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RF Sentinel (RFSentinel): free, open-source police detector app for Android. Spots police body cams, Flock ALPR cameras, AirTag trackers, Remote ID drones, smart glasses and fake cell towers from Bluetooth LE and WiFi. No root.

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RF Sentinel detection signatures

Every signature has a confidence from 0 to 100, which maps to a tier:

Tier Confidence What it means
Weak (verify) below 50 The identifier is shared with many unrelated products. It shows as an amber highlight. By default it does not sound.
Probable 50–79 A vendor-specific identifier. It alerts at the default threshold.
Strong 80 and up A payload tag, or a network name the vendor gives its own devices.

The confidence ladder, and most of the non-registry signatures, come from the all-cameras-are-beacons signature reference (Apache-2.0). That document explains in detail why each row exists and why some tempting rows were rejected. The rules were written from its values; none of its code is used.

Before shipping, the identifiers were checked against these registries:

  • Bluetooth company IDs and 16-bit UUIDs: the Bluetooth SIG assigned-numbers YAML files at bitbucket.org/bluetooth-SIG/public.
  • MAC prefixes: the IEEE registry, through Wireshark's weekly copy. tools/gen_assets.py fails if any prefix used in code stops matching its expected registrant.

Payload / name / UUID signatures (detect/SignatureEngine.kt)

