RF Sentinel (RFSentinel): free, open-source police detector app for Android. Spots police body cams, Flock ALPR cameras, AirTag trackers, Remote ID drones, smart glasses and fake cell towers from Bluetooth LE and WiFi. No root.
RF Sentinel detection signatures
Every signature has a confidence from 0 to 100, which maps to a tier:
| Tier | Confidence | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| Weak (verify) | below 50 | The identifier is shared with many unrelated products. It shows as an amber highlight. By default it does not sound. |
| Probable | 50–79 | A vendor-specific identifier. It alerts at the default threshold. |
| Strong | 80 and up | A payload tag, or a network name the vendor gives its own devices. |
The confidence ladder, and most of the non-registry signatures, come from the all-cameras-are-beacons signature reference (Apache-2.0). That document explains in detail why each row exists and why some tempting rows were rejected. The rules were written from its values; none of its code is used.
Before shipping, the identifiers were checked against these registries:
- Bluetooth company IDs and 16-bit UUIDs: the Bluetooth SIG assigned-numbers YAML files at bitbucket.org/bluetooth-SIG/public.
- MAC prefixes: the IEEE registry, through Wireshark's weekly copy.
tools/gen_assets.pyfails if any prefix used in code stops matching its expected registrant.
Payload / name / UUID signatures (detect/SignatureEngine.kt)
| Category | Signature | Confidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Body cam | BWCDEVICE ASCII in the service data, manufacturer data or raw advert, matched in either byte order |
90 | ACAB, field-validated against cameras confirmed by eye |
| Body cam | Company ID 0x034D (TASER International) |
60 | SIG |
| Body cam | Service UUID 0xFC81 (Axon), 0xFE6B or 0xFE6C (TASER) |
60 | SIG |
| Body cam | Name contains BodyWorn Remote (Utility Inc.) |
80 | ACAB / nite-oui-collection |
| Body cam | WiFi network starting with AB2-, AB3- or AB4- (an Axon Body camera pairing) |
80 | Axon admin docs, via SignalSweep |
| Body cam | WiFi network starting with AXON- (an Axon device's hotspot; not the Axon12-5g Fleet names) |
75 | Axon admin docs, via SignalSweep |
| Public safety | Company ID 0x04EC, or UUID 0xFD8E / 0xFE04 (Motorola Solutions) |
45 | SIG; mostly two-way radios |
| Public safety | UUID 0xFE79 / 0xFD66 (Zebra) with a factory-serial name (^[A-Z0-9]{2}[A-Z]{3}\d{9}$): unrenamed fleet mobile printer, e.g. e-ticket printers |
50 | SIG; Zebra Link-OS BLE app note; field capture |
| Public safety | UUID 0xFE79 / 0xFD66 (Zebra) with any other name |
30 | SIG; mostly warehouse/retail printers |
| Public safety | Company ID 0x01F1 (Zebra Technologies) without a Zebra printer UUID |
25 | SIG; printers, but also store scanners and handhelds |
| Public safety | Company ID 0x0755 (Brother Industries) |
20 | SIG; RuggedJet / PocketJet in-car printers, mostly home and office printers |
| Public safety | UUID 0xFDE1 / 0xFDCA (Fortin Electronic Systems) |
20 | SIG; vehicle interface modules used in police upfits, also civilian remote starters |
| Public safety | Company ID 0x04BC or UUID 0xFCDA (Dräger) |
35 | SIG; roadside breath / drug screening devices, also hospital and gas-detection gear |
| Public safety | UUID 0xFE22 / 0xFE23 (Zoll Medical) |
40 | SIG, after Wardrive Go's EMS list; ambulance defibrillators and monitors, also hospital gear and the LifeVest a patient can wear |
| Public safety | Company ID 0x0A5F or UUID 0xFC6E (Stryker) |
35 | SIG, after Wardrive Go's EMS list; LIFEPAK monitors and ambulance stretchers, plenty of hospital equipment |
