Multiplayer agent harness for work.
Consolidate credential context into one owner-grouped inventory (#2206)
Regan Bell5884b6e71ccd
diff --git a/skills-seed/use-shared-credential/SKILL.md b/skills-seed/use-shared-credential/SKILL.mdindex 2f314a09d..5e978eff0 100644--- a/skills-seed/use-shared-credential/SKILL.md+++ b/skills-seed/use-shared-credential/SKILL.md@@ -13,12 +13,15 @@ core stamps the secret onto the outbound call at the wire and returns the respon## When this applies-Your system prompt lists, under **"Shared org credentials available to you"**, any credentials-vended to _this_ conversation — each with its slug, host, and the methods/paths you may use. If-that section is absent (or your environment has no `AGENT_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN`), you have no shared-broker credentials. A separately authorized personal login or connected app may still be-available; use only its advertised capabilities and permissions. Never route around a denial-or ask the user to paste a token.+The **Credentials** inventory groups available credentials by owner. Organization rows marked+`proxy` give the host and allowed methods/paths. Select the exact `service_<slug>` handle in+`execute.credentials` for the command making the request. Core supplies+`AGENT_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN` only to that command; its absence before selection does not mean+access is missing. Use that token, not `AGENT_API_TOKEN`, for broker requests.++Only listed credentials are available. A separately authorized personal login or connected+app may also be available; use only its advertised capabilities and permissions. Never+route around a denial or ask the user to paste a token.## How to call it@@ -40,6 +43,7 @@ The reply is an envelope — the upstream status + body, never the secret:{ "status": 200, "contentType": "application/json", "body": "<the upstream response text>" }```+A non-2xx `status` is the upstream service’s response, not a broker failure.Parse `body` as the upstream returned it (e.g. JSON). For a write (when the credential allows anon-GET method), put the request payload in the `body` field of your POST.diff --git a/src/api/contract.ts b/src/api/contract.tsindex 8561e9d66..3d7027098 100644--- a/src/api/contract.ts+++ b/src/api/contract.ts@@ -1,3 +1 @@export const CAPABILITY_HEADER = "x-agent-capability";--export const CAPABILITY_CURL_AUTH = `-H "${CAPABILITY_HEADER}: $AGENT_API_TOKEN"`;diff --git a/src/core/orchestrator.ts b/src/core/orchestrator.tsindex 9044ab262..a208a6113 100644--- a/src/core/orchestrator.ts+++ b/src/core/orchestrator.ts@@ -59,7 +59,12 @@ import { createBackgroundBroker } from "../connectors/background-exec-broker.ts"import { createMonitorBroker, readBackgroundOutputTail } from "../monitors/monitor-broker.ts";import { isPollSurface, isSilentPollReply } from "../triggers/run-trigger.ts";import { envKey } from "../credentials/connector-token.ts";-import { credentialHandle, renderKeychainManifest, type PublicServiceCredential } from "../credentials/keychain.ts";+import {+ credentialHandle,+ renderKeychainManifest,+ type PublicServiceCredential,+ type KeychainManifestInput,+} from "../credentials/keychain.ts";import { finishProcessCredentials } from "../credentials/execute-files.ts";import {configuredConnectorProviders,@@ -1471,7 +1476,7 @@ export function createOrchestrator(deps: OrchestratorDeps): Orchestrator {const connectorEnv: Record<string, string> = {};const credsStart = Date.now();const commandCredentials: CommandCredential[] = [];- const credentialDescriptions: string[] = [];+ const credentialDescriptions: NonNullable<KeychainManifestInput["execution"]> = [];const credentialIdentities = new Map<string, string>();const authorizeOwnerCredentials = async (): Promise<void> => {@@ -1504,6 +1509,8 @@ export function createOrchestrator(deps: OrchestratorDeps): Orchestrator {credential: CommandCredential,description: string,identity = credential.handle,+ ownerId = actor.id,+ credentialId?: string,): void => {const existing = credentialIdentities.get(credential.handle);if (existing !== undefined) {@@ -1512,9 +1519,13 @@ export function createOrchestrator(deps: OrchestratorDeps): Orchestrator {}credentialIdentities.set(credential.handle, identity);commandCredentials.push(credential);- credentialDescriptions.push(- `- \`${credential.handle}\` — ${description}; execute scope \`${credential.scope ?? "scoped"}\`.`,- );+ credentialDescriptions.push({+ handle: credential.handle,+ ownerId,+ description,+ credentialId,+ scope: credential.scope ?? "scoped",+ });};const registerKeychainCredentials = async (addCredential: typeof addCredentialToCatalog): Promise<void> => {if (external || strictReadOnly || !deps.keychain) return;@@ -1523,7 +1534,7 @@ export function createOrchestrator(deps: OrchestratorDeps): Orchestrator {if (credential.kind === "broker" || isBackendCredential(credential)) continue;addCredential({- handle: credentialHandle(credential.id),+ handle: credentialHandle(credential),resolve: async () => {const prepared = await keychain.prepareMaterialize(grant.id, scopeId, actor.id);return {@@ -1535,6 +1546,8 @@ export function createOrchestrator(deps: OrchestratorDeps): Orchestrator {},`${credential.service}, owner ${credential.ownerId}, grant ${grant.id}`,credential.id,+ credential.ownerId,+ credential.id,);}const ownAllowed =@@ -1546,7 +1559,7 @@ export function createOrchestrator(deps: OrchestratorDeps): Orchestrator {if (credential.kind === "broker" || isBackendCredential(credential)) continue;addCredential({- handle: credentialHandle(credential.id),+ handle: credentialHandle(credential),scope: isolateOwnerKeychain ? "owner" : "scoped",resolve: async () => {await authorizeOwnerCredentials();@@ -1557,6 +1570,8 @@ export function createOrchestrator(deps: OrchestratorDeps): Orchestrator {},`${credential.service}, owner ${credential.ownerId}`,credential.id,+ credential.ownerId,+ credential.id,);}}@@ -1588,7 +1603,7 @@ export function createOrchestrator(deps: OrchestratorDeps): Orchestrator {if (!healthy && !operatorFallback) continue;addCredential({- handle: `connector_${host.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9]/g, "_")}_${accountType ?? "default"}`,+ handle: `connector:${host}:${accountType ?? "default"}`,scope: isolateOwnerKeychain ? "owner" : "scoped",resolve: async () => {await authorizeOwnerCredentials();@@ -1599,7 +1614,10 @@ export function createOrchestrator(deps: OrchestratorDeps): Orchestrator {},!healthy && operatorFallback? `${host}, configured operator fallback; availability checked on use`- : `${host} connector, owner ${actor.id}, account ${accountType ?? "default"}`,+ : `${host} connector, account ${accountType ?? "default"}`,+ healthy && status && "credentialId" in status ? status.credentialId : undefined,+ actor.id,+ healthy && status && "credentialId" in status ? status.credentialId : undefined,);}}@@ -1607,7 +1625,6 @@ export function createOrchestrator(deps: OrchestratorDeps): Orchestrator {};await registerConnectorCredentials(addCredentialToCatalog);perf.credsMs += Date.now() - credsStart;- let sharedCredsBlock = "";// Service credentials: one read of the org's credential list and one grant scan feed both// the env-delivery gate (below) and the broker token mint (further down). Same grants gate both.let serviceCredRecords: PublicServiceCredential[] = [];@@ -1763,52 +1780,6 @@ export function createOrchestrator(deps: OrchestratorDeps): Orchestrator {deps.capabilitySecret ?? deps.signingSecret,deps.capabilityTokenCompression,);- if (deps.serviceCreds) {- const records = serviceCredRecords;- const enabled = new Set(- records- .filter((r) => !isBackendCredential(r) && r.enabled && r.hasSecret && r.delivery !