Category Signature Confidence Source
Body cam BWCDEVICE ASCII in the service data, manufacturer data or raw advert, matched in either byte order 90 ACAB, field-validated against cameras confirmed by eye
Body cam Company ID 0x034D (TASER International) 60 SIG
Body cam Service UUID 0xFC81 (Axon), 0xFE6B or 0xFE6C (TASER) 60 SIG
Body cam Name contains BodyWorn Remote (Utility Inc.) 80 ACAB / nite-oui-collection
Body cam WiFi network starting with AB2-, AB3- or AB4- (an Axon Body camera pairing) 80 Axon admin docs, via SignalSweep
Body cam WiFi network starting with AXON- (an Axon device's hotspot; not the Axon12-5g Fleet names) 75 Axon admin docs, via SignalSweep
Public safety Company ID 0x04EC, or UUID 0xFD8E / 0xFE04 (Motorola Solutions) 45 SIG; mostly two-way radios
Public safety UUID 0xFE79 / 0xFD66 (Zebra) with a factory-serial name (^[A-Z0-9]{2}[A-Z]{3}\d{9}$): unrenamed fleet mobile printer, e.g. e-ticket printers 50 SIG; Zebra Link-OS BLE app note; field capture
Public safety UUID 0xFE79 / 0xFD66 (Zebra) with any other name 30 SIG; mostly warehouse/retail printers
Public safety Company ID 0x01F1 (Zebra Technologies) without a Zebra printer UUID 25 SIG; printers, but also store scanners and handhelds
Public safety Company ID 0x0755 (Brother Industries) 20 SIG; RuggedJet / PocketJet in-car printers, mostly home and office printers
Public safety UUID 0xFDE1 / 0xFDCA (Fortin Electronic Systems) 20 SIG; vehicle interface modules used in police upfits, also civilian remote starters
Public safety Company ID 0x04BC or UUID 0xFCDA (Dräger) 35 SIG; roadside breath / drug screening devices, also hospital and gas-detection gear
Public safety UUID 0xFE22 / 0xFE23 (Zoll Medical) 40 SIG, after Wardrive Go's EMS list; ambulance defibrillators and monitors, also hospital gear and the LifeVest a patient can wear
Public safety Company ID 0x0A5F or UUID 0xFC6E (Stryker) 35 SIG, after Wardrive Go's EMS list; LIFEPAK monitors and ambulance stretchers, plenty of hospital equipment
Public safety WiFi address in Physio-Control's 40:BD:9E or Stryker's 00:0D:D1 block 45 IEEE, after Wardrive Go's EMS list; LIFEPAK monitors send their data over WiFi from ambulances
ALPR WiFi SSID starting with Flock- 88 ACAB (ryanohoro, GainSec)
ALPR BLE name FS Ext Battery 80 ACAB
ALPR BLE name Penguin-<digits> or FS-<hex> 70, or 80 with company ID 0x09C8 ACAB
ALPR Company ID 0x09C8 with TN + digits (the battery's serial) in its data 80 SignalSweep / oui-spy notes
ALPR Service UUID e8ccbb38-9532-46a8-9fe5-1814df172e6f or 20c944c1-add2-42d7-a638-967ee9a26ff6 (Flock battery) 80 Flock-You, SquachWatch, SignalSweep
ALPR Wildcard probe requests from a Flock radio-module block (USB WiFi adapter) 60, or 75 with the Wi-Fi Alliance element 50:6F:9A:16 03 01 03 SignalSweep / DeFlock field tests (11 of 12 cameras, 2 false alarms)
ALPR BLE name starting with Flock 55 ACAB (loose brand string)
ALPR Probe-request shape 42d75cd1 or d0bbec4c (FlipDeFlock candidates, USB WiFi adapter) 35, or 50 on a Flock module block FlipDeFlock (single report each)
ALPR Company ID 0x09C8 alone (XUNTONG, shared silicon) 45 SIG / ACAB
Audio sensor 128-bit service UUIDs with short IDs 0x3100 to 0x3500 (Flock Raven) 80 ACAB field capture
Drone Service data 0xFFFA with ASTM F3411 app code 0x0D; decoded 95 ASTM F3411 / opendroneid
Drone WiFi vendor IE with OUI FA:0B:BC, type 0x0D 95 ASTM F3411
Drone Drone makers' own IEEE blocks (DJI, Parrot, Skydio, Autel /28, Yuneec /28, Hubsan, FIMI, uAvionix Remote ID modules and others); DJI handhelds named Osmo, OM, RS / Ronin or Mic are left out 60 IEEE / ACAB
Tracker Apple company ID 0x004C, type 0x12, length 0x19 (separated from owner only) 70 ACAB; arXiv 2501.17452
Tracker Google 0xFEAA service data, frame 0x41 (separated; frame 0x40 = near owner, ignored) 70 Find Hub Network spec
Tracker Samsung 0xFD5A / Tile 0xFEED or 0xFEEC service data 55 SIG
Tracker Samsung 0xFD59 service data (a SmartTag not set up yet) 40 SIG; arXiv 2210.14702
Glasses Company ID 0x0D53 (Luxottica), 0x03C2 (Snapchat), 0x060C (Vuzix); UUID 0xFE45 70 SIG
Glasses 0x058E only together with the META_RB_GLASS token 72 ACAB
Glasses Company ID 0x01AB or UUID 0xFEB7 / 0xFEB8 (Meta corporate; also Quest headsets) 45 SIG / ACAB
Glasses HeyCyan SDK UUID 7905FFF0-B5CE-4E99-A40F-4B1E122D00D0, full 16-byte match only 68 ACAB
Network camera (off by default) SSID starting with ARLO_VMB_ or NTGR_VMB_ 88 ACAB
Network camera (off by default) Arlo, Blink, Ezviz, Uniview, Amcrest, Wyze, Swann, Night Owl, SkyBell or WUUK blocks (WiFi only) 65 IEEE / ACAB
Network camera (off by default) Any other block whose IEEE registrant is a camera / recorder maker (Hikvision, Dahua, Tiandy, Rhombus, Eagle Eye Networks, FLIR, Bosch Security, IDIS, TVT, Digital Watchdog, Speco, Jovision, Zmodo, Canary...) (WiFi only) 60 IEEE

A WiFi network named after a passenger rail operator (Amtrak, Brightline, Eurostar, SNCF _WIFI_INOUI, VIA Rail, Deutsche Bahn WIFIonICE; Wardrive Go's rail list) is shown as Train WiFi and its public-safety matches are dropped: its router often comes from the vehicle-router makers police cars use, and it rides along with you. BLE nodes named Meshtastic_… / MeshCore-… or advertising Meshtastic's service are shown as Mesh radio node, without an alert. Hidden-camera setup networks (detect/HackerWatch.kt) also cover generic IP cameras' IPC- / IPC_ + ID networks (50, Wardrive Go).