| Public safety | WiFi address in Physio-Control's 40:BD:9E or Stryker's 00:0D:D1 block |
45 | IEEE, after Wardrive Go's EMS list; LIFEPAK monitors send their data over WiFi from ambulances |
| ALPR | WiFi SSID starting with Flock- |
88 | ACAB (ryanohoro, GainSec) |
| ALPR | BLE name FS Ext Battery |
80 | ACAB |
| ALPR | BLE name Penguin-<digits> or FS-<hex> |
70, or 80 with company ID 0x09C8 |
ACAB |
| ALPR | Company ID 0x09C8 with TN + digits (the battery's serial) in its data |
80 | SignalSweep / oui-spy notes |
| ALPR | Service UUID e8ccbb38-9532-46a8-9fe5-1814df172e6f or 20c944c1-add2-42d7-a638-967ee9a26ff6 (Flock battery) |
80 | Flock-You, SquachWatch, SignalSweep |
| ALPR | Wildcard probe requests from a Flock radio-module block (USB WiFi adapter) | 60, or 75 with the Wi-Fi Alliance element 50:6F:9A:16 03 01 03 |
SignalSweep / DeFlock field tests (11 of 12 cameras, 2 false alarms) |
| ALPR | BLE name starting with Flock |
55 | ACAB (loose brand string) |
| ALPR | Probe-request shape 42d75cd1 or d0bbec4c (FlipDeFlock candidates, USB WiFi adapter) |
35, or 50 on a Flock module block | FlipDeFlock (single report each) |
| ALPR | Company ID 0x09C8 alone (XUNTONG, shared silicon) |
45 | SIG / ACAB |
| Audio sensor | 128-bit service UUIDs with short IDs 0x3100 to 0x3500 (Flock Raven) |
80 | ACAB field capture |
| Drone | Service data 0xFFFA with ASTM F3411 app code 0x0D; decoded |
95 | ASTM F3411 / opendroneid |
| Drone | WiFi vendor IE with OUI FA:0B:BC, type 0x0D |
95 | ASTM F3411 |
| Drone | Drone makers' own IEEE blocks (DJI, Parrot, Skydio, Autel /28, Yuneec /28, Hubsan, FIMI, uAvionix Remote ID modules and others); DJI handhelds named Osmo, OM, RS / Ronin or Mic are left out | 60 | IEEE / ACAB |
| Tracker | Apple company ID 0x004C, type 0x12, length 0x19 (separated from owner only) |
70 | ACAB; arXiv 2501.17452 |
| Tracker | Google 0xFEAA service data, frame 0x41 (separated; frame 0x40 = near owner, ignored) |
70 | Find Hub Network spec |
| Tracker | Samsung 0xFD5A / Tile 0xFEED or 0xFEEC service data |
55 | SIG |
| Tracker | Samsung 0xFD59 service data (a SmartTag not set up yet) |
40 | SIG; arXiv 2210.14702 |
| Glasses | Company ID 0x0D53 (Luxottica), 0x03C2 (Snapchat), 0x060C (Vuzix); UUID 0xFE45 |
70 | SIG |
| Glasses | 0x058E only together with the META_RB_GLASS token |
72 | ACAB |
| Glasses | Company ID 0x01AB or UUID 0xFEB7 / 0xFEB8 (Meta corporate; also Quest headsets) |
45 | SIG / ACAB |
| Glasses | HeyCyan SDK UUID 7905FFF0-B5CE-4E99-A40F-4B1E122D00D0, full 16-byte match only |
68 | ACAB |
| Network camera (off by default) | SSID starting with ARLO_VMB_ or NTGR_VMB_ |
88 | ACAB |
| Network camera (off by default) | Arlo, Blink, Ezviz, Uniview, Amcrest, Wyze, Swann, Night Owl, SkyBell or WUUK blocks (WiFi only) | 65 | IEEE / ACAB |
| Network camera (off by default) | Any other block whose IEEE registrant is a camera / recorder maker (Hikvision, Dahua, Tiandy, Rhombus, Eagle Eye Networks, FLIR, Bosch Security, IDIS, TVT, Digital Watchdog, Speco, Jovision, Zmodo, Canary...) (WiFi only) | 60 | IEEE |
A WiFi network named after a passenger rail operator (Amtrak, Brightline, Eurostar, SNCF _WIFI_INOUI,
VIA Rail, Deutsche Bahn WIFIonICE; Wardrive Go's rail list) is shown as Train WiFi and its
public-safety matches are dropped: its router often comes from the vehicle-router makers police
cars use, and it rides along with you. BLE nodes named Meshtastic_… / MeshCore-… or advertising
Meshtastic's service are shown as Mesh radio node, without an alert. Hidden-camera setup networks
(detect/HackerWatch.kt) also cover generic IP cameras' IPC- / IPC_ + ID networks (50, Wardrive Go).