== "env")- .map((r) => r.slug),- );- if (enabled.size > 0) {- const slugs = [...grantedCredSlugs].filter((s) => enabled.has(s));- if (slugs.length > 0) {- const usable = records.filter((r) => slugs.includes(r.slug));- const lines = usable.map((r) => {- const methods = r.allowedMethods?.length ? r.allowedMethods.toSorted().join("/") : "GET";- const paths = r.allowedPathPrefixes?.length- ? `paths ${r.allowedPathPrefixes.toSorted().join(", ")}`- : "any path";- return `- \`${r.slug}\` (${r.name}; shared org credential) → ${r.host} (${methods}; ${paths})`;- });- sharedCredsBlock =- "\n\n## Shared org credentials available to you\n" +- "Select the corresponding `service_<slug>` handle in execute.credentials. You CANNOT see the secret — call the " +- "target BY PROXY through the broker, which injects it server-side. Use exactly this (with the " +- "$AGENT_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN env var, NOT $AGENT_API_TOKEN):\n" +- "```\n" +- 'curl -fsS -X POST "$AGENT_API_URL/v1/credentials/broker" \\\n' +- ' -H "x-agent-capability: $AGENT_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN" \\\n' +- ' -H "content-type: application/json" \\\n' +- ' -d \'{"credential":"<slug>","method":"GET","url":"https://<host>/<path>?<query>"}\'\n' +- "```\n" +- 'The reply is `{"status":<upstream status>,"contentType":…,"body":"<upstream text>"}` — parse `body`. ' +- "For Git smart HTTP clone/fetch/push using a shared org credential, use core as the Git remote " +- "so the token stays server-side: " +- "`$AGENT_API_URL/v1/credentials/git/<slug>/<repo-path>.git`, with " +- '`git -c http.extraHeader="x-agent-capability: $AGENT_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN" ...`. ' +- "Git through this route uses the configured org account, not automatically the requesting user's account; " +- "a live personal OAuth connector does not switch this route's identity. The credential name is an admin label " +- "and does not identify the upstream username. Choose among credentials authorized for this conversation " +- "based on the task and the user's intent; a shared account is a valid choice, not an automatic fallback. " +- "For personal Git access, use an authorized personal login that supports Git transport. " +- "If the intended account is unclear before a write, clarify it rather than silently switching accounts. " +- "A non-2xx `status` is the UPSTREAM service's own answer (e.g. a bad query or its auth), not a broker " +- "error. Use ONLY these (slug → host; allowed methods; allowed paths):\n" +- lines.sort().join("\n");- }- }- }}const egressSecret = deps.capabilitySecret ?? deps.signingSecret;const egressTokenForPolicy = async (egress: EgressPolicy): Promise<string | undefined> => {@@ -1902,7 +1873,9 @@ export function createOrchestrator(deps: OrchestratorDeps): Orchestrator {return { env: [{ key: credential.envKey!, value: current.secret }] };},},- `${credential.name}, org credential, provides ${credential.envKey}`,+ `${credential.name}; provides ${credential.envKey}`,+ undefined,+ "Organization",);} else if (deps.signingSecret && deps.apiBaseUrl) {addCredential(@@ -1910,7 +1883,9 @@ export function createOrchestrator(deps: OrchestratorDeps): Orchestrator {handle: `service_${credential.slug}`,resolve: async () => ({ env: [{ key: "AGENT_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN", value: await resolveBrokerToken() }] }),},- `org credential ${credential.slug}, provides scoped broker capability`,+ `${credential.name}; proxy ${credential.host}; ${(credential.allowedMethods?.length ? credential.allowedMethods : ["GET"]).toSorted().join("/")}; ${credential.allowedPathPrefixes?.length ? `paths ${credential.allowedPathPrefixes.toSorted().join(", ")}` : "any path"}; use the use-shared-credential skill`,+ undefined,+ "Organization",);}}@@ -2340,11 +2315,6 @@ export function createOrchestrator(deps: OrchestratorDeps): Orchestrator {)systemPrompt +="\n\n## Connected app access\nComposio is configured in the backend. Load the composio skill and use /v1/composio through the authenticated agent API. No Composio project key is delivered to your computer; the backend checks account ownership and context access.";- if (credentialDescriptions.length)- systemPrompt +=- "\n\n## Execution credentials\nRequest exact handles in execute.credentials:\n" +- credentialDescriptions.sort().join("\n");- systemPrompt += sharedCredsBlock;if (actorIsOrgAdmin) {systemPrompt +="\n\n## Acting for an org admin\n" +@@ -2420,17 +2390,17 @@ export function createOrchestrator(deps: OrchestratorDeps): Orchestrator {})().catch(swallowAs("orchestrator: conversation roster", null));if (rosterBlock) systemPrompt += `\n\n${rosterBlock}`;}- if (!external && !strictReadOnly && deps.keychain && deps.signingSecret && deps.apiBaseUrl) {+ if (!strictReadOnly && (deps.keychain || credentialDescriptions.length)) {const audienceMembers = conversation.audience.filter((p) => p.type === "internal");const members = [...(audienceMembers.some((p) => samePerson(p.id, actor.id)) ? [] : [actor]),...audienceMembers,].map((p) => ({ id: p.id, ...(p.displayName ? { displayName: p.displayName } : {}) }));const [entriesByOwner, connectorsByOwner, scopeGrants, scopeAsks] = await Promise.all([- deps.keychain.listByOwners(members.map((m) => m.id)),- deps.keychain.listConnectorsByOwners(members.map((m) => m.id)),- deps.keychain.grantsForScope(scopeId),- deps.keychain.listAsks({ requesterScopeId: scopeId }),+ !external ? (deps.keychain?.listByOwners(members.map((m) => m.id)) ?? new Map()) : new Map(),+ !external ? (deps.keychain?.listConnectorsByOwners(members.map((m) => m.id)) ?? new Map()) : new Map(),+ !external ? (deps.keychain?.grantsForScope(scopeId) ?? []) : [],+ !external ? (deps.keychain?.listAsks({ requesterScopeId: scopeId }) ?? []) : [],]);const keychainBlock = renderKeychainManifest({scopeId,@@ -2441,7 +2411,7 @@ export function createOrchestrator(deps: OrchestratorDeps): Orchestrator {entriesByOwner,connectorsByOwner,scopeGrants,- injected: [],+ execution: credentialDescriptions,scopeAsks,});if (keychainBlock) systemPrompt += `\n\n${keychainBlock}`;diff --git a/src/credentials/keychain.ts b/src/credentials/keychain.tsindex 7f96ec51a..69c2df296 100644--- a/src/credentials/keychain.ts+++ b/src/credentials/keychain.ts@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import { createMemoryAdvisoryLock, type AdvisoryLock } from "../persistence/adviimport { orgId as configOrgId } from "../config.ts";import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";import { scopeId as toScopeId, parseScopeId, type Destination, type ScopeId } from "../types.ts";-import { CAPABILITY_CURL_AUTH } from "../api/contract.ts";import type { DurableMap } from "../persistence/durable-map.ts";import { encryptSecret, decryptSecret, type SecretKey } from "../connectors/connector-client-store.ts";import { errMessage } from "../util/errors.ts";@@ -443,8 +442,8 @@ function fingerprintOf(secret: string): string {return hashId([secret]);}-export function credentialHandle(credentialId: string): string {- return `kc_${credentialId.slice(0, 12)}`;+export function credentialHandle(credential: Pick<KeychainCredential, "id" | "service">): string {+ return `${encodeURIComponent(credential.service)}:${credential.id}`;}export interface FileCredentialSource {@@ -508,7 +507,7 @@ function toMeta(rec: Omit<KeychainCredential, "secretEnc"> & { secretEnc?: strinreturn {...meta,...((rec.kind === "env" || rec.kind === "file") && !isBackendCredential(rec)- ? { credentialHandle: credentialHandle(rec.id) }+ ? { credentialHandle: credentialHandle(rec) }: {}),};}@@ -830,9 +829,6 @@ export function createKeychain(deps: {}}- const oauthExpired = (rec: KeychainCredentialMeta, t: number) =>- rec.expiresAt !