Deliberately not matched, following ACAB:

  • A bare 10-digit BLE name. It false-positived on a phone.
  • The -FALCON SSID suffix. The evidence behind it turned out to be circular.
  • Liteon module blocks. Millions of laptops use them.
  • Motorola Mobility blocks, which belong to consumer phones.
  • Sierra Wireless and Cradlepoint router blocks.
  • Company ID 0x058E on its own. Quest headsets share it.

Combining evidence (detect/EvidenceFusion.kt, detect/PatrolCluster.kt)

Single rules are only the first pass. Every 2 s per device the scanner also:

  1. Fuses agreeing rules. When different rules of the same category match one device, the scores combine by noisy-OR, with each supporting hit discounted by half because rules often share evidence. Hits under 30 never corroborate. Fusion alone never goes past 90. Example: watchlisted address 70 plus Zebra serial name 50 gives 78. The patrol-vehicle hit (below) is never fused: it is derived from the device's own matches, so fusing would count them twice.

  2. Detects patrol-vehicle kits. Every device gets a role when its matches or IEEE registrant say it is police-type gear: body camera, plate reader, two-way radio, vehicle cellular router, mobile printer, in-car computer, rugged laptop or police camera. Consumer brands that also make car audio or office gear (Kenwood, Panasonic Connect, Havis) get no role from their vendor name alone, and whitelisted devices never count. Peplink and Inseego routers count as vehicle cellular routers. Fortin interface modules and Dräger devices are support roles: they add to a group but a group needs at least one other role, so a driveway of remote starters never reads as a police vehicle. At least two different roles count as one vehicle when either condition holds:

    • their RSSI rises and falls together (Pearson r ≥ 0.6 over at least 8 aligned seconds);
    • both signals are flat (parked) and they appeared within 30 s of each other.

    Each member then gets "Possible police vehicle" at 24 + 12 × roles, +10 when the signals move together, capped at 88. So two roles score 48 and stay weak; three moving together score 70. Never grouped: signals that don't move together (r < 0.6), one moving device next to a parked one, or fewer than 8 shared seconds. The group hit is recomputed every 2 s, so it disappears when the group breaks up.

    A device's own match is held for 2 minutes after its evidence was last seen (some body cams only include their tag in some packets), then fades.

  3. Links rotated addresses. A structural advert fingerprint survives address rotation: names, service UUIDs, service-data and company-ID payload sizes, TX power and connectable flag. When a new private address appears with the same fingerprint as exactly one device that went silent 1.5–30 s earlier, it inherits that device's matches at −5. Adverts that carry only Apple Continuity data have no fingerprint, so phones are never linked. Two identical candidates means no link.

Ordinary devices are identified in order of evidence strength, and the detail screen shows "Identified by":

  1. decoded vendor protocols, including the exact AirPods/Beats model
  2. the advertised GAP appearance
  3. standard SIG services (heart rate, HID, LE Audio, medical...)
  4. name patterns
  5. member-service owner
  6. IEEE registrant (vehicle routers, IoT modules, radios...)
  7. company ID

WiFi access points, including hidden networks (detect/WifiFingerprint.kt)

A hidden network still sends beacons with information elements (Android 11+). The access point is identified from the first of these that answers:

  1. WPS model. The WPS element (vendor IE 00:50:F2 type 4, possibly split over several IEs) carries these attributes:

    • Manufacturer 0x1021
    • Model Name 0x1023 and Model Number 0x1024
    • Device Name 0x1011
    • Primary Device Type 0x1054: category 6 means router, access point or gateway

    Placeholder values like "0000" or "Wireless Router" are ignored.