Deliberately not matched, following ACAB:
- A bare 10-digit BLE name. It false-positived on a phone.
- The
-FALCONSSID suffix. The evidence behind it turned out to be circular. - Liteon module blocks. Millions of laptops use them.
- Motorola Mobility blocks, which belong to consumer phones.
- Sierra Wireless and Cradlepoint router blocks.
- Company ID
0x058Eon its own. Quest headsets share it.
Combining evidence (detect/EvidenceFusion.kt, detect/PatrolCluster.kt)
Single rules are only the first pass. Every 2 s per device the scanner also:
Fuses agreeing rules. When different rules of the same category match one device, the scores combine by noisy-OR, with each supporting hit discounted by half because rules often share evidence. Hits under 30 never corroborate. Fusion alone never goes past 90. Example: watchlisted address 70 plus Zebra serial name 50 gives 78. The patrol-vehicle hit (below) is never fused: it is derived from the device's own matches, so fusing would count them twice.
Detects patrol-vehicle kits. Every device gets a role when its matches or IEEE registrant say it is police-type gear: body camera, plate reader, two-way radio, vehicle cellular router, mobile printer, in-car computer, rugged laptop or police camera. Consumer brands that also make car audio or office gear (Kenwood, Panasonic Connect, Havis) get no role from their vendor name alone, and whitelisted devices never count. Peplink and Inseego routers count as vehicle cellular routers. Fortin interface modules and Dräger devices are support roles: they add to a group but a group needs at least one other role, so a driveway of remote starters never reads as a police vehicle. At least two different roles count as one vehicle when either condition holds:
- their RSSI rises and falls together (Pearson r ≥ 0.6 over at least 8 aligned seconds);
- both signals are flat (parked) and they appeared within 30 s of each other.
Each member then gets "Possible police vehicle" at 24 + 12 × roles, +10 when the signals move together, capped at 88. So two roles score 48 and stay weak; three moving together score 70. Never grouped: signals that don't move together (r < 0.6), one moving device next to a parked one, or fewer than 8 shared seconds. The group hit is recomputed every 2 s, so it disappears when the group breaks up.
A device's own match is held for 2 minutes after its evidence was last seen (some body cams only include their tag in some packets), then fades.
Links rotated addresses. A structural advert fingerprint survives address rotation: names, service UUIDs, service-data and company-ID payload sizes, TX power and connectable flag. When a new private address appears with the same fingerprint as exactly one device that went silent 1.5–30 s earlier, it inherits that device's matches at −5. Adverts that carry only Apple Continuity data have no fingerprint, so phones are never linked. Two identical candidates means no link.
Ordinary devices are identified in order of evidence strength, and the detail screen shows "Identified by":
- decoded vendor protocols, including the exact AirPods/Beats model
- the advertised GAP appearance
- standard SIG services (heart rate, HID, LE Audio, medical...)
- name patterns
- member-service owner
- IEEE registrant (vehicle routers, IoT modules, radios...)
- company ID
WiFi access points, including hidden networks (detect/WifiFingerprint.kt)
A hidden network still sends beacons with information elements (Android 11+). The access point is identified from the first of these that answers:
WPS model. The WPS element (vendor IE
00:50:F2type 4, possibly split over several IEs) carries these attributes:- Manufacturer
0x1021 - Model Name
0x1023and Model Number0x1024 - Device Name
0x1011 - Primary Device Type
0x1054: category 6 means router, access point or gateway
Placeholder values like "0000" or "Wireless Router" are ignored.
- Manufacturer
Cisco AP name. Cisco's CCX element (IE 133) holds the configured AP name at bytes 10–25.
BSSID registrant. The IEEE owner of a fixed BSSID, unless it is only a chipset maker.