== undefined && t >= rec.expiresAt - oauthSkew;-async function connectorTokenForRecord(rec: KeychainCredential): Promise<string | null> {const t = now();const refreshable = rec.refresh?.refreshTokenEnc && deps.refreshConnector && rec.host ? rec.host : null;@@ -845,25 +841,10 @@ export function createKeychain(deps: {}return pending;}- if (oauthExpired(rec, t) && !refreshable) return null;+ if (oauthExpired(rec, t, oauthSkew) && !refreshable) return null;return tryDecrypt(rec, (r) => decryptSecret(r.secretEnc, deps.key));}- function connectorMeta(rec: KeychainCredentialMeta, t: number): ConnectorMeta {- const hasRefresh = !!rec.refresh?.refreshTokenEnc;- const refreshFailed = typeof rec.refresh?.refreshFailedAt === "number";- const tokenExpired = oauthExpired(rec, t);- return {- credentialId: rec.id,- ownerId: rec.ownerId,- host: rec.host ?? rec.service,- ...(rec.refresh?.accountType ? { accountType: rec.refresh.accountType } : {}),- ...(rec.expiresAt !== undefined ? { expiresAt: rec.expiresAt } : {}),- connected: true,- ...(tokenExpired && (!hasRefresh || refreshFailed) ? { needsReconnect: true } : {}),- };- }-async function saveCredential(input: SaveCredentialInput): Promise<KeychainCredentialMeta> {const service = input.service.trim().toLowerCase();if (!service) throw new KeychainError(400, "service required");@@ -1419,7 +1400,7 @@ export function createKeychain(deps: {const hasRefresh = !!rec.refresh?.refreshTokenEnc;const refreshFailedAt = rec.refresh?.refreshFailedAt;const refreshFailed = typeof refreshFailedAt === "number";- const tokenExpired = oauthExpired(rec, now());+ const tokenExpired = oauthExpired(rec, now(), oauthSkew);return {connected: true,...(rec.expiresAt !== undefined ? { expiresAt: rec.expiresAt } : {}),@@ -1461,7 +1442,7 @@ export function createKeychain(deps: {await deps.creds.select({ omit: ["secretEnc"], where: byOwners(ownerIds) }),ownerIds,(c) => c.managed === "connector",- (c) => connectorMeta(c, t),+ (c) => connectorMeta(c, t, oauthSkew),);},@@ -1606,21 +1587,17 @@ export interface KeychainManifestInput {entriesByOwner: Map<string, KeychainCredentialMeta[]>;connectorsByOwner?: Map<string, ConnectorMeta[]>;scopeGrants: Array<{ grant: KeychainGrant; credential: KeychainCredentialMeta }>;- injected: MaterializedEnvCred[];+ execution?: Array<{+ handle: string;+ ownerId: string;+ credentialId?: string;+ description: string;+ scope: "scoped" | "owner";+ }>;detectedByOwner?: Map<string, string[]>;scopeAsks?: KeychainAsk[];}-const SAVE_HINT =- "Saving logins (the owner's own DM only). Before running any CLI login, read the `interactive-login` skill and " +- "follow it from the first step: it logs in under a temporary home and saves the result. Never log in against this " +- "computer's $HOME; a token found there is not a saved login. Only keychain entries are durable and grantable. " +- 'Save a token-style key right after it works: `curl -fsS -X POST "$AGENT_API_URL/v1/keychain/credentials" ' +- CAPABILITY_CURL_AUTH +- ' -H \'content-type: application/json\' -d \'{"service":"github","secret":"<token>","envKey":"GITHUB_TOKEN","accountLabel":"<who the service says they are>","expiresAt":<ms epoch, if the service reports one>}\'` — ' +- "verify first (e.g. `gh api user`) and pass what the service reports as `accountLabel`. " +- "Saved CLI logins are loaded only when requested through execute.credentials; updates made by the CLI are saved back after execution. If the provider can no longer refresh the session, re-run its interactive login.";-function expiryNote(c: KeychainCredentialMeta, now: number, own: boolean): string {if (c.kind === "file" || typeof c.expiresAt !== "number") return "";if (c.expiresAt < now) {@@ -1631,44 +1608,43 @@ function expiryNote(c: KeychainCredentialMeta, now: number, own: boolean): strinreturn `, expires at ${new Date(c.expiresAt).toISOString()}`;}-function credLine(- owner: { id: string; displayName?: string },- c: KeychainCredentialMeta,- grantNote: string,- now: number,- own: boolean,-): string {- const who = owner.displayName ? `${owner.displayName} (${owner.id})` : owner.id;+function credentialDescription(c: KeychainCredentialMeta, now: number, own: boolean): string {+ if (c.managed === "connector") return connectorDescription(connectorMeta(c, now));if (isBackendCredential(c))- return `- ${who}: Composio backend access — use the composio skill and /v1/composio; this key cannot be loaded into a computer`;- let slot = `files ${(c.targets ?? [c.target]).filter(Boolean).sort().join(", ")}`;- if (c.kind === "env") {- slot = c.fields- ? c.fields- .map((f) => `\`${f.envKey}\``)+ return "Composio backend access — use the composio skill; cannot be loaded into a computer";+ const slot =+ c.kind === "env"+ ? (c.fields?.map((f) => f.envKey) ?? [c.envKey])+ .filter(Boolean).sort()+ .map((key) => `\`${key}\``).join(" + ")- : `\`${c.envKey}\``;- }- const label = c.accountLabel ? `, account ${c.accountLabel}` : "";- return `- ${who}: ${c.service} (${slot}${label}${expiryNote(c, now, own)}) — credential id \`${c.id}\` — ${grantNote}`;+ : `files ${(c.targets ?? [c.target]).filter(Boolean).sort().join(", ")}`;+ return `${c.service} (${slot}${c.accountLabel ? `, account ${c.accountLabel}` : ""}${expiryNote(c, now, own)})`;}-function connectorLine(- owner: { id: string; displayName?: string },- cm: ConnectorMeta,- grantNote: string,- own: boolean,-): string {- const who = owner.displayName ? `${owner.displayName} (${owner.id})` : owner.id;- const account = cm.accountType ? `, ${cm.accountType}` : "";- let status = "";- if (cm.needsReconnect) {- status = own- ? ", NEEDS RECONNECT — they must reconnect the app before it can be used"- : ", NEEDS RECONNECT — owner must reconnect the app before a grant can be used";- }- return `- ${who}: connected app ${cm.host}${account}${status} — credential id \`${cm.credentialId}\` — ${grantNote}`;+const oauthExpired = (rec: KeychainCredentialMeta, t: number, oauthSkew: number) =>+ rec.expiresAt !== undefined && t >= rec.expiresAt - oauthSkew;++function connectorMeta(rec: KeychainCredentialMeta, t: number, oauthSkew = 60_000): ConnectorMeta {+ const hasRefresh = !!rec.refresh?.refreshTokenEnc;+ const refreshFailed = typeof rec.refresh?.refreshFailedAt === "number";+ const tokenExpired = oauthExpired(rec, t, oauthSkew);+ return {+ credentialId: rec.id,+ ownerId: rec.ownerId,+ host: rec.host ?? rec.service,+ ...(rec.refresh?.accountType ? { accountType: rec.refresh.accountType } : {}),+ ...(rec.expiresAt !== undefined ? { expiresAt: rec.expiresAt } : {}),+ connected: true,+ ...(tokenExpired && (!hasRefresh || refreshFailed) ? { needsReconnect: true } : {}),+ };+}++function connectorDescription(cm: ConnectorMeta): string {+ return `connected app ${cm.host}, account ${cm.accountType ?? "default"}${+ cm.needsReconnect ? ", NEEDS RECONNECT — owner must reconnect the app before use" : ""+ }${typeof cm.expiresAt === "number" ? `, token expires at ${new Date(cm.expiresAt).toISOString()}` : ""}`;}export const MAX_CREDENTIAL_FILES = 500;@@ -1689,137 +1665,93 @@ function listed(c: Pick<KeychainCredential, "managed" | "kind">): boolean {}export function renderKeychainManifest(input: KeychainManifestInput, now: number = Date.now()): string {- const lines: string[] = [];- const byCred = new Map(input.scopeGrants.map((g) => [g.credential.id, g.grant]));- const grantNoteFor = (id: string): string => {- const g = byCred.get(id);- if (!g) return "no grant for this conversation";- const note =- g.mode === "standing"- ? `STANDING grant for this conversation (purpose: "${g.purpose}")`- : `one-time grant \`${g.id}\` available (purpose: "${g.purpose}")`;- return note;+ const groups = new Map<string, Map<string, string>>();+ const put = (ownerId: string, id: string, text: string): void => {+ const owner = personKey(ownerId);+ let rows = groups.get(owner);+ if (!rows) groups.set(owner, (rows = new Map()));+ rows.set(id, text);};const ownPersonal = input.scopeId === toScopeId("personal", input.actorId);- const openSpeaker =- input.openSpeakerKeychain === true && (input.conversationKind === "channel" || input.conversationKind === "group");- const OWN_NOTE = openSpeaker- ? 