  2. Cisco AP name. Cisco's CCX element (IE 133) holds the configured AP name at bytes 10–25.

  3. BSSID registrant. The IEEE owner of a fixed BSSID, unless it is only a chipset maker.

  4. Vendor IE owners. Each vendor-specific IE's OUI, looked up in the IEEE registry and split into equipment makers (Apple, Cisco, Ubiquiti...) and chipset makers (Broadcom, Qualcomm, MediaTek...).

Kind of network. When the name is hidden or says nothing (no ISP default, chain or brand name), the beacon decides the kind, first match wins:

  1. Passpoint (vendor IE 50:6F:9A type 0x10 on an account sign-in network), or an Interworking IE 107 whose access network type is public (2 paid, 3 free) on an open or sign-in network: public WiFi hotspot. Home routers often carry IE 107 saying "private", so IE 107 alone counts for nothing.
  2. WPA-Enterprise (EAP) security: business WiFi with account sign-in, plus the business maker when known.
  3. WPS model of a provider's router (Livebox, Freebox, Bbox, Speedport, FRITZ!Box, Vodafone Station, BT / Sky / Bell hubs, AT&T, Verizon Fios, XB gateways...): home router, named for the model. Works after a rename.
  4. Business WiFi maker, from the BSSID registrant or the beacon's vendor IEs (Cisco, Meraki, Aruba / HPE, Ruckus, Fortinet, Juniper Mist, Extreme, Cambium): business access point. Not on the Routers chip.
  5. Maker of the routers providers hand out (Sagemcom, CommScope / ARRIS, Technicolor / Vantiva, Askey, Sercomm, Hitron, Ubee, Calix, ZTE, Huawei, AVM, Nokia, Actiontec, 2Wire / Pace, Compal Broadband, CastleNet): home router (internet provider's). The provider itself is never guessed.
  6. Store-bought router maker (NETGEAR, TP-Link, ASUS, Linksys, Belkin, D-Link, Tenda, Mercusys, eero, Synology): home router.
  7. WPS device kind Router or Gateway: home router.
  8. No password (named networks only): open WiFi, public or guest.

Same access point. Two BSSIDs belong to the same access point when octets 2–5 are equal, the last octet is within 16, and the first octet is equal or locally administered (virtual BSSID). The detail screen then links a hidden network to the visible network on the same router and borrows its make/model.

Known plate cameras (alpr/)

Downloaded on request from OpenStreetMap through the Overpass API: every element tagged surveillance:type=ALPR in the area on screen (DeFlock maps Flock cameras this way), with manufacturer/brand, operator and direction/camera:direction. They are cached in the app's private storage. While scanning, the app warns once per camera per 30 minutes when one is within ~20 s of travel (150 m minimum, 600 m maximum) and the distance is shrinking. Data © OpenStreetMap contributors, ODbL.

Drone overhead (detect/DroneProximity.kt)

Remote ID broadcasts the aircraft's own GPS position, so the app can say a drone is within 200 m of you (horizontal) with confidence 95, once per drone per 5 minutes.

Fake cell tower signs (detect/CellAnalyzer.kt)

Read every 15 s from the cells Android reports (no root, location permission only):

Sign Confidence
Serving cell uses a test / reserved MCC (001, 002, 999) 85
Dropped to 2G/CDMA after 4G/5G while 4G/5G cells are still visible (40 if none are) 65
Serving cell's MCC differs from the SIM's while not roaming (US 310-316 and India 404/405 are treated as one country) 55
Location / tracking area changed while GPS shows you standing still for 2+ minutes 40
Switched to a cell with no neighbours where several were visible moments ago 35
Serving cell announces a reserved area (0, 0xFFFE, 0xFFFF) or cell number 0 45
A cell number seen before in another area (cloned identity) 50
A never-seen cell took over at -65 dBm or stronger, 20+ dB above the cell before it, while you stood still (after AIMSICD / SnoopSnitch) 40
Serving cell's area is shared by none of 3+ neighbours of the same network, which all agree on another (after AIMSICD) 35

Signs at or above the alert threshold alert; the rest go to the match history.