Vendor IE owners. Each vendor-specific IE's OUI, looked up in the IEEE registry and split into equipment makers (Apple, Cisco, Ubiquiti...) and chipset makers (Broadcom, Qualcomm, MediaTek...).
Kind of network. When the name is hidden or says nothing (no ISP default, chain or brand name), the beacon decides the kind, first match wins:
- Passpoint (vendor IE
50:6F:9Atype0x10on an account sign-in network), or an Interworking IE 107 whose access network type is public (2 paid, 3 free) on an open or sign-in network: public WiFi hotspot. Home routers often carry IE 107 saying "private", so IE 107 alone counts for nothing. - WPA-Enterprise (EAP) security: business WiFi with account sign-in, plus the business maker when known.
- WPS model of a provider's router (Livebox, Freebox, Bbox, Speedport, FRITZ!Box, Vodafone Station, BT / Sky / Bell hubs, AT&T, Verizon Fios, XB gateways...): home router, named for the model. Works after a rename.
- Business WiFi maker, from the BSSID registrant or the beacon's vendor IEs (Cisco, Meraki, Aruba / HPE, Ruckus, Fortinet, Juniper Mist, Extreme, Cambium): business access point. Not on the Routers chip.
- Maker of the routers providers hand out (Sagemcom, CommScope / ARRIS, Technicolor / Vantiva, Askey, Sercomm, Hitron, Ubee, Calix, ZTE, Huawei, AVM, Nokia, Actiontec, 2Wire / Pace, Compal Broadband, CastleNet): home router (internet provider's). The provider itself is never guessed.
- Store-bought router maker (NETGEAR, TP-Link, ASUS, Linksys, Belkin, D-Link, Tenda, Mercusys, eero, Synology): home router.
- WPS device kind Router or Gateway: home router.
- No password (named networks only): open WiFi, public or guest.
Same access point. Two BSSIDs belong to the same access point when octets 2–5 are equal, the last octet is within 16, and the first octet is equal or locally administered (virtual BSSID). The detail screen then links a hidden network to the visible network on the same router and borrows its make/model.
Known plate cameras (alpr/)
Downloaded on request from OpenStreetMap through the Overpass API: every element
tagged surveillance:type=ALPR in the area on screen (DeFlock maps Flock cameras this
way), with manufacturer/brand, operator and direction/camera:direction. They
are cached in the app's private storage. While scanning, the app warns once per camera
per 30 minutes when one is within ~20 s of travel (150 m minimum, 600 m maximum) and
the distance is shrinking. Data © OpenStreetMap contributors, ODbL.
Drone overhead (detect/DroneProximity.kt)
Remote ID broadcasts the aircraft's own GPS position, so the app can say a drone is within 200 m of you (horizontal) with confidence 95, once per drone per 5 minutes.
Fake cell tower signs (detect/CellAnalyzer.kt)
Read every 15 s from the cells Android reports (no root, location permission only):
| Sign | Confidence |
|---|---|
| Serving cell uses a test / reserved MCC (001, 002, 999) | 85 |
| Dropped to 2G/CDMA after 4G/5G while 4G/5G cells are still visible (40 if none are) | 65 |
| Serving cell's MCC differs from the SIM's while not roaming (US 310-316 and India 404/405 are treated as one country) | 55 |
| Location / tracking area changed while GPS shows you standing still for 2+ minutes | 40 |
| Switched to a cell with no neighbours where several were visible moments ago | 35 |
| Serving cell announces a reserved area (0, 0xFFFE, 0xFFFF) or cell number 0 | 45 |
| A cell number seen before in another area (cloned identity) | 50 |
| A never-seen cell took over at -65 dBm or stronger, 20+ dB above the cell before it, while you stood still (after AIMSICD / SnoopSnitch) | 40 |
| Serving cell's area is shared by none of 3+ neighbours of the same network, which all agree on another (after AIMSICD) | 35 |
Signs at or above the alert threshold alert; the rest go to the match history.