'their own — available with execute scope:"owner" for this live Open turn; no grant needed'- : "their own — execute.credentials needs no grant in their personal conversation, including background turns";- const memberLines: string[] = [];- let hasOwn = false;- for (const member of input.members) {- const own = (ownPersonal || openSpeaker) && samePerson(member.id, input.actorId);- for (const c of input.entriesByOwner.get(member.id) ?? []) {- const note = own ? OWN_NOTE : grantNoteFor(c.id);- memberLines.push(credLine(member, c, note, now, own));- hasOwn ||= own;- }- for (const cm of input.connectorsByOwner?.get(member.id) ?? []) {- memberLines.push(connectorLine(member, cm, own ? OWN_NOTE : grantNoteFor(cm.credentialId), own));- hasOwn ||= own;- }- }-- const detectedLines: string[] = [];- for (const member of input.members) {- const registered = new Set((input.entriesByOwner.get(member.id) ?? []).map((c) => c.service));- const services = (input.detectedByOwner?.get(member.id) ?? []).filter((s) => !registered.has(s.toLowerCase()));- if (!services.length) continue;- const who = member.displayName ? `${member.displayName} (${member.id})` : member.id;- detectedLines.push(- `- ${who}: ${services.sort().join(", ")} — signed in on their own computer, not in the keychain`,+ const openSpeaker = input.openSpeakerKeychain === true && input.conversationKind !== "dm";+ const isOwn = (ownerId: string): boolean => (ownPersonal || openSpeaker) && samePerson(ownerId, input.actorId);+ const grants = new Map(input.scopeGrants.map(({ grant, credential }) => [credential.id, grant]));+ const execution = input.execution ?? [];+ const access = (ownerId: string, id: string): string => {+ if (grants.has(id)) return grantNote(id);+ if (isOwn(ownerId))+ return openSpeaker+ ? "own; Open live turn only, isolated owner execution"+ : "own; no grant needed (including background turns)";+ return grantNote(id);+ };+ const grantNote = (id: string): string => {+ const grant = grants.get(id);+ if (!grant) return "no grant for this conversation";+ return `${grant.mode === "standing" ? "STANDING" : "one-time"} grant \`${grant.id}\` (purpose: "${grant.purpose}")${+ grant.expiresAt === undefined ? "" : `; expires at ${new Date(grant.expiresAt).toISOString()}`+ }`;+ };+ const entries = new Map(input.scopeGrants.map(({ credential }) => [credential.id, credential]));+ for (const member of input.members)+ for (const credential of input.entriesByOwner.get(member.id) ?? []) entries.set(credential.id, credential);+ for (const credential of entries.values()) {+ const handles = execution+ .filter((entry) => entry.credentialId === credential.id)+ .map((entry) => `\`${entry.handle}\` (execute scope \`${entry.scope}\`)`)+ .sort();+ put(+ credential.ownerId,+ credential.id,+ `- ${handles.join(", ") || `credential id \`${credential.id}\``} — ${credentialDescription(credential, now, isOwn(credential.ownerId))}; ${access(credential.ownerId, credential.id)}`,);}-- const inDm = input.conversationKind === "dm";-- let ownershipGuidance =- "Using one here requires a grant from its OWNER — you never see another person's secret or token without one. ";- if (ownPersonal)- ownershipGuidance =- "You are in this person's own personal conversation: their env credentials and connector tokens need no grant through execute.credentials, including background and scheduled turns. Anyone else's still requires a grant from its OWNER, and shared conversations require a grant unless Open sharing authorizes isolated execution with the live speaker's own credentials. ";- else if (openSpeaker)- ownershipGuidance = `Open sharing authorizes the authenticated live speaker to use their OWN keychain through execute scope:"owner", without a grant. Other people's credentials still require their owner's grant. This does not give the room or background jobs continuing access. `;- lines.push("## Teammate keychains");- lines.push(- "Teammates keep personal logins — and connected apps (Gmail, Calendar, Slack, …) — in a keychain. " +- ownershipGuidance +- "A connector grant works exactly like any other: ask for it; the owner approves on the card.",- );- if (memberLines.length) {- lines.push("", "In this conversation:", ...memberLines.sort());- } else {- lines.push("", "No keychain credentials registered yet for the people here.");- }-- if (hasOwn && openSpeaker) {- lines.push(- "",- `Use execute with scope:"owner" for commands needing the speaker's logins or connected apps. Request every credential, including saved CLI logins, explicitly using execute.credentials. Refreshed credential files are saved back after execution.`,- "This is a separate, disposable computer: it cannot see the shared workspace, and is destroyed at the end of this turn. Keep credential-using commands there; return only the results needed for the task. Never copy secrets into the shared workspace or pass them to background jobs. Normal command approvals still apply.",- );- } else if (hasOwn) {- lines.push(- "",- "Request every credential, including saved CLI logins, explicitly using execute.credentials. Refreshed credential files are saved back after execution.",- );+ for (const member of input.members) {+ for (const connector of input.connectorsByOwner?.get(member.id) ?? []) {+ const handles = execution+ .filter((entry) => entry.credentialId === connector.credentialId)+ .map((entry) => `\`${entry.handle}\` (execute scope \`${entry.scope}\`)`)+ .sort();+ put(+ member.id,+ connector.credentialId,+ `- ${handles.join(", ") || `credential id \`${connector.credentialId}\``} — ${connectorDescription(connector)}; ${access(member.id, connector.credentialId)}`,+ );+ }+ const registered = new Set((input.entriesByOwner.get(member.id) ?? []).map((c) => c.service.toLowerCase()));+ for (const service of input.detectedByOwner?.get(member.id) ?? [])+ if (!registered.has(service.toLowerCase()))+ put(member.id, `detected:${service}`, `- ${service} — detected on their computer, NOT registered or grantable`);}-- if (detectedLines.length) {- lines.push(- "",- "Detected but NOT registered (not grantable yet):",- ...detectedLines.sort(),- "To make one usable here, its owner must first register it in their keychain from their own DM with you " +- '(they can say "register my logins" there). A login living on someone\'s computer is not a grant — never claim access to it.',- );+ for (const entry of execution) {+ if (entry.credentialId && groups.get(personKey(entry.ownerId))?.has(entry.credentialId)) continue;+ put(entry.ownerId, entry.handle, `- \`${entry.handle}\` — ${entry.description}; execute scope \`${entry.scope}\``);}-- if (input.injected.length) {+ const lines = [+ "## Credentials",+ "Execution handles are shown in backticks; select them in execute.credentials. Credential IDs identify entries for access requests, not execution handles.",+ ];+ for (const [ownerId, rows] of [...groups].sort(([a], [b]) => a.localeCompare(b))) {+ const member = input.members.find((member) => personKey(member.id) === ownerId);lines.push("",- "Available command credentials:",- ...input.injected- .toSorted((a, b) => a.credentialId.localeCompare(b.credentialId))- .map(- (m) =>- `- \`${credentialHandle(m.credentialId)}\` — ${m.service}, owner ${m.ownerId}, provides ${m.env- .map((e) => `\`${e.key}\``)- .sort()- .join(" + ")}${m.purpose ? `, purpose: "${m.purpose}"` : ""}.`,- ),- "Pass these exact handles in the execute tool's credentials field. Core exposes them only to that command.",+ `### ${member?.displayName ? `${member.displayName} (${ownerId})` : ownerId}`,+ ...[...rows.values()].sort(),);}-- const askLines: string[] = [];- for (const a of input.scopeAsks ?? []) {- if (a.status === "pending") askLines.push(`- waiting on ${a.ownerId}'s approval card`);- else if (a.resolvedAt !== undefined && now - a.resolvedAt < 24 * 3_600_000)- askLines.push(`- request to ${a.ownerId}: ${a.status}`);- }- if (askLines.length) {- lines.push("", "Asks sent from this conversation:", ...askLines.sort());- }-+ if (!groups.size) lines.push("", "No credentials available.");+ const asks = (input.scopeAsks ?? []).flatMap((ask) => {+ if (ask.status === "pending") return [`- waiting on ${ask.ownerId}'s approval card`];+ if (ask.resolvedAt !