MAC-prefix watchlist presets (assets/oui_presets/*.json)

These are editable and can be switched on or off in Settings.

Prefix Registrant Category Confidence
00:25:DF Axon Enterprise, Inc. Body cam 75
D8:1F:65 Private (field-attributed to Axon by ACAB) Body cam 75
B4:1E:52 Flock Safety ALPR 75
D4:2D:C5 i-PRO Co., Ltd. Public safety 55
00:09:BC, 00:16:ED Utility, Inc. Body cam 45
48:46:8D Zepcam B.V. (dedicated body-worn camera maker) Body cam 75
00:1D:96 WatchGuard Video (police in-car and body cameras) Body cam 70
00:23:BD Digital Ally (police body and in-car cameras) Body cam 70
9C:83:BF PRO-VISION (body and fleet cameras; also school buses) Body cam 55
58:E8:76:C (28-bit) Kustom Signals (police radar, in-car video) Public safety 70
00:22:AF, E4:1E:0A:B (28-bit) Safety Vision (police and transit mobile video) Public safety 50
D4:11:D6 ShotSpotter / SoundThinking (gunshot-detection sensor) Audio sensor 75
00:16:00 Cellebrite (phone forensic extraction) Public safety 60
70:B3:D5:71:F (36-bit) Grayshift / GrayKey (phone unlocking) Public safety 70
00:1E:96 Sepura (TETRA police radios) Public safety 45
C4:7C:8D:9 (28-bit) Airbus Secure Land Communications (TETRA) Public safety 45
54:02:37, 00:04:18 Teltronic (TETRA radios) Public safety 40
64:69:BC, 9C:06:6E Hytera (radios, body cams; mostly commercial) Public safety 40
8C:1F:64:A7:8 (36-bit), 00:0D:CA Tait (two-way radios) Public safety 40
00:18:29 Gatsometer (speed / traffic enforcement cameras) ALPR 60
00:30:7E Redflex (red-light / speed cameras) ALPR 60
00:22:9F Sensys Traffic (traffic enforcement cameras) ALPR 55
00:1D:4D Adaptive Recognition (ANPR / ALPR cameras) ALPR 55
00:17:3D Neology (ALPR, mostly RFID tolling) ALPR 40
00:24:AE Idemia Public Security (French Mesta Fusion speed cameras, police biometric terminals) ALPR 50
00:0A:3E EADS Telecom (TETRAPOL: French police ACROPOL and gendarmerie RUBIS networks) Public safety 45
00:23:B9 Airbus Defence and Space Deutschland (TETRA / TETRAPOL radios) Public safety 40

North America and Europe sweep (2026-09)

A systematic sweep of the IEEE registry (MA-L, MA-M, MA-S) for makers of law-enforcement and surveillance equipment. Prefixes are pulled from the registry by exact registrant name, and a unit test re-checks every block against its registrant. Ambiguous or consumer registrants are left out on purpose.