MAC-prefix watchlist presets (assets/oui_presets/*.json)
These are editable and can be switched on or off in Settings.
| Prefix | Registrant | Category | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
00:25:DF |
Axon Enterprise, Inc. | Body cam | 75 |
D8:1F:65 |
Private (field-attributed to Axon by ACAB) | Body cam | 75 |
B4:1E:52 |
Flock Safety | ALPR | 75 |
D4:2D:C5 |
i-PRO Co., Ltd. | Public safety | 55 |
00:09:BC, 00:16:ED |
Utility, Inc. | Body cam | 45 |
48:46:8D |
Zepcam B.V. (dedicated body-worn camera maker) | Body cam | 75 |
00:1D:96 |
WatchGuard Video (police in-car and body cameras) | Body cam | 70 |
00:23:BD |
Digital Ally (police body and in-car cameras) | Body cam | 70 |
9C:83:BF |
PRO-VISION (body and fleet cameras; also school buses) | Body cam | 55 |
58:E8:76:C (28-bit) |
Kustom Signals (police radar, in-car video) | Public safety | 70 |
00:22:AF, E4:1E:0A:B (28-bit) |
Safety Vision (police and transit mobile video) | Public safety | 50 |
D4:11:D6 |
ShotSpotter / SoundThinking (gunshot-detection sensor) | Audio sensor | 75 |
00:16:00 |
Cellebrite (phone forensic extraction) | Public safety | 60 |
70:B3:D5:71:F (36-bit) |
Grayshift / GrayKey (phone unlocking) | Public safety | 70 |
00:1E:96 |
Sepura (TETRA police radios) | Public safety | 45 |
C4:7C:8D:9 (28-bit) |
Airbus Secure Land Communications (TETRA) | Public safety | 45 |
54:02:37, 00:04:18 |
Teltronic (TETRA radios) | Public safety | 40 |
64:69:BC, 9C:06:6E |
Hytera (radios, body cams; mostly commercial) | Public safety | 40 |
8C:1F:64:A7:8 (36-bit), 00:0D:CA |
Tait (two-way radios) | Public safety | 40 |
00:18:29 |
Gatsometer (speed / traffic enforcement cameras) | ALPR | 60 |
00:30:7E |
Redflex (red-light / speed cameras) | ALPR | 60 |
00:22:9F |
Sensys Traffic (traffic enforcement cameras) | ALPR | 55 |
00:1D:4D |
Adaptive Recognition (ANPR / ALPR cameras) | ALPR | 55 |
00:17:3D |
Neology (ALPR, mostly RFID tolling) | ALPR | 40 |
00:24:AE |
Idemia Public Security (French Mesta Fusion speed cameras, police biometric terminals) | ALPR | 50 |
00:0A:3E |
EADS Telecom (TETRAPOL: French police ACROPOL and gendarmerie RUBIS networks) | Public safety | 45 |
00:23:B9 |
Airbus Defence and Space Deutschland (TETRA / TETRAPOL radios) | Public safety | 40 |
North America and Europe sweep (2026-09)
A systematic sweep of the IEEE registry (MA-L, MA-M, MA-S) for makers of law-enforcement and surveillance equipment. Prefixes are pulled from the registry by exact registrant name, and a unit test re-checks every block against its registrant. Ambiguous or consumer registrants are left out on purpose.