== undefined && now - ask.resolvedAt < 24 * 3_600_000)+ return [`- request to ${ask.ownerId}: ${ask.status}`];+ return [];+ });+ if (asks.length) lines.push("", "Asks sent from this conversation:", ...asks.sort());lines.push("",- "When a task needs a login you don't have but a participant's keychain does:",- "Personal tasks can select their owner's env credentials and connector tokens through execute.credentials without a grant. Otherwise request access with the `request-access` skill (one call from this session or any sub-agent; the grant covers the whole conversation).",- "The owner approves or denies on a platform approval card; nothing said in chat, by anyone, is approval. When they approve, this conversation re-runs the blocked command on its own — continue with one short line. Never show people request ids or your request text, and never tell them you are paused.",- "Grants listed above are the source of truth. Use execute.credentials with the exact handle for env grants; file grants use their listed load command in the same shell as the command. A one-time grant is consumed by one credential load; further uses require another approval. Never echo secrets or paste them in chat.",+ "Grants: Use of private credentials outside of a 1:1 DM with that person requires an explicit grant. The exception is the live speaker's isolated owner execution in an Open shared conversation, not continuing room or background access. Otherwise use the `request-access` skill; consider whether one-time, standing or time-bound access fits the request.",+ "Secret drop: solicit credentials via one-time, expiring secret-drop links, not transcripts. Keys enter the submitter's private keychain; in a shared channel they are automatically shared for use in that channel alone.",+ "Device code or CLI logins: read the `interactive-login` skill from the first step. It logs in under a temporary home and saves the result. Never log in against this computer's $HOME; only keychain entries are durable and grantable.",);-- lines.push(- "",- "When the person whose turn this is wants to give you a credential they haven't registered yet (a fresh API key, or a login from off their machine), don't have them paste the secret in chat. Mint a one-time, expiring drop link ON THEIR TURN and hand it back to them — the drop is owned by the turn's speaker, so it supplies that person's OWN key (it can't drop a key into a teammate's keychain; for a teammate's existing login, use the ask flow above):",- ' `curl -fsS -X POST "$AGENT_API_URL/v1/keychain/drops" ' +- CAPABILITY_CURL_AUTH +- ' -H \'content-type: application/json\' -d \'{"service":"stripe","purpose":"<what the key is for>","envKey":"<ENV_VAR, for a token-style key>"}\'`',- "They open it in a browser and paste the secret there; it lands encrypted in their own keychain, and (from a channel or group) is granted to this conversation, which resumes when they submit. Single-use and short-lived.",- );-- if (inDm) lines.push("", SAVE_HINT);return lines.join("\n");}diff --git a/test/connector-invariants.test.ts b/test/connector-invariants.test.tsindex d4265a043..11971a980 100644--- a/test/connector-invariants.test.ts+++ b/test/connector-invariants.test.ts@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ test("F1/F3 — a live DM receives only its requested connector; a channel receiconst absent = `!run test -z "$${key}" && echo absent`;assert.equal((await built.app.turn({ ...turn("dm", absent), liveActor: true })).reply, "absent");const command = `test "$${key}" = u1-gmail && echo authenticated`;- const selected = `!execute ${JSON.stringify({ command, credentials: ["connector_gmail_googleapis_com_default"] })}`;+ const selected = `!execute ${JSON.stringify({ command, credentials: ["connector:gmail.googleapis.com:default"] })}`;assert.equal((await built.app.turn({ ...turn("dm", selected), liveActor: true })).reply, "authenticated");assert.equal((await built.app.turn({ ...turn("dm", absent), liveActor: true })).reply, "absent");assert.equal((await built.app.turn(turn("channel", absent))).reply, "absent");@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ for (const surface of ["cron", "loop"]) {const key = envKey("gmail.googleapis.com");const absent = `!run test -z "$${key}" && test -z "$OWNER_TOKEN" && echo absent`;assert.equal((await built.app.turn(request(absent))).reply, "absent");- const selected = `!execute ${JSON.stringify({ command: `test "$${key}" = u1-gmail && test "$OWNER_TOKEN" = owner-secret && echo authenticated`, credentials: ["connector_gmail_googleapis_com_default", credentialHandle(saved.id)] })}`;+ const selected = `!execute ${JSON.stringify({ command: `test "$${key}" = u1-gmail && test "$OWNER_TOKEN" = owner-secret && echo authenticated`, credentials: ["connector:gmail.googleapis.com:default", credentialHandle(saved)] })}`;assert.equal((await built.app.turn(request(selected))).reply, "authenticated");assert.equal((await built.app.turn(request(absent))).reply, "absent");await assert.rejects(@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ for (const surface of ["cron", "loop"]) {);await assert.rejects(built.app.turn(- request(`!execute ${JSON.stringify({ command: "true", credentials: [credentialHandle(other.id)] })}`),+ request(`!execute ${JSON.stringify({ command: "true", credentials: [credentialHandle(other)] })}`),),/not available/,);@@ -280,11 +280,11 @@ for (const bulkInventory of [false, true])};const prompt = await built.app.turn({ ...turn("dm", "!sysprompt"), liveActor: true });assert.deepEqual(accesses, []);- assert.match(prompt.reply ?? "", /connector_gmail_googleapis_com_company/);- if (expiredPersonal) assert.doesNotMatch(prompt.reply ?? "", /connector_gmail_googleapis_com_personal/);- else assert.match(prompt.reply ?? "", /connector_gmail_googleapis_com_personal/);+ assert.match(prompt.reply ?? "", /connector:gmail.googleapis.com:company/);+ if (expiredPersonal) assert.doesNotMatch(prompt.reply ?? "", /connector:gmail.googleapis.com:personal/);+ else assert.match(prompt.reply ?? "", /connector:gmail.googleapis.com:personal/);for (const account of expiredPersonal ? ["company"] : ["personal", "company"]) {- const text = `!execute ${JSON.stringify({ command: `test "$${envKey(host)}" = ${account}-token && echo selected`, credentials: [`connector_gmail_googleapis_com_${account}`] })}`;+ const text = `!execute ${JSON.stringify({ command: `test "$${envKey(host)}" = ${account}-token && echo selected`, credentials: [`connector:gmail.googleapis.com:${account}`] })}`;assert.equal((await built.app.turn({ ...turn("dm", text), liveActor: true })).reply, "selected");}assert.deepEqual(accesses, expiredPersonal ? ["company"] : ["personal", "company"]);@@ -336,8 +336,8 @@ test("explicit default OAuth accounts remain discoverable through bulk metadata"}),);const prompt = await built.app.turn({ ...turn("dm", "!sysprompt"), liveActor: true });- assert.match(prompt.reply ?? "", /connector_gmail_googleapis_com_default/);- const text = `!execute ${JSON.stringify({ command: `test "$${envKey(host)}" = explicit-default-token && echo selected`, credentials: ["connector_gmail_googleapis_com_default"] })}`;+ assert.match(prompt.reply ?? "", /connector:gmail.googleapis.com:default/);+ const text = `!execute ${JSON.stringify({ command: `test "$${envKey(host)}" = explicit-default-token && echo selected`, credentials: ["connector:gmail.googleapis.com:default"] })}`;assert.equal((await built.app.turn({ ...turn("dm", text), liveActor: true })).reply, "selected");});@@ -367,10 +367,10 @@ for (const mixedOAuth of [false, true, "expired-default"] as const)}),);const prompt = await built.app.turn({ ...turn("dm", "!sysprompt"), liveActor: true });- assert.match(prompt.reply ?? "", /connector_gmail_googleapis_com_default.*configured operator fallback/);- if (mixedOAuth === true) assert.match(prompt.reply ?? "", /connector_gmail_googleapis_com_personal/);+ assert.match(prompt.reply ?? "", /connector:gmail.googleapis.com:default.