Registrant(s) Blocks What they make Category Score
Vievu 1 Police body cameras (Axon since 2018) Body cam 75
International Police Technologies 1 Police in-car video (VisionHawk) Body cam 75
ICOP Digital 1 Police in-car video Body cam 70
L-3 Communications Mobile-Vision 3 Police in-car and body video Body cam 70
Applied Concepts 1 Stalker police radar / lidar Public safety 70
Decatur Electronics 1 Police speed radar Public safety 65
Patrol Products Consortium 1 Police vehicle upfit (tablets, control systems) Public safety 60
Federal Signal SSG 1 Emergency-vehicle lightbars and sirens Public safety 55
Havis 2 Vehicle consoles and computer docks Public safety 45
Gamber-Johnson 10 Vehicle computer mounts and docks Public safety 40
Global Traffic Technologies 1 Opticom emergency-vehicle signal priority Public safety 45
Fusus 2 Real-time crime center hubs (Axon) Public safety 70
3SI Security Systems 1 Covert GPS bait trackers (police and bank stings) Public safety 55
Digital Receiver Technology 1 Cell-site simulators ("DRTbox") Public safety 70
Septier Communication 1 Cellular interception and location Public safety 55
Amesys Defense 1 Lawful interception Public safety 40
Domo Tactical Communications 1 Covert / body-worn COFDM video Public safety 55
Persistent Systems, Silvus, TrellisWare 3 Tactical mesh radio (SWAT, robots, drones) Public safety 40-45
Harris, E.F. Johnson, Daniels (Codan) 6 P25 public-safety radio Public safety 40-45
Airbus DS Oy, Selex, Simoco, Damm, Thales Communications 9 TETRA / public-safety radio Public safety 35-45
Perceptics 2 Plate readers (border and police) ALPR 65
Quercus Technologies 11 ANPR cameras (SmartLPR) ALPR 60
Robot Visual Systems 1 Speed / red-light cameras (Jenoptik) ALPR 60
Vitronic 1 PoliScan lidar speed enforcement ALPR 55
Tattile 48 ANPR and traffic cameras (also machine vision) ALPR 50
Jenoptik 1 Traffic enforcement (also optics) ALPR 45
Q-Free 3 Tolling and ANPR ALPR 40
Genetec 4 AutoVu ALPR (also servers, access control) ALPR 40
Ubicquia 1 UbiHub smart streetlights powering police ALPR / video ALPR 55
Cradlepoint 2 Vehicle routers (police cars, buses, stores) Public safety 35

Left out on purpose:

  • Consumer or general-purpose makers: Sierra Wireless and Inseego routers (ACAB), Panasonic Connect laptops, GoPro and Transcend cameras, Axis / Hanwha / Verkada / Avigilon CCTV, Zebra printers (covered by the Zebra service rule instead), Icom and Kenwood radios, FLIR thermal.
  • Offender-monitoring devices (SCRAM and other ankle monitors, breath interlocks): these identify private people on probation, not police.
  • Fixed installations with nothing to detect on the move: Zetron and Frequentis dispatch consoles, Positron 911 systems, Rohde & Schwarz test gear, Verint and NICE recorders.
  • Look-alike names: Teltronics Inc. (telecom, not Teltronic TETRA), Axon Networks, WatchGuard Technologies, Codan Argus (invalid address block).

France: the national police and gendarmerie body cameras (2021 contract) are Motorola Solutions VB400s (WiFi, Bluetooth LE 4.2 for holster sensors and peer-assisted recording). They are covered only by the generic Motorola identifiers above, because no public source documents their Bluetooth name. The earlier Hikvision cameras aren't matched: Hikvision's 84 blocks are ordinary CCTV everywhere. The new Réseau Radio du Futur uses Samsung rugged phones, indistinguishable from consumer ones.

Same-name registrants that are not public-safety vendors are deliberately left out: Axon Networks (unrelated to Axon Enterprise), WatchGuard Technologies (firewalls), Coban Srl (not the US Coban), and general CCTV makers (Axis, Verkada). A unit test checks that every preset block belongs, per the IEEE table, to the company its label names. | 00:1F:92, 4C:CC:34, 00:18:85, 00:04:7D, 10:74:6F, B8:E2:8C, 9C:86:2B | Motorola Solutions | Public safety | 45 |

The Motorola entries are weak on purpose. In ACAB's field capture, all 27 of 27 hits on Motorola WiFi prefixes turned out not to be body cams.

SignalSweep compared (2026-10)

SignalSweep (GPL-3.0) is an ESP32 counter-surveillance scanner. Its signatures and field notes were compared with ours; what was new was re-implemented from the facts (prefixes, UUIDs, frame layouts and thresholds), no code was taken.

