🎥 Make videos programmatically with React
<?php
namespace Remotion\LambdaPhp;
use Exception;
use InvalidArgumentException;
class WebhookSignature
{
/**
* Validate that an incoming webhook request was sent by Remotion and that
* its body was not modified in transit.
*
* Pass the webhook secret that was configured when the render was started,
* the raw request body exactly as it was received, and the value of the
* X-Remotion-Signature header. Throws if the request cannot be verified.
*
* The signature covers the raw JSON bytes, so pass the body as it arrived
* (file_get_contents('php://input')) and decode it only after this method
* returns. Decoding and re-encoding the body first can change whitespace and
* how numbers are serialized, which would break the comparison even for a
* genuine request.
*
* This mirrors validateWebhookSignature() from @remotion/lambda/client and
* uses the same scheme: "sha512=" followed by the hex digest of an
* HMAC-SHA512 over the request body, keyed with the webhook secret.
*/
public static function validate(string $secret, string $body, ?string $signatureHeader): void
{
if ($secret === '') {
throw new InvalidArgumentException("No 'secret' was provided to WebhookSignature::validate().");
}
if ($body === '') {
throw new InvalidArgumentException("No 'body' was provided to WebhookSignature::validate().");
}
if ($signatureHeader === null || $signatureHeader === '' || $signatureHeader === 'NO_SECRET_PROVIDED') {
throw new Exception('No webhook signature was provided');
}
$expected = 'sha512=' . hash_hmac('sha512', $body, $secret);
// hash_equals() is constant time and returns false when the lengths
// differ, so an attacker-controlled header cannot leak information
// through the comparison.
if (!hash_equals($expected, $signatureHeader)) {
throw new Exception('Signatures do not match');
}
}
}