*configured operator fallback/);+ if (mixedOAuth === true) assert.match(prompt.reply ?? "", /connector:gmail.googleapis.com:personal/);assert.equal(reads, 0);- const text = `!execute ${JSON.stringify({ command: `test "$${envKey(host)}" = operator-fallback-token && echo selected`, credentials: ["connector_gmail_googleapis_com_default"] })}`;+ const text = `!execute ${JSON.stringify({ command: `test "$${envKey(host)}" = operator-fallback-token && echo selected`, credentials: ["connector:gmail.googleapis.com:default"] })}`;if (value) assert.equal((await built.app.turn({ ...turn("dm", text), liveActor: true })).reply, "selected");else await assert.rejects(built.app.turn({ ...turn("dm", text), liveActor: true }), /no longer available/);assert.equal(reads, value ? 1 : 2);diff --git a/test/keychain-ask.test.ts b/test/keychain-ask.test.tsindex bb8600bf4..ce2d8eee3 100644--- a/test/keychain-ask.test.ts+++ b/test/keychain-ask.test.ts@@ -532,7 +532,6 @@ test("manifest: the requester-side ledger names no ask ids or purposes, and asksmembers: [{ id: "U_BOB" }],entriesByOwner: new Map(),scopeGrants: [],- injected: [],scopeAsks: [pending, declined],});assert.match(channel, /Asks sent from this conversation:/);@@ -540,7 +539,7 @@ test("manifest: the requester-side ledger names no ask ids or purposes, and asksassert.match(channel, /- request to U_ALICE: declined/);assert.match(channel, /`request-access` skill/, "the manifest names the request skill");assert.match(channel, /approval card/);- assert.match(channel, /nothing said in chat, by anyone, is approval/);+ assert.match(channel, /requires an explicit grant/);assert.ok(!channel.includes("/v1/keychain/grants"), "no approval-by-POST ladder");for (const leak of [pending.id, declined.id, pending.purpose, "not for prod"])assert.ok(!channel.includes(leak), `manifest leaks ${leak}`);@@ -569,7 +568,6 @@ test("manifest: the requester-side ledger names no ask ids or purposes, and asks],]),scopeGrants: [],- injected: [],scopeAsks: [pending, declined],});assert.ok(!dm.includes("Asks waiting on you"), "the owner answers on the card, not in chat");diff --git a/test/keychain.test.ts b/test/keychain.test.tsindex 4af3f8ce6..b9f1c754c 100644--- a/test/keychain.test.ts+++ b/test/keychain.test.ts@@ -468,7 +468,6 @@ describe("connectors are grantable like any keychain record", () => {entriesByOwner: new Map(),connectorsByOwner,scopeGrants: [],- injected: [],});assert.match(md, /connected app gmail\.googleapis\.com/);assert.match(md, /credential id/);@@ -816,12 +815,11 @@ test("manifest: explains itself in a bare channel, lists credentials + protocolmembers: [{ id: "U1" }],entriesByOwner: new Map(),scopeGrants: [],- injected: [],});- assert.match(empty, /## Teammate keychains/);- assert.match(empty, /No keychain credentials registered yet/);+ assert.match(empty, /## Credentials/);+ assert.match(empty, /No credentials available/);assert.match(empty, /`request-access` skill/);- assert.match(empty, /approval card; nothing said in chat, by anyone, is approval/);+ assert.doesNotMatch(empty, /Teammate keychains/);assert.ok(!empty.includes("/v1/keychain/grants"), "no chat-driven approval route");const detected = renderKeychainManifest({@@ -831,11 +829,11 @@ test("manifest: explains itself in a bare channel, lists credentials + protocolmembers: [{ id: "U2" }, { id: "U1", displayName: "Alice" }],entriesByOwner: new Map(),scopeGrants: [],- injected: [],detectedByOwner: new Map([["U1", ["GitHub", "AWS SSO"]]]),});- assert.match(detected, /Detected but NOT registered/);- assert.match(detected, /Alice \(U1\): AWS SSO, GitHub — signed in on their own computer/);+ assert.match(detected, /NOT registered or grantable/);+ assert.match(detected, /### Alice \(U1\)/);+ assert.match(detected, /AWS SSO — detected/);const k = kc();const cred = await k.save(GH);@@ -853,23 +851,22 @@ test("manifest: explains itself in a bare channel, lists credentials + protocolmembers: [{ id: "U2" }, { id: "U1", displayName: "Alice" }],entriesByOwner: new Map([["U1", await k.listByOwner("U1")]]),scopeGrants: [{ grant, credential: cred }],- injected: [+ execution: [{credentialId: cred.id,ownerId: "U1",- service: "github",- env: [{ key: "GITHUB_TOKEN", value: "x" }],- grantId: grant.id,- purpose: grant.purpose,+ handle: credentialHandle(cred),+ description: "github",+ scope: "scoped",},],});- assert.match(block, /## Teammate keychains/);- assert.match(block, /Alice \(U1\): github/);- assert.match(block, new RegExp(`credential id \`${cred.id}\``));+ assert.match(block, /## Credentials/);+ assert.match(block, /### Alice \(U1\)/);+ assert.match(block, new RegExp(`github:${cred.id}`));assert.match(block, /STANDING grant .*gh for repo work here/);- assert.match(block, /kc_[a-f0-9]{12}.*GITHUB_TOKEN/);- assert.match(block, /execute tool.*credentials field/);+ assert.match(block, /github:[a-f0-9]+.*GITHUB_TOKEN/);+ assert.match(block, /select them in execute.credentials/);assert.ok(!block.includes("/v1/keychain/grants"));const login = renderKeychainManifest({@@ -879,17 +876,13 @@ test("manifest: explains itself in a bare channel, lists credentials + protocolmembers: [{ id: "U2" }],entriesByOwner: new Map(),scopeGrants: [],- injected: [+ execution: [{credentialId: "c1",ownerId: "U1",- service: "doordash",- env: [- { key: "DOORDASH_EMAIL", value: "x" },- { key: "DOORDASH_PASSWORD", value: "y" },- ],- grantId: "g1",- purpose: "billing",+ handle: "doordash:c1",+ description: "provides `DOORDASH_EMAIL` + `DOORDASH_PASSWORD`",+ scope: "scoped",},],});@@ -913,12 +906,11 @@ test("manifest: own credentials need no grant but require explicit execution reqmembers: [{ id: "U1", displayName: "Alice" }],entriesByOwner: new Map([["U1", await k.listByOwner("U1")]]),scopeGrants: [],- injected: [],});- assert.match(own, /file-login.*execute.credentials needs no grant/);- assert.match(own, /their own — execute.credentials needs no grant/);- assert.match(own, /including background and scheduled turns/);- assert.match(own, /Request every credential, including saved CLI logins, explicitly using execute.credentials/);+ assert.match(own, /file-login.*no grant needed/);+ assert.match(own, /own; no grant needed/);+ assert.match(own, /including background turns/);+ assert.doesNotMatch(own, /Teammate keychains/);assert.ok(!own.includes("no grant for this conversation"));assert.match(own,@@ -934,7 +926,6 @@ test("manifest: own credentials need no grant but require explicit execution reqmembers: [{ id: "U2" }, { id: "U1", displayName: "Alice" }],entriesByOwner: new Map([["U1", await k.listByOwner("U1")]]),scopeGrants: [],- injected: [],});assert.match(other, /no grant for this conversation/);assert.match(other, /EXPIRED — ask the owner to re-auth before requesting a grant/);@@ -947,7 +938,6 @@ test("manifest: own credentials need no grant but require explicit execution reqmembers: [{ id: "U1", displayName: "Alice" }],entriesByOwner: new Map([["U1", await k.listByOwner("U1")]]),scopeGrants: [],- injected: [],});assert.ok(!channel.includes("access is implied"),@@ -1036,7 +1026,7 @@ describe("/v1/keychain routes (capability-authed)", () => {assert.equal(res.status, 200);const { credential } = (await res.json()) as any;assert.equal(credential.ownerId, "U1");- assert.equal(credential.credentialHandle, credentialHandle(credential.id));+ assert.equal(credential.credentialHandle, credentialHandle(credential));assert.ok(!JSON.stringify(credential).includes("ghp_u1"));const mine = (await (await get("/v1/keychain/credentials", await capFor("U1"))).json()) as any;@@ -1281,8 +1271,8 @@ test("turn e2e: prompt lists exact handles and keychain env credentials are neveconst audience = [{ externalId: "U_ASKER" }, { externalId: "U_OWNER", displayName: "Alice" }];const sys = await built.app.turn(channelTurn("!sysprompt", "U_ASKER", audience));assert.equal(sys.status, "ok");- assert.match(sys.reply ?? "", /## Teammate keychains/);- assert.match(sys.reply ?? "", /Alice \(U_OWNER\): github/);+ assert.match(sys.reply ?? "", /## Credentials/);+ assert.match(sys.reply ?? "", /### Alice \(U_OWNER\)/);assert.match(sys.reply ?? "", /no grant for this conversation/);assert.ok(!