  • Flock cameras turned their management network off around December 2025. Since then the one thing they still send is a wildcard probe request from their radio module, sometimes with the Wi-Fi Alliance element 50:6F:9A:16 03 01 03. A USB WiFi adapter now flags it for the module blocks below, minus four that are common in ordinary devices (F8:A2:D6, A4:CF:12, 3C:71:BF, 82:6B:F2).
  • Three community-listed Flock module prefixes are doubtful: A4:CF:12 (generic Espressif), F8:A2:D6 (seen on a Sony media player) and 82:6B:F2 (a randomized-address prefix). They are now very weak (score 10): listed, but never an alert, sound, banner or radar blip. Any match at 10 or below works this way.
  • Eight newer Flock radio-module blocks (Liteon and Silicon Labs): 14:B5:CD, 04:0D:84, 1C:34:F1, 38:5B:44, 94:34:69, B4:E3:F9, F0:82:C0, E0:0A:F6.
  • Axon's pairing networks, the second Flock battery service, the battery serial, a SmartTag in setup (table above).
  • Hacking tools (detect/HackerWatch.kt, usb/KarmaWatch.kt):
    • Karma / PineAP: one transmitter answering under 4 or more network names within a minute (USB WiFi adapter). A real access point uses its own address for each network.
    • Fake-tracker flood: 6 or more Find My, Find Hub, SmartTag or Tile addresses in 5 minutes, each heard 3 times or fewer within 10 s at -80 dBm or stronger and then never again. Real tags keep their address. One alarm per 5 minutes; real trackers are still reported.
    • 80:E1:26 / 80:E1:27 (STM32WB chips, as in a Flipper Zero): a weak hint (30).
  • Deauth alarm: normal networks send bursts of 11 to 24 frames in 5 s (SignalSweep's field measurements). The alarm now needs 30 in 5 s (a frame to every device counts twice), or 25 in 30 s heard in at least three 5 s slices with 4 or more each. An access point restarting drops all its devices at once, then stops; an attack keeps going.
  • Apple activity: a device's detail screen shows what an iPhone, Mac or Watch is doing, from its Nearby Info status (idle, screen on, driving, on a call...).

Not taken: ringing a tracker (that sends), and the Remote ID OUI 90:3A:E6, which is Parrot's own block rather than an ASTM identifier.

Community lists compared (2026-10)

The prefix lists of five open projects were compared with ours, and every candidate's IEEE registrant was checked against the maker the project names.

Project What was added
Flock You (list by @NitekryDPaul, nite-oui-collection; 82:6B:F2 by DeflockJoplin) 31 radio-module prefixes seen on Flock cameras, as weak ALPR entries (score 35)
OUI-Spy 11 Ring (Amazon) blocks, as home cameras (off by default)
Wardrive Go Same Flock list; its traffic-camera and drone blocks were already here. Later (3.1.165): EMS gear, IP-camera setup networks, train WiFi and mesh radio nodes, above
Flock-You-Android Hikvision, Dahua, Axis, Vivotek, Amcrest, Reolink, Wyze, TVT, Reecam camera blocks; Sierra Wireless and Digi fleet gateways
FlipDeFlock Its probe-request "skeleton" hash (element ids and lengths, vendor OUI + type), ported so its published values match: 2 candidate Flock shapes as weak hits, 6 shapes it found on phones and ESP32 boards marked as common. Shown as "Probe shape" in device details
Fieldwatch BlueTOAD (Iteris) and BlipTrack roadside travel-time sensors; Flock-pole battery radios (weak); Hanwha, Uniview, Rhombus cameras; Sierra AirLink, Compex and Inseego (Novatel) vehicle radios

The Flock radio list is mostly Liteon, Silicon Labs, Espressif and USI module blocks that are also in many laptops, smart plugs and IoT devices, so those entries stay weak: they show up amber and only alert when the threshold is set to "every match". The Flock SSID, Flock's own block (B4:1E:52) and Raven UUIDs remain the strong signals.

