LABEL = "[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?";+const HOSTNAME_RE = new RegExp(`^${HOSTNAME_LABEL}(?:\\.${HOSTNAME_LABEL})+$`);+function deployAppsDomainEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, deployProvider: string): string | undefined {- const canonical = env.DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN?.trim();- if (canonical) {+ const raw = env.DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN?.trim();+ if (raw) {+ const canonical = raw.toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "");+ if (!HOSTNAME_RE.test(canonical)) {+ throw new Error(+ `DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN (${raw}) is not a plain DNS name — set it to a bare domain like apps.example.com (no scheme, port, path, or wildcard prefix).`,+ );+ }const suffix = sharedPlatformSuffixOf(canonical);if (suffix) {throw new Error(@@ -1145,13 +1156,12 @@ export function loadConfig(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): Config {spritesSandbox: spritesSandboxEnv(env),smolmachinesSandbox: smolmachinesSandboxEnv(env),porterSandbox: porterSandboxEnv(env),- porterDeploy: {- ...porterDeployEnv(env),- ...(deployAppsDomain && !env.PORTER_DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN ? { appsDomain: deployAppsDomain } : {}),- },+ porterDeploy: porterDeployEnv(env),awsDeploy: {...awsDeployEnv(env),- ...(deployAppsDomain && !env.AWS_DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN ? { appsDomain: deployAppsDomain } : {}),+ ...(env.DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN && deployAppsDomain && !env.AWS_DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN+ ? { appsDomain: deployAppsDomain }+ : {}),},...(deployAppsDomain ? { deployAppsDomain } : {}),flyDeploy: flyDeployEnv(env),diff --git a/src/deployment/secret-schema.ts b/src/deployment/secret-schema.tsindex 0f6781da7..4c18f9b7f 100644--- a/src/deployment/secret-schema.ts+++ b/src/deployment/secret-schema.ts@@ -82,7 +82,10 @@ function isInvalidSecret(name: string, value: string | undefined): boolean {const candidate = value?.trim();if (!candidate || /^(replace-me|placeholder|changeme|todo)$/i.test(candidate)) return true;return (- (name === "CONNECTOR_SECRET_KEY" || name === "CORE_SIGNING_SECRET" || name === "SKILL_SIGNING_SECRET") &&+ (name === "CONNECTOR_SECRET_KEY" ||+ name === "CORE_SIGNING_SECRET" ||+ name === "SKILL_SIGNING_SECRET" ||+ name === "AWS_DEPLOY_GATE_SECRET") &&!isStrongSigningSecret(candidate));}diff --git a/test/config.test.ts b/test/config.test.tsindex 77b2a350e..7445cca35 100644--- a/test/config.test.ts+++ b/test/config.test.ts@@ -521,7 +521,11 @@ test("DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN is the one-var apps setup: it feeds the gate and defaulAWS_DEPLOY_GATE_SECRET: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",});assert.equal(config.deployAppsDomain, "apps.example.com");- assert.equal(config.porterDeploy.appsDomain, "apps.example.com");+ assert.equal(+ config.porterDeploy.appsDomain,+ undefined,+ "the gate domain must not be registered on Porter ingress — that would bypass the gate or loop the proxy",+ );assert.equal(config.awsDeploy.appsDomain, "apps.example.com");const overridden = loadConfig({DEPLOY_PROVIDER: "porter",@@ -545,7 +549,8 @@ test("the active provider's own apps domain reaches the gate when DEPLOY_APPS_DOPORTER_DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN: "apps.example.com",});assert.equal(porter.deployAppsDomain, "apps.example.com");- assert.equal(porter.awsDeploy.appsDomain, "apps.example.com");+ assert.equal(porter.awsDeploy.appsDomain, undefined);+ assert.equal(porter.porterDeploy.appsDomain, "apps.example.com");const aws = loadConfig({AWS_DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN: "apps.example.com",AWS_DEPLOY_GATE_SECRET: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",@@ -564,6 +569,33 @@ test("DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN refuses shared platform domains that cannot carry per-a);});+test("DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN must be a bare DNS name, normalized to lowercase without a trailing dot", () => {+ const gate = { AWS_DEPLOY_GATE_SECRET: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef" };+ assert.equal(loadConfig({ DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN: "Apps.Example.COM.", ...gate }).deployAppsDomain, "apps.example.com");+ assert.throws(() => loadConfig({ DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN: "https://apps.example.com", ...gate }), /bare domain/);+ assert.throws(() => loadConfig({ DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN: "apps.example.com:[email protected]", ...gate }), /bare domain/);+ assert.throws(() => loadConfig({ DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN: "*.apps.example.com", ...gate }), /bare domain/);+ assert.throws(() => loadConfig({ DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN: "myapp.fly.dev.", ...gate }), /shared platform domain/);+});++test("the portal session secret doubles as the deploy-apps viewer secret when a login URL exists", () => {+ const derived = loadConfig({ PORTAL_SESSION_SECRET: "shared", PUBLIC_WEB_URL: "https://qm.example.com" });+ assert.equal(derived.deployAppsSessionSecret, "shared");+ assert.equal(derived.deployAppsLoginUrl, "https://qm.example.com");+ const noUrl = loadConfig({ PORTAL_SESSION_SECRET: "shared" });+ assert.equal(+ noUrl.deployAppsSessionSecret,+ undefined,+ "no sign-in address means the fallback stays off, not a throw",+ );+ const explicit = loadConfig({+ PORTAL_SESSION_SECRET: "shared",+ DEPLOY_APPS_SESSION_SECRET: "own",+ PUBLIC_WEB_URL: "https://qm.example.com",+ });+ assert.equal(explicit.deployAppsSessionSecret, "own");+});+test("the deploy-apps sign-in address defaults to the public web URL", () => {const derived = loadConfig({DEPLOY_APPS_SESSION_SECRET: "s",diff --git a/test/deploy-path-serving.test.ts b/test/deploy-path-serving.test.tsindex 39ce1aca6..e4b4af9c9 100644--- a/test/deploy-path-serving.test.ts+++ b/test/deploy-path-serving.test.ts@@ -36,9 +36,10 @@ function httpGet(async function fixture(deps: Parameters<typeof createInsecureTestServer>[1],upstreamContentType = "text/html; charset=utf-8",+ upstreamHeaders: Record<string, string> = {},) {const upstream = createHttpServer((_req, res) => {- res.writeHead(200, { "content-type": upstreamContentType });+ res.writeHead(200, { "content-type": upstreamContentType, ...upstreamHeaders });res.end("UPSTREAM OK");});upstream.listen(0);@@ -92,12 +93,23 @@ test("/d/ path serving sandboxes proxied HTML so an app cannot act on the portal}});-test("/d/ path serving leaves non-HTML responses unsandboxed", async () => {- const f = await fixture({}, "application/json");+test("/d/ path serving sandboxes every response — content-type spoofing cannot dodge it", async () => {+ const f = await fixture({}, "Text/HTML; charset=utf-8");try {const data = await httpGet(f.port, "/d/mysite/api", { "x-as-principal": "[email protected]" });assert.equal(data.status, 200);- assert.equal(data.headers["content-security-policy"], undefined);+ assert.match(String(data.headers["content-security-policy"]), /^sandbox /);+ } finally {+ await f.close();+ }+});++test("/d/ path serving strips clear-site-data so an app cannot log its viewers out of the portal", async () => {+ const f = await fixture({}, "text/html", { "clear-site-data": '"cookies", "storage"' });+ try {+ const page = await httpGet(f.port, "/d/mysite/", { "x-as-principal": "[email protected]" });+ assert.equal(page.status, 200);+ assert.equal(page.headers["clear-site-data"], undefined);} finally {await f.close();}diff --git a/test/secret-schema-drift.test.ts b/test/secret-schema-drift.test.tsindex 92a56fc91..b54fcc694 100644--- a/test/secret-schema-drift.test.ts+++ b/test/secret-schema-drift.test.ts@@ -35,7 +35,15 @@ test("AWS deployment app domains reject a missing or placeholder gate secret", (assert.deepEqual(validateCoreSecretEnv({AWS_DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN: "apps.example.com",- AWS_DEPLOY_GATE_SECRET: "real-secret",+ AWS_DEPLOY_GATE_SECRET: "short",+ } as NodeJS.ProcessEnv),+ ["AWS_DEPLOY_GATE_SECRET"],+ "a guessable gate secret would let anyone forge owner tokens, so strength is enforced",+ );+ assert.deepEqual(+ validateCoreSecretEnv({+ AWS_DEPLOY_APPS_DOMAIN: "apps.example.com",+ AWS_DEPLOY_GATE_SECRET: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",} as NodeJS.ProcessEnv),[],);