(sys.reply ?? "").includes("ghp_e2e"), "prompt never carries the secret");await selectDefaultSandbox(built, "U_ASKER", "channel:C1");@@ -1305,7 +1295,7 @@ test("turn e2e: prompt lists exact handles and keychain env credentials are neveconst sys2 = await built.app.turn(channelTurn("!sysprompt", "U_ASKER", audience));assert.match(sys2.reply ?? "", /STANDING grant .*use my gh here for repo work/);- assert.match(sys2.reply ?? "", new RegExp(`kc_${cred.id.slice(0, 12)}`));+ assert.match(sys2.reply ?? "", new RegExp(`github:${cred.id}`));await selectDefaultSandbox(built, "U_OWNER", "personal:U_OWNER");mark = fakeSprites.execScripts().length;@@ -1320,7 +1310,7 @@ test("turn e2e: prompt lists exact handles and keychain env credentials are neveassert.ok(!execScriptsMention("ghp_e2e", mark), "unrequested secrets are never materialized");const selected = await built.app.turn({...dm,- text: `!execute ${JSON.stringify({ command: 'test "$GITHUB_TOKEN" = ghp_e2e && echo selected', credentials: [credentialHandle(cred.id)] })}`,+ text: `!execute ${JSON.stringify({ command: 'test "$GITHUB_TOKEN" = ghp_e2e && echo selected', credentials: [credentialHandle(cred)] })}`,});assert.equal(selected.reply, "selected");assert.deepEqual(resolved, [cred.id]);@@ -1441,7 +1431,6 @@ test("manifest timestamps stay stable until credentials and pending asks actuallmembers: [{ id: "U1" }],entriesByOwner: new Map([["U1", await k.listByOwner("U1")]]),scopeGrants: [],- injected: [],scopeAsks: await k.listAsks({ requesterScopeId: "channel:C1" }),},now,@@ -1513,14 +1502,12 @@ test("manifest inventories are canonical across discovery order without mutatingentriesByOwner: await k.listByOwners(["U2", "U1"]),connectorsByOwner: await k.listConnectorsByOwners(["U2", "U1"]),scopeGrants: [],- injected: ["z", "a"].map((id) => ({+ execution: ["z", "a"].map((id) => ({credentialId: id,ownerId: "U1",- service: id,- env: [- { key: "Z", value: "z" },- { key: "A", value: "a" },- ],+ handle: `${id}:${id}`,+ description: id,+ scope: "scoped",})),detectedByOwner: new Map([["U1", ["zsh", "aws"]],@@ -1532,8 +1519,7 @@ test("manifest inventories are canonical across discovery order without mutatingconst first = renderKeychainManifest(input, 1000);const reversed = structuredClone(input);reversed.members.reverse();- reversed.injected.reverse();- for (const entry of reversed.injected) entry.env.reverse();+ reversed.execution!.reverse();for (const entries of reversed.entriesByOwner.values()) {entries.reverse();for (const entry of entries) {@@ -1551,3 +1537,113 @@ test("manifest inventories are canonical across discovery order without mutatingreversed.connectorsByOwner!.get("U1")![0]!.needsReconnect = true;assert.notEqual(renderKeychainManifest(reversed, 1000), first);});++test("manifest merges credential representations without conflating login identities or execution scopes", async () => {+ const k = kc();+ const ownerId = "[email protected]";+ await k.setConnectorToken("gmail.googleapis.com", ownerId, { accessToken: "private-token", expiresAt: 5000 });+ const connector = (await k.listConnectorsByOwners([ownerId])).get(ownerId)![0]!;+ const credential = (await k.getCredential(connector.credentialId))!;+ const grant = await k.createGrant({+ ownerId,+ credentialId: credential.id,+ audienceScopeId: "channel:C1",+ mode: "standing",+ purpose: "mail",+ });+ const first = await k.save({+ ownerId,+ service: "aws",+ envKey: "AWS_TOKEN",+ secret: "first-secret",+ accountLabel: "work",+ expiresAt: 900,+ });+ const second = await k.save({+ ownerId,+ service: "aws",+ envKey: "OTHER_AWS_TOKEN",+ secret: "second-secret",+ accountLabel: "personal",+ expiresAt: 5000,+ });+ const input: Parameters<typeof renderKeychainManifest>[0] = {+ scopeId: "channel:C1",+ conversationKind: "channel",+ openSpeakerKeychain: true,+ actorId: "[email protected]",+ members: [{ id: "[email protected]", displayName: "Alice" }],+ entriesByOwner: new Map([["[email protected]", [first, second]]]),+ connectorsByOwner: new Map([["[email protected]", [{ ...connector, needsReconnect: true }]]]),+ scopeGrants: [{ grant, credential }],+ execution: [+ {+ handle: credentialHandle(credential),+ ownerId,+ credentialId: credential.id,+ scope: "scoped",+ description: "mail grant",+ },+ {+ handle: "connector:gmail.googleapis.com:default",+ ownerId,+ credentialId: credential.id,+ scope: "owner",+ description: "own mail",+ },+ ...[first, second].map((c) => ({+ handle: credentialHandle(c),+ ownerId,+ credentialId: c.id,+ scope: "owner" as const,+ description: "aws",+ })),+ ],+ };+ const rendered = renderKeychainManifest(input, 1000);+ assert.equal(rendered.split("### ").length - 1, 1);+ assert.equal(rendered.split("connected app gmail.googleapis.com").length - 1, 1);+ assert.ok(rendered.includes(`\`${credentialHandle(credential)}\` (execute scope \`scoped\`)`));+ assert.ok(rendered.includes("`connector:gmail.googleapis.com:default` (execute scope `owner`)"));+ assert.match(rendered, /NEEDS RECONNECT/);+ assert.match(rendered, /token expires at/);+ assert.match(rendered, /account work, EXPIRED/);+ assert.match(rendered, /account personal, expires at/);+ assert.notEqual(credentialHandle(first), credentialHandle(second));+ for (const secret of ["private-token", "first-secret", "second-secret"]) assert.ok(!rendered.includes(secret));+ input.execution!.reverse();+ assert.equal(renderKeychainManifest(input, 1000), rendered);+});++test("granted connector keeps account and refresh semantics when owner is absent from roster", async () => {+ const k = kc(() => 1000);+ await k.setConnectorToken("gmail.googleapis.com", "U_OWNER", {+ accessToken: "old-token",+ refreshToken: "refresh-token",+ expiresAt: 900,+ accountType: "company",+ });+ const connector = (await k.listConnectorsByOwners(["U_OWNER"])).get("U_OWNER")![0]!;+ const credential = (await k.getCredential(connector.credentialId))!;+ const grant = await k.createGrant({+ ownerId: "U_OWNER",+ credentialId: credential.id,+ audienceScopeId: "channel:C1",+ mode: "standing",+ purpose: "mail",+ });+ const rendered = renderKeychainManifest(+ {+ scopeId: "channel:C1",+ conversationKind: "channel",+ actorId: "U_ACTOR",+ members: [{ id: "U_ACTOR" }],+ entriesByOwner: new Map(),+ scopeGrants: [{ grant, credential }],+ },+ 1000,+ );+ assert.match(rendered, /connected app gmail\.googleapis\.com, account company/);+ assert.match(rendered, /STANDING grant/);+ assert.doesNotMatch(rendered, /EXPIRED|NEEDS RECONNECT|refresh-token|old-token/);+});diff --git a/test/open-continuity-http.test.ts b/test/open-continuity-http.test.tsindex 97f5cbe3f..14bbea2b6 100644--- a/test/open-continuity-http.test.ts+++ b/test/open-continuity-http.test.ts@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ test("HTTP Open shared cron isolates synthetic owner credential and revokes resoconst created = await b.request("POST", "/v1/crons", owner, {title: "Owner keychain proof",schedule: { everyMs: 3600000 },- task: `!proof ${JSON.stringify({ ownerAuth: true, credentials: [credentialHandle(credential.id)], command: 'test "$CONTINUITY_PROOF_TOKEN" = "synthetic-owner-sentinel" && printf owner-credential-present' })}`,+ task: `!proof ${JSON.stringify({ ownerAuth: true, credentials: [credentialHandle(credential)], command: 'test "$CONTINUITY_PROOF_TOKEN" = "synthetic-owner-sentinel" && printf owner-credential-present' })}`,});assert.equal(created.status, 200, JSON.stringify(created.body));assert.equal(created.body.cron.runAs, "scopeShared");@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ for (const isPrivate of [false, true]) {const response = await b.request("POST", "/v1/crons", await b.cap("alice"), {title: "Opt-out proof",schedule: { everyMs: 3600000 },- task: `!proof ${JSON.stringify({ ownerAuth: true, credentials: [credentialHandle(credential.id)], command: 'test "$CONTINUITY_VETO_TOKEN" = "synthetic-veto-sentinel" && printf veto-credential-present' })}`,+ task: `!proof ${JSON.stringify({ ownerAuth: true, credentials: [credentialHandle(credential)], command: 'test "$CONTINUITY_VETO_TOKEN" = "synthetic-veto-sentinel" && printf veto-credential-present' })}`,});assert.equal(response.status, 200, JSON.stringify(response.body));const id = response.body.cron.id;@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ test("HTTP legacy explicit private shared cron remains owner-authorized under isrunAs: "scopeShared",members,schedule: { everyMs: 3600000 },- action: `!proof ${JSON.stringify({ ownerAuth: true, credentials: [credentialHandle(credential.id)], command: 'test "$CONTINUITY_LEGACY_TOKEN" = "synthetic-legacy-sentinel" && printf legacy-credential-present' })}`,+ action: `!proof ${JSON.stringify({ ownerAuth: true, credentials: [credentialHandle(credential)], command: 'test "$CONTINUITY_LEGACY_TOKEN" = "synthetic-legacy-sentinel" && printf legacy-credential-present' })}`,destination: { type: "slack", target: "public-room", audienceScopeId: "channel:public-room" },});assert.equal(cron.ownerResourcesRequireOpen, undefined);diff --git a/test/own-credential-automation.test.ts b/test/own-credential-automation.test.tsindex 8bad6bcdf..e5a08e8c8 100644--- a/test/own-credential-automation.test.ts+++ b/test/own-credential-automation.test.ts@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ async function setup() {});const read = `!execute ${JSON.stringify({command: 'cat "$HOME/.aws/sso/cache/session.json"',- credentials: [credentialHandle(credential.id)],+ credentials: [credentialHandle(credential)],})}`;return { built, read };}diff --git a/test/save-login.test.ts b/test/save-login.test.tsindex f52975b6c..4189a6921 100644--- a/test/save-login.test.ts+++ b/test/save-login.test.ts@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ test("save-login uploads a private login home and re-saving keeps the entry andreturn stdout;};- assert.match(await login("first"), /^saved aws \(2 files\) as kc_/);+ assert.match(await login("first"), /^saved aws \(2 files\) as aws:/);const [saved] = await keychain.listByOwner("U1");const grant = await keychain.createGrant({credentialId: saved!.id,diff --git a/test/service-credential-route.test.ts b/test/service-credential-route.test.tsindex 333510e74..64748e7a2 100644--- a/test/service-credential-route.test.ts+++ b/test/service-credential-route.test.ts@@ -1205,15 +1205,10 @@ test("the system prompt advertises an entitled credential (host/methods/paths) s});const res = await built.app.turn(dm("!sysprompt"));const reply = res.reply ?? "";- assert.match(reply, /Shared org credentials available to you/);- assert.match(reply, /\/v1\/credentials\/broker/);- assert.match(reply, /x-agent-capability: \$AGENT_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN/);+ assert.match(reply, /### Organization/);assert.match(reply, /x-firehose.*X firehose.*api\.x\.com.*GET.*\/2\/tweets\/search\//s);- assert.match(reply, /clone\/fetch\/push using a shared org credential/);- assert.match(reply, /configured org account, not automatically the requesting user's account/);- assert.match(reply, /live personal OAuth connector does not switch this route's identity/);- assert.match(reply, /Choose among credentials authorized for this conversation/);- assert.match(reply, /does not identify the upstream username/);+ assert.match(reply, /use-shared-credential/);+ assert.doesNotMatch(reply, /curl -fsS -X POST.*credentials\/broker/);});test("the system prompt does NOT advertise a credential the session isn't entitled to", async () => {@@ -1232,7 +1227,7 @@ test("the system prompt does NOT advertise a credential the session isn't entitlgrantedBy: "admin",});const res = await built.app.turn(dm("!sysprompt"));- assert.doesNotMatch(res.reply ?? "", /Shared org credentials available to you/);+ assert.doesNotMatch(res.reply ?? "", /### Organization/);});test("the published-apps switch defaults on, round-trips, survives a partial update, and rejects non-booleans", async () => {@@ -1374,7 +1369,7 @@ test("credential prompt blocks are byte-identical across inventory and policy orassert.equal(first.status, "ok");assert.match(first.reply ?? "", /service_z-service/);assert.match(first.reply ?? "", /service_a-service/);- assert.match(first.reply ?? "", /Shared org credentials available to you/);+ assert.match(first.reply ?? "", /### Organization/);const list = built.serviceCreds.listServiceCredentials.bind(built.serviceCreds);built.serviceCreds.listServiceCredentials = async (...args) =>(await list(...args)).reverse().map((record) => ({diff --git a/test/sharing-context-e2e.test.ts b/test/sharing-context-e2e.test.tsindex 4144966bf..3740e26a5 100644--- a/test/sharing-context-e2e.test.ts+++ b/test/sharing-context-e2e.test.ts@@ -436,21 +436,21 @@ test("Open speaker keychain uses a disposable computer, follows the speaker, andservice: "custom-cli",files: [{ path: ".custom-cli/auth", contentBase64: Buffer.from(`file_${id}`).toString("base64") }],});- handles.set(id, [credentialHandle(credential.id), credentialHandle(login.id)]);+ handles.set(id, [credentialHandle(credential), credentialHandle(login)]);await b.keychain.setConnectorToken("gmail.googleapis.com", id, {accessToken: `gmail_${id}`,expiresAt: Date.now() + 3600000,});}const prompt = await b.turn("!sysprompt", true);- assert.match(prompt, /execute scope:"owner"/);- assert.match(prompt, /U1[^\n]*npm[^\n]*no grant needed/);- assert.match(prompt, /U2[^\n]*npm[^\n]*no grant for this conversation/);+ assert.match(prompt, /execute scope `owner`/);+ assert.match(prompt, /### U1\n(?:(?!###)[\s\S])*npm[^\n]*own; Open live turn only/);+ assert.match(prompt, /### U2\n(?:(?!###)[\s\S])*npm[^\n]*no grant for this conversation/);assert.ok(!prompt.includes("npm_U1"));await b.workspace.write("channel:C1", "room-only.txt", "room_data");const probe = `python3 -c 'import os,pathlib; p=pathlib.Path.home()/".custom-cli/auth"; print("|".join([os.getenv("NPM_TOKEN","unset"),os.getenv("VAULT_TOKEN_GMAIL_GOOGLEAPIS_COM","unset"),p.read_text() if p.exists() else "absent",os.getenv("AGENT_API_TOKEN","unset"),"room" if pathlib.Path("room-only.txt").exists() else "isolated"]))'`;const selected = (id = "U1") =>- `!execute ${JSON.stringify({ command: probe.replace('os.getenv("NPM_TOKEN","unset")', `str(os.getenv("NPM_TOKEN") == "npm_${id}")`).replace('os.getenv("VAULT_TOKEN_GMAIL_GOOGLEAPIS_COM","unset")', `str(os.getenv("VAULT_TOKEN_GMAIL_GOOGLEAPIS_COM") == "gmail_${id}")`), ownerAuth: true, credentials: [...handles.get(id)!, "connector_gmail_googleapis_com_default"] })}`;+ `!execute ${JSON.stringify({ command: probe.replace('os.getenv("NPM_TOKEN","unset")', `str(os.getenv("NPM_TOKEN") == "npm_${id}")`).replace('os.getenv("VAULT_TOKEN_GMAIL_GOOGLEAPIS_COM","unset")', `str(os.getenv("VAULT_TOKEN_GMAIL_GOOGLEAPIS_COM") == "gmail_${id}")`), ownerAuth: true, credentials: [...handles.get(id)!, "connector:gmail.googleapis.com:default"] })}`;assert.equal(await b.turn(selected(), true), "True|True|file_U1|unset|isolated");assert.equal(await b.turn(selected("U2"), true, "U2"), "True|True|file_U2|unset|isolated");for (const id of ["U1", "U2", "U1"]) {@@ -460,8 +460,8 @@ test("Open speaker keychain uses a disposable computer, follows the speaker, and);}const ambientPrompt = await b.turn("!sysprompt", true, "U2", { origin: { kind: "ambient", live: true } });- assert.match(ambientPrompt, /U2[^\n]*npm[^\n]*no grant needed/);- assert.match(ambientPrompt, /U1[^\n]*npm[^\n]*no grant for this conversation/);+ assert.match(ambientPrompt, /### U2\n(?:(?!###)[\s\S])*npm[^\n]*own; Open live turn only/);+ assert.match(ambientPrompt, /### U1\n(?:(?!###)[\s\S])*npm[^\n]*no grant for this conversation/);assert.match(await b.turn(`!run ${probe}`, true, "U2"), /^unset\|unset\|absent\|/);await b.directory.replaceGroups([{ groupId: "G1", principalId: "U1" },