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Multiplayer agent harness for work.

credential broker: refuse percent-encoded parent traversal in paths

Regan Bellfd890a8a77e1
diff --git a/src/api/credential-broker.ts b/src/api/credential-broker.ts
index bbdc5bdbc..7555935e4 100644
--- a/src/api/credential-broker.ts
+++ b/src/api/credential-broker.ts
@@ -51,7 +51,33 @@ function brokerHostMatches(requestHost: string, pinnedHost: string): boolean {
return h === p || h.endsWith(`.${p}`);
}
+/**
+ * A pathname that could resolve to a parent directory upstream must never pass
+ * the prefix check. The prefix match runs on the RAW pathname, but upstream
+ * servers decode percent-escapes and normalize dot segments — so `..` hidden
+ * behind any layer of percent-encoding (`..%2f`, `%2e%2e/`, `%252e%252e`) can
+ * escape the allowed prefix after we've approved it. Decode to a fixed point
+ * (bounded) and refuse any form that ever contains a dot segment; refuse
+ * undecodable paths outright.
+ */
+function resolvesToParentSegment(pathname: string): boolean {
+ let current = pathname;
+ for (let depth = 0; depth < 4; depth++) {
+ let decoded: string;
+ try {
+ decoded = decodeURIComponent(current);
+ } catch {
+ return true;
+ }
+ if (decoded.split(/[/\\]/).some((seg) => seg === ".." || seg === ".")) return true;
+ if (decoded === current) return false;
+ current = decoded;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
export function brokerPathAllowed(pathname: string, prefixes?: string[]): boolean {
+ if (resolvesToParentSegment(pathname)) return false;
const allow = prefixes && prefixes.length ? prefixes : ["/"];
return allow.some((pre) =>
pre.endsWith("/") ? pathname.startsWith(pre) : pathname === pre || pathname.startsWith(`${pre}/`),
diff --git a/test/credential-broker.test.ts b/test/credential-broker.test.ts
index ab4266c59..8e2f9dfd3 100644
--- a/test/credential-broker.test.ts
+++ b/test/credential-broker.test.ts
@@ -218,6 +218,39 @@ test("WHAT path allowlist: an out-of-allowlist path is refused", async () => {
assert.equal(cap.calls.length, 0);
});
+test("WHAT path allowlist: percent-encoded parent traversal never escapes the prefix", async () => {
+ const mk = () => reader({ slug: "x-firehose", allowedPathPrefixes: ["/2/tweets/search"] });
+ const evil = [
+ "https://api.x.com/2/tweets/search/../secrets", // literal
+ "https://api.x.com/2/tweets/search/..%2fsecrets", // encoded slash
+ "https://api.x.com/2/tweets/search/%2e%2e/secrets", // encoded dots (URL-normalized out of prefix)
+ "https://api.x.com/2/tweets/search/%2e%2e%2fsecrets", // fully encoded
+ "https://api.x.com/2/tweets/search/%252e%252e%252fsecrets", // double-encoded
+ "https://api.x.com/2/tweets/search/..%5csecrets", // encoded backslash
+ "https://api.x.com/2/tweets/search/%zz", // undecodable
+ ];
+ for (const url of evil) {
+ const cap = captureFetch();
+ const r = await brokerCredentialCall(
+ base({ reader: mk(), body: { credential: "x-firehose", url }, fetchImpl: cap.fetch }),
+ );
+ assert.equal(r.status, 403, url);
+ assert.match(JSON.stringify(r.json), /path_not_allowed/, url);
+ assert.equal(cap.calls.length, 0, `no upstream fetch for ${url}`);
+ }
+ // benign lookalikes still pass: dots inside a segment are not dot segments
+ const cap = captureFetch();
+ const ok = await brokerCredentialCall(
+ base({
+ reader: mk(),
+ body: { credential: "x-firehose", url: "https://api.x.com/2/tweets/search/v1..v2/some%20file" },
+ fetchImpl: cap.fetch,
+ }),
+ );
+ assert.equal(ok.status, 200);
+ assert.equal(cap.calls.length, 1);
+});
+
test("a disabled credential is refused even when the token still names it (live re-check)", async () => {
const cap = captureFetch();
const r = await brokerCredentialCall(
diff --git a/test/git-http-broker.test.ts b/test/git-http-broker.test.ts
index 1d83681f8..13d7ec1e0 100644
--- a/test/git-http-broker.test.ts
+++ b/test/git-http-broker.test.ts
@@ -202,3 +202,37 @@ test("git HTTP broker refuses an env-delivery record like a missing credential",
assert.equal(c.res.statusCode, 404);
assert.equal(fetched, false, "no upstream git fetch happens");
});
+
+test("git HTTP broker refuses encoded parent traversal past the repo path", async () => {
+ for (const path of [
+ "/v1/credentials/git/gitlab/acme/repo.git/..%2fother-repo.git/info/refs",
+ "/v1/credentials/git/gitlab/acme/repo.git/%2e%2e%2fother-repo.git/info/refs",
+ "/v1/credentials/git/gitlab/acme/repo.git/%252e%252e%252fother/info/refs",
+ ]) {
+ let fetched = false;
+ const deps: ServerDeps = {
+ control: {} as ServerDeps["control"],
+ serviceCreds: {
+ getServiceCredentialSecret: async () => ({
+ slug: "gitlab",
+ name: "GitLab git",
+ secret: "dXNlcjp0b2tlbg==",
+ host: "gitlab.example",
+ injection: { scheme: "Basic " },
+ allowedMethods: ["GET", "POST"],
+ allowedPathPrefixes: ["/acme/repo.git"],
+ enabled: true,
+ }),
+ } as unknown as ServerDeps["serviceCreds"],
+ gitHttpFetch: async () => {
+ fetched = true;
+ return { status: 200, headers: {}, body: Readable.from(["0000"]) };
+ },
+ };
+ const c = await ctx(path, "GET", deps);
+ await brokerGitHttp(c);
+ assert.equal(c.res.statusCode, 403, path);
+ assert.match(await text(c.res), /path_not_allowed/);
+ assert.equal(fetched, false, "no upstream git fetch happens");
+ }
+});