Left out on purpose: 42 prefixes whose IEEE registrant doesn't match the claim - most of Flock-You-Android's DJI, Autel, Yuneec, Skydio, 3DR and extra Parrot blocks are registered to Texas Instruments, Intel, ASUS, Google, Espressif and others, and would flag ordinary phones and laptops as drones; several more aren't IEEE blocks at all. Generic chip makers listed as "body cam" or "spy camera" sources (Nordic, Texas Instruments, Raspberry Pi, Ralink, Apple) and DJI's Osmo / Ronin gimbal blocks were also left out.

Police-vehicle vendor sweep (2026-10)

Added after checking which in-car equipment makers named in public police procurement records were missing. All weak on their own (they mostly matter for patrol-vehicle grouping), and every block checked against the IEEE registry by tools/gen_assets.py.

Vendor Blocks Score Why weak
Zebra Technologies 17 MA-L 25 Store scanners, handhelds and label printers
Brother Industries 7 MA-L 20 Home and office printers (no patrol role from the registrant)
Peplink 4 MA-L 30 Also buses, boats, RVs
Inseego 4 more MA-L 30 Consumer MiFi hotspots
Panasonic Connect (Toughbook) 3 MA-L 30 Projectors and business gear; a laptop is usually a WiFi client (no patrol role)
Sierra Wireless AirLink 6 MA-L, now also in the Canada preset 40 Buses, utility trucks, kiosks

No IEEE block or Bluetooth ID exists for Getac (its blocks are shared with consumer laptops), Whelen, Feniex, SoundOff or Laser Technology, so they can only be matched by names captured in the field.

Sweden preset (assets/oui_presets/sweden.json), researched 2026-11

Vendor and public facts only: the Swedish Police Authority announced 1,000 Axon body cameras in 2019 after an 18-month field trial, and Rakel, the Swedish public-safety network, is a TETRA network. The Sepura and Airbus blocks are the TETRA makers' IEEE blocks and stay at candidate level, like in the global preset. Sensys Traffic is not repeated here: it stays in the global preset. Flock detection is off with this preset, as with the other European ones.

Canada preset (assets/oui_presets/canada.json), researched 2026-09

Built only from public records: police pilot reports, public procurement records, federal contract announcements and news coverage. Nothing was taken from memory. Every prefix was checked against the IEEE registry by tools/gen_assets.py.

Key Score Why
00:25:DF, D8:1F:65 75 Axon body cams and TASERs, the dominant vendor for Canadian police (including the RCMP's Axon Body 4 contract).
8C:1F:64:DF:0 (36-bit MA-S) 65 Cyberkar Systems inc., a Canadian police-vehicle computer / in-car systems integrator. A narrow police-vehicle registrant, so a better signal than a big vendor block. It must match all 36 bits, because the neighbouring blocks belong to unrelated companies.
name:BC-02, name:BC-03, name:HS-01 45 / 45 / 40 Getac cameras and holster sensor used in Canadian police body-cam pilots. Getac has no IEEE block of its own (its blocks are shared with laptops), so only names can match. These names are capture candidates per ACAB, so verify.
name:BC-04 40 Newer Getac model.
Motorola Solutions ×7 45 P25 radio networks. Weak: the same blocks are used by commercial radios.
Genetec 00:BF:15, 0C:BF:15, 00:50:C2:BE:7 40 Canadian plate-reader (AutoVu / Cloudrunner) vendor. Weak: registry-only, the cameras probably use cellular, and the blocks cover other Genetec products.
Cradlepoint 00:30:44, 00:E0:1C 35 Routers installed in police cars. Weak: common on buses and in stores.
i-PRO D4:2D:C5 50 Body cams / surveillance cameras, kept as a candidate.
F4:60:77 20 Texas Instruments chip block seen on Zebra ZQ-series printers. Highlight only: TI chips are everywhere.
name:RJ-4230B, name:RJ-4250WB, name:RJ-4040, name:PJ-763, name:PJ-883 40 / 40 / 35 / 35 / 35 Brother RuggedJet / PocketJet in-car e-citation and report printers. Name forms need a field capture to confirm.

Not added:

  • Sierra Wireless routers, for the reasons ACAB gives.
  • Getac/MiTAC blocks: shared with laptops.