"rsync for cloud storage" - Google Drive, S3, Dropbox, Backblaze B2, One Drive, Swift, Hubic, Wasabi, Google Cloud Storage, Azure Blob, Azure Files, Yandex Files
Go azure-blobazure-blob-storageazure-filesbackblaze-b2cloud-storagedropboxencryptionftpfuse-filesystemgogolanggoogle-cloud-storagegoogle-driveonedriveopenstack-swiftrclones3sftpsyncwebdav
//go:build !openbsd && !plan9
package local
import (
"context"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/pkg/xattr"
"github.com/rclone/rclone/fs"
"github.com/rclone/rclone/fstest"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestXattrThroughPlantedSymlinkBlocked checks user metadata (xattrs)
// can't be written outside the root through a planted symlink with
// --links, while in-tree writes still work.
func TestXattrThroughPlantedSymlinkBlocked(t *testing.T) {
if !xattrSupported {
t.Skip("xattrs not supported on this OS")
}
skipIfNoSymlinks(t)
ctx := context.Background()
r := fstest.NewRun(t)
f := r.Flocal.(*Fs)
linksMode(f)
metadata := fs.Metadata{
"pwned": "attacker-controlled-value",
}
// Control: an in-tree directory gets the xattr as normal.
_, err := f.MkdirMetadata(ctx, "sub", metadata)
require.NoError(t, err)
if f.xattrSupported.Load() == 0 {
t.Skip("xattrs not supported on this filesystem")
}
v, err := xattr.LGet(filepath.Join(f.root, "sub"), "user.pwned")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "attacker-controlled-value", string(v))
// A directory outside the destination, with a pre-existing child,
// whose xattrs the attacker targets.
evil := t.TempDir()
evilDir := filepath.Join(evil, "secret.d")
require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(evilDir, 0700))
evilSub := filepath.Join(evilDir, "sub")
require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(evilSub, 0700))
// The planted symlink dst/pwn -> outside, faithfully reproduced by --links.
require.NoError(t, putLink(ctx, f, "pwn", evilDir))
// The source now presents "pwn/sub" as a directory with attacker-chosen
// user metadata. Applying it must not reach through the planted symlink.
_, err = f.MkdirMetadata(ctx, "pwn/sub", metadata)
require.Error(t, err, "applying metadata through a planted symlink should be refused")
_, err = xattr.LGet(evilSub, "user.pwned")
require.Error(t, err, "xattr escaped through planted symlink to %q", evilSub)
}
// TestXattrWriteOnlyFile checks user metadata can still be set on a
// write-only file with --links, where the confined open can't read it.
func TestXattrWriteOnlyFile(t *testing.T) {
if !xattrSupported {
t.Skip("xattrs not supported on this OS")
}
skipIfNoSymlinks(t)
ctx := context.Background()
r := fstest.NewRun(t)
f := r.Flocal.(*Fs)
linksMode(f)
require.NoError(t, putFile(ctx, f, "wo.txt", "write only"))
path := filepath.Join(f.root, "wo.txt")
require.NoError(t, os.Chmod(path, 0200))
obj, err := f.NewObject(ctx, "wo.txt")
require.NoError(t, err)
o := obj.(*Object)
err = o.setXattr(fs.Metadata{"potato": "chips"})
require.NoError(t, err)
if f.xattrSupported.Load() == 0 {
t.Skip("xattrs not supported on this filesystem")
}
// Reading xattrs needs read permission
require.NoError(t, os.Chmod(path, 0600))
v, err := xattr.LGet(path, "user.potato")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "chips", string(v))
}