| Registrant(s) | Blocks | What they make | Category | Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vievu | 1 | Police body cameras (Axon since 2018) | Body cam | 75 |
| International Police Technologies | 1 | Police in-car video (VisionHawk) | Body cam | 75 |
| ICOP Digital | 1 | Police in-car video | Body cam | 70 |
| L-3 Communications Mobile-Vision | 3 | Police in-car and body video | Body cam | 70 |
| Applied Concepts | 1 | Stalker police radar / lidar | Public safety | 70 |
| Decatur Electronics | 1 | Police speed radar | Public safety | 65 |
| Patrol Products Consortium | 1 | Police vehicle upfit (tablets, control systems) | Public safety | 60 |
| Federal Signal SSG | 1 | Emergency-vehicle lightbars and sirens | Public safety | 55 |
| Havis | 2 | Vehicle consoles and computer docks | Public safety | 45 |
| Gamber-Johnson | 10 | Vehicle computer mounts and docks | Public safety | 40 |
| Global Traffic Technologies | 1 | Opticom emergency-vehicle signal priority | Public safety | 45 |
| Fusus | 2 | Real-time crime center hubs (Axon) | Public safety | 70 |
| 3SI Security Systems | 1 | Covert GPS bait trackers (police and bank stings) | Public safety | 55 |
| Digital Receiver Technology | 1 | Cell-site simulators ("DRTbox") | Public safety | 70 |
| Septier Communication | 1 | Cellular interception and location | Public safety | 55 |
| Amesys Defense | 1 | Lawful interception | Public safety | 40 |
| Domo Tactical Communications | 1 | Covert / body-worn COFDM video | Public safety | 55 |
| Persistent Systems, Silvus, TrellisWare | 3 | Tactical mesh radio (SWAT, robots, drones) | Public safety | 40-45 |
| Harris, E.F. Johnson, Daniels (Codan) | 6 | P25 public-safety radio | Public safety | 40-45 |
| Airbus DS Oy, Selex, Simoco, Damm, Thales Communications | 9 | TETRA / public-safety radio | Public safety | 35-45 |
| Perceptics | 2 | Plate readers (border and police) | ALPR | 65 |
| Quercus Technologies | 11 | ANPR cameras (SmartLPR) | ALPR | 60 |
| Robot Visual Systems | 1 | Speed / red-light cameras (Jenoptik) | ALPR | 60 |
| Vitronic | 1 | PoliScan lidar speed enforcement | ALPR | 55 |
| Tattile | 48 | ANPR and traffic cameras (also machine vision) | ALPR | 50 |
| Jenoptik | 1 | Traffic enforcement (also optics) | ALPR | 45 |
| Q-Free | 3 | Tolling and ANPR | ALPR | 40 |
| Genetec | 4 | AutoVu ALPR (also servers, access control) | ALPR | 40 |
| Ubicquia | 1 | UbiHub smart streetlights powering police ALPR / video | ALPR | 55 |
| Cradlepoint | 2 | Vehicle routers (police cars, buses, stores) | Public safety | 35 |
Left out on purpose:
- Consumer or general-purpose makers: Sierra Wireless and Inseego routers (ACAB), Panasonic Connect laptops, GoPro and Transcend cameras, Axis / Hanwha / Verkada / Avigilon CCTV, Zebra printers (covered by the Zebra service rule instead), Icom and Kenwood radios, FLIR thermal.
- Offender-monitoring devices (SCRAM and other ankle monitors, breath interlocks): these identify private people on probation, not police.
- Fixed installations with nothing to detect on the move: Zetron and Frequentis dispatch consoles, Positron 911 systems, Rohde & Schwarz test gear, Verint and NICE recorders.
- Look-alike names: Teltronics Inc. (telecom, not Teltronic TETRA), Axon Networks, WatchGuard Technologies, Codan Argus (invalid address block).
France: the national police and gendarmerie body cameras (2021 contract) are Motorola Solutions VB400s (WiFi, Bluetooth LE 4.2 for holster sensors and peer-assisted recording). They are covered only by the generic Motorola identifiers above, because no public source documents their Bluetooth name. The earlier Hikvision cameras aren't matched: Hikvision's 84 blocks are ordinary CCTV everywhere. The new Réseau Radio du Futur uses Samsung rugged phones, indistinguishable from consumer ones.
Same-name registrants that are not public-safety vendors are deliberately left out:
Axon Networks (unrelated to Axon Enterprise), WatchGuard Technologies (firewalls),
Coban Srl (not the US Coban), and general CCTV makers (Axis, Verkada). A unit test
checks that every preset block belongs, per the IEEE table, to the company its
label names.
| 00:1F:92, 4C:CC:34, 00:18:85, 00:04:7D, 10:74:6F, B8:E2:8C, 9C:86:2B | Motorola Solutions | Public safety | 45 |
The Motorola entries are weak on purpose. In ACAB's field capture, all 27 of 27 hits on Motorola WiFi prefixes turned out not to be body cams.
SignalSweep compared (2026-10)
SignalSweep (GPL-3.0) is an ESP32 counter-surveillance scanner. Its signatures and field notes were compared with ours; what was new was re-implemented from the facts (prefixes, UUIDs, frame layouts and thresholds), no code was taken.
- Flock cameras turned their management network off around December 2025. Since then the
one thing they still send is a wildcard probe request from their radio module, sometimes
with the Wi-Fi Alliance element
50:6F:9A:16 03 01 03. A USB WiFi adapter now flags it for the module blocks below, minus four that are common in ordinary devices (F8:A2:D6,A4:CF:12,3C:71:BF,82:6B:F2). - Three community-listed Flock module prefixes are doubtful:
A4:CF:12(generic Espressif),F8:A2:D6(seen on a Sony media player) and82:6B:F2(a randomized-address prefix). They are now very weak (score 10): listed, but never an alert, sound, banner or radar blip. Any match at 10 or below works this way. - Eight newer Flock radio-module blocks (Liteon and Silicon Labs):
14:B5:CD,04:0D:84,1C:34:F1,38:5B:44,94:34:69,B4:E3:F9,F0:82:C0,E0:0A:F6. - Axon's pairing networks, the second Flock battery service, the battery serial, a SmartTag in setup (table above).
- Hacking tools (
detect/HackerWatch.kt,usb/KarmaWatch.kt):- Karma / PineAP: one transmitter answering under 4 or more network names within a minute (USB WiFi adapter). A real access point uses its own address for each network.
- Fake-tracker flood: 6 or more Find My, Find Hub, SmartTag or Tile addresses in 5 minutes, each heard 3 times or fewer within 10 s at -80 dBm or stronger and then never again. Real tags keep their address. One alarm per 5 minutes; real trackers are still reported.
80:E1:26/80:E1:27(STM32WB chips, as in a Flipper Zero): a weak hint (30).
- Deauth alarm: normal networks send bursts of 11 to 24 frames in 5 s (SignalSweep's field measurements). The alarm now needs 30 in 5 s (a frame to every device counts twice), or 25 in 30 s heard in at least three 5 s slices with 4 or more each. An access point restarting drops all its devices at once, then stops; an attack keeps going.
- Apple activity: a device's detail screen shows what an iPhone, Mac or Watch is doing, from its Nearby Info status (idle, screen on, driving, on a call...).
Not taken: ringing a tracker (that sends), and the Remote ID OUI 90:3A:E6, which is Parrot's
own block rather than an ASTM identifier.
Community lists compared (2026-10)
The prefix lists of five open projects were compared with ours, and every candidate's IEEE registrant was checked against the maker the project names.
| Project | What was added |
|---|---|
| Flock You (list by @NitekryDPaul, nite-oui-collection; 82:6B:F2 by DeflockJoplin) | 31 radio-module prefixes seen on Flock cameras, as weak ALPR entries (score 35) |
| OUI-Spy | 11 Ring (Amazon) blocks, as home cameras (off by default) |
| Wardrive Go | Same Flock list; its traffic-camera and drone blocks were already here. Later (3.1.165): EMS gear, IP-camera setup networks, train WiFi and mesh radio nodes, above |
| Flock-You-Android | Hikvision, Dahua, Axis, Vivotek, Amcrest, Reolink, Wyze, TVT, Reecam camera blocks; Sierra Wireless and Digi fleet gateways |
| FlipDeFlock | Its probe-request "skeleton" hash (element ids and lengths, vendor OUI + type), ported so its published values match: 2 candidate Flock shapes as weak hits, 6 shapes it found on phones and ESP32 boards marked as common. Shown as "Probe shape" in device details |
| Fieldwatch | BlueTOAD (Iteris) and BlipTrack roadside travel-time sensors; Flock-pole battery radios (weak); Hanwha, Uniview, Rhombus cameras; Sierra AirLink, Compex and Inseego (Novatel) vehicle radios |
The Flock radio list is mostly Liteon, Silicon Labs, Espressif and USI module blocks that are also in many laptops, smart plugs and IoT devices, so those entries stay weak: they show up amber and only alert when the threshold is set to "every match". The Flock SSID, Flock's own block (B4:1E:52) and Raven UUIDs remain the strong signals.
Left out on purpose: 42 prefixes whose IEEE registrant doesn't match the claim - most of Flock-You-Android's DJI, Autel, Yuneec, Skydio, 3DR and extra Parrot blocks are registered to Texas Instruments, Intel, ASUS, Google, Espressif and others, and would flag ordinary phones and laptops as drones; several more aren't IEEE blocks at all. Generic chip makers listed as "body cam" or "spy camera" sources (Nordic, Texas Instruments, Raspberry Pi, Ralink, Apple) and DJI's Osmo / Ronin gimbal blocks were also left out.
Police-vehicle vendor sweep (2026-10)
Added after checking which in-car equipment makers named in public police procurement
records were missing. All weak on their own (they mostly matter for patrol-vehicle
grouping), and every block checked against the IEEE registry by tools/gen_assets.py.
| Vendor | Blocks | Score | Why weak |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zebra Technologies | 17 MA-L | 25 | Store scanners, handhelds and label printers |
| Brother Industries | 7 MA-L | 20 | Home and office printers (no patrol role from the registrant) |
| Peplink | 4 MA-L | 30 | Also buses, boats, RVs |
| Inseego | 4 more MA-L | 30 | Consumer MiFi hotspots |
| Panasonic Connect (Toughbook) | 3 MA-L | 30 | Projectors and business gear; a laptop is usually a WiFi client (no patrol role) |
| Sierra Wireless AirLink | 6 MA-L, now also in the Canada preset | 40 | Buses, utility trucks, kiosks |
No IEEE block or Bluetooth ID exists for Getac (its blocks are shared with consumer laptops), Whelen, Feniex, SoundOff or Laser Technology, so they can only be matched by names captured in the field.
Sweden preset (assets/oui_presets/sweden.json), researched 2026-11
Vendor and public facts only: the Swedish Police Authority announced 1,000 Axon body cameras in 2019 after an 18-month field trial, and Rakel, the Swedish public-safety network, is a TETRA network. The Sepura and Airbus blocks are the TETRA makers' IEEE blocks and stay at candidate level, like in the global preset. Sensys Traffic is not repeated here: it stays in the global preset. Flock detection is off with this preset, as with the other European ones.
Canada preset (assets/oui_presets/canada.json), researched 2026-09
Built only from public records: police pilot reports, public procurement
records, federal contract announcements and news coverage. Nothing was taken
from memory. Every prefix was checked against the IEEE registry by
tools/gen_assets.py.
| Key | Score | Why |
|---|---|---|
00:25:DF, D8:1F:65 |
75 | Axon body cams and TASERs, the dominant vendor for Canadian police (including the RCMP's Axon Body 4 contract). |
8C:1F:64:DF:0 (36-bit MA-S) |
65 | Cyberkar Systems inc., a Canadian police-vehicle computer / in-car systems integrator. A narrow police-vehicle registrant, so a better signal than a big vendor block. It must match all 36 bits, because the neighbouring blocks belong to unrelated companies. |
name:BC-02, name:BC-03, name:HS-01 |
45 / 45 / 40 | Getac cameras and holster sensor used in Canadian police body-cam pilots. Getac has no IEEE block of its own (its blocks are shared with laptops), so only names can match. These names are capture candidates per ACAB, so verify. |
name:BC-04 |
40 | Newer Getac model. |
| Motorola Solutions ×7 | 45 | P25 radio networks. Weak: the same blocks are used by commercial radios. |
Genetec 00:BF:15, 0C:BF:15, 00:50:C2:BE:7 |
40 | Canadian plate-reader (AutoVu / Cloudrunner) vendor. Weak: registry-only, the cameras probably use cellular, and the blocks cover other Genetec products. |
Cradlepoint 00:30:44, 00:E0:1C |
35 | Routers installed in police cars. Weak: common on buses and in stores. |
i-PRO D4:2D:C5 |
50 | Body cams / surveillance cameras, kept as a candidate. |
F4:60:77 |
20 | Texas Instruments chip block seen on Zebra ZQ-series printers. Highlight only: TI chips are everywhere. |
name:RJ-4230B, name:RJ-4250WB, name:RJ-4040, name:PJ-763, name:PJ-883 |
40 / 40 / 35 / 35 / 35 | Brother RuggedJet / PocketJet in-car e-citation and report printers. Name forms need a field capture to confirm. |
Not added:
- Sierra Wireless routers, for the reasons ACAB gives.
- Getac/MiTAC blocks: shared with laptops.